A Confederate Navy after independence?

:rolleyes: In other words, no. The South is not funding and subsiding northern development, which is occurring because northern industry is quite capable of not only finding a market within the US, but producing shiploads of exports.

From The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers on the post-war US economy: "Swiftly becoming the world's largest producer of manufactures, the United States began to pour its farm machinery, iron and steel wares, machine tools, electrical equipment, and other products onto the world market."

Cotton isn't even mentioned except as traditionally being a major export - the US's economic growth is shooting upwards in areas that losing the eleven CSA states wouldn't eliminate at all, and in some areas (such as steel production) barely even make a noticeable change.

As for quality: "Technologically, leading American firms like International Harvester, Singer, Du Pont, Bell, Colt, and Standard Oil, were equal to, or often better than, any in the world'; and they enjoyed an enormous domestic market and economies of scale, which their German, British, and Swiss rivals did not."

20% according to what source, I wonder.

All things are not possible, because we are looking at scenarios that could exist, not scenarios that people who know nothing about economics wish would happen.

In short, you have a greatly inflated opinion of what Britain and France could and would do, and the idea of the CSA taking New Mexico and Arizona when its OTL efforts were such miserable failures is not plausible.

As I pointed out on this board before the US was the #2 industrial power on the planet by 1860. The South was probably a net drain on the rest of the US between the end of the war and at least 1870 or so.
 
Exactly, so how the North would need the South to finance anything is beyond me.

And pre-war, the idea that the North could only make money at the expense of the South doesn't make sense.

"The North" was a larger market than the South was for anything the North made.
 
What sort of riverine fleet will the CSN build? After the river battles of the war I imagine both USN and CSN would be building up forces to fight for control of the Mississippi and other rivers if another round of fighting started.
 
What sort of riverine fleet will the CSN build? After the river battles of the war I imagine both USN and CSN would be building up forces to fight for control of the Mississippi and other rivers if another round of fighting started.

What kind of riverine fleet CAN the CSA build?

It still has next to nowhere that can produce viable boilers and so forth, which is a huge problem.
 

The Sandman

Banned
Given that the CSA will have to finance all government operations via excise taxes, and that they've got a massive border with the country the majority of their imports are likely to come from, I think they're going to have an enormous smuggling problem. So revenue cutters would seem to be the first priority for the CSA, both at sea and on the rivers.
 
Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that the CSA gains its independence via Anglo-French intervention after the Trent Affair. GB and France are able to force Lincoln to recognize the CSA as an independent country and the USA does not renege when five seconds later the British public throws every government official involved into the Thames. California, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri all remain US soil, since Lincoln's response to giving up those territories would probably include a reference to Queen Victoria's butt and a Brown Bess musket (I highly, highly doubt the willingness of the British public to stomach a war to defend the CSA, aggressive posturing maybe, but not a war).

The USA is not hurt much by this. By 1861, the North already has a powerful industrial sector and a large domestic market (almost 30 million I believe). The need to built up a military-industrial complex to get revenge against the CSA, France, and GB will compensate for any loss of war demand. Bullion from the west is still available, along with local capital (much less war debt) to help pay for all this. The loss of southern markets and raw materials would sting a little, but I doubt it would slow the USA's development by more than a decade.

The CSA is also in decent shape, but its foundation is shaky at best. Little industry and little capital, with most local capital bound up in slaves, cotton, and land, and its owners (the planter aristocracy) not the type to invest in industrial development. Perhaps if British and French investors get involved, although what's the incentive for them. If cotton remains a valuable export long enough for the CSA to somehow develop Texas oil the CSA might be able to afford a 1914 Ottoman fleet, a couple of good ships built by somebody else with the rest being obsolete crap. Anything less than this rosy 'cotton and oil profits actually get into the hands of the CSA government' and the CSN is the 1914 Ottoman navy minus the couple of foreign-built, actually good ships.

Addendum: Even if cotton and oil profits are stupendous, it won't do the CSN much good if it doesn't have shipyards to build them. That requires a huge amount of heavy industry; it's not just some textile windshop. And you can't have a credible navy if you have to buy all your warships from somebody else.
 
What kind of riverine fleet CAN the CSA build?

It still has next to nowhere that can produce viable boilers and so forth, which is a huge problem.

