A True and Better Alamo: The Battle For Wake Atoll

couple of thoughts

1. Civilians being enlisted for" the duration of the emergency" could have been a condtion of staying on the island. Probalby would not have helped them survive any better in the long run, but who knew how the Japanese were going to act.
2. As part of the prewar what if.-- The Marines send part of a squadron of SBDs with VMF 211 or the navy bases some PBYs there. They would have to be kept airborne or ready to launch when air raids came to have any chance of survival. This would give the garrison a means to strike back and PBYs could be used for harrassing the Japanese with night visits,
 
…Of the 17 uninjured contractors that chose to leave with the convoy, half would be dead before the end of the war, the remainder before 1950…

Why do the contractors who left Wake die?
 
Sir you have a great story in the making here and I just want to say Two Thumbs up! Five stars! Subscribed, Hell Ya! :cool::D:)

Thanks!

Killing those trained pilots will come back and hurt Japan in other campaigns later in this war. That was one of those bottlenecks Japan couldn't get over. So every pilot who dies at Wake will be one less pilot at Coral Sea or other battles yet to be written.

I wonder how this first crack at Wake will go. I wonder how those 5inch guns will do and how many ships they will sink this time around.

The losses are fairly minimal, but you're right. Increased losses at Wake will hurt the Japanese further on down the line. The 5-inch guns will show up prominently in the next update...

Cool chapter and you add a combination of lecture, book mode,and personal viewpoints. The finding of a near intact Zero will assist in the designing of the Hellcat as well as future models of the Wildcar. Might also keep tbe Zero myth from fully forming in the Allied minds.

Thanks again for an enjoyable story.

Thanks! Yeah, there won't be a Zero myth in TTL. That being said, the evolution of US tactics will force the Japanese to upgrade their A6M's sooner rather than later in TTL

I think you went from Part III to Part V there :p

D'oh! Fixed.

1. Civilians being enlisted for" the duration of the emergency" could have been a condtion of staying on the island. Probalby would not have helped them survive any better in the long run, but who knew how the Japanese were going to act.
2. As part of the prewar what if.-- The Marines send part of a squadron of SBDs with VMF 211 or the navy bases some PBYs there. They would have to be kept airborne or ready to launch when air raids came to have any chance of survival. This would give the garrison a means to strike back and PBYs could be used for harrassing the Japanese with night visits,

1. The civilians haven't enlisted, they've formed a militia for the defense of the island.
2. I toyed with that idea...but I feel like my TL's already on the verge of being a wank...

…Of the 17 uninjured contractors that chose to leave with the convoy, half would be dead before the end of the war, the remainder before 1950…

Why do the contractors who left Wake die?

Three reasons
1. Age: Most of those who left were older
2. Guilt: This will become apparent as the TL progresses
3. Unfortunate accidents
 
Well you are welcome and I understand about wanting to limit the wanking. I personally do not think you are doing so but others may feel differently.

Now just have the SSN Seawolf take out the Hiryu and Soryu.:D;)
 
Three reasons
1. Age: Most of those who left were older
2. Guilt: This will become apparent as the TL progresses
3. Unfortunate accidents

I can see survivor's guilt, where some of the men commit suicide, and others (the younger ones) volunteer for military service and commit suicide by enemy fire. I'm not sure I like the implications of 'unfortunate accidents', it sounds like people punishing 'those who fled'.
 
Great stuff...and the curse...

I can see a legend arising later on, of Wake's Curse-all who fled, died. And I suspect that they really were accidents. Depressed people pay less attention to things like trolley cars bearing down on them.

Keep it coming!
 
I can see a legend arising later on, of Wake's Curse-all who fled, died. And I suspect that they really were accidents. Depressed people pay less attention to things like trolley cars bearing down on them.

Keep it coming!

Oh, my... "All who were there, died". What if the Japanese execute all the surviving defenders? Have the only long term American survivors being the 'honorably wounded' who were evacuated?
 
I can see survivor's guilt, where some of the men commit suicide, and others (the younger ones) volunteer for military service and commit suicide by enemy fire. I'm not sure I like the implications of 'unfortunate accidents', it sounds like people punishing 'those who fled'.

I can see a legend arising later on, of Wake's Curse-all who fled, died. And I suspect that they really were accidents. Depressed people pay less attention to things like trolley cars bearing down on them.

Keep it coming!

