80 Years On: Shattered Sword's Jonathan Parshall parses some Midway Counterfactuals

[CalBear]

P.S. No, the analysis doesn't look at variants where Saratoga shows up. But it's not hard to see that this would just amount to something approaching overkill - at least, if Yorktown is also present.

Ya'.

If the original three show up, plus the Saratoga, Spruance might just go after the Invasion Feet, or finished of the Kido Butai's heavy escorts, especially with Sara carrying a double size Wildcat and extra heavy SBD complement (she was carrying replacement aircraft for the rest of the fleet, so she had 47 F4F-4, 45 SBD-3, 5 TBD and 14 TBF (there is some disagreement regarding the condition of the Avengers, some lists show them as part of the enlarged complement, but others show them as "cargo". She had the space to operate all of those aircraft (the Sara was HUGE, USN didn't get a bigger deck until the Midway was commissioned) and she had the newest radar in the fleet. She was literally a carrier and a half worth of aircraft and her CO, DeWitt Ramsey (Navy Cross) was no slouch.

The Midway Invasion Force had one CVL, the Zuiho, (12 A5M4 Claudes and 12 B5A1 Kates) as part of the escort force. even a couple U.S. carriers, hell, just the Sara, would have wreaked havoc. Could have sunk half the heavy cruisers in the IJN in an afternoon (total escort was Kongo, Hiei, 4 CA, 1 CL, 7 DD, plus the close support (i.e. naval gunfire prep) group's 4 CA, 2 DD, and an oiler.

Midway, as was, pretty much gutted the Japanese as an offensive formation for months, collecting either the Invasion force or the carriers heavy escorts, which were all packed with pilots from the sunken ships, would have been a real kick in the nuts. Solomons Campaign might be VERY different, and would just be the start.

 

[Athelstane]

If the original three show up, plus the Saratoga, Spruance might just go after the Invasion Feet, or finished of the Kido Butai's heavy escorts

The temptation would be there, with plenty of daylight for another attack.

The variable would be: when would Yamamoto decide to terminate the operation and head for him? In OTL, at 2115, he had ordered Kurita's cruisers in to hit Midway even after the 1700 attack had put paid to Hiryu (only to belatedly cancel Kurita's raid after midnight). So what we know of his psychology seems to suggest it will still take a while for Yamamoto to withdraw.

 

[CalBear]

Potentially, although the other possibility is that if the Kido Butai ceased to exist by 11:30 hrs, including losses to the escorts, especially damage to either of the "fast battleships" Yamamoto may do the exact opposite, tell everyone to run like hell to save the battle line and heavy scouting force for the Decisive Battle™.

 

[mattep74]

But I think that's the critical thing about Lexington: the USN learned some important damage control lessons from Lady Lex's sinking, as Parshall himself has pointed out. The first one was put into practice for Midway on board Yorktown: Oscar Myers' idea of purging the fuel lines with CO2 as soon as the strike packages were sent off. Had they not done that, Yorktown likely would have been lost in Hiryu's first attack, and then Hiryu's subsequent strike would have moved on and probably located TF 16.



Man, people are getting greedy here...

Ok, how about this for greedy. Lexington is damaged but survive just as Yorktown and is also patched together. Then Saratoga show up. USA now have 5 carriers. Lets say Lexington have problems getting her flight up and Wasp strikes and kill a carrier and then the original attack happen and kill the rest. Then Lexingtons aircrafts arrive on the scene as the US strike are on the way home

Oh, no, no carriers alive for us. But hey, there is a battleship, lets go after that. OPS, Haruna is now crippled but is still operational and is taken under toll

Is this the end? Nope USS Nautilus still have a few torpedoes left and fire six torpedoes against Haruna, one actually work and the stricken battleships goes down. It gets worse for the Japanese as the destroyer Hagikaze have been towing the battleship and is not unable to break the line and it also goes down.

Is this the end?

No, becauce in the afternoon the US carriers have launched a second wave.
CL Nagara manouver to close to Kirishima and they collide with Nagara stuck in the middle of Kirishima. Both ships are now stationary.

