That was if they get obnoxious, not suicidal. If the Italians declare war on the Entente (functionally the British and the French) at this point, Matapan will look like a *good* result.
A Blunted Sickle - Thread II
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My problem here is that I keep thinking of Western European Winters by Eastern European/Central North American standards. Hamburg isn't getting a half a metre of snow that often and the weather of the Battle of the Bulge was the exception. Still expect to have the Canadians/Newfoundlanders to deal with the weather better than the Indians.
The question is to what degree the Americans would remain a *True* Neutral in a Japanese attack on the Entente in the South China Sea, I'm guessing they wouldn't and the problem is that even if the Japanese do very well against Singapore, even the USN in the Philippines is a threat to Japan with the IJN with the way it will be post-battle.
And Franco isn't stupid enough to raise one finger to help them neutralize Gibraltar (I *think* the Spanish Army is in better shape than the German Army at this point, but considering that at this point both may be inferior to the Bulgarian Army...)
It's the Americans who want a stronger embargo against Japan, isn't it? If the Japanese did kick off against the Entente then the China Lobby would surely push for American involvement - a better opportunity for Chinese liberation could not present itself.
Yes, you've got the China Lobby. That's a long way from determining whether or not the USN would broadcast information on any spottings of the IJN in the South China Sea in the clear.
No, the Lao and the Khmer fear Vietnamese domination. An Indochinese Federation will just be a larger Vietnam. I also can’t see Vietnamese nationalist agreeing to this. This will probably resulted in SEA Yugoslavia for sure.
They very kindly offered a few years ago. For a variety of reasons, notably tax ones, I'm afraid it isn't happening.
they would not be warning the British and French but any American merchant marine in the area.
they have to send it in clear because not all those tramp steamers havecode books.
they have to send the detail so the American ships do not mix them up with the British and French.
so sorry they keep failing to spot the other side.......
That's obviously very disappointing. Have you considered a free e-book or PDF for the completed version?
(Warning: very limited understanding of the subject)
When the French showed up in the mid-XIXth century, Cambodge and Laos were in the process of being absorbed by Siam and Vietnam ; the protectorates « saved » both kingdoms, Cambodge even submitting volontarily to french protection in 1863… - well, at least this is the narrative that was propelled under the protectorates to legitimise it. At any rate, this narrative was internalised to some extent by the French, and materialised in a degree of (shallow) francophilia among the elites of these countries.
As a matter of fact, « union » of Cambodge and Laos into an « indochinese federation » would ammount to their effective annexation by Vietnam. According to the 1948 census, Vietnamese made up 82% of the population of french Indochina : 18,9 millions inhabitants among the three vietnames ky of Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin, to compare with 3 millions inhabitants in Cambodge and about 1 million in Laos. When you factor in vietnamese nationalists being unlikely to opine to a confederal agreement that would constrain their country effectively enough to assuage Cambodian and Lao fears, and the unlikeliness of such an agreement to hold up without french « oversight », I would think it very unlikely that an « indochinese project » could hold much water in either of the three countries. Hypothetically, the French could try and impose it from the outside, but why would they ? OTL, european powers tended not to favour local federal projects (Malaysia being an exception) and to push instead for the division of colonial federation into a number of independant entities. Here, independant Cambodge and Laos would remain dependant on France for strategic protection, which is much better for french interests than to prop up a federation and cross their fingers for it not to blow up.
In all, I believe that when it comes to Cambodge and Laos, de facto independance under a loose french protection is the most likely outcome. I’m thinking something like a mix of the OTL relationship between Malaysia and the UK for the strategic links and the OTL relation between France and Lebanon for the cultural dimension. OTL, Cambodgian & Lao independance under oversight was the situation the French sought to set up in the later phase of the first Indochina war, but TTL conditions might allow for a tighter relationship to perdure if the turmoil of the indochina wars is butterflied away and allow Cambodge & Laos to retain their stability. ITTL, vietnamese independance makes them both more or less unviable as colonies, as per OTL, and the loose protection solution fits everyone nicely (well, maybe not the most anschluss-happy vietnamese and the francophile cambodgians, but both are tiny minorities either way).
