A Greater Dar al-Islam and an Ever Shrinking Dar al-Harb / a resurgent Islam TL

As you can see, this TL is not dead. You'll also see that I've switched to a wikipage format; from now on updates to the TL will use this format, mostly because if I stick with the old narrative format it would take aeons to reach some of the later content I want to get to.
 
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As you can see, this TL is not dead. You'll also see that I've switched to a wikipage format; from now on updates to the TL will use this format, mostly because if I stick with the old narrative format it would aeons to reach some of the later content I want to get to.
THIS ALIVE, THANKS FOR THE UPDATE BUDDY.
 
Wow what a surprise! Got to say I think its a shame that it won't continue to be in the narrative format as I've liked your writing style, I am very glad to see this thing is still kickin!
 
As you can see, this TL is not dead. You'll also see that I've switched to a wikipage format; from now on updates to the TL will use this format, mostly because if I stick with the old narrative format it would aeons to reach some of the later content I want to get to.

I wonder, what would be the state of Europe east of Germany ITTL. Of course, Germany isn't as weakened as in "The Muslim World" but Western Slavs should have more breathing room ITTL.
 
Western Slavs should have more breathing room ITTL.
They will, though I haven't got it all planned out yet (one of the advantages of the new wikipage is that I don't have to be so strict about going chronologically). I doubt that the Christian Frankish and German states will unify any time soon, so the Slavs and Balts will be able continue developing as they were. Christianisation could still be a possibility though.
 
They will, though I haven't got it all planned out yet (one of the advantages of the new wikipage is that I don't have to be so strict about going chronologically). I doubt that the Christian Frankish and German states will unify any time soon, so the Slavs and Balts will be able continue developing as they were. Christianisation could still be a possibility though.

Yeah, but I was just speculating about it (since I am from one of these countries, it'd be somewhat important to me what happens to them ITTL) and I think that paganism will survive longer here, maybe up to modern times in some places.
 
PART 2 - The War of Andalusian Independence (836-838)
War of Andalusian Independence (836-838)

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The War of Andalusian Independence was a military conflict which occurred in northern Italia. The war began as a rebellion against the Abbasid governor of the province of Ruma al-Gharbiya (northern Italia), Hatim ibn Harthama ibn A’yan; due to longstanding cultural ties between the Muslim nobility of Ruma al-Gharbiya and al-Andalus, the governor of the latter province joined the conflict. The rebellion in Ruma al-Gharbiya had its root in multiple causes: the forced separation of northern Italia from Andalusia to establish the new province; the perceived marginalisation of the Arab-Berber elite (descended from the original Andalusian conquerors) in favour of the abna al-dawla and other recent immigrants; the governors’ reliance on Christian Romans in the administration; and the creation of a saqaliba army.

In 836 CE, after news of the Zanj Revolt had spread west, Arab, Berber, and converted Lombard nobles banded together and declared their allegiance to the governor of al-Andalus, Habib ibn Muhammad al-Fihri. The hesitation on the part of the latter resulted in his swift removal via coup and the succession to his relative Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid ibn al-Qasim al-Fihri. The latter immediately set upon an expedition to join forces with the rebels. Hatim ibn Harthama ibn A’yan simultaneously requested aid from the central Abbasid government in Baghdad. The rebels, under the leadership of the Berber Abu Imran Zallu ibn Yusuf al-Matmata’i, joined with the army of al-Fihri and achieved success early on in the campaign. This success included the killing of the governor’s able lieutenant Tahir ibn al-Husayn al-Mus’abi. Later in the year Abbasid reinforcements under the command of ghulam Bugha al-Kabir arrived on the west coast. The ghulam’s army faced increasing resistance from the local populace which prevented him reinforcing the governor to the north. Consequently Hatim ibn Harthama ibn A’yan himself was killed in battle, leaving local Abbasid soldiers under the capable leadership of Ibrahim ibn al-Husayn al-Mus’abi. Though the war appeared to have shifted in the rebels’ favour, the following year saw a series of indecisive battles which wore down the numbers of Italo-Andalusian leaders. At the same time, Ibrahim ibn al-Husayn al-Mus’abi worked closely with the former governor’s wazir al-Fadl ibn Marwan to entice the rebels to surrender through amnesties and promises of inclusive government. The burgeoning military effectiveness of the Abbasid saqaliba, combined with the government’s reconciliation campaign, proved successful and the rebellion gradually came to an end in 838 CE. Once Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid ibn al-Qasim al-Fihri realised that his cause was lost, he retreated to the territory of the Nicaean League whereupon he declared himself an independent emir. Ibrahim ibn al-Husayn al-Mus’abi prevented Bugha al-Kabir’s army from pursuing the Andalusians and he sent the reinforcements back to Baghdad with the request of appointment to the currently vacant governorships of Ruma al-Gharbiya and al-Andalus; both were accepted by the caliph’s wazir Sa’id ibn Yahya ibn Abu Mansur.

