A Bomb 1944 was there a tactical use in Europe

[Andre27]

Fuel Air Bombs?
EMP?
Radiological (i.e. Neutron Bomb)?
Herbicide?

Fuel Air Bombs although being big m... f... are considered conventional weapons and not WMD.

EMP was until fairly recently a by-product from a WMD detonation. While destructive it is not classified as a WMD either.

Radiological can be a WMD, but little things like fall-out being distributed over large areas makes it a strategic rather than a tactical weapon.

Herbicide = Toxic Gas

 

[Cook]

Or are you referring to WWII A-Bombs, which had higher explosive powers?

World War Two era atomic bombs (10 – 15kt) were very much on the low side when compared to later tactical nuclear weapons, which ranged anywhere from 1kt to 250kt.

But that is getting away from the subject.

 

[Michele]

You still miss the point. An atomic weapon is a WMD and therefor by definition a strategic weapon.

Huh, that's a present-day connotation. Bad mistake. Don't try to make people of the past think like you, they just won't.

The range and usage is insignificant because of the sheer political ramifications.

As mentioned, I agree that the political ramifications are important and that they may bring to strategic use of nukes. That doesn't change the fact that a weapon system that cannot hit anything beyond 2 kms from your forward positions on the frontline isn't strategic, in itself.

There is simply no tactical usage of nuclear weapons.

Of course there is. If the US Army had used a Davy Crockett in order to stop a battalion-sized tank attack in WWIII, that would have been a tactical weapon used for a tactical purpose.

Exactly the same applies to, say gas weapons. You may call them WMDs if you wish; that's a present-day connotation. In WWI, they were fired by short-ranged artillery pieces to hit enemy trenches in order to facilitate gas-masked infantry assaults. It's a tactical weapon used for a tactical purpose.
Your calling it a WMD is neither here nor there, in general, and especially within the WWI context.

May I suggest that you read up about the smaller-yield nukes of the 1950s. Such a reading will be an eye-opener. I suppose your mindset is shaped by a vague background awareness of things like the Mk 41 warhead: 25 megatons, which is 25,000 kilotons. Little Boy was 12-15 kilotons. The Mk 41 was in service until 1976, but the Cold War era thinking about these doom weapons is lasting. Anyway, the Mk 53 was still available until last year as part of the enduring stockpile, and it still was a hefty 9,000 kilotons. The dialed-down yield of the warhead fired by a Davy Crockett was 0,01 kilotons.

 

[Michele]

There would have been no tactical use for an atomic weapon in 1944.

I agree with this, but for the reasons I gave above. OTOH I find some of your arguments, below, dubious.

For those who claim that a nuclear weapon would be able to bust bunkers open your totally mistaken as the shockwave and overpressure at ground level is far less than conventional explosives which would have been far more effective in that role.

Surely you'd had to qualify such a statement in relation to the weights of ordnance dropped.
Also I wonder if you are considering that the real-life examples of nuclear weapons used in wars were airbursts, not ground bursts.

For those that assume that a major battle would be a good location you have to consider the blast and damage radius; from the bombs dropped on Japan we know that only about 26% of people were killed within 3mi of the epicenter of the blast, and that ~85% of all those killed were within an area about half a mile in radius.

Hence you've got about a 2km blast zone where it will be tactically useful.

Given that most battles ranged over tens of kilometers of front your hardly going to make a dent in even the most fierce battles of 1944. Thus while you'll certainly shock the troops in the region your not really dropping a battle winning wonder weapon.

OTOH I don't wonder about this; this is plainly wrong.
Sure operations ranged over many kilometers of frontage. That's not to say that there weren't areas more important than others. And more importantly, if the conventional friendly troops have appropriate plans, the wonder weapon will be a battle winner. In that it will open a sudden, unexpected breach in the enemy line, which armored friendly troops can immediately exploit.
Oh, there is this objection:

Then we have to consider the effects of radiation. The weapon designers knew very well that the bombs would produce radioactive material, thus they knew they didn't really want to be moving into areas that had been bombed, at least not right after the blast.

