Chapter XXXIX: The Wolf and the Eagle (Part I: The Samnite Wars)
Timeline of the Italian Wars
Restoration of the Roman Republic (87 BCE)
Anti-Dictatorial Laws in Rome (87-82 BCE)
Trial of Decimus Marinius (81 BCE)
Samnite Wars (81-72 BCE)
Fourth Samnite War (81-79 BCE)
Revolt of Lower Samnium (79-76 BCE)
Second Battle of the Latins (77 BCE)
Fifth Samnite War (76-70 BCE)
Dissolution of the Samnite Kingdom (72 BCE)
Treaty of Aesernia (70 BCE)
Samnite Revolt/Sixth Samnite War (69 BCE)
The Campanian Wars (71-65 BCE)
First Campanian War (71-70 BCE)
Second Campanian War (68-66 BCE)
Third Campanian War (66-65 BCE)
The Cimbric Wars (66-40 BCE)
First Cimbric War (66-62 BCE)
The Treaty of Caere (62 BCE)
Second Cimbric War (58-52 BCE)
Third Cimbric War (48-45 BCE)
Fourth Cimbric War (45-42 BCE)
The Second Republic would see one of the fastest ascents in Roman history. With few major leagues to counter them and a much more divided Italy, there was a lot more room for an ambitious, increasingly rich state to thrive and prosper. Following the defeat of the Roman-Samnite army in 104 BCE, the Romans had enjoyed something of a status quo with the Germanic peoples to the North. The Germans enjoyed accessing Southern Italian trade and the Romans took advantage of both Germanic mercenaries and a general protection and peace from the North in return for a certain amount of tribute. Trade flowed relatively freely and Rome took careful advantage of German soldiers to win wars. This was especially prominent under the dictators of course, many of whom used both Germanic and Samnite soldiers to maintain their control over Rome.
However, even the Republic, acting as it did as a successor to the pre-174 BCE Republic, took advantage of these mercenaries in order to wage its wars in the decades after 87 BCE. The Germans were adept in cavalry and their access to both the metal and horses of the Mediterranean basin gave the Cimbri and Teutones access to an increasingly formidable armed cavalry force and, over the course of the 1st Century BCE, adopted a somewhat more organised infantry force from the Southern city-states with an accompanying social change. If the Roman dictators had attempted to introduce a more feudalised bureaucracy, the Germanic kings of the 1st Century BCE attempted to introduce a more bureaucratised feudal system. In imitation or adaptation, of Mediterranean practices, the Cimbri and Teutones became significantly more urbanised over the period, settling in cities such as Pisae. Around the 60s especially, the Cimbri introduced a series of changes in their social organisation that sought to formalise and legalise the obligations of the nobility towards the king.
While the system of noble obligation towards the king and vice versa (the so-called
comitatus system) remained, it became increasingly common for nobles to raise to maintain more organised levied infantry. It was not a system unlike the traditional
polis of the Mediterranean world but with a Germanic twist. Now, rather than warriors being tied to lords, they became more tied to the land and to a community and state. This solidified the strength of local lords and required much more obligation from the king. In turn, this could lead either to local
poleis independent of a central authority or to something approaching a mixed monarchical-oligarchical system where the nobles held more power than they had previously but still acknowledged the authority of the king. Cavalry worked in a similar way to previously, however, with local horse owners pledging allegiance to individual lords who could, in turn, bring those resources to support the king in return for the king fulfilling their own obligations.It was this that Rome could exploit. Landed Germanic cavalrymen became famed in Italy and the Romans made extensive use of Germanic cavalry both in the Italian Wars as a whole and even in the Cimbric Wars where the Romans were able to make use of ambitious chieftains willing to fight against their own king.
The first major conflict of the Republican Era was not the Cimbri, however, but the Samnites. True, over the course of the 80s, the Republic had sought to consolidate its hold on Latium and had fought minor conflicts to that end. But large-scale warfare was generally avoided while the Republic sought to consolidate itself in Rome. Germanic protection and their treaty with the Pontii generally kept potential rivals at bay during this period, allowing the Romans to turn inwards and deal with their own issues. The death of Gaius Pontius in 82 BCE, however, changed that. His son, the young Marcus Pontius, was far from secure on his throne and the Republic, now turning outwards once more, saw in the young Pontius an opportunity for Rome. See, the Republic had taken the view that the dictatorial government was illegitimate and that anything they had done while in power was illegitimate and should be swept away. This, however, included the terms signed by the Didii that recognised Samnite colonisation and integration of Latium as 'Lower Samnium'. The desire for the Republic to avoid a devastating war with a still strong Samnite kingdom while they were still recovering from the dictatorial period kept any issues being raised but with the death of Gaius I Pontius, the Republic considered their terms of the treaty with the Samnites upheld.
