1916 German offensive on the Somme

[Deleted member 1487]

I came across an interesting proposal in the Jack Sheldon book "German Army on the Somme 1914-16" in which 2nd army commander von Bulow proposed to OHL first in March and again in May 1916 to launch a short spoiling offensive against Entente forces in the Somme area while they were building up to disrupt their offensive. Given the lack of reserves because of Verdun and as of June the Brusilov offensive, Falkenhayn never acted on the proposal citing lack of forces.

So what if when Falkenhayn was hesitating in March-April about continuing the Verdun operation (it was actually 5th army that wanted to more than Falkenhayn) he calls off that operation and transfers reserves in April 1916 to launch von Bulow's spoiling offensive on the Somme in May?
Here is the POD point I was thinking of:

Battle of Verdun - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

By the end of March the offensive had cost the Germans 81,607 casualties and Falkenhayn began to think of ending the offensive, lest it become another costly and indecisive engagement similar to the First Battle of Ypres in late 1914. The 5th Army staff requested more reinforcements from Falkenhayn on 31 March with an optimistic report claiming that the French were close to exhaustion and incapable of a big offensive. The 5th Army command wanted to continue the east bank offensive until a line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont, to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes had been reached, while on the west bank the French would be destroyed by their own counter-attacks. On 4 April, Falkenhayn replied that the French had retained a considerable reserve and that German resources were limited and not sufficient to replace continuously men and munitions. If the resumed offensive on the east bank failed to reach the Meuse Heights, Falkenhayn was willing to accept that the offensive had failed and end it.[47]

The failure of German attacks in early April by Angriffsgruppe Ost, led Knobelsdorf to take soundings from the 5th Army corps commanders, who unanimously wanted to continue. The German infantry were exposed to continuous artillery fire from the flanks and rear; communications from the rear and reserve positions were equally vulnerable, which caused a constant drain of casualties. Defensive positions were difficult to build, because existing positions were on ground which had been swept clear by German bombardments early in the offensive, leaving German infantry with very little cover. The XV Corps commander, General Berthold von Deimling also wrote that French heavy artillery and gas bombardments were undermining the morale of the German infantry, which made it necessary to keep going to reach safer defensive positions. Knobelsdorf reported these findings to Falkenhayn on 20 April, adding that if the Germans did not go forward, they must go back to the start line of 21 February.[48]

Upon seeing the early April attacks were failing let's say ITTL that Falkenhayn asserts himself and calls off further attacks and
starts a quiet withdrawal back to the start line to free up reserves for the Somme and reduce losses. They'd still be considerable by that point though:

The Battle of Verdun and the number of casualties

The Battle of Verdun is considered the greatest battle in world history. What about the number of casualties?

www.wereldoorlog1418.nl

Here is von Bulow's proposal for the Somme offensive in May (p.115 Sheldon's book):

"Its aim would be to attack the Allies on a twenty km front from St. Pierre Divion (near Thiepval) in the north to Foucaucourt in the south. The scheme involved an attack to a depth of twenty five km in a series of phases, tackling the British forces north of the Somme initially, then following up south of the river. 'As far as timings for the two or three phase attack are concerned,' he wrote, 'the attack cannot being soon enough. The British have been reinforced so strongly north of the Somme that there can hardly be any remaining doubt concerning their plans for an offensive...Whether they intend to attack in the next few days, or if they are waiting for further reinforcements, or an improvement int he training of their troops, cannot be determined. If we launch it is entirely possible that we shall pre-empt the British and throw their plans into confusion...'
On the 2nd of June, despite the fact that there had been no response to his proposal from Supreme HQ, von Below returned to his theme, stressing that the situation looked even more threatening and urging at least an attack between St. Pierre Divion and Ovillers."

So let's say that after Verdun turned out to be a bust and to deal with the threatening British build up Falkenhayn puts his reserves that would have been used at Verdun after early April into the Somme sector and launches von Below's spoiling offensive in early May while pulling back on the Verdun front. How does that play out, what does it do to the Somme offensive, and what do the French do with the breathing room?

