A Re-evaluation of Operation Barbarossa: Logistics, logistics, logistics

[TheWWIIHistorian;)]

On February 18, 1943 Joseph Goebbels gave his Sportpalast speech to the world. It was speech declaring TOTAL WAR - SHORTEST WAR. Goebbels stated three times the following:

1. If the Wehrmacht was not in a position to counter the danger from the Eastern front, the German Reich would fall to Bolshevism and the rest of Europe shortly afterwards.
2. The Wehrmacht, the German people and the Axis Powers alone had the strength to save Europe from this threat.
3. Danger was at hand, and Germany had to act quickly and decisively

(Source: Above is a direct quote from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sportpalast_speech)

Ironic, by the end of the claimed Nazi mission all that was left of Europe were leveled cities, a starving population, and an uncountable figure of unidentified mass graves.

I use this speech as an intro to the discussion of Operation Barbarossa for dramatic effect.

Much of us have come to the conclusion that Operation Barbarossa was a strategic blunder. That in fact it was the single greatest mistake in the war. When entering the discussion as to why, the problem enlarges. Much of the issue has to do with how little information we, the general public, know about the so called "Eastern" Front of WWII. As the name already demonstrates, we in the Western world have an inherit bias of the Nazi-Soviet War. This was no ordinary front. This was a full multi continental war. The largest industrialized war that humanity has yet to see... The only wars that have come close to the figures of the Nazi-Soviet War include the Sino-Japanese War and yet-to-occur-possibility of a nuclear weapon fallout.

Matters get further complicated by the sheer amount of myth and untruths woven throughout our perception of the Nazi-Soviet War. There are too many to count but some of the major flawed analysis and/or assumptions about the Nazi-Soviet War include the following:
1. The Winter is what stopped the Wehrmacht
2. Hitler was a Madman whose strategic analysis was ludicrous
3. Hitler and Hitler alone was to blame for the disasters that fell upon the Wehrmacht
4. The Red Army had the numerical advantage
5. Taking Moscow = Ending the War
6. Invading the Balkans spoiled the Invasion's timeline

There is ongoing information that is painting a very different picture of the Nazi-Soviet War that counters some of these core beliefs many of us have about this war. Before proceeding I encourage those who want to understand to watch the following videos. Below there is about 10+ hours of content. These videos are a highly enriching and informative experience on the "Eastern" Front. Some of these videos directly address these misconceptions:
This is a video series by Military History Visualized (MHV)

Operation Barbarossa

Videos on Operation Barbarossa

www.youtube.com

This is a video series by TIK, MHV, Eastory (who creates brilliant animation timeline of the "Eastern" Front) as well as by U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, The Dole Institute of Politics, World War II History Round Table, which includes lectures by Military Historians Dr. Robert Citino, Dr. Geoffrey P. Megargee, and Dr. Jonathan House

Nazi-Soviet War ("Eastern" Front) Playlist

Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.

www.youtube.com

Once these videos are watched, onto the alternate history!

Logistics appear as a fundamental flaw to the Wehrmacht. Part of this flaws stems from an already flawed chain of command with conflicting prioritization between the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and Oberkommando des Heeres.

I really only have one simple aspect to discuss: What if the Wehrmacht actually cared about its logistics? The Wehrmacht lacked the amount of fuel let alone, trucks and trains to maintain their offensive in the East 1941. To make matters worse is that the Wehrmacht never fully fixed the problem throughout every year of the war in the East: Case Blue in 1942 was riddled with logistical problems! My 'what-if' scenario gravitates around the idea that the German High Command recognizes the importance of their logisitics during the 1940-1941 inter war period given how much they wanted a Bewegunskrieg.

I won't sit here and act like I know the answer. In fact, it is becoming apparently clear that no one in 2020, nearly 79 years after the event, knows the answer on the exact shortages of German logistics throughout Operation Barbarossa and the occupational battles to follow. Let's begin the discussion with this proposition: the Wehrmacht builds not only a Corps, but an entire Army of Engineerings dedicated to the sole purpose of rebuilding at the very least the railroad infrastructure to maintain momentum in Operation Barbarossa. How feasible was this given the destabilizing nature of the Third Reich economy in the interwar period is up to debate. This Army of Engineers and the project to follow may have been so costly it could have led to the cancellation of Operation Barbarossa all together.