"I must be dreaming" say the commander of Nautilus who fire all five remaining torpedoes, two are duds, three run wild and do not hit anything, but the sixth hit Krishima in the aft and now is it unable to move at all

The two stationary targets are set upon by every US plane and both are badly damaged, but refuses to sink. They however are not able to move and the Japanese have to scuttle them

As night set the Japanese have lost
Four carriers
Two battleships
One CL
One destroyer

US have lost a lot of torpedoe planes

When day arrives the next day US catalinas find the Japanese ships speeding westwards, but from the North come first fleet battle line. They are greeted by greedy American dive bombers. But they do not attack the fighting ships, they go after the oilers and sink one and damage another.

As soon as the US land the planes they withdraw toward Hawaii

Japanese are unlucky again. They just happen to move across the USS Flying fish who sends six torpedoes into Yamato and one detonate forcing Yamato to go home. Yamamoto call of the operation and order everyone home.

Is this to ASB?

 

[Dilvish]

Ya'.

If the original three show up, plus the Saratoga, Spruance might just go after the Invasion Feet, or finished of the Kido Butai's heavy escorts, especially with Sara carrying a double size Wildcat and extra heavy SBD complement (she was carrying replacement aircraft for the rest of the fleet, so she had 47 F4F-4, 45 SBD-3, 5 TBD and 14 TBF (there is some disagreement regarding the condition of the Avengers, some lists show them as part of the enlarged complement, but others show them as "cargo". She had the space to operate all of those aircraft (the Sara was HUGE, USN didn't get a bigger deck until the Midway was commissioned) and she had the newest radar in the fleet. She was literally a carrier and a half worth of aircraft and her CO, DeWitt Ramsey (Navy Cross) was no slouch.

The Midway Invasion Force had one CVL, the Zuiho, (12 A5M4 Claudes and 12 B5A1 Kates) as part of the escort force. even a couple U.S. carriers, hell, just the Sara, would have wreaked havoc. Could have sunk half the heavy cruisers in the IJN in an afternoon (total escort was Kongo, Hiei, 4 CA, 1 CL, 7 DD, plus the close support (i.e. naval gunfire prep) group's 4 CA, 2 DD, and an oiler.

Midway, as was, pretty much gutted the Japanese as an offensive formation for months, collecting either the Invasion force or the carriers heavy escorts, which were all packed with pilots from the sunken ships, would have been a real kick in the nuts. Solomons Campaign might be VERY different, and would just be the start.

Smashing the Invasion Fleet is a possibility. Bagging a fifth carrier, the transports, and the landing forces also hurts the Japanese war effort in a big way. If the Hiryu can be bagged with the other three CVs at the same time, Yorktown survives. Nagumo, or his successor, may not order the escort force towards the Americans in that case. And Yamamoto may not order Kondo's cruisers forward.

A downside for the Americans sticking around to get the Invasion Force (which may be more attractive than Kido Butai's heavy escorts due to Zuiho) is the possibility of a night action with IJN surface forces. I don't recall what Saratoga's screen consisted of; The USN might not fear a night action at this time.

Ah, Saratoga had two heavy cruisers and four destroyers. Giving a total of nine heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and 18 destroyers. The USN might feel confident that they could handle a night action. Oh, I want to game that out. Not enough USN cruiser models unless I use the Baltimores and Clevelands though.

 

[mack8]

This is interesting, because the results pretty resoundingly reject the the proposition, mooted over the years, that Yamamoto bringing Zuikaku along could have been a game changer. In fact, the Japanese still get smashed. The real difference maker, as it turns out, is Yorktown. As Parshall, Bongers, and Torres' analysis seems to consistently show, if the Americans bring all three carriers as they did OTL, the Japanese are going to get their asses kicked at Midway even if they bring all 5 intact KB fleet carriers

To be honest, i find the above statement rather bewildering regarding Zuikaku. Me i've always seen Parshall as heavily US biased in whatever he writes about Midway and other things, which a true historian should not be if he still want to be called a historian. History should be reported exactly as it was, not as one wants it to be.

