80 Years On: Shattered Sword's Jonathan Parshall parses some Midway Counterfactuals

[naraic]

The only question about whether Hornet's air group (having stumbled by luck as a group over the Kido Butai) will prove more competent to be there, like the other carriers, or less trained like Marines and unable to push their attack in successfully. Given Waldron' aggressiveness with VT-8 compared well to Enterprise's VT-6, I'm inclined to guess they'd have given a decent show, so one or two Japanese carriers would probably have Bombing 8 and Scouting 8's name on them here.

If Hornet's airgroups show up over the Japanese fleet they could have a disasterous performance and not get a single hit on a carrier and still improve the situation from otl significantly.

I'm inclined to feel that they probably show up with the torpedo bombers early in the battle while the Japanese CAP was in good condition and get a hit or maximum two damaging rather than sinking a carrier or two.

Their presence and that of the escorting fighters degrades the CAP further and the later attacks suffer less losses and score extra hits. Whatever carrier is damaged probably eats a torpedo too and sinks.

 

[Captain Seafort]

Its also worth noting that the main problem with US torpedoes was that the air dropped torpedoes were slow. The mark 13 air dropped toredoes were 30 knot torpedoes.

If a carrier is damaged and it can't turn away the torpedoes were capable of blowing up.

Not correct, unfortunately. The Mks 13, 14 and 15 were effectively the same weapon system, with variations based on their intended launch platform. I don't know if the Mk13 had the same depth-keeping issues as the Mk14 (wouldn't be surprised) but it had the same Mk6 exploder and therefore the same issues detonating.

 

[e of pi]

I'm inclined to feel that they probably show up with the torpedo bombers early in the battle while the Japanese CAP was in good condition and get a hit or maximum two damaging rather than sinking a carrier or two.

I think that's really underestimating the likely performance of Hornet's dive bombers and really overestimating the CAP, esepcially if (as noted) VF-6 actually wise up to the fight going on below them and come down to pitch in. Two fighter squadrons, two divebomber squadrons, and a torpedo squadron are almost certain to do a dang sight better than 2 hits in 36 from attacks that were actually pushed to Navy doctrine, not glide bombing like Henderson's Marines. There were only 18 Zeroes up, which means the Hornet's fighters if joined by VF-6 would actually have numeric superiority for a hot second until the additional planes warming up get launches mid-engagement, which only brings things up to about 30 Zeroes vs about 20-24 American Wildcats to break off attacks on fifty or so strike aircraft.

Like I said, it's up to exactly how the person writing it rolls the dice and games out the combat, but Hornet could make a real mess of it and still be pretty assured of scratching at least one carrier if they'd just managed to end up over Kido Butai.

 

[naraic]

I think that's really underestimating the likely performance of Hornet's dive bombers and really overestimating the CAP, esepcially if (as noted) VF-6 actually wise up to the fight going on below them and come down to pitch in. Two fighter squadrons, two divebomber squadrons, and a torpedo squadron are almost certain to do a dang sight better than 2 hits in 36 from attacks that were actually pushed to Navy doctrine, not glide bombing like Henderson's Marines. There were only 18 Zeroes up, which means the Hornet's fighters if joined by VF-6 would actually have numeric superiority for a hot second until the additional planes warming up get launches mid-engagement, which only brings things up to about 30 Zeroes vs about 20-24 American Wildcats to break off attacks on fifty or so strike aircraft.

Like I said, it's up to exactly how the person writing it rolls the dice and games out the combat, but Hornet could make a real mess of it and still be pretty assured of scratching at least one carrier if they'd just managed to end up over Kido Butai.

You might be right. I don't know.

I tend to give actually lot of credit to the effect an attack that disrupts a bomber formation will have on a dive bomber or torpedo bomber strike.

My main point was actually that showing up and doing a poor job is probably still a massive success.

 

[e of pi]

You might be right. I don't know.

I tend to give actually lot of credit to the effect an attack that disrupts a bomber formation will have on a dive bomber or torpedo bomber strike.

My main point was actually that showing up and doing a poor job is probably still a massive success.