As you say, the bomb designers - which aren't the same men as generals. Generals would be worried about any immediate effects of radiations, i.e. the danger that their men could become sick within hours, or days, or weeks. They knew nothing and couldn't care less even if they had known about long-term health hazards (heck, later on they deliberately exposed troops to radiations in tests!!).
Soldiers wearing ordinary chemical protection, moving through the hot zone on vehicles, and eating/drinking nothing in it, are unlikely to suffer irradiation high enough to immediately affect their performance.

We have to remember that there was an opinion to invite 3rd parties and deligations from the axis to watch the Trinity(?) blast to let the Axis know that the Allies had built the Atomic Bomb and that within a few months that was going to be dropped on their forces or cities. The idea being to let the axis commander know the war was lost and have them give up without ever having to use the weapon in anger.

Yeah, a scientists' opinion. Not going to last more than a snowball in hell once the weapon is actually available and in the generals' hands.

If the Allies had the Atomic Bomb in 1944 that is the most likely course of action rather than actually dropping the bomb on Germany, and even if they had dropped it on Germany the way that the Nazis could use the propaganda of the Allies vapourising a city means that's the last place the Allies would want to drop the weapon.

You mean like they were worried about enemy propaganda when they firebombed Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo, and when they nuked Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Hence Berlin or any other German city is not an opition to demonstrate the weapon. This was an actual decision made by Allied high command earlier in the war (however it got changed later after VE day). Thus if the weapon was dropped in anger it would likely be some small millitary target away from populated areas (but close enough to be visable) with the attack pre-announced/or credited as soon as it happened, in order that it wouldn't give the Germans a propaganda victory and that the weapon would have the desired effect...shock...shock being much less if it is used in an actual battle and found to not be all that effective insuring the enemy doesn't fear its tactical use.

For these reasons, there is no tactical use for an atomic weapon in 1944.

You are arguing with yourself, you know. If there really is no tactical use for an atomic weapon in 1944, then the other way to use it is strategically. On Berlin, or some other city if the Allies make the mistake of wanting the current German government (i.e. one raving lunatic) still in charge after the first explosion.

Or conversely, if you really believe in your ahistorical idea that the Allies were worried about enemy propaganda, then they will demonstrate the weapon - on a useful target, however (BTW, it's not as if they had hundreds of those toys). So we're back to tactical use. Aachen or its whereabouts in september 1944 just springs to mind, followed by Cologne in order to break the supply routes to the defenders of the Hürtgenwald. Nice, effective tactical targets that save Allied lives and time, while at the same time providing an impressive, useful demonstration.

As a final aside, when, in all human history, during a war, was a new revolutionary weapon used for demonstration purposes only, just in order to impress the enemy?

 

[Andre27]

Huh, that's a present-day connotation. Bad mistake. Don't try to make people of the past think like you, they just won't..

Actually this was already the accepted policy during world war two so perhaps it is you who needs to read up on facts.

The allies had stockpiled poison gas to retaliate against German cities if Germany ever used Poison gas against allied forces. The allies considered any use of WMD as strategic usage.

By the same definition an atomic weapon is a strategic weapon and not a tactical one.

 

[Michele]

Actually this was already the accepted policy during world war two so perhaps it is you who needs to read up on facts.

So you'll now be able to quote sources dated 1945 that use the term "weapons of mass destruction"?

The allies had stockpiled poison gas to retaliate against German cities if Germany ever used Poison gas against allied forces. The allies considered any use of WMD as strategic usage.