Oh, my... "All who were there, died". What if the Japanese execute all the surviving defenders? Have the only long term American survivors being the 'honorably wounded' who were evacuated?

All of this will be dealt with in later updates. But my reasoning is far more along the lines of NHBL. Depressed people are less likely to pay attention to trolley cars etc. You're also dealing with a very small number (17) so a few "bad dice rolls" will affect overall survival rates substantially.
 
I can see survivor's guilt, where some of the men commit suicide, and others (the younger ones) volunteer for military service and commit suicide by enemy fire. I'm not sure I like the implications of 'unfortunate accidents', it sounds like people punishing 'those who fled'.

I can see a legend arising later on, of Wake's Curse-all who fled, died. And I suspect that they really were accidents. Depressed people pay less attention to things like trolley cars bearing down on them.

Keep it coming!

Oh, my... "All who were there, died". What if the Japanese execute all the surviving defenders? Have the only long term American survivors being the 'honorably wounded' who were evacuated?

All of this will be dealt with in later updates. But my reasoning is far more along the lines of NHBL. Depressed people are less likely to pay attention to trolley cars etc. You're also dealing with a very small number (17) so a few "bad dice rolls" will affect overall survival rates substantially.
 
Part V: A Rude Awakening…

“Sitting there, looking through the sights of that 5-inch gun, I remembered thinking ‘This is what those guys on Bunker Hill must’ve felt like…’ Devereux kept telling us to hold our fire, and we held it just fine. By the time the order did come through they were so damn close, I swear I could see the looks on their faces right before our rounds wiped them right off…”
-1st Lieutenant Clarence A. Barndinger commander of Battery A (5-inch)

(From “An Unexpected Obstacle: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Wake Island” By Bill Ray)

…Having annihilated VMF-211 and severely damaged the island’s AA capacity, the Japanese invasion fleet committed its largest error of the initial phase of the battle, namely refusing to adequately suppress the coastal artillery installations of the Americans. Admiral Kajioka had drawn the worst possible information from his bombardment on the 10th. Devereux’ decision not to return fire led Kajioka believing that the coastal defenses had been sacrificed in favor of aerial defenses and thus once those had been suppressed, the invasion could go ahead…

…A final naval bombardment run had been planned, but Kajioka decided that it was not necessary, instead ordering the landing of the infantry to take place beginning at dawn without any provision for immediate naval gunfire support. Devereux must have had trouble believing the initial reports as the Japanese transports sailed boldly into range and began the process of unloading troops. Devereux had anticipated an artillery duel with Japanese cruisers and had ordered his men once again to remain silent until he gave the order. By the time he realized that no cruisers were immediately inbound, the process of unloading troops had already begun, ironically working to his advantage as there was simply no way for the transports to retreat quickly and allow the fleet to move in to suppress the coastal batteries…

…The 1500 men of the Japanese Naval landing forces had been distributed between three transports. 600 had been packed onboard Patrol Craft 32 and Patrol Craft 33. While the remainder had been placed onboard the Kongo Maru and the Konryu Maru auxiliary cruisers converted to carry troops for the invasion. Supplies, support staff, and others were embarked on the Tenyo Maru. The initial plan had the two patrol craft offload their troops on Wake Island proper, while a force from the Kongo Maru took Wilkes Island, the remaining forces being held in reserve(1)…

…At 0535 December 22nd, all three batteries opened fire on the Japanese with devastating effect. Among those hardest hit were the elite naval landing forces upon both destroyers. These men included the crack special naval landing troops, the initial 450 men which had been expected to overrun a force of American marines nearly twice their number in the initial Japanese attack plan. Their transports, being converted Great War destroyers, were simply not built to withstand the punishment capable of being doled out by the 5 inch guns in the batteries. Within minutes the Americans had disabled Patrol Boat 33 and forced Patrol boat 32 to withdraw. Had the commander of Patrol Boat 32 not suffered some difficulties disembarking his men, it is likely that American coastal batteries could have destroyed both vessels easily…

…The scene would have been beautiful if not so deadly. With one destroyer burning in the dawn light, the other retreating behind a thick layer of smoke, Devereux ordered the coastal battery on Wilkes Island to shift their fire to the remaining transports before they could retreat out of range. Battery L on Peale had already opened fire on the Kongo Maru upon getting Devereux’ order to open fire. Wilkes promptly joined in and continued Battery L’s work even as the transports reversed course out of its range. Though she weathered the initial volleys quite well, as she proceeded out into deeper water, the Kongo Maru was hit several times below the waterline and found herself unable to retreat fully out of the range of the American guns…

