A series of assumptions: a Britwank on a budget?

[Bougnas]

I have checked Rob Griffin's book on Chieftain. The way he phrased it, the estimated weight of Chieftain when the reclined driver's seat, 120mm gun and V8 diesel were added to the requirements (105mm gun before that, and apparently a Meteor?!) was 47 long tons, with hopes to reduce it to 45. When the L60 was chosen, again according to his phrasing, weight increased by 1 ton to fit the engine and the tank was estimated at 50 tons (increases for other reasons I suppose). This was reduced again to 48 tons by changing the armour distribution and certain components.
All of the modifications carried out to improve gearbox reliability, improve cooling and reduce engine vibration then led to a prototype weight of 49.5 tons, which as we know eventually increased to 53.2 tons by the Mk 3 (how they keep adding so much weight without changing the armor, gun and size I don't know).

This means that if the phrasing is correct and ASSUMING that the cooling/vibration/gearbox (the last one is the most doubtful) modifications were avoidable with the V8, maximum expected weight reduction could be 2.5 tons, which is rather weird and impressive. Possibly less, possibly more if less reinforcements are needed to cope with the increased weight.

Second point: Vickers-Armstrong was only added to the project in August 1958 to work on the turret, to avoid any further delays (the 120mm Chieftain design having been submitted in June 1956).

Third point: All of the automotive-related shenanigans in prototyping:

Even if it had taken two years to see the RR V8 on prototypes as sometimes stated, that just brings testing pretty much at the same time as the first L60s, except that the engine would most likely have been operating much closer to its intended power and would likely not have experienced as many early troubles as the L60, on top of Rolls-Royce being in charge instead of...well Leyland. So instead of high power test engines being used well after November 1961 as it's said, we might see full testing in maybe early 1960. Uncovering all of the major automotive problems a year earlier therefore doesn't sound too unlikely.


Extra sidenote: the FV 4401 Prodigual one-man anti-tank vehicle project which preceded Chieftain had torsion bars. The plot thickens...

 

[Not James Stockdale]

The real purpose of the PAL was to keep General Power from launching a nuclear first strike all by himself, although SAC had figured out how to bypass most of the locks by October 1962. JFK was absolutely terrified of his generals, which is why he told LeMay and Power to f*** off with the space battleships and had NASA take the Army's Nazi rocket scientists and get to the Moon before the Air Force.

 

[Bougnas]

For information, the story of the 110mm gun:

In 1966 the British started development of a 110mm gun but since it wasn't any better than the 120mm L11 and no interest abroad was shown, it was decided to cut funding and end development. Until the British decided to cancel the sale of Chieftains to Israel in late 1969. Since no reparations were in order, Israel proposed to get the 110mm instead to at least improve their tanks. The British weren't willing to do this for some time but after refusing to sell Chieftains to Lybia (which had already paid), they came back to the Israelis and accepted to sell the gun if Israel funded the rest of the development and found other potential buyers.

Israel tried again in 1970 after the Tories took over but it wasn't until 1971 that the British accepted to show them the weapon. A new plan was set up: the British would fund development themselves, but Israel would still pay royalties for each gun sold under the licensing agreement and would develop a HEAT round like the 105mm M456, and buy 10 000 guns in 10 years.
In the end the British reneged again in May 1971, fearing this would worsen their relations with the Arab world.

Assuming that the Israeli HEAT shell could actually properly exploit standoff distance unlike the FRG 120mm round which actually had 480-550 in practice, the 110mm HEAT could have been significantly more powerful than 105.

The 110mm gun had the same overall dimensions as the L7 and shot an APDS shell that is between 105 and 120mm APDS in size and weight. Tripartite trials in January 1974 claimed a 1387 m/s muzzle velocity, but it seems that operating pressure was increased again in 1975 to a whopping 1578 m/s. It displayed the best accuracy of all guns tested but had poorer penetration than 105 and 120mm APFSDS.

The technology was applied to 120mm guns, the EXP 19 M7 for the Chieftain (slightly shorter and with less internal length and greater operating pressure and durability than L11), and the EXP 19 M13 that was designed to best fit in the M1 Abrams (which got the FRG 120mm gun in the end).

Seems to me that the constant back and forth in British Middle Eastern policy hurt its credibility and military export sales a lot. The Arab states turned to the Soviets for weaponry even after Israel was shafted.