Hell no. You are projecting present-day terminology and states of mind onto period concepts and conventions, besides being factually wrong.
The Allies had signed the 1925 Protocol against poison gases, or had made a no-first-use commitment (in the case of the USA who had not signed the Protocol).
That said, the USA, for instance, had plenty of 4.2" mortar units, and do you know how the units using them were named? Chemical mortar companies. The weapon had specifically been designed to deliver chemical weapons - obviously, in a tactical context. You can't lob a 4.2" mortar shell strategically.
Sure the Allies would also use other chemical weapons strategically, if the Germans started using them, strategically or tactically. That doesn't mean that both side couldn't use them tactically, too, if they so wished.

Your reasoning goes bankrupt when you assume that since the tactical use of some weapon might make a similar weapon be used strategically, that means that that tactical use actually is strategic. That's just plain wrong from a simple logic POV. The tactical use is tactical; it may then make a strategic use possible.
Otherwise, you know, by your reasoning one could claim that since conventional bombs can be used tactically against a frontline bunker, but also strategically against a factory hundreds of kms in the rear areas, this means that conventional bombs are strategic weapons only.

By the same definition an atomic weapon is a strategic weapon and not a tactical one.

Yeah. In fact, the problem is exactly that the definition doesn't hold water.

As a side note, I notice you have nothing to reply to the considerations about range and yield (power). Of course, since these alone prove you are wrong.

 

[Gunnarnz]

Sorry, but I have to agree with Michele here. I once asked our local nuclear arms academic about what the difference was between a tactical and a strategic nuclear weapon (I was confused by Pershing missiles, tactical weapons, having yields around 300kt). His response was that whether a weapon is tactical or strategic basically boils down to what you use it for, which makes a fair bit of sense. By modern standards the two weapons that were used on Japan had yields more like tactical weapons, but they were used for a strategic effect and thus merit being called strategic weapons. The "Lulu" nuclear depth charge had a similar yield, but is clearly a tactical weapon.

If a nuclear weapon - or any other - can't strike strategic targets or have some other strategic effect, it's a tactical weapon in practical terms and should be regarded as such. There's nothing magic about nukes that makes them automatically strategic weapons, although a certain amount of magical thinking does get used about them unfortunately.
There are plenty of examples of people using chemical weapons tactically, WWI being the obvious starting point, but I don't think we can really call those weapons strategic ones. Modern rhetoric tends to conflate terms a lot, usually in pursuit of an emotional reaction, and lumps NBCR weapons (and cluster bombs, incendiaries, and a whole lot of other stuff) together as "weapons of mass destruction". But that's a modern term, for modern sensibilities, and neither matches what people thought about them historically.
Apart from anything else, there's a pragmatic argument to consider as well. No-one seriously thinks that the use of a 1kt tactical weapon on a battlefield has the same strategic effect as sending 1000 bombers over Cologne, do they? No? Good, then lets put this idea to rest.

 

[Cook]

This all presumes the Allies actually have a means of delivery though...

The B-29 was in operational service from April 1944. In addition to which the Lancaster bomber was in service from 1942 and could carry the Grand Slam which was both heavier (almost twice as heavy) and longer (more than double) than Fat Man.

if you nuke the central station and whole city with it.

You aren’t going to destroy ‘the whole city’, at Hiroshima the Marine training Division was housed in barracks at Ujina, less than four kilometres from the epicentre of the blast. Being a concrete and brick building, the barracks were not substantially damaged and was converted to a hospital for those injured in the blast. Japanese cities were far more vulnerable to bombing than German cities because the far more buildings were build out of timber and light-weight materials while German buildings were mostly brick.

you could bring the third Reich to collapse

Given that the thousand bomber raids by the RAF, starting with Cologne in 1942, each delivered more damage to their targets than Fat Man and still didn’t bring about the collapse of the Reich, I think we must rule that out unless some other factor is involved (such as the decapitation of the Reich government and much of the party apparatus.)

The German Army is not going to dissolve with Hitler dead at least at this point in time...

Commanders on the Italian and Western fronts would certainly have been willing to surrender from the time of the breakout from Normandy onwards; von Rundstedt’s ‘End the war you fools’ really did say it all.

Lubeck has been referenced as a European A-Bomb target, but beyond the comment about literature about the early atomic program, does anyone have any more detail?

