We are talking about WW1, what scale of remote control are you suggesting?
A better High Seas Fleet for WW1
- Thread starter mack8
- Start date
Drone boats were tried in 1916-18 to attack RN shore bombardment monitors off the Flanders coast, with not much success due to the limitations of the control equipment available at the time.
There's a very minimal English wikipedia page on them (rather more in German); more detail in chapter 10 of Friedman, Fighting the Great War at Sea
Scheer's strategy in the Jutland operation was to destroy an exposed detachment of the British fleet. This promptly presented itself in the form of Beatty's onrushing force of 10 battlecruisers and fast battleships. Unfortunately, Scheer really hadn't thought through his own operational objective because he concentrated his High Seas Fleet in two groups, the scouting forces under Hipper and the main fleet under his own command. These formations resulted in Beatty simply turning around and using his superior speed to sail directly to the approaching Grand Fleet. If Scheer had placed torpedo boats and/or a strong battleship force or two on the flanks of the British advance, such that by the time that Beatty contacts the main body of the High Seas Fleet the Germans had essentially surrounded Beatty's force, it might have been the case that Beatty could not have steered towards Jellicoe and would not have been able to break out.
If Beatty's force were destroyed by being encircled after a foolish pursuit that pockets the Battlecruiser Force, it would have resulted in a strategic victory for the German navy, as the battlecruiser balance would have shifted to Germany's favor.
Taking this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion there are two things that stand out. First, the HSF didn't require any additional equipment to attempt this type of battle. It was a command / doctrinal issue. That being said, if the objective was to pocket and destroy Beatty, the HSF could have used better torpedo capabilities overall, specifically equipping its torpedo boats and light cruisers with heavier torpedo batteries with longer range, and some sort of Gotha style torpedo bomber force capable of reaching a significant distance out into the North Sea. The HSF could stand to have its ships with maximum gun elevations of 30 degrees or more rather than the pedestrian 16% (or whatever it was) they went with. The Konig and Bayern Classes, at least, could have been built with one less turret each in order to turn them into 23kt or 24kt ships.
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If the BCF (5 battlecruisers, 4 battleships, 14 light cruisers and 27 destroyers) are sunk between 1SG and the High Seas Fleet it will put the High Seas Fleet in a position where they are likely trade favorably in subsequent engagements. Even if only by way of 1 Scouting Group picking at the edge of the Grand Fleet's screen and running for home.
The real difficulty of the German position is that they are far enough that they have win a major battle and back that up by doing it again.
And drones are small and being used in coastal warfare... not really suited for open ocean use.
Some kind of Gotha torpedo bomber makes sense, with hindsight of course. It would have made sense for the germans to think outside the box of the day for ways to compensate for their numerical inferiority vs the RN. Nevermind that, just having aircraft (or indeed any other means) providing sufficiently timely and accurate position reports on the RN position would have mattered a lot. Maybe some seaplane tender like Campania?
It also does seems that at times HSF commanders lacked aggresiveness and/or severely constricted by leadeship orders? If i understand correctly there was a real chance they could have caught a portion of the GF during the December 1914 raid on Scarborough, which likely could have been destroyed by the HSF present in full strength if contact would have been made, which is exactly the kind of opportunity the germans were looking for.
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On more technical matters, it appears that the british were oil spraying their coal as far back as the Nelsons, which the germans only started doing after 1916, is that correct? They started introducing oil fired boilers only just before the war, like on the Konigs and Derfflingers. So there is scope for improvement in this area as well. Yes, they did not have access to a lot of oil, but perhaps they could have stockpiled some before the war. alternatively, maybe they could have convinced Romania to side with them (a whole TL on it's own), thus gaining access to the Ploiesti oil which was 1,7 million tons in 1915. It could have been just as important to them as it was in WW2.
They also fiddled about with diesels, but with hindsight they shouldn't have put that much faith in it until it was proven to work, avoiding things like Prinzregent Luitpold being 1 knot slower due to having only 2 shafts since the diesel was not ready.
So between adopting turbines from the Nassaus onwards (and better turret layouts for them and the Helgolands), as well as earlier adoption oil-spraying and perhaps oil-fired boilers, the earlier dreadnoughts at least could have gained 1 even 2 knots in speed, which doesn't seem much now, but it kinda was during those days.