The big question mark, of course, is the fate of Vietnam… OTL, an insurrection led by the VM was in the process of being mopped up by the time TLL POD hit. Assessing the likely outcome of the POD requires much more knowledge of the dynamics of vietnamese nationalism than I have (although I’m getting curious and might make some more research), and I wish pdf good luck in coming up with something convicing since that is one elephant he probably won’t be able to ignore.
@Belschaft, you may ask for pdf27 to email you a .PDF copy in exchange for a donation to a charity of his choosing. Just slide into his DM (and hope you don't hit him at a moment he's too tired!)
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The Vietnamese Nationalists are extremely anti-French, they would never agree to a confederal proposal. Though they don't have any power, Bao Dai and the mandarinate are basically puppets of the French so having their consent willl be pretty easy.
That's not right in regards to the British. Perhaps the French, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish didn't favour local federations leading up to independence (this much seems definitely true for the French as they apparently opposed the original intent of the Mali Federation to encompass a number of former French West African colonies) but in OTL besides Malaysia, [1] the British favoured local federations in the West Indies, [2] East Africa, Southern Africa, [3] South-Central Africa, [4] Australasia, [5] Canada, [6] South Arabia/Yemen, [7] and Nigeria. [8] One could even possibly count the Cabinet Mission Plan for India in 1946 and the provisions of the Goverment of India Act 1935 which allowed for a Federation of India (never enacted as enough Princely States never agreed to it before the Second World War anyway) as British support for a local federation in India (all of India) from the 1930s to the 1940s. British support for local federations varied over time and in terms of reasons (often starting as administrative conveniences without the intention of independence, but this clearly wasn't the case after the 1920s-1940s and even with Canada, Southern Africa and Australasia in the 1860s-1910s the intention was for unprecedented local governance that was effectively independent in local affairs) but at times they favoured local federations even more than the colonies they sometimes wished to see federated. The push for local federations basically lasted 100 years, mainly starting in the 1860s with the confederation of Canada and ending in the 1960s with failed federations in the West Indies, East Africa (which didn't even get off the ground) and partial failures of successful federations in Nigeria (civil war) and Malaysia (the discord resulting in the expulsion of Singapore).
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[1]. and prior to that, Malaya.
[2]. 1940s-1960s; additionally within the West Indies they had previously favoured federations/unions of the smaller set of islands, i.e. the Leewards and the Windwards.
[3]. they disfavoured it in the 1850s, then favoured it in the 1870s into 1910s culminating in the Union of South Africa, then favoured Rhodesian unification in the 1920s under the terms negotiated with Smuts although that failed at a referendum.
[4]. with Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the 1950s, where paradoxically two ministries of the British government were in opposition about the the same goal with the colonial office initially supporting federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland as a way to try to keep Southern Rhodesia from becoming as extreme as apartheid South Africa and the dominion office supporting Southern Rhodesia's autonomy and the extension of its dominance to the other territories; this fell apart in the 1960s as Southern Rhodesia's leadership agreed with the colonial office for first Nyasaland and then Northern Rhodesia to become separate and independent because of the inherent tensions in the goals of that federation.
[5]. as with southern Africa they initially disfavoured it in the 1860s only to begin favouring it in the 1880s.
[6]. late 1860s onwards; including Newfoundland where the option was supported insofar as by the 1940s the British had no intention of continuing to provide financial assistance to Newfoundland even if the voters chose to continue the unpopular Commission Government which had re-established direct British rule in place of the responsible government of the Dominion; restoring Dominion government or letting Newfoundland join Canada were both suitable options to ensure that there would no expectations or obligations to continue providing financial assistance.
[7]. late 1950s to the 1960s.
[8]. 1940s-1950s.
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Thank you for correcting me. I was thinking indeed of french opposition to the short-lived Mali federation & Dutch schemes to oppose the creation of an unified Indonesia, and I slid over british plans. You could potentially have added Tanzania (Tanganyka + Zanzibar) to the list of successful federations - I thought of it but decided not to mention it as it was not relevant to my point that the French tended to oppose federal arrangements.
At any rate, I'm lucky to have blustered and so get the chance to have you share your knowledge with us!
You're welcome!