I think you will find that references to German cities would be only in the form of concepts discussion papers as to the impact the new weapon would have on a city of a known size, rather than a formal study into which German cities would have been considered best; the Los Alamos Target Committee only met for the first time on 27 April, 1945. First you have to build a working bomb, then you can think about where you’re going to use it.

For an idea of the criteria the committee considered when selecting a target, here are the minutes of the second (and final) meeting of the committee on 10-11 May, 1945.

http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html

You’ll note that at the top of the final list was Kyoto, the old capital of Japan. Truman ruled out both Tokyo and Kyoto because for their cultural and historical importance. From his diary, 25 July, 1945:

‘An experiment in the New Mexico desert was startling - to put it mildly… I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new… He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance.’

In my opinion, the very nature of an A-bomb doesn't allow for tactical use.

That was not the consensus at the time:

 

[Andre27]

So you'll now be able to quote sources dated 1945 that use the term "weapons of mass destruction"?

The first known use of the term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is from 1937 although it should be noted that this referred to massive aerial bombing.

The first use of the term in relation to atomic weapons is by J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Even if the term WMD was not yet commonplace during WW2, the use of poison gas by Germany would have started a strategic response by western allies. Preparations for this can be found in the Bari gas disaster following the sinking of Liberty ship John Harvey.

In addition there is the radio speech by Churchill in which he made a direct threat to use Poison Gas against German cities.

"We know the Huns, which is the reason why we are keeping up our afford and why we are building up our storage of chemical weapons. I would say that should Germany again attack our ally, Soviet, with more chemical weapons, then we will start using such gas in our attacks on German cities and towns."

This indicates a clear strategic response to the use of Chemical weapons.

To summarize: Even if the terms strategic and tactical use and "weapons of mass destruction" did not come into place until after WW2 the response to the use of WMD would be a strategic one. By the earliest definition of WMD (1937) atomic weapons are strategic weapons. There may be tactical uses (though not in the WW2 era) but the weapon itself is by definition a strategic weapon.

Edit:
Some quick links for reference.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapon...y_uses_of_the_term_weapon_of_mass_destruction

http://rense.com/general83/gas.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_raid_on_Bari#John_Harvey

 

[Michele]

The first known use of the term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" is from 1937 although it should be noted that this referred to massive aerial bombing.

The first use of the term in relation to atomic weapons is by J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Even if the term WMD was not yet commonplace during WW2,

Oh good. I was going to ask you for sources for the claims above, but since it's moot, then OK.

the use of poison gas by Germany would have started a strategic response by western allies. Preparations for this can be found in the Bari gas disaster

I'm well aware of the Bari tragedy, I'm Italian. Of course the Allies would have launched a strategic response - and a tactical one too. That's not in discussion, so could you please stop making strawmen.
What is in discussion is that the fact that a certain kind of weapon is used strategically means that another weapon of the same kind, that has been used tactically, magically becomes a strategic weapon. Got the point?

Interstingly enough, the load of the Harvey wasn't a gas weapon that could only be used strategically. They weren't ballistic missiles having a minimum range. They could have been dropped 1 km behind the frontlines, if so wished by the Allied generals.

By the earliest definition of WMD (1937) atomic weapons are strategic weapons.

Uh, no. Even if you can dig up an apax legomenon dated 1937 of "WMD", that doesn't mean it makes them strategic only.

There may be tactical uses (though not in the WW2 era)

That there were no good tactical uses has never been in discussion; that's my original claim, so please stop erecting strawmen. Even the proposals I made for a putative tactical use are in the better-than-nothing class. But that's simply because of the issue of power (an issue you studiously ignore, since it is one of those that demolish your peculiar views). The actually available nuclear weapons, being above 10 kilotons, were simply too big to be expended on a battlefield.
That's why I mentioned the Davy Crockett launcher with its 2-km range (another issue you carefully ignore being range) and its 10-ton yield (when dialed down to the minimum possible yield).
Now imagine this. You tell Zhukov: we have a device that weighs 25 kgs, can be fired by three men from a tripod or a jeep, and packs the explosive power of a full all-tubes salvo from an entire battery of katyushas. Do you think he won't find a tactical use for that?

but the weapon itself is by definition a strategic weapon.