Ultimately, this post if nothing more is to untangle the confusing misinformation about the Nazi-Soviet War and to encourage everyone to start digging into the details of German logistics: covering everything from quantities of lorries and trains; to the frequency of mishaps and breakdowns; to the daily amount of supplies sent to each army versus the amount of supplies each army demanded!

Start digging and researching folks! Maybe this will help frame the nature of this war in a clearer manner and provide deeper explanations for why this operation was so close yet so far.

Truly, how close was the Wehrmacht to victory in the East?



Define victory?

 

[Veiovis]

I disagree that the decision to attack the Soviets, in the particular situation of the Germans, was a mistake. The germans had no real way to force the Brits to peace, the Soviet Union was growing stronger very fast, and eventually Germany would have become the Soviets economic client. We forget how fantastical the german war aims actually were, blinded by their historical success, but germany always had to take the risky gamble to get to the Endsieg.

Now,I belive the germans could have won the war in the east-the "lol the nazis lost the war in december 1941,juni 1941,september 1939,1933,heck when the empire was founded" as a popular counter to wehraboos has gone to far.

I also believe they faced some pretty horrible odds to actually achieve that. They were also stuck with two poor choices:

1) The historical barbarossa, a massive one stage campaign,aiming to knock the Soviets out in one blow. Almost impossible to achieve...but arguably the only way to win,as any long war means german defeat.

2) A multi step plan over several years, advancing up to say Kiev, consolidating a long time, then cautiously advance further...This would solve many logistical issues, and seems very prudent...but it means a long war, which germany would loose.

So imho the Germans had to take the gamble of barbarossa, which at least offered a low chance of victory through a natural 20,over the certain defeat of conservative strategies. Thankfully, this last great strategic hail mary failed them.

 

[Garrison]

Matters get further complicated by the sheer amount of myth and untruths woven throughout our perception of the Nazi-Soviet War. There are too many to count but some of the major flawed analysis and/or assumptions about the Nazi-Soviet War include the following:
1. The Winter is what stopped the Wehrmacht
2. Hitler was a Madman whose strategic analysis was ludicrous
3. Hitler and Hitler alone was to blame for the disasters that fell upon the Wehrmacht
4. The Red Army had the numerical advantage
5. Taking Moscow = Ending the War
6. Invading the Balkans spoiled the Invasion's timeline

Thing is that I don't think you will find many people here who would argue for those assumptions, or indeed argue against the proposition that logistics were perhaps the major constraint on the planning and execution of Barbarossa.

 

[Rizkyss]

So the something i got from your post is that Nazi problem is time, as they try to eat soviet Union in one gulp. But they really have no choice, either they eat SU in one gulp or face defeated.

 

[Dorknought]

IIRC Halder's plan required the destruction of the entire Soviet Army (about 200 divisions) within the first 500km of the border. By early August the Germans had now identified over 360 Divisions and Halder realised the plan had failed.

 

[Changundramon]

Thing is that I don't think you will find many people here who would argue for those assumptions, or indeed argue against the proposition that logistics were perhaps the major constraint on the planning and execution of Barbarossa.

I do think points 1, 5 and 6 are at least somewhat true. 4 is a fact.

 

[Garrison]

I do think points 1, 5 and 6 are at least somewhat true. 4 is a fact.

I must have misread 4, because yes obviously 4 is correct.

1 and 6 though both fundamentally assume that timing was key whereas it was the logistics chain that was the issue. Even with better weather that chain had a physical limit in terms of distance, essentially a point at which the supply chain is consuming most of the supplies its moving just to stay in operation and can't deliver enough to the front. Basically after about 500km the supply chain reaches its limit regardless of weather so if the Red Army isn't destroyed before retreats behind the Dnieper the Germans have to halt regardless.

5 is dubious, its as likely if not more so to become the kind of exhausting street fighting slog that Stalingrad was, and potentially with the same outcome, or even a rerun of 1812.

IIRC Halder's plan required the destruction of the entire Soviet Army (about 200 divisions) within the first 500km of the border. By early August the Germans had now identified over 360 Divisions and Halder realised the plan had failed.