Though indeed for the Dutch I believe their opposition to a unified Indonesia was because they were opposed to Indonesia independence overall. When Dutch policy changed towards trying to shed the colonies in the 1970s (resulting in Surinamese independence in 1975), they attempted to force the Netherlands Antilles to become independent as a continuing federation rather than the islands separating. This ran against what Aruba wanted whereby the 1970s into 1980s, Aruba so desired to separate from rule via Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles federation that the main Aruban leader even managed to begin steering Aruba towards total independence from the Dutch Antilles and the Netherlands too (even though what Aruba really wanted from the 1920s was separation from the Netherlands Antilles as a separate autonomous colony of the Netherlands (or after the 1950s as a separate autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands) - the Dutch relented to this in 1980s and stipulated that Aruba was supposed to become totally independent by 1996 after a 10 year transition period as an autonomous country within the Kingdom, but by the 1990s the Dutch, Arubans and Antilleans all agreed to postpone that provision indefinitely (and Aruba finally got what it always wanted). The Dutch push in the 1970s also ran against what the rest of the Netherlands Antilles wanted (the Dutch Antilles wanted to remain with the Dutch).
I suspect that if the Dutch were pushing for Indonesian independence they might well have wished for a unified, federal Indonesia to accede to independence.
I got the sense that the French opposition to federal arrangements for former colonies was to ensure continued dominance within the framework of the French Union as each territory would then have to deal with Paris separately. It is ironic given that prior to this the French had established colonial federations for West Africa, Equatorial Africa and Indochina. In essence the policy on federal arrangements always seemed to revolve around maximizing French control in some way (under direct colonial rule it enabled convenience of administration, with the end of colonial rule it allowed continued French dominance in each territory as each territory was likely weaker and more pliant as an independent territory than as a federation). We even see the principle at work in what you described as likely outcomes for French Indochina: From the 1800s until 1950s they had a French Indochina federation/union for administrative purposes, but would likely favour separation of Laos and Kampuchea/Cambodia in a post-colonial arrangement as this would ensure continued French influence in each territory and aligned with what most of the local elites themselves favoured in wishing for French influence as a counterbalance to potential Vietnamese (or more remotely Siamese/Thai) hegemony.
In terms of TTL I would imagine that British policy would remainly mostly the same in terms favouring federal arrangements where possibly and especially where local interests favoured it (certainly if what was French West Africa had been British, there would not have been opposition from London to a Mali Federation). There had been local movements in favour of federating in the West Indies and East Africa from the 1920s. Whether these would work out in TTL vs OTL would depend on how factors changed as a result of this war. For instance British Guiana might have been radically different if Cheddi Jagan's education in the United States had led him on different paths or if he had somehow become a lawyer as he originally intended and likely gone to law school in London as many leading West Indian politicians had done by the 1930s-1950s; the West Indian federation itself might well have survived had it been formed earlier or had more support from London or been given more powers or had some provisions of the constitution not been changed over the course of the 1950s. East African federation might still have occurred between Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar* if Kenyatta and Nyerere were able to come to an accommodation and perhaps if Tanganyikan independence had been delayed to be aligned with Kenyan and Zanzibari independence (they might well have formed a federation before independence in the 1960s). The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland might form as in OTL but is likely to dissolve as in OTL due to the inherent tensions between white settler dominated Southern Rhodesia and the other two territories. Nigeria, South Arabia and Malaya (if not Malaysia, perhaps we might get Malaya, Singapore and the Straits Settlements and a North Borneo Federation) would seem likely to progress to a federal arrangement as in OTL at somepoint in TTL (perhaps later than in OTL). India would be the big question mark. In TTL the 1935 Government of India Act is already in existence and provides for a Federation of India if the Princely States wish. The lack of war with Japan and the much shorter war with Germany might change the trajectory of Indian decolonization if not the eventual outcome. Would we see a a (potentially weak) Federation of India encompassing all of British India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh)? Or would any 1940s Government of India Act update these potential arrangements to allow for a stronger federal Union of India (not necessarily the same as OTL Union of India)?