Well, by your definition, which is what is broken about your position.

Now for some more fun. On Septemebr 1, 1939, Stukas bombed the Polish town of Wielun. The bombing of cities, according to British policy, would and indeed did bring about a strategic response in kind, with the same type of attack. Therefore, the fact that in 1945 Dresden suffered a strategic attack by bombers, means that the Stuka and the 250-kg and even the 50-kg bombs were strategic weapons by definition. By your definition.

Maybe it's time that you revise the definition. Now, I will reply to further posts by you if you avoid strawmen and provide new arguments. Otherwise, please carry on.

 

[BlairWitch749]

the germans would retaliate with mustard agent, tabun and sarin spraying attacks by night over central london

which would bring about complete and utter mustard/lewisite (and probably anthrax) saturation of germany

and depending on how stubborn the germans wanted to be versus how pissed the allies would be from the nerve and chemical agents sprayed on the uk, they could just exterminate the entire german culture

 

[Michele]

Sorry, but I have to agree with Michele here. I once asked our local nuclear arms academic about what the difference was between a tactical and a strategic nuclear weapon (I was confused by Pershing missiles, tactical weapons, having yields around 300kt). His response was that whether a weapon is tactical or strategic basically boils down to what you use it for, which makes a fair bit of sense. By modern standards the two weapons that were used on Japan had yields more like tactical weapons, but they were used for a strategic effect and thus merit being called strategic weapons. The "Lulu" nuclear depth charge had a similar yield, but is clearly a tactical weapon.

If a nuclear weapon - or any other - can't strike strategic targets or have some other strategic effect, it's a tactical weapon in practical terms and should be regarded as such. There's nothing magic about nukes that makes them automatically strategic weapons, although a certain amount of magical thinking does get used about them unfortunately.

Thanks, the gist of my position exactly.

Now, of course there may be a strategic reaction to a tactical measure. That cannot be ruled out. It doesn't make the tactical measure strategic. Chinese soldiers tactically fired their tactical weapons (rifles!) at Japanese tactical forces in the vicinity of the Marco Polo bridge in 1937; the Japanese response was strategic, and it was planned to be so. That doesn't make the rifle a strategic weapon.

 

[Michele]

the germans would retaliate with mustard agent, tabun and sarin spraying attacks by night over central london

Nothing to be too excited about.
On January 21, 1944, the Germans began carrying out the Baby Blitz. They sent out 447 sorties. They suffered 43 bombers lost to combat and non-combat causes, an unsustainable 9% rate. And in exchange, they placed 44 bombs within the Greater London defense area (which is immensely wider than "central London"). There were 201 more bombs reported, but all over the place, including the Kent, Sussex and Essex countryside.

So what could have the Germans achieved if those 44 bombs had been gas bombs?
With mustard gas, little; it's annoying but rarely lethal. They would have overburdened the British hospitals for a short while.
With sarin, nothing. It was not weaponized yet.
With tabun, something. It was lethal, though not as lethal as sarin and later nerve agents. It was also notoriously unstable and the Germans' stockpile wasn't recent. It is also very volatile and in the open, high concentrations are required regardless of its low LD50.

Spraying tanks were also a possibility. They would have required flying very low to be effective, and, obviously, finding Greater London in the first place, something that as shown was no longer that easy for the late-war under-trained German bomber crews.

 

[Genmotty]

...I find some of your arguments, below, dubious.

Well you don't have to because I can back up what I said.

