Just a quickie bit of work in response to this thread https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=261554
Even today, more than 70 years after the event, the surprise Japanese attack against the U.S. on December 7th 1941 remains one of the most popular discussion items among students of the Second World War. While much of the discussion revolves around how the USN could have allowed the Imperial Japanese Navy to bring virtually its entire striking force to within 300 miles of Pearl Harbor undetected and what might have happened if not for the completely accidental discovery of the Japanese cruiser force that had, inexplicably, been sent to bombard the airfield on Midway Island on the evening of December 7th (i.e. after the scheduled attack against the Pearl Harbor anchorage and shore facilities), a decent argument can be had just by mentioning the name Kimmel.
While it is perhaps unfair that the Commander, U.S. Fleet Admiral Husband E Kimmel, is blamed for everything that happened on the “Day of Infamy”, that has been the verdict of history, albeit a verdict that was more or less set in stone long before the end of the War in August of 1945. The real question is, however, how much blame should be heaped on Kimmel’s shoulders?
Kimmel was not in command of the search assets that belonged to the USAAF, those fell under the control of General Short, as did the defense of the fleet units while in the harbor. How can Kimmel be blamed for the poor results turned in by men not under his command?
The infamous “War Warning” notice of November 27, 1941 was hardy a flaming message in the sky. In fact even the authors of the message, Admiral Stark and General Marshal,admit that they never imagined for an instant that the Japanese would actually strike at Pearl Harbor, expecting instead that the blow would fall on the Philippines and perhaps on Wake Island. If the men who sent the message didn’t expect the attack, should Kimmel be blamed for believing the real danger lay across the Pacific in the Philippines?
The Japanese broke every rule of military planning with the Pearl Harbor attack plan. They put their entire striking force into the jaws of a trap, beyond their range capacity (the almost irrational actions taken by the Japanese, up to and including the deck loading of fuel drum onto ships of the fleet, including on at least one of the Kido Butai carriers, to allow the fleet to reach strike position are legendary), and well within the reach of the most powerful military base in the Pacific Basin between the West Coast of North America and Malaya. Can Kimmel be reasonably held liable for failing to anticipate this sort of effort?
Kimmel’s snap decision to sortie the fleet when the contact report was received from the Midway patrol sighting, leaving the safety of the harbor, with its famously shallow waters, strong ground based air defenses and large contingent of front line fighters, is one that was roundly condemned by the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. However, as a naval officer, what else could be expected of him, especially after the example set by the British air attack against the Italian fleet in its Taranto anchorage? The Royal Navy had proved that battleships were in fact vulnerable to enemy aircraft when tied up to the quay, to criticize Kimmel for doing what he could to avoid a similar fate seems, to this author, to be overly harsh. Yes, the decision to sortie resulted in something of a mad dash, one that was lacking in organization, but a fleet is meant to be at sea, not in port when the enemy is near. A ship that can maneuver is always better off than one tied to the dock.
The main charge laid against Kimmel, namely that he went in the wrong direction, is also somewhat disingenuous. It carries in it the double implication that 1) Kimmel was a fool and 2) Kimmel was trying to evade battle (one of the implications also often raised by those who criticize the decision to sortie). Neither belief is true.
The USN had long believed that any sort of IJN attack against Pearl Harbor would be originate out of the Marshall Islands (i.e. the Mandates) or, put another way, from the southwest, not from the northeast. In shaping his course in the general direction of Wake, Kimmel was, far from fleeing the enemy, rather running headlong toward where every senior planner in the U.S. Navy expected the enemy to be. That he was doing it without any sort of useful air cover (with both Enterprise and Lexington off on ferry missions) might well be said to have been reckless, but cowardly? Hardly.
In hindsight, it is likely that the fleet would have been better off had it remained in port. The Japanese strikes lost nearly 170 aircraft to the combination of P-40 fighters and their .50 caliber machine guns and the skillful Army anti-aircraft gunners (post war, one of the few men to have flown in the December 7th raid and have survived the entire war described the anti-aircraft fire over Pearl Harbor the heaviest he ever saw from a ground installation) while damage to ships unable to sortie was deemed to be moderate at worst (of the ships unable to meet the sortie order, only the USS San Francisco was permanently lost, she wreckage deemed to be too far lost to justify salvage). Based on the results it seems likely that the losses to the Battle Force would have been minimal, certainly far less than the nearly 2,000 men who died when the Oklahoma and West Virginia were sunk by torpedoes fired by the I-23 (which was, in turn subsequently sunk by a ferocious depth charging by American destroyers). Still, the loss of warships is, simply put, part of war.
Perhaps the best reason that Husband Kimmel should be given the benefit of the doubt is that he was never able to defend himself from the (mainly unreasonable) charges laid against him. Admiral Husband E Kimmel died on December 23rd, 1941 of injuries suffered when his force flag, USS West Virginia was sunk at 1600 hours (local) on December 7th, 1941.