…From the first volley, Kajioka had been ordering his forces into action. Yet poor planning prevented him from immediately deploying the heavier 8-inch guns of Cruiser Division 6. Possessed only of those guns of his destroyers and the light cruisers he’d originally been allocated, Kajioka was nonetheless forced into action to try and salvage his initial landing attempt. Yet before he could even effectively return fire, the Americans had effectively destroyed nearly half of his landing force (2)…

...As the naval battle was ongoing, the Japanese troops already disembarked were left with the unenviable decision of whether or not to retreat or press forward. Believing that the attack would continue regardless of the presence of American coastal artillery, the troops of the SNLF pressed the attack and continued on towards Wake. Though they were ignored by the larger 5-inch guns, they soon found themselves the object of the attentions of far more pernicious foes as the men manning the coastal machine guns and remaining anti-boat guns turned their attention to them…

…The result was a complete massacre, less than half of the Japanese troops disembarked on the 20th made it ashore. Those that did were quickly cut down by a hail of automatic weapons fire as the Marines and the members of the recently organized “Wake Island Civilian Defense Force” eagerly engaged the first Japanese soldiers they’d seen not encased in aluminum aircraft. Few surrendered, most preferring to die in suicidal charges that failed well short of the American positions. Within an hour the best chance for a quick Japanese victory at Wake perished with the men of the Maizuru Second Special Naval Landing Force…

…The chattering of small arms fire on the beaches was almost completely drowned out by the bigger artillery duel between Wake’s 5 inch guns and the weapons of the Japanese destroyers deployed to try and salvage the situation. Yet unpreparedness again proved to be the bane of the Japanese as a lucky strike on the Hayate resulted in her cargo of depth charges being detonated and the obliteration of the vessel. In a panic, Kajioka ordered the remaining destroyers to jettison the extra depth charges, embarked out of fear of another American submarine attack (3)…

...Only when the larger 6 inch guns of the Yubari and Tenryu came into play could they Japanese begin to salvage something of the situation. Yet persistent American fire proved to be simply too much. A second destroyer, the Yayoi was sunk by American coastal battery fire attempting to cover the recovery of the Kongo Maru. Eventually Kajioka was forced to accept the loss of that transport as well and pull his forces back beyond the range of Wake’s coastal batteries…

...In less than an hour, the Marine garrison of Wake had shown a glimpse of why the decision to allocate so many forces to the invasion of the island had been prudent. The loss of the Kongo Maru and Patrol Boat 33 along with most of the troops, supplies, and equipment onboard placed even more constraints on the Japanese invasion plans. In total, roughly half of the 1500 men now allocated to the invasion had been lost in that initial hours, along with precious base construction equipment, and landing craft. Furthermore, the Japanese had lost a pair of destroyers, one with all hands, to the unexpected coastal batteries of the island. Had the Kajioka opted for a dawn bombardment, perhaps utilizing the heavier 8-inch guns of Cruiser division 6, and ordered his destroyers to cover the invasion force immediately, the Japanese could have successfully dealt with the coastal batteries and established a firm foothold on the atoll. Yet Kajioka’s arrogance proved to be his undoing, causing the invasion fleet to suffer yet another delay…

…With his battered landing force beyond the range of American guns. Kajioka proceeded to bombard American positions from outside the range of the 5-inch batteries using the 6 inch guns of his cruisers. They were soon augmented by the 8-inch guns of Cruiser division 6, and at noon, by strikes from the Chitose air group and planes from the Soryu and Hiryu. Though American AA fire did succeed in downing several planes, they were unable to do anything about the naval shells which proceeded to wreak a terrible toll on the batteries…

…Meanwhile, the Japanese proceeded to reorganize their battered landing force as best they could. It was decided to press the attack for a second time at night in order to catch the Americans by surprise and avoid any further coastal gunfire. Those landing craft that remained were tasked with landing a smaller force on Wilkes Island, while the main force boarded the battered Patrol Boat 32 which was to be run aground on Wake proper. To flesh out their ranks, additional crewmembers from the ships of the 4th fleet were armed and placed onboard. Despite the makeshift nature of the second attack, Kajioka remained confident that they would be able to overrun the equally battered defenders of Wake Atoll (4)…