Upon the accession of Marcus Pontius, the young king's first job was to send envoys to the Senate offering a renewal of the treaty and terms of friendship as had existed between his father and Brutus. The Senate responded that it was willing to accept on the condition that the treaty of 109 BCE was reversed by the Samnites and any Samnite colonists withdrawn from Latium with a new border drawn between Rome and Samnium. Of course, Pontius was not about to just give up such a sizeable portion of Latium (Samnite influence had grown since the days of Gaius and Lucius Didius). There was obviously much more to it than this. It had been 27 years since the treaty had first been signed and many who lived in 'Lower Samnium' had lived there for a large portion of that time, especially in the areas closest to Samnium itself. What the Romans were asking for was an expulsion of Samnite people from the land they considered theirs in favour of a subsequent Latin colonisation.
Pontius refused the demand outright, agreeing only to a potential realignment of the border between Lower Samnium and Rome, something that was an unacceptable step-down for the Republic. The Senate, in turn, responded that there could not be friendship and, indeed, peace with kingdoms that occupied Roman land, in effect declaring that Lower Samnium was still Latium and was still Roman land that was being occupied by a foreign power. If Pontius were willing to withdraw and accede to Roman demands then, yes, there could be friendship and peace between Rome and the Samnite kingdom, if not then the Romans would do what they could to preserve the rights of Roman farmers. This was tantamount to an ultimatum. Pontius would withdraw from Lower Samnium or else he would have to fight for it. Not willing to accede to a demand that would not only cost him Lower Samnium but probably the support of his people and, in turn, his kingdom, Pontius left Rome and began to raise his armies for war.
The Samnite Wars (81-72 BCE)
If Pontius had hoped that fighting the Romans would preserve either Lower Samnium or his kingdom, he was sadly mistaken. In 81 BCE, the Roman army entered Lower Samnium and began demanding the expulsion of Samnite settlers. Entire villages were rounded up and forcibly migrated towards the Apennines to make way for Roman farmers who would surely follow. With violence characteristic of forced migrations, the Roman army brutalised and often massacred thousands in their quest to expel the Samnite populace from what they considered Latium. Those who did leave promptly turned to their main ally, the King of Samnium, begging him to come to their aid and protect their homes from Roman soldiers.
That is what Pontius did, marching with an army of 28,000 men into Lower Samnium to meet the Roman army, sending ultimatums demanding their withdrawal from Samnite land as well as for them to turn over specific individuals accused of particular crimes against Samnite people. The Senate, not strictly at war yet, sent back that they were simply defending their own territory and that they would defend themselves if Pontius attacked. Until about mid-81 BCE, this diplomatic dance continued as Pontius sought to block the Roman army, peacefully as possible, from expelling more Samnite farmers from the region and the Romans continued on their mission. Finally, in May 81 BCE, the Roman Senate formally declared war. In truth, the actual inciting incident was a series of skirmishes between Roman and Samnite soldiers that the Senate claimed were instances of Samnite aggression against Roman soldiers, providing an ideal justification to finally break the political stalemate brought on by Pontius' refusal to actually attack.
The Fourth Samnite War (continuing on from the three Samnite Wars that the old Republic had waged) consisted of mostly only two battles: Tibur (81 BCE) and Praenesto (79 BCE). With the truce broken, the Romans marched against Pontius' army, camped at Tibur and set up across the river from him. The Samnites, commanded by Marcus Pontius, had around 28,000 soldiers, possibly boosted by volunteers from amongst the displaced farmers as somewhat organised levy troops. The Romans, commanded by the consul Gaius Cornelius Scipio (of the same
gens and
family as the Scipii from the Second Latin War) had about 25,000 soldiers- a mixed force of primarily Romans with a few Latin allies and some 600 German cavalrymen. Hoping to win the glory of a quick victory, Scipio made the first move, crossing the River Tiber with his infantry and attacking the Samnite army. After a day of brutal infantry fighting, the Samnites had held firm and the bridgehead remained in Pontius' hands. One Greek source claims that this stalemate continued for another three days although most historians believe that the stalemate cannot have continued for more than a day beyond this given the timeline of Scipio's return to Rome. Whatever the case, Scipio eventually had a contingent of Germanic cavalry cross the river elsewhere and ride through the night to eventually flank the Samnite position during the next day's battle, allowing the Romans to break through and finally overrun the Samnite positions.