Anyway the results of the wargame are skewed imo by the inclusion of this "good Hornet" thing, otherwise even according to Parshall as you can see Zuikaku's inclusion means 2 japanese carriers remain intact vs 1 US, in which case the US force will run for it to protect the remaining CV like it did at Coral Seal, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. Midway was the only CV battle in 1942 in which the Japanese were running away, Zuikaku's presence could have easily changed that. Not to mention that looking at the battle's mechanics one can easily see how Zuikaku's presence could have resulted in ALL US carriers lost for 2 japanese ( Zuikaku would have brought 24-25 Zeros to the battle, with the present extra Zeros even a shotai could have say prevented Best from hitting Akagi, or maybe even he would have attacked and missed Zuikaku who knows, Zuikaku was faster, turned tighter, had better AA, faced US carriers before at Coral Sea and was "luckier"! So then you will have THREE very angry japanese CVs launching two devastating strikes against TF 17 and TF16, 3 times as large as the OTL strikes)

In that scenario (with KB temporaraily controling the seas around Midway) the landing on Midway is quite irrelevant even if it fails, because really the IJN came there to kill the US carriers. Hell, a repulsed landing on Midway might in the long run more beneficial for IJN by making then snap out of their complacency and underestimating the US side (like they did OTL at Guadalcanal)

What i also want to say about this Hornet and Mitscher pilloring though, not that i have any sympathy for either, but after reading some stuff and seeing some maps, imo Mitscher sent Ring on course 265 because Nimitz and intel told him so. In other words Nimitz and intel told them that KB will operate in two groups, one about 80-100 miles behind the other. So after the dawn PBY spotting of 2 japanese CVs, Mitscher logically assumed the other two are 100 miles behind, just as the intel says. Up to date the intel has been spot on, so why would he not continue to believe it? I bet that looking at the map Ring ended up about 100 miles from Nagumo's position when he eventually turned, maybe someone more knowledgeable can measure that.

If there is one other thing that i find bewildering is Waldron's literal mutiny during wartime, he killed himself and his men for nothing. If he would have obeyed Ring and just stay in formation, yes eventually he would have had to turn back to Hornet, about the same time as the VF-8 i guess, but at least he would have saved his men, and possibly helped most or all VF-8 return too (if they see and follow Waldron to Hornet). Though i wonder where VF-6 would go in this scenario. I know Waldron's actions has been spun by USN as MOH bravery etc. but makes one wonder if was it really necessary to do what he did, or just pigheadedness. I also read that relations between Ring and the other pilots/commanders were not terribly good to put it mildly (not exactly a band of brothers, to quote Lundstrom), so perhaps that played a part. Miscommunication could be another or on top of everything else, maybe neither Ring nor Mitscher bothered to tell Waldron WHY they go on 265 (because there should be 2 carriers there according to intel)

There is indeed the issue of how the battle mechanics would have been affected if VT-8 did not attack, maybe VT-6 and VT-3 are completely wiped out instead, but that's still a net gain of about 10 TBDs and 8-10 F4Fs. Hell, maybe a few more of Mitchell's VF-8 fighters above Yorktown would have prevented one or both torpedo hits, so then perhaps it's not Mitscher who sank the Yorktown, but Waldron!

 

[CalBear]

Smashing the Invasion Fleet is a possibility. Bagging a fifth carrier, the transports, and the landing forces also hurts the Japanese war effort in a big way. If the Hiryu can be bagged with the other three CVs at the same time, Yorktown survives. Nagumo, or his successor, may not order the escort force towards the Americans in that case. And Yamamoto may not order Kondo's cruisers forward.

A downside for the Americans sticking around to get the Invasion Force (which may be more attractive than Kido Butai's heavy escorts due to Zuiho) is the possibility of a night action with IJN surface forces. I don't recall what Saratoga's screen consisted of; The USN might not fear a night action at this time.

Ah, Saratoga had two heavy cruisers and four destroyers. Giving a total of nine heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and 18 destroyers. The USN might feel confident that they could handle a night action. Oh, I want to game that out. Not enough USN cruiser models unless I use the Baltimores and Clevelands though.

The danger of night surface action would be at least somewhat mitigated if a second strike package went after the Kido Butai, much as happened IOTL, but finds all four enemy carriers either sinking or aflame from end to end with the result being a hundred plus SBD (and maybe 10-15 TBD/TBF) going after the Haruna, Kirishima, Tone, and Chikuma, Nagara and the eleven destroyers while they have absolutely no air cover.