 

[TDM]

....

"Its aim would be to attack the Allies on a twenty km front from St. Pierre Divion (near Thiepval) in the north to Foucaucourt in the south. The scheme involved an attack to a depth of twenty five km in a series of phases, tackling the British forces north of the Somme initially, then following up south of the river. 'As far as timings for the two or three phase attack are concerned,' he wrote, 'the attack cannot being soon enough. The British have been reinforced so strongly north of the Somme that there can hardly be any remaining doubt concerning their plans for an offensive...Whether they intend to attack in the next few days, or if they are waiting for further reinforcements, or an improvement int he training of their troops, cannot be determined. If we launch it is entirely possible that we shall pre-empt the British and throw their plans into confusion...'
...

Are they not just going to attack an already heavily reinforced area of the front (I.e. where the British were massing for their own offensive)? That's not going to be a cheap day for German lives & resources. I mean yes I get that would definitely disrupt the British attack no doubt about it, but given how costly the British attack was for the British, I'm not sure letting the British attack wouldn't be a better result for the Germans anyway!

Also withdrawing from Verdun, and starting in on the British might run up against the sunk cost fallacy, especially when you consider the ethos behind the Verdun operation in the first place.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Are they not just going to attack an already heavily reinforced area of the front (I.e. where the British were massing for their own offensive)? That's not going to be a cheap day for German lives & resources. I mean yes I get that would definitely disrupt the British attack no doubt about it, but given how costly the British attack was for the British anyway I;m not sure letting the British attack wouldn't be a better result for the Germans anyway!

Also withdrawing from Verdun, and starting in on the British might run up against the sunk cost fallacy, especially when you consider the ethos behind the operation in the first place

Units preparing for an offensive are not set up for defense.


Edit:
This is evidenced by several accounts in Sheldon's book about trench raiding that was going on on the Somme front in 1916 prior to the British offensive and how the Germans were able to repeatedly snag dozens of British PoWs in raids. The Brits also were doing their own raiding with less success. Lest you think that Sheldon is biased, he's a retired British Army officer himself and a Sandhurt graduate.
Here is the book:

Amazon.com: German Army on the Somme: 1914-1916 (9781844155132): Sheldon, Jack: Books

Amazon.com: German Army on the Somme: 1914-1916 (9781844155132): Sheldon, Jack: Books

www.amazon.com

He notes too the poor British coordination during the battles, probably a function of the New Armies not really being ready for show time in July let alone May, while the German army had spent the trench months in 1914 up to the start of the Somme heavily training and preparing for combat.

 

[TDM]

Units preparing for an offensive are not set up for defense.

No but it's still men and guns and artillery with large amounts of stockpiled shells, all in the right place and at the right time. It doesn't take that much to put them up against an attack especially as the attack will be coming onto them and their communications and supply lines. It's also not like every single British military resource will be stripped from defence and put in a mutually exclusive "over the top" offensive footing (leaving aside the fact that many would still be launching their assault from the established defensive positions anyway)! Plus offensives in 1916 are not launched and run at lightening fast speed. The German assault isn't going to magically transport itself past the British initial lines of defence like a unit of light horse getting past a camp's night time pickets before the camp can wake up. It will have to get there, plus it likely they'll have to announce themselves with a preliminary artillery barrage, the British will have time to react.

 

[AussieHawker]

Were there any other notable spoiling offensives, for the rough period that could potentially be used as a point of comparison?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Were there any other notable spoiling offensives, for the rough period that could potentially be used as a point of comparison?

Not that I'm aware of TBH. The only thing I have to go on were accounts from the book about numerous successful German trench raids to grab prisoners in the months leading up to the campaign. I edited my post above to talk about that.