They also fiddled about with diesels, but with hindsight they shouldn't have put that much faith in it until it was proven to work, avoiding things like Prinzregent Luitpold being 1 knot slower due to having only 2 shafts since the diesel was not ready.
So between adopting turbines from the Nassaus onwards (and better turret layouts for them and the Helgolands), as well as earlier adoption oil-spraying and perhaps oil-fired boilers, the earlier dreadnoughts at least could have gained 1 even 2 knots in speed, which doesn't seem much now, but it kinda was during those days.
They would need them earlier if they are to have such aircraft available by the time of a Jutland style battle, and if at all possible something more durable/faster, maybe a torpedo better adapted for air-dropping etc. Nevermind sinking or even hitting the british ships, just several aircraft attacking the british battlelines and force them into evasive maneuvers could have all kinds of consequences for the day battle at least. Or just spotting and tracking the british fleet and sending accurate enough reports.
I thought there was some evidence that the damage the 18" did to Furious was embellished. And I'm still not sure what problems occurred on Yamato/Musashi.
What do you mean by that? How is Scheer supposed to get battleships on the flanks of Beatty without knowing exactly where Beatty was? Scheer didn't even expect to find Royal Navy on May 31st, IIRC the idea was to stir up trouble off the coast of Norway and attack any reaction force that sortied later. Besides, historically Scheer came really close to outflanking and trapping Beatty. If the light cruisers hadn't tried investigating the Danish NJ Fjord steamer, Beatty would have ended up to the east of the High Seas Fleet. I have a hard time imagining a superior configuration to Scheer's historically chosen one that doesn't incur much higher risks of a German force being the one cut off and destroyed.
If the Germans ever achieved superiority in battlecruisers it would have been a disaster for Britain. They might not have been perfectly optimized for raiding but they could and did make trans-Atlantic trips. If they could not be countered by Royal Navy battlecruisers, Britain has lost control of the high seas and things unravel from there.
I'm going to be honest, I can't find something to directly cite, but the damage that big naval guns do to the ships they're mounted on is pretty well-documented. As for the Japanese Navy, well a lot of their records are at the same place as their ships. HMS Rodney and Nelson are some of the worst offenders, but American 16-inch gunned battleships often had to clear their decks of personnel (including open-air anti-air mounts) to prevent blast damage from killing or severely injuring them, if you fire the guns incorrectly, it can damage the deck, pretty much every battleship that fought in World War 2 knocked out their electronics from the concussion of their guns firing, glass is broken, rangefinders (which are extremely delicate instruments themselves) are knocked out. The Japanese looked at building a 20-inch armed battleship during World War 2 and those guns are stupidly big. They would have fired shells twice as large as a standard 16-inch shell. With a concurrently larger propellant charge. Twenty-inch guns on a battleship would be an absolute nightmare in terms of actually operating them.
Until those battlecruisers run out of coal, ammunition, their engines break down and can't be repaired, their rangefinders are knocked out and they can't hit anything anymore. The guerre de course sounds good, but it has never been successfully accomplished by a Navy that did not have already have sea control.
It might be possible to assume that if HSF could knock out all those British BC/BB/destroyers, they could have sustained some damage as well.
... and that Germany couild not afford as RN was just so much bigger
... hence my suggestion: look at something smaller and different.
PS: jellicoe was nervous about u-boats and mines when exciting
... and that Germany couild not afford as RN was just so much bigger
... hence my suggestion: look at something smaller and different.
PS: jellicoe was nervous about u-boats and mines when exciting
When has such an encirclement occurred in the relevant time period, with the communication and navigation problems of the time?
Weren't the range of guns limited by the usual North Sea fog and mist rather than range? How many hits were scored at the range that 30 degrees allowed?
What was the overall advantage of being 25% faster but having 25% less hitting power?
What are the inevitable trade offs? Is it possible that the men who had spent a lifetime training in this area, who had devoted their lives to it, know more about the technology of their day than amateurs 100 years later do? The answer to the latter question is undeniably "yes".
Upn further reading, couple of other issues to analyze. First, the germans were seriously behind in broadside weight compared to the contemporary british ships due to their smaller guns and inefficient turret layout in the first dreadnoughts. To compensate for this they need then all the BBs with 12 guns, with at least a 10 gun broadside on the Nassaus and Helgolands, with the Kaisers and Konigs built as 12 gun ships even if keeping to the 30,5cm calibre.