I can just picture McClusky sending in dive bombers by section and killing anything that moved (Hanura sank at Kure after taking 8 bomb hits, so the Kongo's were anything but impervious to air attack). Having four decks would also allow Spruance to exercise his usual degree of caution by leaving two carriers to cover Midway when the others TF went after the invasion force (which had already been located by Midway strike aircraft and attacked) the following day after withdrawing to redice the chances of a night surface attack. The landing force was horribly vulnerable due to the speed of the slower transports.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

To be honest, I find the above statement rather bewildering regarding Zuikaku. Me, I've always seen Parshall as heavily US biased in whatever he writes about Midway and other things, which a true historian should not be if he still want to be called a historian. History should be reported exactly as it was, not as one wants it to be.

Me too. I think that the bias is there, and throws off everything else. I have a thread where I open up discussions for alternatives to OTL's battle, and hope to showcase one potential alternate course of the battle.

 

[Glenn239]

Yeah. As Parshall points out, that was really the decision that doomed the Kido Butai, regardless of whether Zuikaku was there or not. Because it took most of Nagumo's strike forces off the table while a major US carrier task force is present and already knows roughly where the KB is.

Nagumo's reserve wave if armed and escorted as intended was good for knocking out about 2 USN CV's on account of the IJN's superlative torpedo squadron tactics. If Zuikaku were to contribute an additional torpedo bomber squadron, this would increase by one (ie from 2 to 3) the potential number of US carriers disabled by Nagumo's properly armed reserve wave. Nor is it a given that a fifth carrier would be used in the initial attack on Midway, (the 108 aircraft allocated was already beyond the expected air strength of the Midway garrison) meaning that it was quite possible that Zuikaku would sit out the initial strike altogether, and also sit out the rearmament decision at 0715.

Notice that the IJN don't repeat this mistake in the subsequent three carrier battles. At Eastern Solomons Nagumo was careful to use only Ryujo to attack Henderson Field, while keeping Shokaku and Zuikaku back until he could be dead sure there were no US carriers present. And of course, Ryujo gets sunk for its trouble, but at least it's not fatal to Nagumo in the way that the Fatal Five Minutes was at Midway. At Santa Cruz and Philippine Sea, there's no attempt at all at a land raid - everything is focused on finding and destroying US carriers.

The full strength of Shokaku and Zuikaku at Eastern Solomons (roughly 36 torpedo and 54 dive bombers) was only slightly more numerous than the 2nd wave strength of Nagumo at Midway, (43 torpedo and 36 dive bombers).

 

[Glenn239]

I think that's really underestimating the likely performance of Hornet's dive bombers and really overestimating the CAP, esepcially if (as noted) VF-6 actually wise up to the fight going on below them and come down to pitch in. Two fighter squadrons, two divebomber squadrons, and a torpedo squadron are almost certain to do a dang sight better than 2 hits in 36 from attacks that were actually pushed to Navy doctrine, not glide bombing like Henderson's Marines. There were only 18 Zeroes up, which means the Hornet's fighters if joined by VF-6 would actually have numeric superiority for a hot second until the additional planes warming up get launches mid-engagement, which only brings things up to about 30 Zeroes vs about 20-24 American Wildcats to break off attacks on fifty or so strike aircraft.

Hornet's dive bomber squadron making contact around 0930 probably decides the battle in favor of the USN. Ring's group should be able to knock out one IJN carrier at least and in doing so, send a vast column of smoke skyward that could draw McClusky's wing directly to the target. Even if Yamaguchi counterattacks at 0930 in response, all four IJN carriers should be hit by 11am as Yorktown's and Enterprise's 3 squadrons knock out 1 deck each.

Hornet's dive bomber wing missing the target was one chance missed to take out the 4th carrier by 11am. The second chance missed was Nimitz's failure to garrison Midway with naval aviators equipped with SBD dive bombers - this measure would have knocked out one carrier around 0800. The third chance missed was, of course, Fletcher's decision to sideline half of Yorktown's dive bombers. Had Fletcher sent these then Leslie would have taken out two carriers.

 

[Athelstane]

Nagumo's reserve wave if armed and escorted as intended

But that's the big "if."

The other "if," is - that first "if" having been consummated - whether they actually find TF 16. Which in OTL, they never did.

The full strength of Shokaku and Zuikaku at Eastern Solomons (roughly 36 torpedo and 54 dive bombers) was only slightly more numerous than the 2nd wave strength of Nagumo at Midway, (43 torpedo and 36 dive bombers).