"Disrupting" a bomber formation requires first being aware there's even a threat, and then making it through the escorts, and then breaking them up meaningfully. VF-6 orbited over the Kido Butai waiting for either a radio call from VT-6 (which is what they thought VT-8 was OTL) and looking for the Enterprise dive-bomber squadrons. That seems to suggest that the upper door was pretty open, and any "disruption" of dive bomber attacks would be attacks made very hastily as those planes were already in or setting up their final dives.

Similarly, the CAP wasn't a single monolithic thing that was degraded, but a loose assembly of whatever was up with minimal control. It grew and shrank as attacks developed and planes exhausted ammunition and fuel, so it varied between like 18 to 36 aircraft all morning. Anyway, I do agree with your assessment at the end--even the worst-case likely performance of a single carrier knocked out is still a massive success, if for no reason than Hornet's air group will be turning for home without losing all the fuel spent looking for the carriers and has a higher chance of actually making it home intact for another try later.

 

[Athelstane]

One of the first few viewer questions asked was about Operation Z and Parshall's answer was very intriguing; saying that if the KB had had a bit farther, spotting the British. The RN presence in the Indian Ocean, at least for a time, would've been severely hampered. Parshall bases his answer off conventional wisdom at the time; certainly a must view for those who have worked on an RN timeline before.

Thus the cleverness of Zheng He's Alternate Indian Ocean timeline, which has Somerville tackling the far more practical objective of ambushing Ozawa's Malay Force. Tackling Nagumo would have been suicide. And Somerville fully appreciated that.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

Interesting approach. Though I would note, this controls for only the variable of how many carriers are present on the US/Japanese side while keeping the rest of the timeline the same; I would argue that the conclusion that the battle's outcome was predetermined ignores a lot of other factors that led to the US spotting the Japanese first that easily could have gone the other way, i.e Hornet dodging Japanese submarine pickets, Tone's recon plane, etc.

 

[Athelstane]

I would argue that the conclusion that the battle's outcome was predetermined ignores a lot of other factors that led to the US spotting the Japanese first that easily could have gone the other way, i.e Hornet dodging Japanese submarine pickets, Tone's recon plane, etc.

If I understand Parshall correctly here, I think he really is making a narrow point: The battle's outcome *was* predetermined, whether or not Zuikaku was there, the moment Nagumo sends off his 0430 attack Midway Atoll. In this respect, Tone's delay doesn't actually make much material difference: the decisive moment had already come when Nagumo sent off his strike to Midway. But then, Nimitz's whole strategy was based on the assumption that they had correctly deciphered the IJN plan and that Nagumo would stick to the plan.

To look at other PODs would indeed require a whole new analysis. If Nagumo is made aware of Fletcher's presence much sooner (as in, before he's ready to launch a strike on Midway), that obviously shifts the odds, though I think Fletcher still has a a good chance of trashing at least some of Kido Butai even with the advantage of surprise lost. He has more aircraft than Nagumo, an unsinkable carrier in the form of Midway to do most of his scouting without giving away the location of his sinkable ones, more robust carriers, radar, and some outstanding dive bomber formations. These are not unbeatable advantages, but in aggregate I think (and I think Parshall, Tully, and Symonds think) that they give the US a modest advantage.

 

[wcv215]

get a hit or maximum two damaging rather than sinking a carrier or two.

The thing is that all the American dive bomber hits did nothing more than damage the Japanese carriers. The poor design decisions, lackluster to bad damage control, and the rearming process being slow combined to render every carrier taken out of action after being hit. None of the dive bomber hits were inherently fatal OTL, see Yorktown, it was how the Japanese (failed to) handle the hits that ensured the ships couldn’t be saved.

And they were all scuttled by the Japanese, none sank of their own accord IIRC.

 

[Athelstane]

The thing is that all the American dive bomber hits did nothing more than damage the Japanese carriers. The poor design decisions, lackluster to bad damage control, and the rearming process being slow combined to render every carrier taken out of action after being hit. None of the dive bomber hits were inherently fatal OTL, see Yorktown, it was how the Japanese (failed to) handle the hits that ensured the ships couldn’t be saved.