Scipio returned to Rome in glory, celebrating his victory over the Samnites as the first Roman victory of the new Republic and donating a statue of Jupiter with the spoils from the battle. However, his victory would not prove enough to win the war; two years later Pontius was back at the head of another Samnite army. This time, the battle was a lot closer between the two and Pontius initially had the upper hand, beating back the Roman wings at Praenesto and forcing the Romans to retreat after the first day of battle. The next day, the Romans formed up a second time for battle and this time, though difficult, were able to take the upper hand. Pontius was killed in the fighting and his successor, the young and untested Gaius II Pontius (only 14 at the time) was quick to sign an agreement for the safety of what remained of the Samnite army. Under this agreement, the Samnites ceded Lower Samnium and agreed to accept any Samnites who were removed from the land.
Of course, the Samnites in Lower Samnium had no intention of going easily. Seemingly abandoned by their own government, they raised the banner of revolt only two weeks after the end of the Fourth Samnite War. Led, ironically, by the Roman-born Marcus Marinius who claimed his right to rule in Samnium, the Samnite revolt would prove a harbinger of things to come. For two years, the revolt proved a particular pain for the Romans. Marcus would devastate Latin farms, stealing away their women and children and slaughtering their men and selling the captives into slavery to fund his revolt. In 78 he defeated a small Roman force at Tibur. Usually, however, his army disappeared into the Appenine Hills whenever the Romans made any attempt to directly confront them.
In 77, already distracted with Lower Samnium (now rebranded once again as Latium), the Romans faced another threat. In a time-honoured tradition, the Latin states bristled under Roman domination and took the opportunity to revolt. In the 'Second' Battle of the Latins (albeit a battle unrelated in either theme or style to the first), the Romans met the rebelling Latins in 77 BCE and put them down once again. Only a year later, Marcus Marinius and his army were caught near Ferentinum and slaughtered.
Map of Latium from the 5th Century, a decent guide to important locations. At it's height, Lower Samnium covered as far as Gabii in the West and Interamna in the South. In some instances, Samnite communities stretched to the coast, as at Tarracina and Circeii. (Source: Wikipedia, image author presumed to be Maduixa)
But the fighting was not finished for Rome. Accusations of support for Marinius' revolt were almost instantly placed on the Samnite kingdom and, in particular, upon particular individuals surrounding the young king Gaius Pontius. Gaius had found his ability to actually govern the Samnite kingdom greatly limited by a series of increasingly powerful, increasingly ambitious aristocrats. Despite his best attempts, he had found himself politically outmanoeuvred and isolated, unable to exert much actual control whatsoever. This left Samnium increasingly divided as different interests conflicted with one another and Pontius found himself increasingly at risk of being simply ousted. To his credit, the young man was an astute politician and had realised that the now much more powerful Rome was potentially an ideal friend. As such, in 76 BCE, he smuggled a slave out of his palace and had him sent to Rome to seek support.
Falling back upon the old treaty between Gaius I Pontius and Rome and on the fact that the Samnites had now indeed ceded Lower Samnium to Rome, the young king sought a declaration of friendship and political support to liberate his kingdom from the ambitious aristocracy. Importantly and rather cleverly, he put the blame for any Samnite support for Marinius on the aristocracy whom he claimed still resented the Roman acquisition of Lower Samnium. Instead, he offered friendship and an alliance between the two powers that would protect Rome from any attacks from the East, including raiding aristocrats with small bands of Samnites.
This plea for help would change the balance of power between Rome and Samnium yet again. In 76 BCE, the Roman army entered Samnium to 'liberate' the king from his palace. The Fifth Samnite War is something of a misnomer. Strictly speaking, it was not against the Samnites but against the Samnite aristocracy, many of whom had been raiding Latium in their spare time and many of whom had had their personal tribes strengthened by the inclusion of exiled Samnite farmers and had become rather strong as a result, overshadowing the young Samnite king. Over 6 years of fighting, Rome slowly but steadily subdued local strongholds under the control of powerful local figures. Soon enough, the original goal of the war had changed; Gaius II died young in 72 BCE and the Senate took the opportunity to divide their potential enemies and dissolved the Unified Samnite Kingdom, an important precursor to the subsequent Treaty of Aesernia. Most important were the main four tribes of the Samnites; the Hirpini, Caudini, Cararceni and Pentri. Each of these had grown much more powerful, bolstered first by economic prosperity under the Marinians and then by the inclusion of fleeing settlers from Latium (and a few from Campania as other local city-states sought to expel the Samnites as well). The fighting was hard and slow and involved numerous setbacks as the hills and mountains of the Apennines forced slow, bloody warfare besieging small forts and fighting raids rather than major battles.