They provide a breakdown of what they assume Zuikaku brings to the engagement:

​

Hence, in this counterfactual exercise we assume that also Zuikaku was available and joined the other four carriers striking force with 21 fighters, 21 dive-bombers and​

21 torpedo-bombers. This implies a Japanese striking force of five aircraft-carriers. We simulate this scenario with both the one-shot model (the model for the whole battle) and the sequential model for comparison with the benchmark case.​

Nor is it a given that a fifth carrier would be used in the initial attack on Midway, (the 108 aircraft allocated was already beyond the expected air strength of the Midway garrison) meaning that it was quite possible that Zuikaku would sit out the initial strike altogether, and also sit out the rearmament decision at 0715.

Possibly. But the model seems to allow for either possibility. "The additional carrier has important implications for the battle but not enough to produces a Japanese victory. Probability of success of the first American attack reduces but attacking first is still a signicant advantage. Reduced losses for Japanese carriers during the first American attack combined with a large number of attacking aircraft increases the probability of success for the Japanese counterattack."

But you can read the paper (free) online, to see the analysis. (The charts are at the end.)

https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2017-1.pdf

 

[Glenn239]

To be honest, i find the above statement rather bewildering regarding Zuikaku. Me i've always seen Parshall as heavily US biased in whatever he writes about Midway and other things, which a true historian should not be if he still want to be called a historian. History should be reported exactly as it was, not as one wants it to be.

Parshall seems to want to convince the reader that Nimitz's plan 29-42 at Midway was a strategic masterpiece that could not have failed if Hornet had followed the plan. Nimitz would have fought the battle even if Zuikaku had sailed with Nagumo, and if so it follows that the model would seek to smooth over Zuikaku's possible inclusion.

Anyway the results of the wargame are skewed imo by the inclusion of this "good Hornet" thing,

IMO, the reason why the Hornet strike missed the target is because the Hornet air wing had not been properly worked up prior to the battle. Plan 29-42 called for a green carrier wing and staff with no 'hands on' carrier warfare experience attempting a difficult interception against a fast moving enemy task force moving unpredictably on a lateral course at extreme range.

What i also want to say about this Hornet and Mitscher pilloring though, not that i have any sympathy for either, but after reading some stuff and seeing some maps, imo Mitscher sent Ring on course 265 because Nimitz and intel told him so. In other words Nimitz and intel told them that KB will operate in two groups, one about 80-100 miles behind the other. So after the dawn PBY spotting of 2 japanese CVs, Mitscher logically assumed the other two are 100 miles behind, just as the intel says. Up to date the intel has been spot on, so why would he not continue to believe it? I bet that looking at the map Ring ended up about 100 miles from Nagumo's position when he eventually turned, maybe someone more knowledgeable can measure that.

Mitscher could not have possibly believed that there was a trailing group because the PBY's that found Nagumo's force scoured the waters northwest of Nagumo's force soon thereafter and reported nothing.

 

[Glenn239]

But that's the big "if."

It apparently is Parshall's assertion that Nagumo lost the battle at 0430 when he attacked Midway. Yet Nagumo did not start to rearm his reserve until 0715. If Nagumo's reserve wave could cripple two US carriers if launched as originally organized, and it was not until 0730 that the reserve was muddled into a state of unreadiness, then Parshall's thesis that the battle was decided at 0430 is broken on its face. (In fact, Nimitz's planning assumption was that Nagumo would hit Midway with all his strength like he did at Pearl Harbor, leaving him more vulnerable than would actually be the case with half his aircraft in reserve).

The other "if," is - that first "if" having been consummated - whether they actually find TF 16. Which in OTL, they never did.

Tone 4's contact report sent at 0728 was in response to having sighted the escorts of TF-16. It's later report of an 'apparent' carrier was due to identifying either Hornet or Enterprise, not Yorktown. TF17's escorts was spotted by this aircraft to the north of the first group some time after the first report. The sighting report by Tone 4 was in error, placing TF-16 north of the actual location of TF-17. Later, a D4Y dispatched from Soryu around 0830 found both TF-16 and TF-17, noting 3 carriers. This information was only made available to Yamaguchi upon the return of the scout to the fleet on account of radio troubles. Earlier than this, a crashed torpedo bomber pilot from TB-3 had been interrogated and Nagumo had a report that he was facing the trio of Yorktown Class carriers.