Comments are, as always, quite welcome.
Even today, more than 70 years after the event, the surprise Japanese attack against the U.S. on December 7th 1941 remains one of the most popular discussion items among students of the Second World War. While much of the discussion revolves around how the USN could have allowed the Imperial Japanese Navy to bring virtually its entire striking force to within 300 miles of Pearl Harbor undetected and what might have happened if not for the completely accidental discovery of the Japanese cruiser force that had, inexplicably, been sent to bombard the airfield on Midway Island on the evening of December 7th (i.e. after the scheduled attack against the Pearl Harbor anchorage and shore facilities), a decent argument can be had just by mentioning the name Kimmel.
While it is perhaps unfair that the Commander, U.S. Fleet Admiral Husband E Kimmel, is blamed for everything that happened on the “Day of Infamy”, that has been the verdict of history, albeit a verdict that was more or less set in stone long before the end of the War in August of 1945. The real question is, however, how much blame should be heaped on Kimmel’s shoulders?
Kimmel was not in command of the search assets that belonged to the USAAF, those fell under the control of General Short, as did the defense of the fleet units while in the harbor. How can Kimmel be blamed for the poor results turned in by men not under his command?
The infamous “War Warning” notice of November 27, 1941 was hardy a flaming message in the sky. In fact even the authors of the message, Admiral Stark and General Marshal,admit that they never imagined for an instant that the Japanese would actually strike at Pearl Harbor, expecting instead that the blow would fall on the Philippines and perhaps on Wake Island. If the men who sent the message didn’t expect the attack, should Kimmel be blamed for believing the real danger lay across the Pacific in the Philippines?
The Japanese broke every rule of military planning with the Pearl Harbor attack plan. They put their entire striking force into the jaws of a trap, beyond their range capacity (the almost irrational actions taken by the Japanese, up to and including the deck loading of fuel drum onto ships of the fleet, including on at least one of the Kido Butai carriers, to allow the fleet to reach strike position are legendary), and well within the reach of the most powerful military base in the Pacific Basin between the West Coast of North America and Malaya. Can Kimmel be reasonably held liable for failing to anticipate this sort of effort?
Kimmel’s snap decision to sortie the fleet when the contact report was received from the Midway patrol sighting, leaving the safety of the harbor, with its famously shallow waters, strong ground based air defenses and large contingent of front line fighters, is one that was roundly condemned by the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. However, as a naval officer, what else could be expected of him, especially after the example set by the British air attack against the Italian fleet in its Taranto anchorage? The Royal Navy had proved that battleships were in fact vulnerable to enemy aircraft when tied up to the quay, to criticize Kimmel for doing what he could to avoid a similar fate seems, to this author, to be overly harsh. Yes, the decision to sortie resulted in something of a mad dash, one that was lacking in organization, but a fleet is meant to be at sea, not in port when the enemy is near. A ship that can maneuver is always better off than one tied to the dock.
The main charge laid against Kimmel, namely that he went in the wrong direction, is also somewhat disingenuous. It carries in it the double implication that 1) Kimmel was a fool and 2) Kimmel was trying to evade battle (one of the implications also often raised by those who criticize the decision to sortie). Neither belief is true.
The USN had long believed that any sort of IJN attack against Pearl Harbor would be originate out of the Marshall Islands (i.e. the Mandates) or, put another way, from the southwest, not from the northeast. In shaping his course in the general direction of Wake, Kimmel was, far from fleeing the enemy, rather running headlong toward where every senior planner in the U.S. Navy expected the enemy to be. That he was doing it without any sort of useful air cover (with both Enterprise and Lexington off on ferry missions) might well be said to have been reckless, but cowardly? Hardly.
In hindsight, it is likely that the fleet would have been better off had it remained in port. The Japanese strikes lost nearly 170 aircraft to the combination of P-40 fighters and their .50 caliber machine guns and the skillful Army anti-aircraft gunners (post war, one of the few men to have flown in the December 7th raid and have survived the entire war described the anti-aircraft fire over Pearl Harbor the heaviest he ever saw from a ground installation) while damage to ships unable to sortie was deemed to be moderate at worst (of the ships unable to meet the sortie order, only the USS San Francisco was permanently lost, she wreckage deemed to be too far lost to justify salvage). Based on the results it seems likely that the losses to the Battle Force would have been minimal, certainly far less than the nearly 2,000 men who died when the Oklahoma and West Virginia were sunk by torpedoes fired by the I-23 (which was, in turn subsequently sunk by a ferocious depth charging by American destroyers). Still, the loss of warships is, simply put, part of war.
Perhaps the best reason that Husband Kimmel should be given the benefit of the doubt is that he was never able to defend himself from the (mainly unreasonable) charges laid against him. Admiral Husband E Kimmel died on December 23rd, 1941 of injuries suffered when his force flag, USS West Virginia was sunk at 1600 hours (local) on December 7th, 1941.
Comments are, as always, quite welcome.
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