 

[Have Blue-117]

Maybe in this scenario have the US adopt the EXP19 M13 instead of the L44 because of a preference for rifled tank guns, then the US and UK both use the rifled 120 with unitary ammo, adoption by the US could make British tanks more popular and they would get royalties from the US for production and sales of the gun. It was talked about previously in the thread but a v8 Chieftain that is more successful export wise among NATO nations could give the Brits the necessary funding and customer base to make the MBT 80 a reality, plus greasing some palms wouldn't hurt and they certainly weren't above doing that. Maybe involve involve some European customers of British tanks in it's development (Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland) so they stay consistent customers from Centurion to Chieftain to MBT 80.

 

[Riain]

Seems to me that the constant back and forth in British Middle Eastern policy hurt its credibility and military export sales a lot. The Arab states turned to the Soviets for weaponry even after Israel was shafted.

I tried to undo this to an extent but in truth apart from the Chieftain tank a lot of British stuff isn't suitable to widespread export, especially in competition with the great benefits the USA and USSR can throw into a deal. Vosper-Thorneycroft did pretty well on the world market with their family of Corvettes and Frigates, the Chieftain was sold to Oman, Jordan, Kuwait and in big numbers to Iran and the Lightning sold to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait but the likes of the Harrier, TSR2, Buccaneer and Type 82 DLG aren't really suitable for widespread export on the world market.

It was talked about previously in the thread but a v8 Chieftain that is more successful export wise among NATO nations could give the Brits the necessary funding and customer base to make the MBT 80 a reality, plus greasing some palms wouldn't hurt and they certainly weren't above doing that. Maybe involve involve some European customers of British tanks in it's development (Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland) so they stay consistent customers from Centurion to Chieftain to MBT 80.

ITTL only the Dutch buy the Chieftain in NATO, which is a nice sale. In my mind the since British ended up with the Challenger, which is a good enough tank in my mind, I thought it was best to arrive there without the fuss and effort of the intervening Anglo-German FMBT and UK only MBT-80 and go with Iran on the FV4030 series tanks.

 

[McPherson]

Which Harrier is this, that is not an export success?

 

[Bougnas]

Maybe in this scenario have the US adopt the EXP19 M13 instead of the L44 because of a preference for rifled tank guns, then the US and UK both use the rifled 120 with unitary ammo, adoption by the US could make British tanks more popular and they would get royalties from the US for production and sales of the gun. It was talked about previously in the thread but a v8 Chieftain that is more successful export wise among NATO nations could give the Brits the necessary funding and customer base to make the MBT 80 a reality, plus greasing some palms wouldn't hurt and they certainly weren't above doing that. Maybe involve involve some European customers of British tanks in it's development (Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland) so they stay consistent customers from Centurion to Chieftain to MBT 80.

I'm pretty sure the agreement regarding the German 120mm and therefore any ITTL British 120 didn't involve royalties being paid. With all that said there is some basis for the US accepting the British rifled gun because apparently the military brass was highly skeptical of the Rh 120, maybe with reason as it seems that the gun still experienced a few issues with the combustible cartridge, but also maybe for no reason because it would have been the first service smoothbore gun. It is claimed that the SecDef intervened to choose the German gun (in exchange of Germany buying the AWACS), although it is also possible that the Rh 120 prevailed in late testing.

The EXP-19 wouldn't have had the long term potential of the Rh 120 due to lower maximum operating pressure and the inherent extra cost and energy losses to friction of the rifling, but raw gun performance was probably not have that big of a factor in choosing a gun in the late 70s because ammunition performance itself was improving a lot in that period and because NATO didn't really expect the armor that they found on Soviet tanks, so just improving on the 105mm would have been enough. It is not certain that the EXP-19 would have matured and been integrated faster into the Abrams than the German 120mm even if the British designed the ergonomics of the gun for the American tank, but this could have been an advantage over OTL until 1986 when the German 120mm was deployed on the M1A1 OTL (although budget control by Congress played a part in the late integration). In the longer term this choice would have been less efficient than OTL but then again by this time replacement guns for the Abrams would absolutely have been an option (or Soviet tanks would no longer have been a serious issue).