Perhaps it would be better to say that those bomb hits would not have been fatal to a Yorktown-class carrier. . .

But the reality is, they were fatal to three Japanese carrier classes. IJN pre-Shokaku IJN carriers were remarkable ships in many ways, but they had glass jaws (even aside from s***y damage control).

The bombs may not have sunk Nagumo's carriers, but they did render them hors d'combat. They were no more usefu to the IJN as burnt out hulks than they would have been as sea-anemone-encrusted hulks on the seabed floor, save possibly for the scrap iron value. But even then, I can't think the scrap could justify the oil you'd need to burn (or the increased risk of submarine or air attack on the towers) to tow them back to Japan.

 

[173rd LRRP]

And your dad's job would have been met with success if I-168 hadn't shown up and gotten lucky. For all the beating Yorktown had taken, she was definitely salvageable at the end of the battle, and the salvage teams were making solid progress when the torpedoes hit. The Yorktowns were very tough ships.

Did your dad make it off the ship?



Another beloved counterfactual! Since Sara showed up at TF 17 on June 8, just a few days too late for the battle . . .

Nimitz had lit as much fire as he could under Saratoga's teams to get her underway, to the point of wiring Ramsay on May 30 to leave San Diego immediately even if Admiral Fitch hadn't shown up yet . . . I think what really made it hard to do was that Nimitz and King weren't convinced of the Midway operation intel until May 16, and two weeks just wasn't enough time to speed it up sufficiently. Had they had more warning, I think Saratoga could have been gotten out there sooner.

Dad was part of the salvage operation since almost all of engineering division was involved. He was on deck when the torpedoes were spotted and could only regret his Leica was in his room. He was in water for first abandon ship and was able to step onto a tug for the second abandonment. He managed to carry off the Leica, a 1901 Lugar, and a set of binoculars. I still have the Lugar and binocukars. The pistol may be only sidearm with provenance to both Coral Sea and Midway.

Dad lived to be 83 and retired a RADM. His photo of the Yorktown sinking is well known

 

[Athelstane]

Dad was part of the salvage operation since almost all of engineering division was involved. He was on deck when the torpedoes were spotted and could only regret his Leica was in his room. He was in water for first abandon ship and was able to step onto a tug for the second abandonment. He managed to carry off the Leica, a 1901 Lugar, and a set of binoculars. I still have the Lugar and binocukars. The pistol may be only sidearm with provenance to both Coral Sea and Midway.

I just love hearing stories like this.

Which Yorktown sinking photo is the one he took, if I may ask?

 

[173rd LRRP]

I just love hearing stories like this.

Which Yorktown sinking photo is the one he took, if I may ask?

The one in “Incredible Victory” which shows Yorktown having rolled over. The Navy kept the negatives till long after the war since the damage inflicted by submarine torpedoes was evident and this kept classified till long after the war.

Unfortunately Dad sold the Leica fora rubber check.. he was a great Dad.

 

[173rd LRRP]

I just love hearing stories like this.

Which Yorktown sinking photo is the one he took, if I may ask?

The one in “Incredible Victory” which shows Yorktown having rolled over. The Navy kept the negatives till long after the war since the damage inflicted by submarine torpedoes was evident and this kept classified till long after the war..

Attached may be photo but attributed to him at this site. It is attributed at Naval Proceedings site. He had been transferred to a cruiser at this time. We had his life preserver but Mom did some housecleaning once.

Unfortunately Dad sold the Leica fora rubber check.. he was a great Dad.

 

[wcv215]

But the reality is, they were fatal to three Japanese carrier classes. IJN pre-Shokaku IJN carriers were remarkable ships in many ways, but they had glass jaws (even aside from s***y damage control).

Yes, that’s my point. That getting a hit or two, as stated in the post I was quoting, isn’t different than sinking, since getting a hit or two is what happened to the carriers OTL. Theygot hit, caught fire, and then couldn’t be saved. I don’t see any reason this would be different if this early strike hit the carriers. That still equates to a carrier knocked out given OTL results.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Silly idea: how about extra bad Hornet where Mitscher defects to the Japanese?

