I guess it’s time to address a few of the perpetual myths that seem to crop up regarding the BoB.
Sorry if this is a bit ‘wordy’ I’ve tried to cover as much as possible. I’ve tried to respond to specific comments and those are in bold/Italic text. I’m pretty sure there are going to be bits that might need further explanation or exploration, please feel free to comment or question.
Attrition and higher sortie rates @sonofpegasus @Cryhavoc101 @David Flin
Of the 2 its my opinion that Luftwaffe had the poorer staying power - lacking the reserves, system of aircrew replacement, aircraft production and very importantly for the decision making process the ability to source (there had been no early war investment in dedicated air recce), correctly understand and then disseminate useful actionable intelligence.
We’ll first of all look at sortie rates, all information relates to 08/08/1940 to 06/09/1940. During the period in question Fighter Command conducted 643 sorties per day, roughly 0.68 sorties per pilot per day. This drops to 483 sorties per day between 19/08/1940 to 23/08/1940, 0.51sorties per pilot per day. Certainly, on the British side the increase to fatigue from flying would be insignificant. Now obviously the pressures would be greater for squadrons in 11 Group, the effective front line, but even there not every sortie resulted in combat and it is the reason that squadrons were rotated regularly.
No 1 Squadron was in 11 Group throughout the period in question so if you follow the sortie rate for a single pilot it might give an indication of flying hours/patterns etc.
F/Lt Brown was involved in 2.26 sorties per day, with two combats and an aircraft loss.
Over the thirty-day period Brown was operational for 19 days (11 days recovering from injuries received on 15th after crash) and took part in 43 sorties, 26 of which were active patrols/interceptions – the remaining sorties were flights to and from forward base, practice and local flights. The average sortie length was 36 minutes. So… even assuming on the 8 days of poor weather that no flying was done at all a pilot such as Brown would only be doing an extra 10-11 hours flying and would possibly be involved in one more combat as a result. From what I can tell the fatigue came from the heightened tension of being at constant readiness, the expected danger of bombings and some part from sleep deprivation due to night time air raid sirens. Many a pilot said the only relief they got was when they were in the air.
To see how hard pushed the Luftwaffe was is not quite so easy as I have no individual unit records etc. to go on. From the Luftwaffe Crash Archive series of books, it’s possible to get some indication of the workload imposed on Bf109 pilots from British intelligence reports. The following is a list of accounts from German fighter pilots who make mention of the number of sorties they have undertaken between 8th August and 9th September:
• 14th August – Uffz Gerhart Kemen states that he had a 2.25 sortie rate per day
• 24th August – Ofw Fritz Beeck said he occasionally flew up to 4 sorties a day with rest days
• 28th August – Ofw Artur Dau claimed to have flown 140 sorties in his career. However he had been flying operationally since at least 17th May 1940 as this was the date of his first combat claim.
• 2nd September – Uffz Emil von Stein was shot down on his second war flight since joining his unit in mid-June.
• 5th September – Lt Heinz Schnabel said he had made 15 War Flights since returning to his unit after being injured in mid-May. He was certainly flying throughout August if not sooner.
• 5th September – Uffz Fritz Hotzelmann was assigned a War Flight every other day.
• 6th September – Fw Erich Bramm flew up to 2 sorties a day with at least two days off a week.
• 6th September – Fw Werner Gottschalk had flown 4 War Flights since early August.
• 7th September – Uffz Heinz Zurhage flew 1 sortie a day, occasionally two with 2 days off a week.
• 9th September – Fw August-Willhelm Muller recorded 22 War Flights since (probably) early July.
• 9th September – Uffz Georg Rauwolf flew 18 War Flights since June.
While this is only a small sample of pilots it shows great similarities to their British counterparts, there were certain units/pilots that flew multiple sorties and there were many others who flew occasional sorties. A good guesstimate based on the limited information available would suggest that German pilots were undertaking 1 sortie per day on average but in most cases had the advantage of regular rest days.
If you look at Bf109 activity over Britain it tells a slightly different story, on the quietest days there were fewer than 100 fighter sorties over Britain (War Flights), regularly there were 300-400 and occasionally 600-700. So on average it’s safe to assume that on average a pilot conducted 1 War Flight every couple of days. The other sorties were, in all likelihood, movements to forward base, defence patrols, local flights and training/test flights.