Blast Waves/Pressures:
An air blast does not transfer a strong concussive effect on the ground as air is far less dense then earth about 1.2kg/m3 and 1500kg/m3 respectfully, thus only about 1/1000th of the energy from the air shockwave is transferred to the ground (for a given radius) Concrete is about 2500kg/m3 So even a lightly buried bunker is only going to have about 0.048% of the energy from the blast be transferred to it. Negligible.

A ground burst by comparison for a given radius is about 60%.

This is why the 'Grand Slam' bomb was developed to penetrate into the ground/concrete of a bunker and then detonate as a literal ground burst transferring the whole 6.5tons of TNT of blast directly at the structure.

About 1 in 20 people survived at the very centre of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts with little more than having been in their basements, hardened structures or underground at the time with no real formal 'bunkered' protection. Fact. You can go look that up from any site/book/source whatever that has statistics on the civilians killed.
Akiko Takakura survived the detonation of the 16kt warhead at a distance of just 300 meters from the hypocenter, with only minor injuries, due in most part to her position of residing in the lobby of the bank of Japan, a reinforced concrete building, at the time of the Nuclear explosion. To name a specific case.

A typical German blast door would be rated to a couple hundred kg, but since they vary and have differing statistics, then one would have to ask the number of blast doors and size of the blast void behind them, it would be very difficult to crunch the numbers unless considering specific examples.

To give an idea of even how good basic German bunker design such as was used on the Atlantic wall in the channel islands, one bunker took about 70 1-ton shells off a British ship on Alderney and the door is still intact today (not claiming these shells were direct hits, but the bunker was able to withstand heavy continued bombardment without being compromised).

Blast Size & Effect:

For those that assume that a major battle would be a good location you have to consider the blast and damage radius; from the bombs dropped on Japan we know that only about 26% of people were killed within 3mi of the epicenter of the blast, and that ~85% of all those killed were within an area about half a mile in radius.

Hence you've got about a 2km blast zone where it will be tactically useful.

OTOH I don't wonder about this; this is plainly wrong.
Sure operations ranged over many kilometers of frontage. That's not to say that there weren't areas more important than others. And more importantly, if the conventional friendly troops have appropriate plans, the wonder weapon will be a battle winner. In that it will open a sudden, unexpected breach in the enemy line, which armored friendly troops can immediately exploit.

Really this is wrong is it?
Sources;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki
http://www.nukefix.org/weapon.html

Numbers don't generally lie.

For most battles you can find a battle map showing the scale of the battle. If we take the Battle of the Bulge for instance;

and we know that the nuclear blasts at maximum are about 3mi in radius, then one can get a comprehension of the scale of the battle. Remember only about 1mi represents the blast centre of tactical effectiveness.

We also have to remember that Allied and Axis forces would be typically very close together, meaning that to drop a bomb on the enemies front means your also dropping it on your own men. Furthermore the Germans aren't going to be stupid if they see Allied troops falling back they are going to pursue, or realise that they they are retreating so that the German positions can be bombarded. Thus the Germans know they have to move out from where they are.


Another battle map with scale;
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1c/Aachen.jpg

If a bomb had been dropped at Aachen the entire forest would have been burnt to a crisp, Allied and Axis troops alike ¬.¬


Finally remember the Mining of the German trenches at the Somme in the Great War? The Allied Generals know they can't go right in after dropping the bombs because their troops will get covered by radioactive particulate, and the generals knew this long before the bombs were dropped in Japan. They also knew that the radiation would decay exponentially over time, thus it is immediately very strong enough to kill of people within hours or days, but after about 48hrs it has decayed a thousand times to a low level which might be considered safe to move into the region.

Hence they cannot move into a sudden hole in the line, since they know they have to wait about 2 days before they can move into the area, or condemn the troops they sent to a very painful and messy death from radiation sickness (and they did know about this before the atomic bombing of Japan, but what they didn't know with much certainty was the scale of effect radiation would have on troops).