To the surprise of many contemporary observers, Ibrahim ibn al-Husayn al-Mus’abi honoured his promises of reconciliation and reintegrated the Andalusian Arab-Berbers, as well as some Muslim Lombards, into governance of the province thus maintaining a precarious balancing act. The al-Mus’abi family were able to retain the governorships of Ruma al-Gharbiya and al-Andalus (though the latter was titular) through outward loyalty and obedience to the caliph in Baghdad. In reality however, the Abbasid Caliphate or its de facto rulers had little authority over the provinces and lacked the capability to assert that authority. On the other hand, the Fihrid dynasty in Andalusia began the process of extrapolating their already highly autonomous existence into an entirely independent state, culminating in the eventual declaration of a new caliphate.
 
Nice to see another update! what an interesting development. Its definitely been a while, what are the other polities currently occupying Italy other than Ruma Al-Gharbiya?
 
what are the other polities currently occupying Italy other than Ruma Al-Gharbiya?
Other than the (Eastern) Roman Empire, there's the Lombard duchies of Benevento and Spoleto. The Pope is under the authority of the Empire, but is in an uneasy partnership with the Constantinople-appointed Duke of Rome. The Republic of Venice is an autonomous part of Ruma al-Gharbiya. Roman Sicily is currently facing a Muslim invasion which controls the western part of the island.
 
On the other hand, the Fihrid dynasty in Andalusia began the process of extrapolating their already highly autonomous existence into an entirely independent state, culminating in the eventual declaration of a new caliphate.
Ohh, So the long term they would split on their own like the ummayds did? on the other hand wonder how that would affect the future plans in the Italian Peninsula
 
PART 2 - The Sirafid Dynasty
Sirafid Dynasty
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The Sirafid dynasty comprised a series of Persian rulers who officially served as the wazirs of the Abbasid Caliphate from 841 CE to 1011 CE. In practice though, the Sirafid wazirs held ultimate power while the caliphs were relegated to being puppets. The Sirafid period was both a result and accelerator for certain processes which had been occurring in the Abbasid Caliphate, namely the transfer of power from the caliph to the bureaucracy and the (re)feudalisation of Iran, the latter of which greatly affected the composition of the caliphal military. Sirafid rule also coincided with the gradual loss of the caliphate’s outer lying provinces in favour of a strengthening of the core provinces of Iraq, Iran, and part of Suriyah, though most newly-independent rulers continued to profess loyalty to the Abbasid Caliph.