Assuming they can get cash crop agriculture back up and start getting money trading with Britain, France, etc I'd assume they buy materials if not whole ships from those countries the way the Ottomans and most of the South American nations at the time did. What they would buy overseas is an open question though since the Confederates might have naval doctrines for river war that prevent buying "off the shelf" ships.
 

frlmerrin

Banned
Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri all remain US soil

Not necessarily, in a British intervention context Maryland it is easily assaultable from the sea and hardly pro-Union as such.

Kentucky and Missouri the arguments are pretty much unchanged in a British intervention but you get a better armed Confederacy and a very poorly armed but larger Union army so things could change from OTL.

Queen Victoria's butt and a Brown Bess musket

Enfield rifle musket, times have moved on.

The USA is not hurt much by this [Confederate independence].

Wrong - see below.

By 1861, the North already has a powerful industrial sector

No it was a small industrial sector compared to Belgium or Prussia tiny compared to Britain.


and a large domestic market (almost 30 million I believe).

Smaller than that but none the less large. In OTL it was growing by 200,000 a year in the 1860s by immigration alone. In a Trent war all this stops and it is unlikely to resume at anything like 1860 levels afterwards.


The need to built up a military-industrial complex to get revenge against the CSA, France, and GB will compensate for any loss of war demand.

This is silly, real politick not risk.

Bullion from the west is still available,

Yes but not in unlimited quatities or even enough to cover the service of the war debt.

along with local capital (much less war debt) to help pay for all this.

Much of this has gone into war bonds which are unlikely to be paid and there was never that much of this money about.

The loss of southern markets and raw materials would sting a little, but I doubt it would slow the USA's development by more than a decade.

As you have not been able to show how the USA Govt could fund itself you should be thinking in terms of economic basket case like Germany after WWI or II (pre-Marshall plan) rather than sting a little.

A decade would be more than enough for the Confederacy to snaggle Britsh investment in rail, mines and factories and thus close the production gape with the moribund USA economy. Twenty or thirty years is much more realistic perhaps more. Remember the USA economy took over 30 years to recover from the relatively minor defeat in the War of 1812.

The CSA is also in decent shape, but its foundation is shaky at best. Little industry and little capital,

Like half the countries in Europe, not exactly shakey for an agricultural economy.

with most local capital bound up in slaves, cotton, and land, and its owners (the planter aristocracy) not the type to invest in industrial development.

Some numbers to support this would be good. I don't think this has been proved one way or the other yet.

Perhaps if British and French investors get involved, although what's the incentive for them.


Infrastructure and secure bonds. The USA is now a poor investment and in Argentina the speak Spanish and it is a long way way. Australia even further.

If cotton remains a valuable export long enough for the CSA to somehow develop Texas oil the CSA might be able to afford a 1914 Ottoman fleet, a couple of good ships built by somebody else with the rest being obsolete crap.

Bold statements for a future 50 years from 1865. How about some ballance sheets?

Addendum: Even if cotton and oil profits are stupendous, it won't do the CSN much good if it doesn't have shipyards to build them. That requires a huge amount of heavy industry; it's not just some textile windshop.

Lots of deepwater ports. Ship yards in that period need a foundry some forests and a shear hulk. It is not rocket science or indeed the cost of Apollo. In anycase why build at first? Buy British, copy British it worked for a lot of countries, Russia, Japan, the new Italy.

And you can't have a credible navy if you have to buy all your warships from somebody else.

Worked for the South Americans and Prussians.
 
Not necessarily, in a British intervention context Maryland it is easily assaultable from the sea and hardly pro-Union as such.

Kentucky and Missouri the arguments are pretty much unchanged in a British intervention but you get a better armed Confederacy and a very poorly armed but larger Union army so things could change from OTL.

The British public is not going to tolerate a full-out war with the USA in order to defend the CSA, what with its 'peculiar institution'. And there is no way the British can hold anything on the North American mainland (except maybe Canada north of the Saint Lawrence) against the US by this point. Especially Maryland. There British supplies have to be shipped from across the Atlantic, while the US can pour in troops and men via one of the most developed rail networks in the world at that time. And if the British start reenacting the War of 1812, the US won't have to introduce a draft.

Enfield rifle musket, times have moved on.

That was a joke, meant to express how the North would react to Great Britain trying to balkanize it. Having the US recognize the CSA is one thing, having the US give up territory it currently controls is another.

No it was a small industrial sector compared to Belgium or Prussia tiny compared to Britain.