Nobody would have been seriously interested in funding the MBT-80 as is because they were all rightly concerned with getting a tank in 1980, not 1989. The British shot themselves in the foot getting into the Anglo-German MBT program instead of starting their own brand new tank program for the late 70s/early 80s (or at least completing Chieftain Mk 5/2). The problem with the MBT-80 is that contrary to the Americans and Germans who were eager to get a tank in 1980 no matter what, the British overreacted to the reveal in 1976 or so that the Soviets posessed a 125mm gun. The Germans and Americans chose to put their tanks in service even if the armor MIGHT have been deficient against this gun and evaluate the threat later. The British decided to increase the MBT-80's armor requirements, bloating the weight and delaying the tank (on top of the change in FCS requirements later on).
As it turned out, the 125mm threat wasn't so severe because Soviet ammunition wasn't that good. The M1's and Leo 2's armor proved adequate after some upgrades.


@Riain The main problem is that the FV 4030 was grossly inadequate for British needs and it's dubious that Iran wanted a tank made to Western standards that would have been more complex and expensive. That's why they asked only for a Chieftain with a new engine and more armor in the first place.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

I'm pretty sure the agreement regarding the German 120mm and therefore any ITTL British 120 didn't involve royalties being paid. With all that said there is some basis for the US accepting the British rifled gun because apparently the military brass was highly skeptical of the Rh 120, maybe with reason as it seems that the gun still experienced a few issues with the combustible cartridge, but also maybe for no reason because it would have been the first service smoothbore gun. It is claimed that the SecDef intervened to choose the German gun (in exchange of Germany buying the AWACS), although it is also possible that the Rh 120 prevailed in late testing.

The EXP-19 wouldn't have had the long term potential of the Rh 120 due to lower maximum operating pressure and the inherent extra cost and energy losses to friction of the rifling, but raw gun performance was probably not have that big of a factor in choosing a gun in the late 70s because ammunition performance itself was improving a lot in that period and because NATO didn't really expect the armor that they found on Soviet tanks, so just improving on the 105mm would have been enough. It is not certain that the EXP-19 would have matured and been integrated faster into the Abrams than the German 120mm even if the British designed the ergonomics of the gun for the American tank, but this could have been an advantage over OTL until 1986 when the German 120mm was deployed on the M1A1 OTL (although budget control by Congress played a part in the late integration). In the longer term this choice would have been less efficient than OTL but then again by this time replacement guns for the Abrams would absolutely have been an option (or Soviet tanks would no longer have been a serious issue).

The US had smoothbore tank guns in development since the early 1950s, but they were dropped in favor of gun/missile launchers like on the M551, M60A2, and MBT-70 rather than any conventional tank gun. The M68 on the M60 was a stopgap solution as the largest possible gun within the 90mm M41/24-pdr envelope that tanks like the M48 and Centurion had been designed around. By the 1970s and 1980s, after the MBT-70 come-to-Jesus moment and the realization that the German KPz-70 and its 120 mm Delta gun were the future, I doubt there was any real chance that the US could adopt a new, rifled tank gun. By this point, all the ammunition they are using in the M68 is APDSFS and HEAT-FS, which have to use slip rings to cancel out the rifling, so the writing is basically already on the wall for rifled tank guns.

In a perfect world, a Patton/PIP Patton/FMS Centurion replacement deployed in the 1960s would have had a 120 mm smoothbore gun and composite armor.

 

[Riain]

@Riain The main problem is that the FV 4030 was grossly inadequate for British needs and it's dubious that Iran wanted a tank made to Western standards that would have been more complex and expensive. That's why they asked only for a Chieftain with a new engine and more armor in the first place.

The FV4030/3 became the Challenger, how is the Challenger grossly inadequate for British needs?

The 4030 programme was 3 phase:

1. IOTL an optioned up Chieftain Mk5 with a fully automatic TN12 and ITTL is the same but with the 850hp version of the RR V8.
2. IOTL the phase 1 with a new rear hull with a 1200hp CV12 and fully automatic TN37 transmission with super horstmann suspension.
3. IOTL the phase 2 rear hull and drive-train with an entirely new front hull and turret with Chobham Armour and hydrogas suspension.

ITTL Britain is happy to rebuild it's Chieftain fleet drive train to 4030/1 standards as Iran has paid for development and its a cheap mid-life upgrade, Britain has no interest in phase 2 but sees phase 3 as an easy way to get into the 3rd generation tank game early and cheap while still driving the development.

To me this is like the Polaris and Harrier, getting to the OTL result without the cost and hassle of the intervening steps.