 

[Athelstane]

How fitting that today, Drachinifel's ship feature is . . . IJN AKAGI. A.K.A., Dick Best's 41,000 ton Distinguished Flying Cross.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

Anyone want to hear my thoughts on a simple change, that might have led to a 3v3 carriers lost at midway? I'm surprised that this isn't (as far as I know), one of the things that was asked at the end of the video. I also have not watched the whole thing yet.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

This weekend is the 80th anniversary of Midway, so it's not at all surprising to see Jonathan Parshall drop in today for another lengthy pod/video cast with Drachinifel.

But this one looked worth special mention here, because this time, unprompted, Parshall offers up some alternate history - or as he likes to call it, "counterfactuals." And these are the questions he looks at:

1. What would have happened if Midway had been 3 vs 5 carriers (the IJN brings Zuikaku)?
2. What would have happened if Midway had been 2 vs 5 carriers (the IJN brings Zuikaku, but the USN cannot bring Yorktown in time)?

And then, in turn, he also looks at a further variant of both, in which either a) the "good" Hornet shows up, or b) the "bad" Hornet shows up (i.e., whether Mitscher actually follows his orders in where he sends his strike groups out). First, though, he does model the existing battle (4 vs 3) with both Hornet variants, just to see what happens.

This gets modestly rigorous: Parshall employs a stochastic salvo combat model developed in cooperation with two Spanish scholars, Aneli Bongers and Jose L. Torres, in a 2017 article, "Revisiting the Battle of Midway: A counterfactual analysis."

So, here are the quick and dirty answers:

​

0(a): [OTL: 4 IJN vs 3 USN, good Hornet]: US wins a curbstomb, 4 IJN losses vs 0 US losses. In short, Parshall, concludes, "Mitscher sunk the Yorktown."​

0(b): [OTL: 4 IJN vs 3 USN, bad Hornet]: US wins as in OTL, 4 IJN losses vs 1 US losses. The model bears out history!​

​

1(a): [5 IJN vs. 3 USN, good Hornet]: 5 IJN losses vs. 1-2 USN losses​

1(b): [5 IJN vs. 3 USN, bad Hornet]: 3-4 IJN losses vs 2 USN losses​

​

2(a): [5 IJN vs. 2 USN, good Hornet]: 2-3 IJN losses vs. 2 USN losses​

2(b): [5 IJN vs. 2 USN, bad Hornet]: 2 IJN losses vs 2 USN losses​

This is interesting, because the results pretty resoundingly reject the the proposition, mooted over the years, that Yamamoto bringing Zuikaku along could have been a game changer. In fact, the Japanese still get smashed. The real difference maker, as it turns out, is Yorktown. As Parshall, Bongers, and Torres' analysis seems to consistently show, if the Americans bring all three carriers as they did OTL, the Japanese are going to get their asses kicked at Midway even if they bring all 5 intact KB fleet carriers. Even with Nimitz's crappy sub captains and Midway's crappy attack squadrons, American advantages are just too much for the Japanese to have much chance of overcoming.

The video is 3 hours long, but Parshall's actual discussion is only 7 minutes, starting at my timestamp:

Discuss amongst yourselves whether you find this analysis persuasive (though you really have to dig into the paper to see the math and the modeling).

I wonder (not having time to watch it about to pop out) if this took into account the massive disparity in the levels of intelligence advantage enjoyed by the USN

It was effectively a massive carrier ambush - it being almost certain that they would find fix and strike the IJN carrier first and more likely to get the first hits in

 

[Athelstane]

I wonder (not having time to watch it about to pop out) if this took into account the massive disparity in the levels of intelligence advantage enjoyed by the USN

It was effectively a massive carrier ambush - it being almost certain that they would find fix and strike the IJN carrier first and more likely to get the first hits in

The model they used assumes everything held constant, except: 1) Whether Zuikaku is at the battle, 2) Whether Yorktown is at the battle, or 3) Whether Mitscher sends his pilots off on a wild goose chase.

So, the massive intel advantage that Nimitz had is assumed in all variations. And you're right, what it amounted to was a gigantic carrier ambush. Once Nagumo sent off his raid to Midway Atoll, he had put himself deep in a hole without realizing it.