*Uganda had a major issue with the local semi-autonomous Kingdom of Buganda, which formed the core of Uganda, wishing to be in any East African federation as its own unit separate from the rest of Uganda; that looks very difficult to square in the 1960s until Buganda and the other kingdoms get abolished in the late 1960s - in fact the solution that the British supported just prior to Ugandan independence was for a federal Uganda which is what came into being in 1962
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I was not aware of these developments. I am getting quite out of my depth, but don't you think those are quite different contexts? First things, the shift towards shedding colonies happened after the Netherlands had effectively ceased being an imperial power - granting Indonesia independance would be a wholly different decision. If, as OTL, it is forced upon them by Indonesian nationalists, then the Dutch have a clear incentive to avoid gifting an unified Indonesia to their adversaries; besides, they may still wish to hang on to parts of Indonesia (for all this, I am over-relying on Anderson's depiction of early Indonesian nationalism, so I'm not working it out of thin air but have only a very partial picture). Moreover, the attitude of OTL Java-based indonesian nationalists also fostered at least some autonomism as a reaction. So, if, as OTL, they are effectively forced out of the archipelago before choosing so, I believe they will still try their OTL strategy of propping up autonomous or independant governments. However, if the DEI independance happens differently, then we might see something like what you suggest. It would probably require a shift in Indonesian nationalism away from its OTL, "Javacentric" form, and away from violent action. Yet both are consistent with what pdf has hinted to concerning the impact of indian independence.
Agreed on the entire post. It's exactly what I was thinking, insofar as if the Dutch are choosing to leave Indonesia they may advocate a federal East Indies/Indonesia as a way to bring the locals as well as the native states onboard and as a way to assuage some of the other groups that it won't be the beginning of a Javanese empire in place of the Dutch one. However if they are being forced out they may support various groups becoming autonomous (either within the Dutch empire or as independent of Java/Indonesia) to not gift a unified Indonesia to their anti-colonial enemies in Java.
In terms of the Dutch shift towards shedding the colonies, this actually didn't happen after the Netherlands ceased to effectively be an imperial power post-Indonesian independence (1945-1950). It happened after riots in Curacao in the mid-to-late 1960s and border issues between Suriname on one hand and Guyana and Brazil on the other hand. Dutch marines had to be sent in to put down the riots in Curacao and restore order and the prospect of a border conflict with Guyana and Brazil alarmed the politicians the Netherlands and most of the political class then began to agitate against needing to be drawn in to the internal troubles and border conflicts of the "West" (Dutch West Indies/ Western territories) despite those territories now having complete internal autonomy and the Dutch having no say over the internal affairs that might lead rise to these troubles (internal and external).
A similar dynamic I think would most likely end up at play even if somehow (with ASBs) the Dutch scheme to keep Indonesia had succeeded (the 1950s Statute forming the Kingdom of the Netherlands and granting complete internal autonomy to the Antilles and Suriname was actually designed with the East Indies in mind; the West Indies were very much an afterthought). With complete internal autonomy for the East Indies, then the Dutch would probably find by the 1960s that they would be required to put down rebellions within the East Indies (right off the bat I'm thinking that South Moluccas and Ambon, Aceh, Sulawesi (Makassar), Borneo and West Papua would be the most likely spots for rebellion against rule from Jakarta as a wholly autonomous Indonesia as a country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands much as how Aruba (and to a lesser extent Sint Maarten) opposed federal rule from Willemstad in Curacao) and potentially become embroiled in border conflicts with Malaya/Malaysia in Borneo and perhaps in New Guinea and in Timor.
So the Dutch might transition towards wanting to push Indonesia, the Antilles and Suriname out of the Kingdom by the 1970s anyway if somehow Indonesia how accepted the Statute and become a part of the new arrangements of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as the other two territories did.
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And any US Navy Sailor who sends out will be confined to quarters for 24 hours prior to his 30 day leave.
As others point out, French policies towards their colonies could vary, and it was sometimes difficult to predict what would happen since the situation on the ground would vary quite a lot, and furthermore from region to region things could be exceptionally different. Léopold Senghor was a fervent advocate of federalism in West Africa and keeping it together: just a few years later he was president of a new independent Senegal. In the 1950s the idea of West Africa as independent was unimaginable: just a few years later the French were granting independence to individual states. Things changed quickly and French policy was often more reactive, and their responses ran the gambit of the system from full assimilation into France, to local federations, to regional autonomy, to of course independence.