Possibly. But the model seems to allow for either possibility. "The additional carrier has important implications for the battle but not enough to produces a Japanese victory. Probability of success of the first American attack reduces but attacking first is still a signicant advantage. Reduced losses for Japanese carriers during the first American attack combined with a large number of attacking aircraft increases the probability of success for the Japanese counterattack."

If Zuikaku is in the battle and nothing changes, then at 1030 Nagumo has 3 of his 5 carriers knocked out. One (Soryu) is in a probable sinking condition. One (Kaga) is at best a year in repair. One (Akagi) is at best case scenario for the IJN about 6 months in repair. Since Zuikaku was probably not assigned to either attack on Midway, Yamaguchi counterattacks around 1050 with about 12 Zeroes, 18 dive bombers and 18 torpedo bombers. He then attacks again with another 12 Zeroes, 18 dive bombers and 10 torpedo bombers. Two US carriers are knocked out in these two attacks. Spruance hits back with 1 (not 2) carriers in the late afternoon, knocking out Hiryu (probably in repair and working up a replacement wing for the rest of 1942). The final US carrier is damaged by Zuikaku's dusk strike. Night sees Nagumo's vastly superior surface forces charging for a surface action with 4 IJN carriers and 3 US carriers damaged and one IJN carrier operational. Midway is bombarded by 7th Cruiser division with more of Kondo's surface ships able to follow up.

Nagumo winds up with Zuikaku operational, Soryu sunk, and three other carriers heavily damaged. Nimitz is down to one operational carrier for the 2nd half of 1942- Saratoga, boosted to two by Wasp - facing four medium or heavy IJN carriers, (Zuikaku, Shokaku, Junyo, Hiyo), boosted by any survivors from Midway in late 1942. The conditions for Watchtower do not exist and Guadalcanal does not occur.

 

[CalBear]

But that's the big "if."

The other "if," is - that first "if" having been consummated - whether they actually find TF 16. Which in OTL, they never did.



They provide a breakdown of what they assume Zuikaku brings to the engagement:

​

Hence, in this counterfactual exercise we assume that also Zuikaku was available and joined the other four carriers striking force with 21 fighters, 21 dive-bombers and​

21 torpedo-bombers. This implies a Japanese striking force of five aircraft-carriers. We simulate this scenario with both the one-shot model (the model for the whole battle) and the sequential model for comparison with the benchmark case.​

Possibly. But the model seems to allow for either possibility. "The additional carrier has important implications for the battle but not enough to produces a Japanese victory. Probability of success of the first American attack reduces but attacking first is still a signicant advantage. Reduced losses for Japanese carriers during the first American attack combined with a large number of attacking aircraft increases the probability of success for the Japanese counterattack."

But you can read the paper (free) online, to see the analysis. (The charts are at the end.)

https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2017-1.pdf

It is a HUGE if.

Of course that is rather what this whole Site is about.

I don't really agree with the scenario Glenn presented, especially the idea that Zuikaku would not be part of the primary strike force, that would be a radical change from how the Kido Butai was used at Pearl, as frankly, would be a top shelf performance by Nagumo in command. The Japanese success would rely almost entirely on everything coming together perfectly for the Japanese and even with that assumes the Japanese ever realize that the Enterprise and Hornet are there (something they never quite twigged to IOTL)

The biggest difference in the alternative is, of course, Hornet's strike package heading in the right direction. That almost certainly puts paid to the Hiryu before Noon, meaning the later attack never materializes.

 

[Unknown]

I don't really agree with the scenario Glenn presented, especially the idea that Zuikaku would not be part of the primary strike force, that would be a radical change from how the Kido Butai was used at Pearl, as frankly, would be a top shelf performance by Nagumo in command. The Japanese success would rely almost entirely on everything coming together perfectly for the Japanese and even with that assumes the Japanese ever realize that the Enterprise and Hornet are there (something they never quite twigged to IOTL)

And, even if everything goes perfectly for Japan, it only delays their inevitable loss--and they will lose, because the US will eventually overpower them in the Pacific...

On a side note, @CalBear, have you read the book The Moscow Option by David Downing? I like it because, in part, the Germans manage to take both Moscow and Leningrad, and still lose the war in the end...