At this point in time, everybody is tiny compared to Britain. But the US industrial sector is far larger than Prussia or Belgium. In 1860 it produced 2.5 times as much iron as Russia (note Russia, not Prussia). Pennsylvania alone produces almost eighteen times more iron than the entire CSA. The US industrial sector produced 1.7 million rifles. I'd like to see Belgium do that, and make cannons, ironclads, trains, and ammunition as well.


Smaller than that but none the less large. In OTL it was growing by 200,000 a year in the 1860s by immigration alone. In a Trent war all this stops and it is unlikely to resume at anything like 1860 levels afterwards.

Why would immigration to the US stop? Most immigrants went to the North and West, not the South. Is Britain blowing up transport ships? And even without immigration, the US still has a large domestic market. They've got twenty seven million consumers at home.




This is silly, real politick not risk.

Are you saying that a USA that has a big, hostile neighbor to the south that had two European powers just try to take big pieces out of it isn't going to militarize to a far greater extent than OTL late 1800s USA?



Yes but not in unlimited quatities or even enough to cover the service of the war debt.

What war debt? The war lasted three years shorter than OTL. And Great Britain is not going to get involved in a long, drawn-out war with the USA, especially to protect slavery. The USA is not Zanzibar. It's not something that can be smacked down by a RN squadron and a couple of Her Majesty's battalions.


As you have not been able to show how the USA Govt could fund itself you should be thinking in terms of economic basket case like Germany after WWI or II (pre-Marshall plan) rather than sting a little.

A decade would be more than enough for the Confederacy to snaggle Britsh investment in rail, mines and factories and thus close the production gape with the moribund USA economy. Twenty or thirty years is much more realistic perhaps more. Remember the USA economy took over 30 years to recover from the relatively minor defeat in the War of 1812.

Eh, why? The US economy did just fine in OTL when the South had been completely, utterly wrecked, and during the war too I might add. Given that the US economy did not collapse when it was actively fighting the South strongly suggests it won't be a basket case with it being a neutral. The loss of cotton will hurt, but it's not going to gut the US. The US has not had its cities incinerated, its young men annihilated in trenches or scattered in graveyards across a continent. Any British army stupid enough to try will be up to its neck in blood, its own.



Like half the countries in Europe, not exactly shakey for an agricultural economy.

I will concede that for an agricultural economy, a CSA with good cotton markets is in good shape. But for a modern navy, an agricultural economy just doesn't cut it.


Infrastructure and secure bonds. The USA is now a poor investment and in Argentina the speak Spanish and it is a long way way. Australia even further.

Why is the US suddenly a poor investment? It's not going to collapse if the South becomes independent. And in a choice between investing in the US and CS, a British investor is going to pick the US. Why? Because then his rivals won't be able to say he works with slavers.

If cotton remains a valuable export long enough for the CSA to somehow develop Texas oil the CSA might be able to afford a 1914 Ottoman fleet, a couple of good ships built by somebody else with the rest being obsolete crap.

Bold statements for a future 50 years from 1865. How about some ballance sheets?

I will concede that they are bold. But a CSA that is exporting oil and cotton isn't an industrial power, it's the north American equivalent of Brazil at this time. To build and maintain a modern fleet, even by WW1 standards, requires an industrial power. And the CSA is unlikely to become one. Any industry that gets started will be swamped under by cheaper British (because they're certainly going to demand trade concessions from the CSA for the whole 'saving your lives' bit) or Yankee goods (good luck stopping smuggling along that border, especially since you also have to make sure slaves don't escape in the other direction).

It's not just a matter of money (and if British investors are the ones responsible for developing Texas oils, the profits are going to London anyway, not Richmond), but also a matter of having the technical expertise and equipment to support dreadnought battleships and actually useful submarines.

Lots of deepwater ports. Ship yards in that period need a foundry some forests and a shear hulk. It is not rocket science or indeed the cost of Apollo. In anycase why build at first? Buy British, copy British it worked for a lot of countries, Russia, Japan, the new Italy.

I should've been more clear. I was thinking of navies in the 1890s, 1900s, 1910s period, not 1860s. The CSA could, if cotton is still king, produce frigates, potentially ships of the line (although where would they get the sailors?). But battleships are another story entirely.

There are plenty of places to put them, but where is the CSA going to get the capital, the raw materials, and the experienced labor force to built and maintain shipyards capable of building advanced warships (by the time period's standards)? What's in it for the British to subsidize all this?

I will concede that I am responsible for moving the goal posts to 'could the CSA build battleships?'. They could maybe develop, say Mobile, so that it could produce destroyers and maybe an armored cruiser or two, but at this time, it's battleships that count.