 

[Bougnas]

The US had smoothbore tank guns in development since the early 1950s, but they were dropped in favor of gun/missile launchers like on the M551, M60A2, and MBT-70 rather than any conventional tank gun. The M68 on the M60 was a stopgap solution as the largest possible gun within the 90mm M41/24-pdr envelope that tanks like the M48 and Centurion had been designed around. By the 1970s and 1980s, after the MBT-70 come-to-Jesus moment and the realization that the German KPz-70 and its 120 mm Delta gun were the future, I doubt there was any real chance that the US could adopt a new, rifled tank gun. By this point, all the ammunition they are using in the M68 is APDSFS and HEAT-FS, which have to use slip rings to cancel out the rifling, so the writing is basically already on the wall for rifled tank guns.

In a perfect world, a Patton/PIP Patton/FMS Centurion replacement deployed in the 1960s would have had a 120 mm smoothbore gun and composite armor.

Yes, the early guns didn't pan out because the rod they used wasn't quite tough enough and more importantly the fins had a tendency to get easily damaged, which meant the rounds were not sufficiently accurate. The DELTA was supposed to fix that but the whole gun-launcher craze and Vietnam vampirization of budgets meant that this was dropped before it could mature, although the XM578 APFSDS program was started in 1966 just after.

I'm pretty sure that the Americans knew that smoothbores would be inherently superior once APFSDS ammo worked, it seems that they were worried about the German 120 solely because of the combustible ammo and because thanks to a relatively superior APFSDS design they weren't that far behind the German gun at first, although not with the 105mm and one could argue the German gun could take american ammo anyway (which is what happened with the M256 in the end). That's probably why they didn't care about the EXP-19 in the end.

The British dropped the ball on this one, they got the lead in APDS design after WW2 while the Americans had focused far more on early APFSDS testing and HEAT, but they got overconfident and dismissed APFSDS development until the 1974 trials against the German 120 and the M68 with then XM735 APFSDS. Naturally that meant that they only focused on rifled guns, first the 110mm gun that they originally didn't want but pursued because of Israeli interest until they pushed operating pressure up with the EXP-14, and then we got the 120mm experiments (+APFSDS) since the 110mm was not powerful enough, and the MBT-80 was supposed to use the EXP-28 with a new breech. In any case the British rifled guns, including the L30 were just warmed over guns with somewhat higher pressure and greater durability than the L11 but were otherwise rather outdated.

Interestingly enough, if the Americans had been more successful with early APFSDS (the Soviets did it as early as 1961 with the MT-12 towed gun for one), the Chieftain could very well have mounted the 90mm smoothbore gun since the Americans and British made sure many components were interchangeable between the Chieftain and T95. Unfortunately it would have been too late to exploit this to reduce the size and weight of the tank...

The FV4030/3 became the Challenger, how is the Challenger grossly inadequate for British needs?

The 4030 programme was 3 phase:

1. IOTL an optioned up Chieftain Mk5 with a fully automatic TN12 and ITTL is the same but with the 850hp version of the RR V8.
2. IOTL the phase 1 with a new rear hull with a 1200hp CV12 and fully automatic TN37 transmission with super horstmann suspension.
3. IOTL the phase 2 rear hull and drive-train with an entirely new front hull and turret with Chobham Armour and hydrogas suspension.

ITTL Britain is happy to rebuild it's Chieftain fleet drive train to 4030/1 standards as Iran has paid for development and its a cheap mid-life upgrade, Britain has no interest in phase 2 but sees phase 3 as an easy way to get into the 3rd generation tank game early and cheap while still driving the development.

To me this is like the Polaris and Harrier, getting to the OTL result without the cost and hassle of the intervening steps.

I mean that OTL the British only wanted the Challenger 1 because it was ready sooner and because they had to bail out ROFL but before the Iranian Revolution the British military procurement branch actually refused the Shir 2 because of insufficient protection. In fact they planned to redo the armor array later on but the government fucked up yet again so the Brits had to do with the Challenger 2, CHARM and CHIP to upgrade the Challenger 1. At least by the late 70s.

To be fair I'm just nitpicking here, fundamentally your proposal is to finish the FV 4211 Chieftain Mk 5/2 as originally planned but bring the Iranians in and introduce the 2nd and 3rd phase components either in the final product or as an upgrade, which I can get behind with. Just saying that could probably enter service in 1976 instead of 1983.