No but it's still men and guns and artillery with large amounts of stockpiled shells, all in the right place and at the right time. It doesn't take that much to put them up against an attack especially as the attack will be coming onto them and their communications and supply lines. It's also not like every single British military resource will be stripped from defence and put in a mutual exclusive "over the top" footing (leaving aside the fact that many would still be launching their assault from the established defensive positions anyway)! Plus offensives in 1916 are not launched and run at lightening fast speed. The German assault isn't going to magically transport itself past the British initial lines of defence like a unit of light horse getting past night time pickets before the camp can wake up. It will have to get there, plus it likely they'll have to announce themselves with a preliminary artillery barrage, the British will have time to react.

Doesn't mean they're ready to operate defensively on the fly, especially when they were in training. Plus this is in May two months out from the Somme battle, so having all the artillery and shells in place isn't really accurate. In June yes, but in early May the build up is largely still getting started.

Per the plan the Germans weren't going to be going for broke, they were just aiming for a shallow penetration (25 km in 2-3 stages...for comparison the Brits planned on doing 25 km in the first day!) on a short frontage within range of their own artillery to disrupt the Brits in their staging zones before they were ready to fight so as to throw off their time tables entirely. This also was a relatively quiet sector in early 1916 and since the Germans had not attacked since 1914 defenses were pretty weak on the Allied side. Certainly the Brits will be able to react, but without a plan in place doing it on the fly with poorly trained armies that were still forming (remember Haig was told to attack in May, but refused and pushed it out to July despite begging to be allowed to wait until August to start.

Battle of the Somme - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The original British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of six divisions and the Cavalry Division, had lost most of the army's pre-war regular soldiers in the battles of 1914 and 1915. The bulk of the army was made up of volunteers of the Territorial Force and Lord Kitchener's New Army, which had begun forming in August 1914. Rapid expansion created many vacancies for senior commands and specialist functions, which led to many appointments of retired officers and inexperienced newcomers. In 1914, Douglas Haig had been a lieutenant-general in command of I Corps and was promoted to command the First Army in early 1915 and then the BEF in December, which eventually comprised five armies with sixty divisions. The swift increase in the size of the army reduced the average level of experience within it and created an acute equipment shortage. Many officers resorted to directive command, to avoid delegating to novice subordinates, although divisional commanders were given great latitude in training and planning for the attack of 1 July, since the heterogeneous nature of the 1916 army made it impossible for corps and army commanders to know the capacity of each division.[23]

Really doesn't sound good for their ability to react to an unanticipated threat.

Another issue:

First Battle of the Somme | Summary, Location, Outcome, Casualties, Significance, & Facts

First Battle of the Somme (July 1–November 13, 1916), costly and largely unsuccessful Allied offensive on the Western Front during World War I. The horrific bloodshed on the first day of the battle became a metaphor for futile and indiscriminate slaughter.

www.britannica.com

On July 1, 1916, after a week of prolonged artillery bombardment, 11 divisions of the British Fourth Army (recently created and placed under Sir Henry Rawlinson) began the attack north of the Somme on a front extending for 15 miles (24 km) from Serre and Beaumont-Hamel southward past Thiepval, Ovillers, and Fricourt (east of Albert) and then eastward and southward to Maricourt, north of Curlu

Whereas the French had more than 900 heavy guns, the British had barely half this number for a wider front.

Summary of the Prelude to the Battle of the Somme, 1916

Summary page for preparations for the Battle of the Somme.

www.greatwar.co.uk

The British Fourth Army was formed in March 1916. It took over the Somme battlefront from the British Third Army between Fonquevillers and Maricourt on the Somme river. The British operational plan for an offensive between Serre on the left wing and Maricourt on the right wing developed during April, May and June 1916.

Fighting a forming a new army only in place two months before the attack in May I'm suggesting here doesn't sound like it would be capable of effectively defending against an attack.

 

[TDM]

Not that I'm aware of TBH. The only thing I have to go on were accounts from the book about numerous successful German trench raids to grab prisoners in the months leading up to the campaign. I edited my post above to talk about that.