As for copying British designs, yes the CSA could do that. But that still leaves the matter of developing shipyards large and advanced enough to replicate them. That's why I considered the CSN at its best to be like the Ottomans. Wealthy enough to afford some good foreign warships, but lacking the technological and industrial base to build copies.


Worked for the South Americans and Prussians.

I meant credible compared to a great power. One squadron of the Grand Fleet could take on the Chilean, Argentinian, and Brazilian fleets combined. I apologize for being unclear.

It's possible to build a decent second-rate fleet that way. But the CSA needs a lot more than a Brazilian or Ottoman level to be more than a speedbump to the USN.
 
Assuming they can get cash crop agriculture back up and start getting money trading with Britain, France, etc I'd assume they buy materials if not whole ships from those countries the way the Ottomans and most of the South American nations at the time did. What they would buy overseas is an open question though since the Confederates might have naval doctrines for river war that prevent buying "off the shelf" ships.

Possibly. Although buying a major fleet from overseas sounds expensive.

Basileus: About 23 million, not 30. But given that this is increasing by leaps and bounds. . .

For those concerned, the Great Powers (with the vast majority of US manufacturing in the north) in 1860 and 1880:

UK (19.9 percent), France (7.9 percent), United States (7.2%), Russia (7%) German States (4.9%), Habsburg Empire (4.2%), Italy (2.9%), Japan (2.6%)

UK (22.9%), United States (14.7%), Germany (8.5%), France (7.8%), Russia (7.6%), Habsburg Empire (4.4%), Italy(2.5%), Japan (2.4%)

Total Industrial Potential (sadly Kennedy only gives figures for 1880 and later), with the UK in 1900 as 100:

Britain: 73.3, United States: 46.9, Germany: 27.4, France: 25.1, Austria-Hungary: 14, Italy: 8.1, Japan: 7.6

So less than a generation after the ACW left the South with a lot of economic rebuilding to do, the US is soaring as an industrial power, and getting richer and richer.

Meanwhile, the industrial capacity of the independent CSA (even if it has no rebuilding to do) in this context doesn't even belong on this scale except as part of the "Third World".

Pig-iron production in 1890 just as a final figure (no earlier ones sadly):

Greater to every power listed except Great Britain put together. (9.3 million tons vs. 7.03 million - Britain is 8 million).

Paul Kennedy's well known book as the source.

Meanwhile the US has much of its OTL massive production of food crops, which are not vulnerable to something like the boll weevil.
 
Basileus: About 23 million, not 30. But given that this is increasing by leaps and bounds. . .

Huh. I could've sworn I read 27 million somewhere. Don't have access to my couple of Civil War books at the moment.



Anyway for the discussion, here's an interesting mental exercise.

CSA Iron production in 1860: 36,700 tons
Russian Iron production in 1860: 350,000 tons

Russian Iron/Steel production in 1913: 4.8 million tons

For Russia, that is a growth rate of 1,371% over 53 years, for an average growth rate of 25.86% a year. A very impressive rate, that I find very doubtful the CSA could match (for starters, none of those lovely French loans specifically designed to boost Russia's warmaking capabilities). But for the sake of argument, let's apply the same figures to the CSA. If so:

CSA Iron/Steel production in 1913: 503,000 tons
Italian Iron/Steel production in 1913: 930,000 tons

If 1913 Italy outweighs you almost two to one, you are by no means an industrial power.

If you want to be ASB generous to the CSA, let's give the CSA the OTL USA growth rates.

USA Iron production in 1860: 830,000 tons
USA Iron/steel production in 1913: 31,800,000 tons

Growth of 3,831% for an average of 72.2% a year. Applying those to the CSA:

CSA iron/steel production in 1913: 1,400,000 tons.
Austria-Hungary iron/steel production in 1913: 2,600,000 tons

The CSA has a substantial lead over Italy (not saying much) but the Habsburg Empire still beats it almost two to one.

Assuming phenomenal, extremely unlikely growth rates on the part of the CSA, it might be able to fight its way up to being a upper second-rank great and industrial power, at best a state as important and powerful as Italy on the world stage.

Also consider this. If somehow the loss of the CSA reduced the USA's growth rate to Russia's level (a loss of almost two-thirds):

USA iron/steel production in 1913: 14,370,000 tons
Germany iron/steel production in 1913: 17,600,000 tons
Britain iron/steel production in 1913: 7,700,000 tons

Germany has a respectable lead on alt-USA, but alt-USA still outmatches the UK almost two to one. And is 10.26 times larger than the CSA if it grew at OTL USA rates.