And that was still a low count. Even with their original optimistic count they were still largely counting on 'kicking in the door and having the whole rotten edifice collapse'. Now had their original estimate of numbers been true then sure maybe they could have won, but that would require massive changes to the history of the USSR.

So the something i got from your post is that Nazi problem is time, as they try to eat soviet Union in one gulp. But they really have no choice, either they eat SU in one gulp or face defeated.

Essentially yes, they had convinced themselves that 'blitzkrieg' was the strategy that could overcome the physical distances and numerical disadvantages Nazi Germany faced and that they could indeed shatter the USSR in one single blow. They needed to beat the USSR so they convinced themselves they could with superior tactics and the quality of their troops, not understanding, or perhaps not wanting to understand, that the same tactics that worked in France, with limited distances, an excellent road network, perfect summer weather and the ability to live off the land to some degree, were not going to work against an enemy who could trade space for time and where the logistics chain would rapidly hit a hard limit.

 

[TheWWIIHistorian;)]

Thing is that I don't think you will find many people here who would argue for those assumptions, or indeed argue against the proposition that logistics were perhaps the major constraint on the planning and execution of Barbarossa.

Glad to know that the community is climbing over this long held perception. What is concerning is how little we know on exactly how the Wehrmacht distributed its supplies to each of their divisions.

I do think points 1, 5 and 6 are at least somewhat true. 4 is a fact.

What is fact is that on June 22nd, 1941 the were more Axis troops along the border than Soviet troops. What is also fact is that the combined populations of Germany, Hungary, Finland, and Romania were equal in size to the population of the unoccupied sectors of the Soviet Union in 1942. The Red Army had a far larger Reserve than the Wehrmacht. That's true. However, that only aids the Red Army in the long run when it has the time to equip these reservists with the necessary equipment. Matters on supplies for the Red Army get further complicated when considering the crippled state of Soviet industry after its evacuation to Siberia. The ability of the Soviet industry to recover at all is an undervalued feat in WWII and may have been the main reason for why the Allies defeated Nazi Germany.

Edit: that is like not the ONLY reason why the Allies won; there could be dozens. In the context of the Nazi-Soviet War, we also need to consider STAVKA's ability to outwit the German High Command on the strategic scale starting with Operanus Uranus and climaxing with Operation Bagration if we want to get a clearer sense of the Ostheer's downfall.

In general however, the Wehrmacht had the numerical advantage in most battles from 1941-1942 at the operational level if not at the strategic one. This is further reinforced by their usage of Schwerpunkt to concentrate their forces at operational breakthrough points.

The Soviet numerical advantage began materializing at the operational scale in mid to late 1943 when the Ostheer began transferring more divisions to Italy and France; this occured well after the Wehrmacht had lost the large scale strategic initiative in the East. I find it fascinating that in the early battles when the Wehrmacht had all the cards, they still couldn't defeat the Soviet Armies as swiftly as they did against the French Armies back in 1940. Was it the Soviet's fear of the consequences of surrender or the stubbornness to continue fighting, who knows? There seems to be a rabbit hole of ideas that put into question the operational effective of the Ostheer against the Red Army and the effectiveness of Bewegunskrieg as a whole for that matter. The results are reflected by the material loss of the Ostheer in Operation Barbarossa and the highly chaotic nature of Case Blue before the Don river crossings. That is for a whole other conversation though. If only we can get more info & data on the day-to-day, week-to-week German logistics (ie spare parts, fuel, ammunition) to frame the combat side of events in a better context. They go hand in hand.

Perhaps, the German economy bit more than it could chew in 1941 when it diverted massive amounts of resources towards other wartime ambitions such as the large-scale Uboat and Bismark-class battleship production programs. Simultaneously, perhaps the German Army over depended on its operational effectiveness without considering the costs of equipment, manpower, and fuel that would follow.

I like how Garrison sums it up nicely:

And that was still a low count. Even with their original optimistic count they were still largely counting on 'kicking in the door and having the whole rotten edifice collapse'. Now had their original estimate of numbers been true then sure maybe they could have won, but that would require massive changes to the history of the USSR.

Had German intelligence been correct, Operation Barbarossa as a one-strike-knock-out blow would had been the only operation needed to defeat the USSR. German intelligence is whole other topic that needs more clarity as well. The simple reality was that the Soviet Union was superb at controlling information within its borders. There was much mystery about the Soviet Union before the war as much as there was during and after the war.