The generals knew that a few tens of people had been killed from radiation sickness throughout the Manhattan Project and before and were well knowledgeable in it effects, but also weren't certain of the level of contamination from a blast. Hence 48hrs was stated as a minimum time to wait before moving into a blast zone (REF: Colonel Seeman advising Major General Hull on Operation Downfall).

While yes, today we know that it would be possible to a level to move earlier than 48hrs with adequate forms of protection and preparedness. Then they didn't know quite how strong the radiation was in the environment, what black rain was or how to deal with the level of devastation wrought.



Choice of Target(s):
Look up the Interim Committee [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interim_Committee] as well as what Allied Intelligence knew on the Nazi atomic bomb project. It was well known to the Allies in 1943 that the Germans would not (likely) be able to catch up with the Allied effort, hence Szilards and Einstein’s fear that the Nazis may build the bomb were actually unfounded.

The scientists at the Manhattan Project were not informed of this fact and so right up until before the fall of Germany were under the impression that the Nazis were still working on the weapon and so they were building theirs.

The point being that the Allies knew that they didn't have to build the bomb anyway, but it was built anyway. Thus when it appeared that the bomb might be ready before the fall of Germany the awkward question had to be asked of how should it be used.

There is much debate on the issue and many sources and opinions here is an overview article; [http://www.anzasa.arts.usyd.edu.au/ahas/bomb_historiography.html]

The fact of the matter is that it was decided not to bomb Germany, and that Japan should be bombed instead. Plus there is the fact that this thread is about a tactical use, not a strategic use. It is likely that had the bomb been used in a strategy context in Germany it might have been the Ruhr or another similar strategic target, but it is unlikely to have been a city although claim and counter claim are pointless without reading the various sources, for that reason we cannot hope that people here will do so, and so arguing city or not city is pointless. From what I know/read/seen I believe that the Allies would not have made themselves another Dresdan.

The Allies were always very conscious about Nazi propaganda because occupied Europe did believe it (read up on its effectiveness), and they also had a moral imperative to be 'better than the Soviets' war crimes were something that it was important the Allies be not seen to conduct after they had called the Soviets out on it.

As a final aside, when, in all human history, during a war, was a new revolutionary weapon used for demonstration purposes only, just in order to impress the enemy?

Thermopylae springs to mind right away...

Then you have siege artillery from the Dark Ages and Medieval era desired to make castles surrender without a fight since you could reduce their walls.

Then there is the development of the Musket/Arquebus whose use against various medieval lords and later new world/oriental 'primitives' was more than a demonstration enough.

Then there is the machine-gun...

The list isn't endless, but half of just even having a military, is just a demonstration of will and capacity for a nation to fight if called for. Look at Switzerland for example .


EDIT: With that last section, I know that's not exactly what you meant, but my implication from the examples is that a demostration does generally involve some blood. At the same time, the point of 'shock and awe' is to spill as little blood as possible in creating that 'shock and awe', the Japanese were a very 'fanatical' people therefore it is likely they would have needed more convincing than the Germans the game was up, particularly since their armies were well on the retreat by mid '44, while Japan still held Manchuria, parts of China and much of their home islands still and had the deathwish spirit to boot.

 

[Michele]

A ground burst by comparison for a given radius is about 60%.

This is why the 'Grand Slam' bomb was developed to penetrate into the ground/concrete of a bunker and then detonate as a literal ground burst transferring the whole 6.5tons of TNT of blast directly at the structure.

About 1 in 20 people survived at the very centre of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts with little more than having been in their basements, hardened structures or underground at the time with no real formal 'bunkered' protection. Fact. You can go look that up from any site/book/source whatever that has statistics on the civilians killed.

I have no doubts about anything of that and I don't need to check. However, the blast at Hiroshima was an air burst. And I don't see why a nuclear bomb cannot penetrate into the ground before exploding, thus doing exactly the same thing as a Grand Slam - only, in the form of an earthquake shockwave.

Blast Size & Effect:
Really this is wrong is it?


Numbers don't generally lie.

No, in fact I'm doubting your conclusions, not the numbers.