Doesn't mean they're ready to operate defensively on the fly, especially when they were in training. Plus this is in May two months out from the Somme battle, so having all the artillery and shells in place isn't really accurate. In June yes, but in early May the build up is largely still getting started.

Per the plan the Germans weren't going to be going for broke, they were just aiming for a shallow penetration (25 km in 2-3 stages...for comparison the Brits planned on doing 25 km in the first day!) on a short frontage within range of their own artillery to disrupt the Brits in their staging zones before they were ready to fight so as to throw off their time tables entirely. This also was a relatively quiet sector in early 1916 and since the Germans had not attacked since 1914 defenses were pretty weak on the Allied side. Certainly the Brits will be able to react, but without a plan in place doing it on the fly with poorly trained armies that were still forming (remember Haig was told to attack in May, but refused and pushed it out to July despite begging to be allowed to wait until August to start.

Battle of the Somme - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Really doesn't sound good for their ability to react to an unanticipated threat.

Another issue:

First Battle of the Somme | Summary, Location, Outcome, Casualties, Significance, & Facts

First Battle of the Somme (July 1–November 13, 1916), costly and largely unsuccessful Allied offensive on the Western Front during World War I. The horrific bloodshed on the first day of the battle became a metaphor for futile and indiscriminate slaughter.

www.britannica.com

Summary of the Prelude to the Battle of the Somme, 1916

Summary page for preparations for the Battle of the Somme.

www.greatwar.co.uk

Fighting a forming a new army only in place two months before the attack in May I'm suggesting here doesn't sound like it would be capable of effectively defending against an attack.

Of for heavens sake do you really think the British are just going to stand there paralysed and frozen in attack positions as tens of thousands of Germans steam towards them. just because there are some officer vacancies.

You are very good at citing tiny sections of wiki articles and very precise numbers and anecdotes of things that don't really matter at the scale we're discussing or are only relevent in hindsight that will be unavailable at the time. But you're really bad at interpreting what would actually happen in terms of two sides fighting a war and reacting to each other at the time it's actually happening.

Take for example,:

On July 1, 1916, after a week of prolonged artillery bombardment, 11 divisions of the British Fourth Army (recently created and placed under Sir Henry Rawlinson) began the attack north of the Somme on a front extending for 15 miles (24 km) from Serre and Beaumont-Hamel southward past Thiepval, Ovillers, and Fricourt (east of Albert) and then eastward and southward to Maricourt, north of Curlu

Whereas the French had more than 900 heavy guns, the British had barely half this number for a wider front.



oh no half the number of french guns, oh no that sounds bad, but it's like you entirely missed the whole "On July 1, 1916, after a week of prolonged artillery bombardment" bit! And "half the number of french guns" is an very abstract point when in context we're actually taking about this

even if you somehow manage to time the German attack when not every single shell was stockpiled (because somehow the Germans will know exactly when that is) you still running an attack into that.

The British don't need a perfectly formed plan, they just need to be there.

There is no way the Germans can attack quickly enough to actually achieve surprise for long enough for this to matter

The Germans will obviously spoil the British attack that is not in doubt, but what's the point? What is the actual German goal here? What do they achieve at best a shallow penetration, what do they do then, they get pushed back once all those British counter attack.

Seriously look at the British losses when they actually attack at the Somme, I doubt the Germans can do better than just let them attack their own defences.

On top of this the whole point of the attack at the Somme was to release pressure on Verdun, only doing this does that for them! Doing this achieves what the attack on the Somme was trying to do!

 

[Canuck Wingnut]

Were there any other notable spoiling offensives, for the rough period that could potentially be used as a point of comparison?

Take a look at the Battle of Mount Sorrel. As a Canadian, I was taught in school that it kept the Canadian Corps out of the first day of the Somme, but looking it up now I see that that's been debunked. Still a German spoiling attack aiming to draw away forces from the upcoming Somme Offensive, though. In some ways, the strategy behind this attack makes more sense to me: attack in a different sector to try to draw British troops away from the location of all their logistical preparations. I'm no expert, though.