(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)

…The ferocious bombardment of Wake continued even after the sun set on December 20th. A concerted air and naval bombardment sought to annihilate the coastal batteries that the Japanese had all too foolishly ignored during the previous strikes. Yet sitting well out of range of Wake’s 5-inch guns, Devereux recognized that once the Japanese had pulled back, there was precious little he could do about it. He had known this would happen, hence the order for his men to hold their fire, yet Devereux would later remark that he still felt pain seeing the Japanese demolish the positions he and his men had spent so much time and effort on earlier in the year. Even the consolation of sinking 2 Japanese destroyers and 2 transports did not soften the blows struck by the Japanese bombs and shells…

…Perhaps more important was Devereux’ decision to pull the majority of his men back to their bunkers once the Japanese bombardment began. Though it left the Americans temporarily vulnerable to a simultaneous attack during the Japanese bombardment, it also prevented dozens if not hundreds of Marines and militia from dying needlessly at the sides of their now outranged 5 inch guns…

…Still, as the bombardment died down, the men of Wake were optimistic. Some doubted the Japanese would press the attack given their horrific losses earlier in the day. Some believed that they had weathered the best the Japanese could throw at them yet again. They even had managed to take some of the first Japanese prisoners of war. Their spirits were further buoyed by initial reports from scouts that some of the 5 inch guns remained operational, or at least, repairable after the Japanese bombardment. Though many worried about what the morning would bring, most surviving accounts of the night of December 20th reveal a cautiously optimistic mood among the defenders as evidenced in Devereux concluding assessment in his after action report “…situation stable. Request naval support.”…

…Among the items damaged or destroyed in the Japanese bombardment were the island’s searchlights. Thus the impeding Japanese attack was only detected when the Marines saw the incoming craft with their naked eyes at 0055 on December 21. This proved to be enough warning, as by this point, the Marines and the militia had taken to sleeping in their positions. Within thirty seconds of sounding the alarm, the men of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion and the Civilian Militia were ready to repulse the Japanese assault…

...Unlike the attack on the 20th, Kajioka had made sure to give his troops the best chances of getting ashore. He had chosen a route for Patrol Boat 32 that prevented either of the coastal batteries from bearing on it. Yet what he had not anticipated was the survival of a 3-inch anti-boat gun, emplaced with the intention of covering the batteries’ blind spot. Within seconds of being sighted, Patrol Boat 32 found itself under determined fire from the gun and its crew of Marines and Militia. Yet despite the Marines’ best efforts, their successive hits did little to slow or dissuade the Japanese landing force. Within minutes, the battered destroyer managed to crash ashore and begin disgorging men onto the beach…

…Kajioka had compared Wake to an egg, an entity with a tough shell but with nothing of substance beyond it. The shell was initially supposed to be the formidable anti-aircraft defenses and fighters, then the coastal batteries, however as the Japanese troops hit the ground early on on December 21st they found out that getting ashore was only the beginning of their worries. Devereux and his men had been planning for an amphibious assault for months (5). They had known from the beginning that this day would come and had built bunkers and fortifications to this end. Star shells fired by the island’s recently arrived mortar teams, lit up the night sky and shrouded the Japanese troops in a harsh artificial light that made the men sitting ducks for the American gunners. Pinned down by superior firepower, the Japanese quickly found out that getting ashore was only the beginning…

…The batteries of Wake scored yet another victory within a few minutes of the Japanese landing as fire from Lieutenant Hanna’s anti-boat gun continued to hit the now beached Patrol Boat 32, lighting it afire. The damage caused by the anti-boat gun coupled with determined small arms fire prevented the Japanese from making any initial headway and left the invasion force tasked with taking Wake Island pinned down and vulnerable. This only became worse as Devereux’ mobile reserve was gathered and committed to the battle (6)…

...Unlike Wake proper, Wilkes Island did not possess a well camouflaged anti-boat gun as there was no need to cover the gap between 5 inch batteries. Fortunately, the Japanese force tasked with taking the island was far smaller. Only a third of the revised landing force had been sent to the island, meaning that upon landing, they were outnumbered two to one by the American defenders. Though the Americans were unable to inflict damage on the landing craft, fierce small arms fire kept these invading forces pinned down as well. Within half an hour of landing the force at Wilkes had abandoned all efforts at taking the island and contented itself with lasting the night until further air and naval support could be made available in the morning…

…Like many defending forces, Devereux was able to take advantage of superior interior lines of communication. By 0200 he had decided that any further Japanese landings were unlikely and opted to deploy his mobile reserve. Knowing that overrunning the main Japanese force pinned down on Wake proper would be an expensive ordeal, Devereux instead opted to deploy the bulk of his reserve to Wilkes Island in hope of annihilating the smaller Japanese beachhead there...