 

[Riain]

I mean that OTL the British only wanted the Challenger 1 because it was ready sooner and because they had to bail out ROFL but before the Iranian Revolution the British military procurement branch actually refused the Shir 2 because of insufficient protection. In fact they planned to redo the armor array later on but the government fucked up yet again so the Brits had to do with the Challenger 2, CHARM and CHIP to upgrade the Challenger 1. At least by the late 70s.

To be fair I'm just nitpicking here, fundamentally your proposal is to finish the FV 4211 Chieftain Mk 5/2 as originally planned but bring the Iranians in and introduce the 2nd and 3rd phase components either in the final product or as an upgrade, which I can get behind with. Just saying that could probably enter service in 1976 instead of 1983.

No worries, if the Challenger falls short on technical grounds but meets political imperatives then i'm happy with the result. In particular I'm more than happy that Britain got the Challenger 1 in 1983 rather than the A/G-FMBT or MBT-80 in 1989 when that tank would be strangled in the cradle by 'Options for Change' in 1990. To me it's like having the Lightning as the FGA/FR; not ideal compared to say the P1121 but the OTL alternative was the Hunter FGA9-FR10/P1154/Phantom/Jaguar debacle, so in comparison having 10 squadrons for FGA/FR Lightnings in service from 1961 makes for a better RAF.

 

[Bougnas]

No worries, if the Challenger falls short on technical grounds but meets political imperatives then i'm happy with the result. In particular I'm more than happy that Britain got the Challenger 1 in 1983 rather than the A/G-FMBT or MBT-80 in 1989 when that tank would be strangled in the cradle by 'Options for Change' in 1990. To me it's like having the Lightning as the FGA/FR; not ideal compared to say the P1121 but the OTL alternative was the Hunter FGA9-FR10/P1154/Phantom/Jaguar debacle, so in comparison having 10 squadrons for FGA/FR Lightnings in service from 1961 makes for a better RAF.

Exactly, unless they had managed to rush it in 1986 as they thought they could possibly do the MBT-80 would have gone the way of the Leclerc, huge cuts in the number ordered with the unit cost skyrocketing. And if we get "Challenger" even earlier than 83 it's even better because it gives the Brits time and money to focus on putting more modern components even if no brand new tank was developped later on. Challenger 1 Mk whatever with OTL MBT-80 FCS and optics components, a new gun, new transmission and possibly the uprated variant of the CV12 (or even better the transversely mounted variant just as the Americans were designing the transversely mounted version of the AGT-1500 for future Abrams upgrades) would have been viable.

TOGS and Hydrogas IMO show what could be done when the British stopped using the cheapest and worst components. CHIP+CHARM Challenger 1 itself would have been no slouch if it had entered service: L30 gun with L26A1 DU ammo, ICCS fire control, glacis armor increased from 275/300mm KE to 500mm KE to match the turret, TN 54 gearbox.

 

[Riain]

Exactly, unless they had managed to rush it in 1986 as they thought they could possibly do the MBT-80 would have gone the way of the Leclerc, huge cuts in the number ordered with the unit cost skyrocketing. And if we get "Challenger" even earlier than 83 it's even better because it gives the Brits time and money to focus on putting more modern components even if no brand new tank was developped later on. Challenger 1 Mk whatever with OTL MBT-80 FCS and optics components, a new gun, new transmission and possibly the uprated variant of the CV12 (or even better the transversely mounted variant just as the Americans were designing the transversely mounted version of the AGT-1500 for future Abrams upgrades) would have been viable.

TOGS and Hydrogas IMO show what could be done when the British stopped using the cheapest and worst components. CHIP+CHARM Challenger 1 itself would have been no slouch if it had entered service: L30 gun with L26A1 DU ammo, ICCS fire control, glacis armor increased from 275/300mm KE to 500mm KE to match the turret, TN 54 gearbox.

The problem with the MBT-80 isn't the MBT-80 but the Iranian revolution. No matter where the MBT-80 is in 1979 the ROF is going to be stuck with 125 partly built Shir 1 and production release order for 250 Shir 2 and the prospect of a massive crisis that will have to be dealt with. I imagine that the Shir1 will still get sold to Jordan, which is a big help but that does't solve the Shir2 problem and leaves a virtually fully developed Chobham Armour tank ready to go. I can't imagine a scenario where the British Government just leaves that on the table for the MBT-80, Ministers will not be swayed by technical details.