From this then results that perhaps the 3 Derfflingers might have been better off with 10x 28cm guns in centerline mounts as initially contemplated. The 28 cm guns would still be sufficient to make a mess of any british BC up to Tiger.
Like proposed earlier then the Badens should be built with 10x 35cm guns, to maximize the number of barrels. Mackensens i don't know, maybe they are good enough as is in light of the british BB and BB increase to 15 inch guns.
The other main aspect is that judging by the Jutland statistics, the germans were shooting better, both sides got about 120 hits on eachother but the germans fired 3500 shells to do so, while the british 4500. So if the germans have more barrels to fire on the broadside and in general they might fire 4000 or even 4500 shells too, which translates to another what 30-40 hits on the british? Which could possibly mean more british ships being sunk, iirc in OTL as it was couple of BCs and one QE came perilously close to being so?
From this then results that perhaps the 3 Derfflingers might have been better off with 10x 28cm guns in centerline mounts as initially contemplated. The 28 cm guns would still be sufficient to make a mess of any british BC up to Tiger.
Like proposed earlier then the Badens should be built with 10x 35cm guns, to maximize the number of barrels. Mackensens i don't know, maybe they are good enough as is in light of the british BB and BB increase to 15 inch guns.
The other main aspect is that judging by the Jutland statistics, the germans were shooting better, both sides got about 120 hits on eachother but the germans fired 3500 shells to do so, while the british 4500. So if the germans have more barrels to fire on the broadside and in general they might fire 4000 or even 4500 shells too, which translates to another what 30-40 hits on the british? Which could possibly mean more british ships being sunk, iirc in OTL as it was couple of BCs and one QE came perilously close to being so?
I wonder at whether the technology was there to support a longer range twin engine torpedo bomber though. The Gotha was pretty slow and lacked decent range.
With the exception of the British, it seems to me that all the navies in WW1 battleship admirals had a bit of a privileged viewpoint on the war, that their battleships were some sort of irreplaceable strategic weapon that, like ICBM's, had to sit idle waiting for the conditions of their commitment to never come. Maybe that's bit of an exaggeration and there were exceptions, but inactivity seemed to be rule and operations the exception.
Even the British were prone to periods of inactivity.
I've previously suggested for example the Zebrugges and Ostend raids would have had a better chance with battleship firesupport in addition to monitor fire support. The 15 inch gunned battleships had much better fire control and range than even the best monitors.
Shutting down those ports to submarines would have imo been worth the loss of battleships. Especially since the German fleet had stayed in port essentially since Jutland.
In a nutshell the Germans didn't want to commit ships to anything for fear that it would give the British a free hand. I've long felt that British had a free hand and didn't use it to push home advantages.
The Germans are the ones that required a decisive outcome, the British were content with the status quo. If the result was to be a stone cold coin flip where the Germans lose a battleship squadron 50% of the time and the British lose their Battlecruiser squadron 50% of the time, that was a coin flip the Germans should have been willing to accept, and the British never willing to risk.
Beatty might well escape any trap, no matter well laid, and if he does so, Jellicoe will piece it together afterwards, realize the danger, and never again would the HSF have the same opportunity . So the stakes would be high, one shot. Still, proposal is a plan intended to transform the situation to Germany's favor, so it's worth considering.
The basic plan as I picture it would be for the HSF to deploy in a diamond shaped formation with the wedge sailing towards the BC base at Rosyth. The spacing between the groups has to be enough that the British BC force could pass by in pursuit heading south without its scouting line detecting the flanking force, so we're talking at least 40nm and maybe even 60nm between the lead group and the flanking forces, depending on visibility conditions. The trailing force, sailing north, will have a closing rate with Hipper of up to 44kt, (18kt for the battleships, 26kt for the battlecruisers). So the distance between the trailing force and Hipper is at least 100nm, maybe 120nm. That is to say, Hipper has to be subject to pursuit for long enough and far enough that the flanking forces moving inwards at 21kt can close the trap from their initial positions. Hipper therefore must use his superior speed to the 5th BS to stay out of range of the 5th BS, but not break contact with it either, so that Beatty will continue to charge with his BC's, and 5th BS trailing.
Disposition assuming the Jutland OOB I picture something as follows:
Scouting Group (Hipper, 5 BC, 2 CL, 20% of TB)
Flank Group West (Scheer, 4 x Konig, 2 x Helgoland, 4 CL, 35% of TB)
Flank Group East (Schmidt, (4 x Kaiser, 2 x Helgoland, 4CL, 35% of TB)
Trailing Force (Mauve, 4 x Nassau, 5 x Deutchland, 5 x Braunschweig, 1CL, 10% of TB)
Zeppelin Force: 9 ships.