Here is an intriguing video on that major intelligence blunder:

 

[King Augeas]

Yeah, Tooze argues convincingly that a rapid victory in a Barbarossa 1941 was Germany's best hope for victory in the world war.

 

[BlackDragon98]

There were other problems as well. Logistics were notoriously bad but these issues made me question the intelligence of the OKW and the entire Wehrmacht and Waffen SS.

1. German Panzers sucked statistically compared to the KV tanks and T-34s. This continued until the 7.5cm KwK 40 and 5cm KwK 39 were introduced along with heavier armor in late 1941-early 1942. However, the shitty 270 hp (300 hp is a lie) Maybach engines remained the same, making them slower.

2. German AT guns in Barbarossa sucked ass. Mostly 3.7cm Pak 36s with some 5cm Pak 38s. Unless you had tungsten rounds for the 5cm, an encounter with KV tanks and T-34s means you're toast. And tungsten rounds were rare. Only a combo of bad Soviet tactics and strategy, limited numbers, and the Luftwaffe prevented catastrophe. 7.5cm Pak 40s only came in mid 1942.

3. Burning villages. I just don't understand why German troops burned villages as they marched thru the USSR. Killing and looting is pretty obviously part of GP Ost and whole subhuman thing, but why burn down the village when you can use it as billets or shelter or something. I found it even harder to understand why German troops did that after the first snow. Burn the villages and you freeze in the cold or keep them standing and shelter in there. But they still burned them down. A bunch of dummkopfs.

4. Not going for OP Eisenhammer when they were literally in front of Moscow in 1941. Even if they don't take the city, taking out the turbines would still do a number.

 

[Darknick]

The vastness of Russia cannot be understated. Germany had to crush the Red Army before they could utilize their space and retreat. And the Germans almost did, a big problem, not just logistically, but fundamentally. They simply did not have the ability to move as fast as their victory needed.

The germans were only, not sure about the exact percentage, but somewhere around 80% still horseback. That is a lot of resources eating away at their already thin logistics. There was an old timeline where before the war(1937) they began using smaller coal fired trucks that allowed the Germans the mechanization of their logistic force.

 

[Quintuplicate]

If the Germans had treated the Soviets like the Soviets later treated the Eastern Europeans, they would have won. Of course that's not possible because they were Nazis.

 

[Post]

The germans were only, not sure about the exact percentage, but somewhere around 80% still horseback.

Most of the infantry just walked all the way to Stalingrad. If they were lucky they got to walk the way back.

 

[NoMommsen]

I'm always somewhat ... intrigued as how carbon-burning-based nd half 20thcentury based 'logistcal' thinking is around here ☺.
Ig it doesn't burns fuel it's not 'logistical' ... right ? 😁

...
The germans were only, not sure about the exact percentage, but somewhere around 80% still horseback. That is a lot of resources eating away at their already thin logistics. There was an old timeline where before the war(1937) they began using smaller coal fired trucks that allowed the Germans the mechanization of their logistic force.

And with that (first highlightened) they bet on :

• the most easily by every local means of even the remotest farmers hut maintaned,
• not too trained personnel requiring
• an almost ubiquitous available not much if any refination needing even if for longer times only on low quality available fuel utilizing
• very low maintained streets, roads ... paths ... even no paths at all needing (if not too much overgrown)
• all over europe in quantities available

transportation system.

Given the to be expexted condition in overly rural to 'pastoral' Russia where ther isn't every 100 miles or so a Gas Station available ... IMHO not the worst choice.

Your other objection (second highlightened) I somewhat fail to follow.
Grass and other plants (horses not necessarily require high-end grain(s) to be fed, they can run for a considerable time on rather 'low quality' stuff from the wayside) seems to me somewhat less 'resource costly' than getting, refineing, moving some fossile carbohydrates.
And for maintenance ... you will find almost everywhere wood and a smithy to fix something broken.

 

[Captain Homicide]

Not going for OP Eisenhammer when they were literally in front of Moscow in 1941. Even if they don't take the city, taking out the turbines would still do a number.

Eisenhammer was created in 1943.