Bomber crews flew even fewer sorties in general, on a typical day the Luftwaffe was only using about a quarter of the available bomber force.
I think what I’m trying to say is that increasing the flying activity over eight of the 29 days in question is not going to contribute considerable to an increase in fatigue. The heightened alert status and lack of rest periods are more likely to increase fatigue but, as Fighter Command stayed on a medium alert even on the worst weather days, and, as the Luftwaffe included regular rest days in their flying routine I doubt that even this will make much of a difference.
Britain is outproducing Germany in airframes.
Yes, Britain is out producing Germany and is also repairing more aircraft but on the flip side more Hurricanes/Spitfires are being lost and damaged than the Bf109. A quick comparison of losses and available replacements over the 5 days before and after 19th – 23rd August (plus the limited losses from 19th-23rd) against the same period but with increased activity shows that Fighter Command will lose an extra 28% of monthly production compared with an increase of 27% for the Bf109. The Bf110 has not been included in the calculations as it was the only type on the Luftwaffe books where production matched and/or exceeded losses throughout the battle.
This does not mean that there will be a huge reduction in either British or Luftwaffe sorties immediately however. Fighter Command had a good reserve of aircraft never dropping below 100 in the storage units and the Luftwaffe rarely used more than half of their Bf109s at any one time with a maximum push of over 600 on 7th September.
The proposed increase in activity (using rudimentary calculations) would see Fighter Command running out of reserves of aircraft by the end of August
British pilots that survive being shot down get to return to the fray.
German aircrew that survive being shot down get to become POW.
This is a given, not only a loss of pilots but aircraft too as there would be a whole pile of aircraft that might have been repairable that are no longer available for recovery. Fighter Command was running at 55% lost and 45% Cat 2 repairable (extensive repairs required). In comparison the Bf109 was running at 73% and 27% respectively. During the period 8th August to 6th September this difference would equate to roughly 70 extra Bf109s repairable rather than lost.
During the same period the Luftwaffe lost 75 pilots taken as POWs. After loss or damage 46% of British pilots were unhurt and available to fly immediately compared to 38% of the Bf109 pilots. The British wounded/injury rate was 26% with half of those minor, so available to fly again in a day or two at most, compared with just 12% of the Bf109 pilots. 59% of Fighter Command’s pilots were available to fly again either immediately or within a day or two whereas only 44% of Bf109 pilots were in the same position. Using these figures it would seem that fighting over Britain cost the Luftwaffe roughly 55 Bf109 pilots due to being taken as POWs, the remaining 20 were beyond flying due to injury/wounds.
RAF Repairs @sonofpegasus
A quick passage from ‘Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority’ Edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling with the Battle of Britain study authored by Robin Higham.
“During this period, the production of new Hurricanes and Spitfires remained fairly constant: 394 in July, 463 in August, and 373 in September. But the number of repaired Hurricanes and Spitfires being returned to service climbed from 85 in June to 121 in July, 146 in August, and 166 in September. In October, as the pressure of intense fighting dropped off and the civilian repair organization of the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) under Beaverbrook’s direction really got underway, supplementing the RAF repair system, the number of repaired and returned machines rose to 255.”
This shows that whilst the maintenance units were doing an excellent job they were still a long way from working at full tilt during August 1940. With production of Hurricanes/Spitfires at 463 and repairs at 146, a loss of 442 with 356 Cat 2 damaged (Figures from Battle of Britain Then and Now) that shows a wastage of 189 fighters. An additional 8 days of fighting could, as a minimum, add another 200 lost aircraft.
At the end of the day the battle was a fanatical bunch verses enthusiastic amateurs with the Luftwaffe being the latter @Cryhavoc101
In the opinion of one author in one book, a view that is not expressed by anyone else in any other publication I have read.
Note that the accident rate will increase more than the sortie rate does, due to the increase in air-and maintenance-crew fatigue meaning more errors per air-hour than OTL. @GarethC
Personally, I’m not sure that this follows, the ground crews would not increase their work rate, they conducted routine maintenance and servicing in the main. If an aircraft was damaged it would either be left on site and repaired when crews were available or shipped off to be repaired off site. Poor weather did not prevent the ground mechanics from continuing with their tasks so I just don’t see this being an issue. If anything, it might just mean one fewer aircraft available per squadron in the latter part of August due to a backlog of flying hour related servicing. Anyone know how many hours were flown between services? I think the only way this would have any affect is if the service periods are less than 100 flying hours. Any thoughts?