If the CSA is given more realistic growth rates, say France's:

Kennedy's book only has France's production going back to 1890, but it goes from 1.9 million tons in 1890 to 4.6 million in 1913, an annual growth rate of 10.5% over 23 years. For the sake of argument, let's apply that rate for 53 years to the CSA, a total growth of 557%.

CSA iron/steel production in 1913: 204,000 tons.

Italy here has over a 4.5 to 1 advantage.

All figures taken from Kennedy's book.
 
Huh. I could've sworn I read 27 million somewhere. Don't have access to my couple of Civil War books at the moment.

Maybe counting slave population of the CSA? I dunno.

Anyway for the discussion, here's an interesting mental exercise.

CSA Iron production in 1860: 36,700 tons
Russian Iron production in 1860: 350,000 tons

Russian Iron/Steel production in 1913: 4.8 million tons

For Russia, that is a growth rate of 1,371% over 53 years, for an average growth rate of 25.86% a year. A very impressive rate, that I find very doubtful the CSA could match (for starters, none of those lovely French loans specifically designed to boost Russia's warmaking capabilities). But for the sake of argument, let's apply the same figures to the CSA. If so:

CSA Iron/Steel production in 1913: 503,000 tons
Italian Iron/Steel production in 1913: 930,000 tons

If 1913 Italy outweighs you almost two to one, you are by no means an industrial power.

If you want to be ASB generous to the CSA, let's give the CSA the OTL USA growth rates.

USA Iron production in 1860: 830,000 tons
USA Iron/steel production in 1913: 31,800,000 tons

Growth of 3,831% for an average of 72.2% a year. Applying those to the CSA:

CSA iron/steel production in 1913: 1,400,000 tons.
Austria-Hungary iron/steel production in 1913: 2,600,000 tons

The CSA has a substantial lead over Italy (not saying much) but the Habsburg Empire still beats it almost two to one.

Assuming phenomenal, extremely unlikely growth rates on the part of the CSA, it might be able to fight its way up to being a upper second-rank great and industrial power, at best a state as important and powerful as Italy on the world stage.

Also consider this. If somehow the loss of the CSA reduced the USA's growth rate to Russia's level (a loss of almost two-thirds):

USA iron/steel production in 1913: 14,370,000 tons
Germany iron/steel production in 1913: 17,600,000 tons
Britain iron/steel production in 1913: 7,700,000 tons

Germany has a respectable lead on alt-USA, but alt-USA still outmatches the UK almost two to one. And is 10.26 times larger than the CSA if it grew at OTL USA rates.

If the CSA is given more realistic growth rates, say France's:

Kennedy's book only has France's production going back to 1890, but it goes from 1.9 million tons in 1890 to 4.6 million in 1913, an annual growth rate of 10.5% over 23 years. For the sake of argument, let's apply that rate for 53 years to the CSA, a total growth of 557%.

CSA iron/steel production in 1913: 204,000 tons.

Italy here has over a 4.5 to 1 advantage.

All figures taken from Kennedy's book.

And while the CSA does have oil (which Italy and France do not), finding oil is a matter of luck, drilling for it a matter of investment - and where's that money coming from? There just isn't that much of a basis for large scale investment in the CSA even if you somehow could inspire enthusiasm, because the economy isn't developed to support it - rather more like Russia or Italy than France, Germany, the UK, or the USA (OTL or TTL).

And if foreign investors are investing most of the money, they're getting most of the profits.

"By 1914 90 percent of mining, almost 100 percent of oil extraction, 40 percent of the metallurgical industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry and even 28 percent of the textile industry" for OTL Russia.

Despite being in (distant) fourth place for industrial muscle and the second largest oil producer in the world, guess the source of the vast majority of Russia's exports?

If you guessed agriculture, you would be correct: 63% in 1913.

Kennedy again.

So unless the CSA somehow manages to get enormous amounts of native liquid capital, substantial interest in development, and so on . . .

At best, it's a less illiterate Italy. At worst, it's not worth counting as relevant.
 
In 1860 the largest city in the Confederacy was New Orleans. The second largest city was Charleston, around 120,000 people smaller. That should just show you what kind of a state the CSA is. Investment? In what? Cotton? The oil deposits in Texas are far from being discovered, and barring foreign intervention to discover oil in Texas, I don't see why the Confederates would find the oil. In 1859, the Pennsylvania Oil Boom had just started. So after the Civil War the United States is a better investment in terms of oil then the Confederacy is.
 