For most battles you can find a battle map showing the scale of the battle. If we take the Battle of the Bulge for instance;

Thanks I'm somewhat familiar with WWII battles and battle maps. That's exactly why I'm telling you that a hole in the frontline of the size of 1 km, if it's done in the right point, and if the friendly ground troops are ready to exploit it, will be quite likely to have strategic effects even on a battle that rages for some fifty kms on both sides of it.
A few examples for you:

- at Montecassino, a 1-km radius would have been more than enough to end the standoff during the first battle of that name.
- during the final breakout of operation Cobra, the area that was conventionally carpet-bombed was some 2 kms by 5 kms, and that was largely inaccurate and ineffective; but a nuclear attack on the same area would have made the hole the US troops needed.
- at Chambois, in the final battle for closing the Falaise pocket, a kill zone of 2 kms in radius behind the head of the German final offenisve to break out of the thinly held stopping positions would have doomed the Germans.
- or for something entirely different, imagine if the Germans had had a 2-km radius of effectiveness available when the Soviets had 3-km depth at Stalingrad.

We also have to remember that Allied and Axis forces would be typically very close together, meaning that to drop a bomb on the enemies front means your also dropping it on your own men. Furthermore the Germans aren't going to be stupid if they see Allied troops falling back they are going to pursue, or realise that they they are retreating so that the German positions can be bombarded. Thus the Germans know they have to move out from where they are.

A battle front isn't paper thin. Much of the effectiveness of the actual frontline riflemen depends on things that are 500 to 2,000 meters behind them, such as ammo dumps, HQs, field hospitals, supply units, reserves, artillery units, armor units. So dropping a bomb 3 kms behind the closest enemy position is fine with me. That position can be attacked and dealt with in the usual way, and then - the enemy will have nothing supporting it.

If a bomb had been dropped at Aachen the entire forest would have been burnt to a crisp, Allied and Axis troops alike ¬.¬

That depends on when it was dropped, i.e., how close the Allies had come to it, wouldn't it.

The Allied Generals know they can't go right in after dropping the bombs because their troops will get covered by radioactive particulate, and the generals knew this long before the bombs were dropped in Japan. They also knew that the radiation would decay exponentially over time, thus it is immediately very strong enough to kill of people within hours or days, but after about 48hrs it has decayed a thousand times to a low level which might be considered safe to move into the region.

Assuming that that is really an issue, it's interesting to note that it cna be very well perfectly used against the enemy.

For Monte Cassino or Stalingrad, for instance, you first kill a lot of soldiers in the key 2-km frontage and depth. Then you wait as an astounded enemy rushes to move what little reserves they have to plug the hole. They will not be wearing gas masks because there is no trace of gases. They will drink the water.
Once these are becoming ill, say after those 48 hours, you attack in protective gear.

For the Falaise pocket, it's the Germans that have to move through the hot zone, not the Allies.

The one operation where time is of the essence is Cobra. But that's also interesting, in that the USA took some 600 casualties because of that conventional bombardment, plus of course all the casualties caused by enemy action. I wonder what radiation sickness price would be considered affordable.

And we're talking about a bomb in 1944, so obviously the Allies wouldn't have made "another Dresden" with it.

 

[MerryPrankster]

The plans by the Allied leaders to use the bomb on Japan first might change depending on the circumstances.

Valkyrie, for example. If the plotters win and don't surrender, if Guderian kills the plotters and takes control himself (BW's "Panzerfuhrer" scenario), or if Himmler and the SS somehow take over eek, the calculus of the war might change.

(One of the board's better Valkyrie TLs features the evacuation of the Falaise Pocket and the extrication of parts of Army Group Center, which could make the reduction of the Third Reich a much bigger pain.)

There was an earlier discussion on the board about how the Germans could have made some attack against the oncoming Soviet armies and pinned them against the Baltic. I think it involved the Courland Pocket in some capacity. I don't recall the specifics though.