Speaking of technical details, I haven't gone into them for 2 interconnected reasons; I know more about planes than tanks and I'm wary of falling for Rule of Cool as a driver of decisions. However I did note that the L60 was 19 litres so the RR CV12 26 litres was a big jump in capacity, however the RR V8 was 24 litres so the CV12 will have to be a fair bit bigger than OTL 26 litres to justify it's development and a bigger engine will be capable of producing more reliable power than the OTL CV12. In addition without the constant need to upgrade the Chieftain's L60 and TN12 there would be more funds available for other goodies.

 

[Lascaris]

The problem with the MBT-80 isn't the MBT-80 but the Iranian revolution. No matter where the MBT-80 is in 1979 the ROF is going to be stuck with 125 partly built Shir 1 and production release order for 250 Shir 2 and the prospect of a massive crisis that will have to be dealt with. I imagine that the Shir1 will still get sold to Jordan, which is a big help but that does't solve the Shir2 problem and leaves a virtually fully developed Chobham Armour tank ready to go. I can't imagine a scenario where the British Government just leaves that on the table for the MBT-80, Ministers will not be swayed by technical details.

Actually the Greeks might, emphasis on might, have been interested, they were certainly discussing licence production of tanks with Vickers at the time, although details are unclear and the election of the socialists in late 1981 put a stop to that. But if the price is right no reason they wouldn't buy at least part of the Shir 2 (assuming Jordan picks up Shir 1) in place of the 106 Leopard 1 they actually ordered.

 

[Riain]

Actually the Greeks might, emphasis on might, have been interested, they were certainly discussing licence production of tanks with Vickers at the time, although details are unclear and the election of the socialists in late 1981 put a stop to that. But if the price is right no reason they wouldn't buy at least part of the Shir 2 (assuming Jordan picks up Shir 1) in place of the 106 Leopard 1 they actually ordered.

What's the time-frame because the ROF is in a lot of trouble in Feb 1979? Jordan got them out of the immediate hole in 4 months by taking the 125 Shir 1 and ordering another 149, this gave them breathing space for the British to decide to drop the MBT-80 in favour of the Shir2 in June 1980 and buy 243. ITTL this is a much easier transition because Britain planned to buy the FV4030/3 all along.

The window for Greece to get Iran's Shir2 instead of Britain is pretty small and not necessary to save the ROF, although if they want to buy British tanks that's awesome and they can jump in at any time.

 

[Bougnas]

It's interesting to compare the Chieftain to the tank closest to it in timeframe and concept: the Soviet Object 770

At 55 metric tonnes in 1960 (1 more than the Chieftain Mk 5), the thing carries a gigantic 130mm gun, with loading assisted by a cassette semi-automatic loader (powered rammer), has arguably even more armor, has a modern FCS consisting of an optical rangefinder and dual-axis stabilization, but most importantly remains nimble thanks to a 1000hp supercharged diesel engine.

Of course the Soviets sacrificed a bit of internal space (though ergonomics are actually pretty good), the suspension is hydropneumatic so maybe not quite mature by then, although it was probably not the super complex version that increases the gun's arc, which is smaller than on Chieftain and it only carries 26 big rounds...
But what strikes me is how the powerplant was adequately scaled for the mass of the tank.

One could argue that specifying only 700hp for a 45-long-ton tank was already questionnable at a time when the Franco-Germans desired over 20hp/t and the Americans wanted 750hp on a sub 40-tonne T95, but it what even more so when the Chieftain's weight bloated. It is also unfortunate that like the rest of NATO the British didn't design a form of loading assistance or even autoloader for the gun, especially when the Soviets had no issues with such systems by the mid 1950s.
It seems to me that the biggest problem of the Chieftain was actually the amount of ammo carried, it was 53 at first and then a whopping 64. Sure you can fit 2 HESH bagged charges in a single container, but it's worth noting that 120mm NATO tanks of the 80s only carried 40 rounds. The British didn't consider the amount of stored kills and this absurd amount of ammo probably explains why the tank got so large and heavy. 20 rounds with containers alone represent nearly a full tonne.

Not really blaming the British but it's interesting how much of an impact the requirements had on the characteristics of Chieftain. It's also probably unfair to ask the British to have the bestest tank ever, this was a country with a relatively outdated industry and work practice compared to the rest of the West or the USSR, grossly out of proportion commitments, ruined by a war it was never supposed to be so important in...