And you can't have a credible navy if you have to buy all your warships from somebody else.

Frankly you are wrong. Please consider the Japanese, which with warships purchased from Britain and France, defeated the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War.

The warship export market was a huge boon to British shipyards and banks. Loans were typically given to foreign governments, such as Brazil for example, on the condition that they place orders with British armament firms. On top of that Armstrong-Whitworth built stock cruisers that were purchased by nations like one buys a car from a dealership.

Using the example of the Grand Fleet is a bit ridiculous. The Anglo-German naval race distorts things so it is best left alone.
 
In 1860 the largest city in the Confederacy was New Orleans. The second largest city was Charleston, around 120,000 people smaller. That should just show you what kind of a state the CSA is. Investment? In what? Cotton? The oil deposits in Texas are far from being discovered, and barring foreign intervention to discover oil in Texas, I don't see why the Confederates would find the oil. In 1859, the Pennsylvania Oil Boom had just started. So after the Civil War the United States is a better investment in terms of oil then the Confederacy is.

I'm fairly certain Texans already knew that there was a lot of oil; it was the bane of ranchers and farmers who were trying to dig (water) wells (in fact, there was already an operational oil well in 1859, in Nacogdoches). So there's going to be an incentive for oil exploration in Texas once oil booms, either on the part of the CSA or foreign investors.
 
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Maybe counting slave population of the CSA? I dunno.



And while the CSA does have oil (which Italy and France do not), finding oil is a matter of luck, drilling for it a matter of investment - and where's that money coming from? There just isn't that much of a basis for large scale investment in the CSA even if you somehow could inspire enthusiasm, because the economy isn't developed to support it - rather more like Russia or Italy than France, Germany, the UK, or the USA (OTL or TTL).

And if foreign investors are investing most of the money, they're getting most of the profits.

"By 1914 90 percent of mining, almost 100 percent of oil extraction, 40 percent of the metallurgical industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry and even 28 percent of the textile industry" for OTL Russia.

Despite being in (distant) fourth place for industrial muscle and the second largest oil producer in the world, guess the source of the vast majority of Russia's exports?

If you guessed agriculture, you would be correct: 63% in 1913.

Kennedy again.

So unless the CSA somehow manages to get enormous amounts of native liquid capital, substantial interest in development, and so on . . .

At best, it's a less illiterate Italy. At worst, it's not worth counting as relevant.

Exactly, with the latter for more likely.
 
Frankly you are wrong. Please consider the Japanese, which with warships purchased from Britain and France, defeated the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War.

The warship export market was a huge boon to British shipyards and banks. Loans were typically given to foreign governments, such as Brazil for example, on the condition that they place orders with British armament firms. On top of that Armstrong-Whitworth built stock cruisers that were purchased by nations like one buys a car from a dealership.

Using the example of the Grand Fleet is a bit ridiculous. The Anglo-German naval race distorts things so it is best left alone.

Very well, I will concede that point. But I will point out that starting with the Satsuma-class, Japan built its own battleships. Since they knew you can't be a credible, long-term, naval power if you can't built your own warships but have to contract everything out.

As for the Grand Fleet, I think the British will still have at least a squadron of battleships without the naval race, and it would still take Chile, Argentina, and Brazil to take said squadron on. I will concede that I should revise 'credible' to 'capable of inflicting more than minor damage on a great power fleet before dying'.

@Elfwine: I agree, the best case scenario for the CSA is a somewhat better version of Italy. I was just applying growth rate to see what numbers would come out in 1913, not seriously arguing for their plausibility. But I think it's telling that even if the CSA, somehow, magically, got the OTL USA growth rate, the Habsburgs beat it almost two to one.
 
@Elfwine: I agree, the best case scenario for the CSA is a somewhat better version of Italy. I was just applying growth rate to see what numbers would come out in 1913, not seriously arguing for their plausibility. But I think it's telling that even if the CSA, somehow, magically, got the OTL USA growth rate, the Habsburgs beat it almost two to one.

Yeah. My point is that such numbers still leave the CSA looking pitiful - it really is that far behind in 1860.

So it was more agreement than argument. :D

It's just a mess. Economic miracles do occur, but when Russia or US like growth rates are not enough with this low a base, I think we can safely assume that "an industrial power" is not going to happen.
 
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