 

[ric350]

One big difference was the Nazis weren’t making a ideological war against communism, it was a racial war against Slavs. Talk about an incentive to stiffen resistance. If the Nazis had treated the French during that invasion, the way they treated the East, I doubt the French would have considered surrender either.

ric350

 

[Garrison]

I'm always somewhat ... intrigued as how carbon-burning-based nd half 20thcentury based 'logistcal' thinking is around here ☺.
Ig it doesn't burns fuel it's not 'logistical' ... right ? 😁
And with that (first highlightened) they bet on :

• the most easily by every local means of even the remotest farmers hut maintaned,
• not too trained personnel requiring
• an almost ubiquitous available not much if any refination needing even if for longer times only on low quality available fuel utilizing
• very low maintained streets, roads ... paths ... even no paths at all needing (if not too much overgrown)
• all over europe in quantities available

transportation system.

Given the to be expexted condition in overly rural to 'pastoral' Russia where ther isn't every 100 miles or so a Gas Station available ... IMHO not the worst choice.

Except it wasn't a choice, it was a result of Germany's inability to fully mechanize its armed forces. A horse drawn supply system place a limit on how fast supplies could move. Also the notion that horses are easy and cheap to maintain and could live off of whatever was available is also misleading. Read a lot of books on WWI and several go into the complexities of maintaining horses for their logistics system. They are temperamental beasts and can't simply be left to their own devices at the end of the day, in fact compared to a truck they are incredibly high maintenance and a lot less robust. Truck blows a tire, fit a new tire. Horse breaks a leg, you need a new horse. Truck runs out of petrol, it can wait a few days, horse runs out of fodder, then in a few days its either not fit to work or its dead. Truck gets hit by a few splinters of shrapnel or a couple of bullets, decent chance its still running, horse takes the same damage, yeah you need a new horse. A truck freezes up in the cold, you heat it up, horse freezes and the only reason to heat it up is to serve it for dinner because the supply line has broken down.

Bear in mind that the British army between the wars was hardly awash with money and they still chose to mechanize everything, because it actually made their transport system cheaper, simpler and more robust.

 

[thaddeus]

And with that (first highlightened) they bet on :

• the most easily by every local means of even the remotest farmers hut maintaned,
• not too trained personnel requiring
• an almost ubiquitous available not much if any refination needing even if for longer times only on low quality available fuel utilizing
• very low maintained streets, roads ... paths ... even no paths at all needing (if not too much overgrown)
• all over europe in quantities available

transportation system.

Except it wasn't a choice, it was a result of Germany's inability to fully mechanize its armed forces. A horse drawn supply system place a limit on how fast supplies could move. Also the notion that horses are easy and cheap to maintain and could live off of whatever was available is also misleading.

my view somewhat in the middle, horses (and trains and motorcycles) were a great expedient, a logical choice for Germany, but then it was not reexamined when they decided to depart European railway system?

maybe they could have considered a crash program for more motorcycles, adding captured French aircraft engines to gliders, or ... consider NOT departing from their ad-hoc transportation system? (which means not much further than Belorussia?)

 

[BlackDragon98]

Eisenhammer was created in 1943.

Doesn't matter if the idea was created in 1943, just think of the idea earlier.
I mean the idea to cripple the turbine stations in Moscow.
In 1941 they were doing air raids on Moscow.
Specifically targeting the turbines wouldn't be hard.
Leningrad is under siege so no repair center is available.
Once the power goes down, Soviet won't be able to crank out anything heavy.

 

[Julian]

The problems with the German economy in 1941 (Declining labor efficiency and thus reduced production) were largely unavoidable. Up until then German armaments growth had largely been concentrated in defense enterprises in central Germany producing munitions (Shells, small arms ammo, etc.), which they knew how to do very efficiently, and a few experienced enterprises producing planes, tanks, etc. The demands of the war economy, particularly for more complex machinery like planes and tanks, meant that Germany had to start subcontracting a wide variety of new, previously civilian, producers even if they didn't focus on naval production. In the long run this increased productivity (The "armaments miracle"), but in the short term the process of capital deepening and bringing in new, inexperienced producers actually lowered productivity.

So the best long-term choice had short-term tradeoffs in 1941. In that context waiting until 1942 to attack the USSR was probably the better bet.