It would be fairer to blame the US for squandering its technological lead after 1945 by doing pretty much nothing until 1950 and not paving the way for the rest of NATO.

 

[AJE]

It is also unfortunate that like the rest of NATO the British didn't design a form of loading assistance or even autoloader for the gun, especially when the Soviets had no issues with such systems by the mid 1950s.

Yes, but according to CalBear those made Soviet tanks horribly inferior to NATO tanks:

Depends. Do you like your tank gunner and/or commander to have both arms? If so, then the Soviet designed autoloaders are a problem (the French and Japanese use a different system that doesn't have the same sort of potential to maim).

Auto loaders are also a problem in actual combat operation. The Soviet system always leave you with a live round inside the turret, which greatly reduces survivability in the case of a hit. Autoloaders are also 3-5 seconds slower than a human crewman in loading the next round. That can be the difference between getting in the killing shot and receiving the killing shot. The Soviet designs also only have three crew members, which makes life that much more difficult in the field (as an example, in a 4 man crew, the driver can get assistance from the loader doing work on the treads, and the work load when replenishing the ammunition store is reduced by 25% as are all the other mundane, but necessary tasks that have to be done).

As far as reactive armor... It is terrific against RPG or even most ATGM, but it is far less effective against kinetic penetrators (something that the Challenger and Abrams demonstrated numerous times against the Iraqis).

The guys with the T-90s are in a butt load of trouble.

Autoloaders are death on a stick, at least that is their record in combat. Soviet/Russian tanks ALWAYS have a %^#& LIVE ROUND sitting in the crew compartment just waiting to go off and turn the crew into meat paste. The Japanese and French systems seem to have eliminated this fairly charming aspect of the autoloader, but short of combat it is impossible to be sure that their system will work any better than a human loader, which, as has been pointed out provides an extra set of hands that can be VERY useful.

As far as the Soviet/Russian continued use of the autoloader being some sort of proof that they system is effective... The Soviets were forced to use an autoloader due to the size of their turrets, something that the Red Army believed gave them an advantage over the Western designs (since they also believed it was a good thing to hang a 55 gallon drum of fuel off the back of every tank that the crew was supposed to remember to jettison in the heat of battle, their perspective on advantages seems to be open to question). The history of Soviet/Russian autoloaders is also written in the blood of tank crewmen who have had arms, legs and other useful body parts wretched off or mangled by those much maligned systems.

Lastly, given the actual combat record of every Soviet tank from the T-55 forward against Western designs, something also known as The Parade of the Flaming Jack-in-the-Box, the consistency of Soviet tank design is hardly something to point to in any positive manner.

 

[Bougnas]

I thoroughly disagree.

-Arm-eating autoloader: Blatantly untrue and a myth. If you put your arm in front of the rammer when starting the loading sequence, it would be raised up and pushed out of the way by the cartridge stub ejector in the T-72, and by the entire tray in a T-64/T-80. It is as close to physically impossible as it can get. The worst thing that could happen is in a BMP-1 where the autoloader could pinch your clothes, but there is a warning for that and you would have to be monumentaly stupid or to actively try it to even take a risk in those vehicles. The Soviets took safety in military equipment just as seriously as anyone else. You are more likely to be hurt (in any tank btw) by putting your arm behind the breech and pulling the trigger.
No really eaten arms were recorded, while in western tanks there are multiple occasion of loader being hit by recoiling breech or commander being squashed against turret roof by the breech when riding with stabilizer. Who has the safer work practice here (trolling this time, that's true of all tanks)?

- Live round inside the turret: That's true of literally EVERY SINGLE gun in existence. There is zero difference between a manually loaded round, or autoloaded in a Soviet or Western tank. There will always be a time between when you start loading the gun and firing it when you will have a live round in the turret. The rest of the time the rounds are below the turret ring on Soviet and most manually loaded tanks. At this point I should bring up the AMX-30 and Pattons that always carry many live rounds in the bustle with zero protection beyond the turret armor and are WAY more dangerous in this regard.

- Difference in loading time: There are a number of factors in this. First, it doesn't even matter that an Abrams loader can maybe load in 4s in training while a T-72 will maybe take 7s, because finding a new target/reaiming, ranging and aiming will actually take more time than loading in both cases. Even on a T-54 or T-62 which should have the most problems loading quickly, actual aimed and sustained rate of fire has always been lower than loading rate. Said Abrams loader will also quickly tire at this rate while the autoloader won't. The loader will also load more slowly on the move as he is rocking around, the autoloader won't care. The T-72 is the worst case scenario because most other autoloaders get 10-15rpm, matching manual loading.