…The reserve companies, consisting of the now grounded men of VMF-211, a company of newly arrived Marines, and the rest being civilian militia. Arrived on the island within half an hour. Utilizing these extra men Lieutenant Will Lewis was able to effectively encircle the Japanese men on Wilkes and separate them from the larger body. By launching a flank attack to the south of the Japanese position, Lewis brought the fighting on Wilkes to an effective conclusion within a few hours. As dawn began to break, the Marines and the civilians continued to press their attack led by the fearless actions of Henry Elrod and Frank Tharin…

…Their numbers having dwindled through the night, at 0415 in the predawn darkness a cry rose up that would later become synonymous with the Pacific War. BANZAI! It should be noted however, that though the Japanese charge led to the annihilation of the forces on Wilkes Island, the charge itself may not have been suicidal. As the bulk of the charge was directed southwards, one could argue that the Japanese commander was simply attempting to link up with the larger force on Wake proper…

…”As soon as I heard that charge and saw where they were going, I was deathly afraid that they were going to break. Sure VMF-211 were fine soldiers, but the rest of the forces on the beach were civilian militia. They’d been fine assistant gunnery crews, but I never really had that much confidence in them as infantry. Hell, some of them didn’t even have Springfields! That night in particular they were still using those old Krags someone had gotten shipped over here” First Lieutenant William A. Lewis…

…Small arms had always been in short supply on Wake Island. Right up until the final shipment of supplies onboard the Wright few non-Marines possessed their own weapons. The discovery of several dozen crates of surplus Krag rifles and ammunition had been sent to Wake as a provisional measure until more modern arms could be allocated. These rifles initially equipped the unarmed naval and army personnel on the island, only to be passed on to the civilians after more rifles arrived with the relief convoy. Though it should be noted that Springfields were the most common weapon used on Wake, the Krag did make a notable appearance on Wilkes Island resulting in the following verse being added to its lore…

"Damn, damn, damn the Japanese!
Hold out boys the fleet will come!
Underneath our starry flag,
We’ll civilize 'em with a Krag,
And then return to our own beloved homes."…

…That night, on Wilkes Island, the civilian militia would finally prove its worth as infantry. Faced with the unprecedented act of a Japanese infantry charge, the men of the civilian militia, anchored by VMF-211 held their ground and proceeded to pour fire into the Japanese before the distance closed and hand to hand fighting ensued. Though the militia probably could have held their ground on their own, Lewis’ decision to counter-charge the Japanese relieved them within minutes and effectively brought the fighting on Wilkes to a close before sunrise…

…The dawn of December 21st saw the Battle for Wake atoll enter into an entirely new phase. With the remainder of the initial landing force clinging to a tiny stretch of beach on the south shore of Wake proper. Kajioka was shocked to discover that not only had the Wilkes force been unable to capture the islet, it had also been completely destroyed. Furthermore it quickly became apparent that unless drastic action was taken, the main beachhead would be overwhelmed as well...

…Carrier and later land based air strikes once again ravaged the tiny island, as Kajioka moved heaven and earth to try and reinforce his sole beachhead on Wake proper. Once again, he ordered his cruisers to pour fire onto the Marine positions from outside the range of the Marine’s 5 inch guns. By utilizing his complete air and naval superiority, Kajioka was able to stave off the complete annihilation of his force while reinforcements were brought ashore…

…By 1400 hours on the 21st, Kajioka had finished landing the last of his troops on Wake. Now numbering just over a thousand men, they were ordered to press their attack against the Marine’s defensive positions. Though less than a third of these men were of the elite Special Naval Landing Force, the rest being sailors taken off the Kajioka’s ships, all of them were highly motivated and willing to sacrifice everything to eliminate the American position on the island…

…The Japanese attacks on the 22nd would reveal yet another critical flaw in the Japanese war machine, namely their lack of a dedicated naval gunfire support doctrine. Though Kajioka used his cruisers admirably to pin down the Marines and protect his landing craft which were ferrying troops in to the Japanese beachhead, he could not coordinate a sustained bombardment with their subsequent attack. Again Japanese doctrine did not call for excessive artillery support in the same way that later American doctrine would, instead they stressed the elan of the individual units and possibilities for infiltration…