The French initial strategy in Indochina during the Second World War was opting for federation, and the French made a resolute effort to encourage the development of a common feeling of Indochinese sentiment. They established a federal university in Hanoi, they established a tour d'Indochine, they went in for monuments and propaganda stressing the unity of Indochina, and they portrayed themselves as fair arbitrers for Indochina - that they would be the ones keeping the peace between the different nations - this partially at least in response to the realization that the claiming that they were protecting Indochina from foreign aggression no longer made any sense since... well, the Japanese were occupying the place. There was also, somewhat incongruously although it made sense in the context of the révolution nationale, a rehabilitation of local nationalism, but this was supposed to exist alongside federal, and then broader French imperial, nationalism, taking pride in all three at once. A focus on tradition, tne combability of European and Asian tradition, stressing the parallels between Confucius and the révolution nationale, etc.
This strategy has two motivations which would not be present in A Blunted Sickle: firstly, the French are not powerless and thus don't have to attempt a priori to be conciliatory to local national sentiment, and secondly the French are not under the Vichy regime with its heavy focus of return to the soil and local national sentiment. I think it unlikely that French policy in A Blunted Sickle will pursue Vichy's traditonalist policies to anywhere near the same extent, since things like the encouragement of Vietnamese patriotism (which the French tried to keep distinct from Vietnamese nationalism but of course this often was a subtle difference which on the ground was ignored by the target population) are very risky and the lack of a feeling of desperation will mean that there will be less need to pursue such relatively radical options. I suspect instead that French policy will be reactionary, aiming to continue to avoid facing up to Vietnamese nationalism, and continue to focus on the idea of a broader French empire. This will be tenable until, say, the later 1950s, when increasing dissent, supported probably by the Chinese (for whoever wins in China, they will be opposed to European colonialism), will mean that a serious reevaluation of French objectives will be necessary.
In West Africa, the driver for the movement from the West African Federation to local regionalism, balkanization, was the increasing cost of the French colonial project in the region, as the ostensible French goal of assimilation and the idea that these territories were integral parts of France meant that local workers and particularly administrators started to work to link their wages, economic conditions, and social conditions to those of their equivalents in metropolitan France, resulting in an escalating spiral of unsustainable costs which threatened to make the entire system unprofitable and unsustainable. To short circuit this the French granted financial autonomy to local regions, to prevent bureaucrats from being able to link their wage demands to metropolitan levels, and to try to make local African leadership responsible for unpopular decisions regarding budgetary retrenchments. You also had tensions about Côte d'Ivoire feeling that it was going to be the milk cow for the rest of the (substantially poorer) West African Federation, the easier ability to control individual governments, and the feeling in periphereal regions of dislike for and over-centralization of Dakar.
This will not be present to the same extent in Indochina, since Indochina is a richer place so it is more affordable in the short term, and Vietnam is so massive compared to the rest that it is difficult for it to really be significantly drained and held back as Côte d'Ivoire feared. However, nationalism will be even more prevalent and will be tightly linked to ethnicity, in contrast to the West African situation. In Indochina, additional years of French control will make the upper echelons of administration closer, accentuating the developments espoused in Benedict Anderson's book on nationalism, but there will not have been the same degree of broader French efforts to promote federation as occurred in WW2. I suspect that ultimately the French will leave Indochina sometime in the later 1960s or early 1970s, and popular agitation will be overwhelmingly for independent nations. If there is no war, then relations among the governing elites of former Indochina will be close, to the extent of a cooperation agreements and very friendly relations, but there won't be a federation or even a confederation: if there is war, then things will lead to a situation rather akin to the present, without much love lost between them but with Vietnam having significant influence over the surrounding territories by dint of its much larger population and power.
To follow the Yugoslavian model, could the French have 6 provinces of an independent FIC, Tonkin , Annam , Cochinchina, Cambodia, Laos and Guangzhouwan(!) (for the last, with France undefeated, it might stay in French hands) with a majority province vote required for significant activities or would the three Vietnamese dominate anyway. (No idea how many people Guangzhouwan had in 1942, Wikipedia last gives a population of 209,000 in 1935.
Well Guangzhouwan couldn't be in it at all. That was a leased territory weigh meant it was still part of China. Independence for French Indochina means the French administer it directly as the British did with Hong Kong and the Portuguese with Macau.