- The only thing I kinda agree with is that this is one less man for maintenance. With all that said when the East-Germans went from T-54 to T-72, they were never overwhelmed with work because the latter tank was so easier to maintain and so much more reliable. The French, Japanese, South Koreans had no problems transitioning to autoloaders. The Germans kept considering it as a Leopard 2 upgrade and for the Next Generation tank they wanted before the end of the Cold War. Even the US which are supposed to be the biggest opponents of autoloading wanted and tested them as early as the early 1950s (Rheem autoloaders), used it in the MBT-70 (with the German autoloader performing the best) and wanted it for future versions of the Abrams. Evidently none of these countries viewed the 3-man crew as a serious problem.

Why more Western countries didn't use autoloaders (or adopted them late) had more to do with the specific autoloaders they tested or the fate of specific tanks that had them than any inherent superiority of manual loading. The Rheem autoloaders tried to push ridiculous performance with some 23 rpm which was bound to make them unreliable because they work so fast, the MBT-70 was cancelled for many reasons that were unrelated to the autoloader itself, then the Abrams was developped as an extremely conservative design because Congress didn't want it to try new things yet to keep it very cheap (which is why the Abrams lacked many features that were perfectly viable even in the late 70s), the Leopard 2 also was developped without an autoloader because again the Germans wanted the thing now and didn't want to experiment with an autoloader yet. That's just because you don't need any development with a human loader.

- ERA and KE: Kontakt 5 begs to differ. Any heavy flyer plate ERA design works against kinetic ammo.

- external fuel tanks: They drop it BEFORE battle. It's not even that unsafe because it's super easy and quick to jettison it and diesel fuel doesn't burn that easily. It's literally not a problem for a drilled crew.

Not to be mean but I frankly hope that CalBear was trolling in these posts because the SOVIET TONK BAD myth really needs to die. I don't mean that they are better than Western tanks, just that we should take a serious look at their true merits and flaws. The autoloader isn't one of the latter.

 

[Rickshaw]

Soviet tanks as supertanks myth has to die as well. Soviet tanks were different, thats all, from Western Tanks. They were designed to defend the fUSSR that meant fighting (for them) on the open steppe, where a small Silhouette was important, so the tank was lower than Western tanks. They didn't need (in their opinion) a massive depression because the terrain was basically flat, where as in Western Europe a large depression allowed hull down positions to be adopted more easily. Their armour was less than Western tanks but they made up for that we reactive armour towards the end of the Cold War. That made their superb for use in that environment. When they were used outside of it, those advantages were seen as disadvantages.

Soviet armour was quite advanced for it's time. They were preparing to introduce ceramic armoured vehicles when the Soviet Union collapsed. When the British had a competition which resulted in the Challenger 2, the Russians offered a ceramic vehicle. Ceramics are significantly harder than steel. The Russian offer wasn't treated seriously by the British. They were the second nation to introduce explosive reactive armour (after Israel). They offered CIWS for tanks first. Their tanks were the first with autoloaders to enter service. They had many firsts. Didn't make their tanks supertanks but it made them more advanced in some areas than Western Armour. It was just a bit of a shame they offered "monkey models" to their third world customers, which is what a lot of the Western attitudes to Soviet Armour are based on.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

Soviet tanks as supertanks myth has to die as well. Soviet tanks were different, thats all, from Western Tanks. They were designed to defend the fUSSR that meant fighting (for them) on the open steppe, where a small Silhouette was important, so the tank was lower than Western tanks. They didn't need (in their opinion) a massive depression because the terrain was basically flat, where as in Western Europe a large depression allowed hull down positions to be adopted more easily. Their armour was less than Western tanks but they made up for that we reactive armour towards the end of the Cold War. That made their superb for use in that environment. When they were used outside of it, those advantages were seen as disadvantages.

While the tanks had these characteristics, they stemmed primarily from the Soviets' focus on offensive tactical doctrine with their armored forces. Smaller tanks are harder to hit while they are in the open. High gun depression is more useful for defending hill crests and they decided they wanted lower silhouettes instead. Armor was generally better than comparable Western tanks because of size, although they didn't have an answer for Western tank guns until the T-64 and T-72 introduced the composite armor in the 1970s.