By degrees, however, the Romans slowly took the advantage in Samnium, fighting with their usual tenacity and refusal to give up and, by 70 BCE, the majority of the Samnite chiefs and aristocrats had been beaten (although some still held out in the most rural areas and would return to haunt Rome only a year later). Under the careful watch of the Senate, the Romans set out a new political system for Samnium at Aesernia in 70 BCE. Under this system, Rome was to return to its pre-Hannibalic position as the ultimate arbiter of disputes in Samnium. No colonisation would take place, nor any attempts to enforce Roman law. Rather, Rome would extort soldiers from the Samnite people and arbitrate disputes between them. Rather than a single, unified Samnite kingdom, Rome would instead deal with a variety of disparate individual groups and ambitions as a means to keep a hold on Samnium and prevent the Samnites from reunifying. There would be only one more 'Samnite War' although it was much more of a revolt than anything. Only a year after Aesernia, a revolt broke out amongst the Samnite tribes as soon as the Roman army left. The revolt went about as well as expected and within only 9 months had been crushed at Arpinum with which the Samnite Wars finally drew to a close.
Why Rome?
I will talk in the next chapter about the next stage of Rome's 'Third Coming' but, for now, I want to discuss temporarily why Rome continued to bounce back in a way that other cities didn't. True, cities such as Carthage bounced back remarkably as well after the end of the Barcid Empire, but Rome is a particularly odd case in that it seemed to go through periods of seemingly utter ruin, only to bounce back time and again. After the Second Latin War, Rome bounced back within only a few years to become the hegemon of Central Italy. After the War of the Three Leagues, Rome went through a temporary period of Samnite domination but by the mid-1st Century was the up and coming power of Italy yet again. There are a few reasons why this might be the case that have been suggested.
The first is sheer economics. Rome was ideally placed to take advantage of trade routes moving across Italy. True they could, and often did especially in times of war, pass through the Apennines. But for large scale trade, the flatter terrain of Latium with its bigger population was easier and more convenient. This meant that Rome could take advantage of flourishing trade routes to enrich itself, support large armies (helped by a naturally large population) and win wars. However, placing the entire success of Rome on geography, population and economics is a silly basis for explaining this in its entirety. No doubt this was crucial, especially in cases where Rome should have been destroyed after major defeats but could bounce back better than their enemies (such as after Cannae) and played a large role in its ability to keep raising armies to fight wars. But none of that would have meant anything if Rome was burnt to the ground or divided by constant political chaos or simply lacked the will to keep fighting.
Another part of this was cultural. Rome had a certain drive to win that others seem to have lacked, something that hadn't gone away in the last couple of centuries. In fact, the cultural need to win whatever the cost seemed to grow during these tough times. As after the Battle of Allia in the 4th Century, there was never any consideration of abandoning Rome itself and setting up elsewhere, the city of Rome was their city and it would be their last line whatever happened. This led to a certain cultural inflexibility. Brutus could have easily taken his band and become a powerful, rich city elsewhere, but Rome was too culturally important to abandon. That applied to every single war, Rome could not be abandoned so whatever the cost, they had to win. The ideal, touted by both the first and second Republic, of the freedom of Roman citizens had to be preserved whatever the cost and the memory of dictators and foreign powers had strengthened that; to the Roman people, it was victory or death.
Furthermore, the martial culture of Rome, somewhat lessened by the more economically focussed democracy, had been encouraged by the dictators and continued into the new Republic. Once again, feats of heroism on behalf of Rome and in the protection of the freedom of its citizens were the symbol of a good Roman. Brutus hearkened back to the Brutus of 509, the Scipiones appealed back to their heroes of the 3rd Century. The Senatorial class had returned and it justified its return by its own martial heroism, linking itself both to the old Republic and to the new system that the Dictators had encouraged.
Finally, there was the legacy of domination. Bear in mind that in 87 BCE, Rome was only about 140 years removed from having been the single dominant power in Italy and even somewhat abroad. Rome had been one of the most powerful states in the Mediterannean and that gave the city a legacy of empire. From infrastructure that helped it outstrip its rivals, to the cultural allure of Rome as a centre of prestige. Like it or not, Rome was still seen as an important city because it had been an important city and had never really stopped being an important city. This gave a certain diplomatic weight to Rome, something that allowed them to enforce their will just a bit easier.
So to a degree, it is no wonder that Rome succeeded. The city had the resources, the infrastructure, the culture, the will and the diplomatic importance to succeed in Italy. It was still and hadn't stopped being, a major metropolis and under the new Republic, no longer struggling with the same internal division or social unrest, with revolution, now having something of an agreement between the democrats and the republicans and no dictators to struggle against, Rome turned to the outside world once more and began to flex its muscles.