To what extent in OTL did relief fighter squadrons come in from other air groups? These should still be available, and there may be greater pressure to bring in the Polish squadrons earlier than OTL. @CaptainCalvert
Squadrons were regularly swapped between groups to offer relief to mauled squadrons and give them time to reequip, rest and train new pilots until Dowding introduced the Stabilisation Scheme on 8th September. Basically, at that time there were too few fresh squadrons to provide full replacement.
The question of pilots
As of the 8th August Fighter Command had 55 Squadrons fit for operations, including 19 Spitfire and 26 Hurricane, and 6 squadrons refitting or under training. As of the 3rd August there were 1434 pilots and final training at OTUs was increased to a month from 2 weeks.
The question of pilots seems to have popped up several times, which is understandable, in particular pilots transferred from other branches.
The FAA loaned Fighter Command 68 pilots in June 1940 but 10 had to be recalled as fighting in the Med increased the FAAs workload and the First Lord said that no more detachments were possible.
From Bomber Command 20 Volunteers were called for from the four Battle squadrons, roughly 20-25% of the available pilots. Bomber Command were not willing to provide more because firstly a large number of pilots destined for both Bomber and Coastal Commands had already been diverted to Fighter Command prior to OTU stage and secondly the remaining Battle pilots were destined for conversion to other bomber types imminently.
From Army Cooperation squadrons there was a transfer of 33 Lysander pilots to Fighter Command.
During the heaviest fighting through August and the first week of September Fighter Command reported a pilot wastage of 120 pilots a week. Despite shortening the OTU training period to just two weeks by mid-August AND the transfer of pilots from other areas only 260 replacement pilots were available throughout August. By the end of the month there were 1023 Hurricane and Spitfire pilots but that included those in hospital, those recuperating, those on leave and 160 pilots who were classed as non-operational, mainly because they had passed out of training too quickly and were not classed as good enough to fly in combat. In essence there were only 850 operational pilots on the 1st September, or about 16 operational pilots per squadron. 11 Group Squadrons tried to maintain an establishment of 19 pilots but this was not always possible especially in squadrons freshly arrived in in the front line as they suffered disproportionate losses in the first few days of being in 11 Group. For example, the following numbers are taken from ‘The Battle of Britain (RAF Official Histories)’; T.C.G. James: -
616 Squadron was posted to 11 Group on 25th August and lost 5 Pilots and 12 Aircraft by 2nd September
603 Squadron lost 7 Pilots and 16 Aircraft from 28th August to 6th September.
253 Squadron lost 9 Pilots and 13 Aircraft between 30th August and 6th September.
AVM Park had asked on numerous occasions, from early on in the battle, for a systemic change that would see experienced pilots moved from squadrons in quieter groups as replacements for lost 11 Group Pilots but Dowding persisted in wholesale squadron replacement. By early September it became obvious a change was needed, between 24th August and 6th September there had been 21 squadron movements and 2 new squadrons formed as part of 11 Group. It was putting an unnecessary strain on organisation, logistics and transport. By 6th September all of the Hurricane/Spitfire squadrons that could be used were either stationed or had been stationed in 11 Group or neighbouring Sectors.
On 8th September the Stabilisation Scheme was enacted by Dowding whereby squadrons were Classified as A, B or C squadrons. The 28 ‘A’ squadrons were those in 11 Group plus those at Duxford and Middle Wallop Sectors that were to be kept up to strength by direct pilot replacement. There were 5 ‘B’ Squadrons who were to be kept up to strength and used as wholesale replacements should an ‘A’ squadron have a particularly bad day or two and needed immediate withdrawal. The remaining ‘C’ squadrons were posted to the more remote Sectors and were used to train pilots fresh from the OTUs, and retained a small handful of experienced pilots, usually just 5 or 6 per squadron. By this time there were effectively 750 operational pilots and a couple of hundred pilots in squadron training.