Six Zeppelins are in a line, maintaining station maybe about 70nm in front of Hipper, spaced about 40nm apart, so a scouting sweep of about 280nm.
One Zeppelin is on station ahead of Flanking Group West, within flag signal range of the flagship.
One Zeppelin is on station 10nm ahead of Flanking Group East, within flag signal range of the flaghip
One Zeppelin is on station 10nm ahead of Hipper's Scouting Group, also within flag signal range of the flagship.
Tasks -
Zeppelin Scouting Line: Make contact with Beatty's force. Then, track it with two Zeppelins while the other four move north of the British BC's seeking the Grand Fleet, never getting more than 100nm from Hipper. (The Germans do not care where the Grand Fleet is beyond 100nm of the German BC's or either flanking force).
Hipper - make contact with Beatty using the accompanying Zeppelin and the scouting line, then draw him at 25kt towards Mauve's trailing force.
Schmidt and Scheer - Allow Beatty to pass between moving southeast such that there is no contact, then after Beatty has passed south, sail inwards and towards Mauve at 20/21kt. The accompanying Zeppelins are tasked to coordinate. Commit the torpedo boats to mass attacks on the BC force only after Beatty has contacted Mauve and is attempting to fleet north.
Mauve: Sail northwest at 18kt to reinforce Hipper. Prevent Beatty from breaking through to escape south.
I'm not saying it would work, but it's a plan....
If the Germans have battlecruisers and the British do not, the situation should allow for not only the German battlecruisers, but also their most modern Konigs, Kaisers and Bayerns, to become a bit more adventurous in their operations, including raids into the Western Approaches. Jellicoe would presumably have to alter his overall strategic plan for the Grand Fleet away from a North Sea blockade to convoy escorts in the Western approaches. The Germans should also be able to gain political leverage in Norway as the naval balance of power changes, allowing for more imports from that quarter, in particular more fish, (which historically the British worked successfully to prevent the Norwegians selling to the Germans).
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So what constitutes a strong Battle ship force on both flanks (parking the almost improbability of managing to pull off such a maneuver for now)
There were 16 such vessels in the German navy at the time - so two groups of 8?
And they are slower than Beatty's force so the British force could simply choose which force to engage - and 4 of his ships are QEs
There was a total of 11 CLs and 61 Torpedo boats (light destroyers) in the entire German OOB 5 CL and 20 of those Torpedo boats where with the 'Scouting force'.
The BCF alone had 14 CLs and 27 Destroyers
So if the German fleet had somehow managed to get a force of BBs on each flank and assuming that said force was equal force that would be
German flanking force - 8 BBs 4 CLs and 20 or 21 Torpedo boats vs a British force of 4 BBs (QEs) 4 BCs (assuming 2 sunk) 14 CLs and 27 Destroyers
So I cannot see the Germans splitting their main force into 2 because they would not want to fight any battle at such a disadvantage
Also if these forces are on the flank what's to stop Beatty ignoring them and continuing to chase after Hippers Scouting force?
Not that it could happen anyway as it would be almost impossible to carry out such a co-ordinated deployment with the fog of war that existed on the day.
Indeed, the signalling as previously mentioned wasnt much better than that of Trafalgar, flags and lights and with some element of radio. It was a miracle that the Grand Fleet operated as well as it did! Coordinating all of those forces is going to end in tears. There was a reason Scheer kept his fleet in one piece and in line ahead.
The Zeppelins proved to be very hit and miss in the reconnaissance role, they were prone to misidentification and mispositioning of forces as happened on a number of occasions before and after Jutland. They were also very susceptible to the weather and in the latter part of the war would have been faced with swarms of RN fighters launched from carriers and turrets of battleships.
The other problems with the scenario is that it supposes Beatty advances blindly and dumbly down the middle of the two forces and omits the fact that he had no less than 3 light cruiser squadrons ranging in front of him, each one of which at least equalled or outclassed any German light cruiser. In many ways in the North sea far more reliable reconnaissance platforms than any Zeppelin. With his speed advantage he can either flee or seek to overwhelm one or other force. Beatty is certainly the bete noir of most alt hist RN fans but he wasn't an utter moron