…Unfortunately, in preparing the south shore of the island in particular for a Japanese attack, the Americans had removed a great deal of the scrub that would have given the Japanese an opportunity to infiltrate their positions and outflank them. What scrub remained worked solely to the advantage of the defenders in shielding them from Japanese attacks and bombardments. With no possibilities for infiltration, the Japanese commanders prepared for a frontal assault on the center of the American lines in the hope that they could break out from the beach and take the vaunted airfield only a few hundred meters away…

…For the second time on Wake the cry of “Banzai!’ echoed past the roaring surf as the Japanese force slammed into Marine defensive lines. Defensive fire was fierce and casualties were heavy, but to their credit, the Japanese forces were able to break through the American lines at points and make it to the airfield…

…However they arrived only to be met, not only by Devereux’ reserve force, but nearly the entire Wake Island civilian militia including no fewer than 5 improvised tanks. All of them had been well versed in the brutality of the Japanese troops and were determined to defend the airfield. Not only that, but they were determined to drive the Japanese back into the sea itself. With a roar the engines on the converted bulldozers started, causing the hastily built machines to lurch towards the Japanese machineguns blazing…

…Though the bulldozers were hardly impressive tanks, constructed out of scrap metal and surplus machine guns, they were almost invulnerable to Japanese small arms fire or anything short of a direct hit from a Japanese knee mortar. This coupled with the factor of surprise caused the Japanese advance to stall before the airfield and in the face of such staunch resistance retreat once again to their positions along the beach…

…Watching the island from the bridge of the Yubari, Kajioka had his worst fears realized when he watched his men come streaming back to their lightly held positions along the beach. Had he not reacted as quickly as he did it’s likely that the defenders of Wake would have succeeded in completely wiping out the Wake Island landing force as well. Instead he sprung into action and began to open fire in the hopes of saving at least some of his force. Though the 6-inch shells fell on both the Marines and the Japanese alike, they effectively stopped Devereux’ counter attack in its tracks and prevented them from completely overrunning the shallow Japanese positions. The bombardment continued sporadically until dusk…

…With the failure of the attacks on the 22nd, it was decided that the forces at hand were simply not strong enough to take Wake Island. Here again Kajioka was faced with a choice. Should he pull his men off the island, return to the Marshalls for reinforcements before making a second attempt? The problem with such a move lay in running the risk of allowing the Americans to reinforce the island yet again. Kajioka and Inoue were keenly aware that there was a strong possibility the Americans could arrive at any moment…

…Debate raged for the rest of December 22nd as to how to proceed. Final casualty estimates had roughly 60% of the initial Japanese force dead or captured on the first day of fighting alone. Offensive operations obviously couldn’t be sustained at such a rate. Yet withdrawal meant not only ceding victory to the Americans but allowing them the opportunity of repairing and reinforcing Wake. Left without a palatable option, the decision was made to adopt a siege mentality in regards to Wake. Naval forces currently in play would remain in and around the island. The beachhead would be supported by regular naval and air bombardment, reinforcements would be requested, and eventually the island would fall…

Footnotes

1) Very similar to OTL. Remember that Kajioka has almost completely discounted the American coastal batteries.

2) Like OTL Kajioka feared the arrival of the Americans and so initially employed the 4 heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 as a screening force for his invasion force.

3) Remember, prior to engaging the coastal batteries in TTL, the only naval casualty suffered by the Japanese was the damage done to the cruiser Tatsuta on December 10th. In TTL Kajioka is disproportionately concerned about submarines.

4) This echoes the plan in OTL as well as the Japanese force planned to draw upon sailors in the 4th fleet to supplement the lacking manpower of the invasion force if need be. Yet due to the heavy losses sustained during the dawn attack, Kajioka is forced to “scrape the bottom of the barrel”.

5) Keep in mind that the Marines in TTL have had MONTHS to plan for the defense of Wake, something that they allocated very little time do in OTL. They know that the south shore of the island is most likely to be the site of a landing and have prepared accordingly. They also have considerably more manpower and equipment to do so.
 
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VERY nice update and I get from various quotes at least some of the Wake defenders live long enough to record their points of views and observations.

Still very much a fan.:)
 
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