The Sirafid dynasty was established by al-Hasan Farrukhan ibn Manuchihr al-Sirafi, the son of a middling Persian noble who converted to Islam under Caliph al-Muntasir’s land redistribution strategy. Farrukhan had distinguished himself in military service for the caliphate, including the rescue of Caliph al-Mu’tasim from a revolt in Misr. After the death of wazir Sa’id ibn Yahya ibn Abu Mansur, the Iranian-dominated bureaucracy convinced the caliph to appoint Farrukhan as the new wazir. During Farrukhan’s tenure, Persian was introduced as an administrative language and his allies among the Iranian nobility were relied upon increasingly during military ventures. To counterbalance this Farrukhan allowed the abna al-dawla to retain their traditional dominance in the standing army while also prioritising warfare against the Roman Empire, often couched in religious terms. Farrukhan’s successors ignored the abna al-dawla to an even greater degree, which had the effect of reducing their military effectiveness and preventing the success of their few revolts in the core provinces of the caliphate. During the reign of Farrukhan’s son and successor, al-Husayn Khosrow, the province of Ifriqiya was overrun and conquered by Berber tribes aligned with the Rustamid dynasty. The central government did little to aid the outlying province, setting the tone for future Sirafid rule. The old Arab settlers who dominated the province of Misr began to appoint their own governor and contribute the minimal amount of taxes to Baghdad that they could get away with. The province of al-Sham remained within Sirafid control but not without difficulty, while central authority in the eastern provinces was severely disrupted by Turkic migrations. Sirafid rule came to an end when a plague outbreak killed most of the family, following which there was a period in which the various Iranian noble families fought over the right to be appointed wazir of the Abbasid Caliphate.

The historiography of the Sirafid dynasty is dominated by the question of whether they constituted a new Persian empire. Unlike later Iranian dynasties the Sirafid wazirs did not adopt the pre-Islamic title of shahanshah. However, alongside the re-emergence of Persian as an administrative language, the Sirafids encouraged the development of Persian secular and religious literature. Furthermore, pre-Islamic themes of Iranian kingship were revived, such as religion’s subordination to the state. The Sirafid dynasty is widely considered to mark the transition in Islamic history from a universal Islamic caliphate to a period of independent and often combative states.
 
Interesting chapter, seems the sirafid keep pushing the OTL Persianization on a bigger scale, with the Iranian culture and language that the caliphate ended in a more Iranian polity, and seems they split before beating the Roman once for all.

Plus the use of roman and no ere show that HRE didn't happened either
 
PART 2 - The Armenian Revival Party
Armenian Revival Party
Armenian Revival Party wikibox.png


The Armenian Revival Party (Armenian: Haykakan Veratsnund Kusaktsutyun) is a regional catch-all Armenian nationalist political party in Iran. The HVK is divided into two factions: the minority Separatists, who advocate for the establishment of an independent Armenia and the eventual inclusion of Armenian-populated territories in neighbouring countries; and the majority Federalists, who advocate the transformation of the unitary Republic of Iran into a federal system. The HVK is the largest party in the devolved Assembly of Hayastan, as well as being a prominent but small party in the Iranian Assembly of People’s Representatives. The party’s current leader, Hrant Khachaturian, has been Hayastan’s Ishkhan since 2002.

The Revival Party was founded in 1917 by Armenian intellectuals after some nationalists were caught up in Iran’s Emergency Period (which was directed at socialists and trade unions). For the first two decades of its existence the HVK’s appeal was limited to middle-class Christian Armenians until the first elections to the devolved Assembly of Hayastan in 1934, in which the party won 12 of the 120 seats. From that point onward the HVK broadened its appeal to working-class and Muslim Armenians, and gained its first seat in the Assembly of People’s Representatives in 1951. The party achieved a plurality in the Assembly of Hayastan in 1975 and has since led a series of minority and coalition governments. The HVK is currently in a coalition government with the Radical Democratic Party of Iran. At the national level, the HVK has entered into confidence-and-supply agreements with minority governments, but is yet to join a formal coalition government.

Despite the Revival Party’s origin in Christian Armenian intellectual circles, it currently holds broad appeal to all sections of Armenian society in both Hayastan and elsewhere in Iran. The HVK generally supports state intervention in the economy, strong constitutional and electoral reform, and peaceful cooperation in foreign affairs.
 
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