 

[Athelstane]

Tone 4's contact report sent at 0728 was in response to having sighted the escorts of TF-16.... Later, a D4Y dispatched from Soryu around 0830 found both TF-16 and TF-17, noting 3 carriers.

I don't have time for a full response just now. But what I was referring to was Yamaguchi's strike force finding TF 16, not the scout planes. Because Tone's #4 plane was so far off in its location report, Hiryu's noon strike had no way of knowing just exactly whether Yorktown's group was what had been sighted earlier. Assuming that it *was* (a not unreasonable assumption), they diverted all of their attentions to Yorktown. Not that it mattered, really: I mean, you just sighted a Yank carrier, you're gonna go hit it, immediately.

 

[Athelstane]

I don't really agree with the scenario Glenn presented, especially the idea that Zuikaku would not be part of the primary strike force, that would be a radical change from how the Kido Butai was used at Pearl, as frankly, would be a top shelf performance by Nagumo in command.

It's a good point.

 

[CalBear]

And, even if everything goes perfectly for Japan, it only delays their inevitable loss--and they will lose, because the US will eventually overpower them in the Pacific...

On a side note, @CalBear, have you read the book The Moscow Option by David Downing? I like it because, in part, the Germans manage to take both Moscow and Leningrad, and still lose the war in the end...

I haven't read it, but I can see how the basic story would work. Getting the Reich to actually straight up win the War with the Soviets is REALLY hard.

 

[Glenn239]

I don't really agree with the scenario Glenn presented, especially the idea that Zuikaku would not be part of the primary strike force, that would be a radical change from how the Kido Butai was used at Pearl, as frankly, would be a top shelf performance by Nagumo in command. The Japanese success would rely almost entirely on everything coming together perfectly for the Japanese and even with that assumes the Japanese ever realize that the Enterprise and Hornet are there (something they never quite twigged to IOTL)

Nagumo's situation assessment for Midway was,

Situation in the Midway Area
Midway acts as a sentry for Hawaii. Its importance was further enhanced after the loss of Wake and it was apparent that the enemy was expediting the reinforcing of its defensive installations, its air base facilities, and other military installations as well as the personnel.

Estimate of existing conditions there were as follows:

1. Air strength:1
   
   

   Recco. Flying Boats	2 squadrons.
   Army Bombers	1 squadron.
   Fighters	1 squadron.

   
   The above estimated strength could be doubled in an emergency.

They were thinking about 36 combat aircraft, (2 squadrons) or less than half of Midway's actual combat air strength. The 108 aircraft dispatched seem ample for the expected target, leaving me with the assumption that Zuikaku might be left untouched in reserve (and omitted from the rearmament order). But, even assuming Zuikaku did participate, the basic mechanics of the afternoon strikes do not change, except for the fact that Yamaguchi will launch about 12 Zeros and 36 Vals around 11am, then follow up with 12 Zeroes and 28 Kates around 1pm.

 

[Glenn239]

And, even if everything goes perfectly for Japan, it only delays their inevitable loss--and they will lose, because the US will eventually overpower them in the Pacific...

Of course, but there is the timing factor between the end of the European War and the end of the Pacific War. The Marianas were secured in the summer of 1944 and the B-29's based there had asserted air dominance over the Japanese Homeland by the following spring. The A-bomb was available in August, at the moment that the USSR launched its own offensive. The American strategic bombing campaign culminated at the same moment the Soviets invaded Manchuria.

So, mix that up a bit. Let's say the Soviets were nowhere near close to invading Manchuria in August 1945. Does that change the outcome of the war? It's hotly debated, but I'd say probably not, the Japanese government was already reeling from the strategic campaign and pending collapse, and the A-bombs were an opportunity to shove through unconditional surrender. So, the Soviets after the A-bomb should not make any differenc.

What about the opposite case? Let's say Nimitz loses 3 carriers at Midway to 1 Japanese sunk, (Soryu) and 2 more damaged, (Akagi and Kaga). Let's say the knock on effect to this, rolling through delays in the Solomons and such, is that the Marianas are not taken until the summer of 1945. Now the Soviets have invaded Manchuria before Japan is anywhere near surrendering to the Americans. But, the Japanese are still collapsing in Manchuria and the Soviets are rolling south. Does that change the dynamics of US-Japanese surrender negotiations? I would hazard the guess that yes, it could.