 

[Curtain Jerker]

Probably better for the Germans if they let the British stick their dicks into the meat grinder that was the Somme without stopping them right?

"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Of for heavens sake do you really think the British are just going to stand there paralysed and frozen in attack positions as tens of thousands of Germans steam towards them. just because there are some officer vacancies.

Of course not, but a successful defense takes a LOT more than just being present. The Germans put in months of work to prepare for the Allied offensive, which enabled them to survive the severe damage inflicted by the mine attacks on July 1st.
Having serious officer and equipment deficiencies on top of all this really puts them in a precarious situation to turn what amounts to a battleship on a dime. It's more than just vacancies, it's also retired older officers who don't know how to handle a continental army/corps/division in modern warfare, not knowing modern defensive tactics/techniques, how to coordinate via modern technologies, etc.

There is a reason the British army suffered so badly on the Somme on July 1st and beyond.

You are very good at citing tiny sections of wiki articles and very precise numbers and anecdotes of things that don't really matter at the scale we're discussing or are only relevent in hindsight that will be unavailable at the time. But you're really bad at interpreting what would actually happen in terms of two sides fighting a war and reacting to each other at the time it's actually happening.

That's one opinion.

Take for example,:

On July 1, 1916, after a week of prolonged artillery bombardment, 11 divisions of the British Fourth Army (recently created and placed under Sir Henry Rawlinson) began the attack north of the Somme on a front extending for 15 miles (24 km) from Serre and Beaumont-Hamel southward past Thiepval, Ovillers, and Fricourt (east of Albert) and then eastward and southward to Maricourt, north of Curlu

Remind me what happened on that first day?

Battle of the Somme - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Fourth Army took 57,470 casualties, of which 19,240 men were killed, the French Sixth Army had 1,590 casualties and the German 2nd Army had 10,000–12,000 losses.[30]

So with months of preparations, outnumbering the enemy over 2:1, having that foe being locked down fighting on the Somme and against the Brusilov offensive, and huge mine explosions they still suffered vastly higher losses.

Whereas the French had more than 900 heavy guns, the British had barely half this number for a wider front.
oh no half the number of french guns, oh no that sounds bad, but it's like you entirely missed the whole "On July 1, 1916, after a week of prolonged artillery bombardment" bit! And "half the number of french guns" is an very abstract point when in context we're actually taking about this

Having half the guns and close to twice the frontage isn't a good combo.
See above for the results.
Maybe as many as 1/3rd of shells were duds and the Germans fucking massacred the British offensive.

First day on the Somme - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Some heavy guns and howitzers burst on firing, due to defective shells made from inferior steel with hairline cracks, through which the propellant discharge detonated the shell. The fuzes of 8-inch howitzers failed so often that the battlefield was littered with blinds (duds) and a remedy made the fuzes fall out. Many shells failed to explode due to deterioration of the explosive filling and many guns misfired due to poor quality barrels. The 60-pounder guns averaged a premature explosion every 500 shrapnel rounds and 4.5-inch howitzer shells exploded in the barrel or 4–5 yd (4–5 m) beyond the muzzle, the crews being nicknamed suicide clubs. Some propellants were not fully consumed on firing, requiring the barrel to be cleaned after each shot, which slowed the rate of fire. Some copper driving bands on 18-pounder field gun shells were too hard, which reduced the accuracy of the gun; when high explosive ammunition was introduced late in 1915, premature detonations and bulges occurred, with a burst barrel every thousand shots. There was a shortage of buffer springs, replacements were sometimes worse than worn ones and spare parts for every mechanical device in the army were lacking. Some shells exuded explosive in the summer heat, flare fillings decomposed, phosphorus bombs went off spontaneously and the firing mechanism of the heavy trench mortars failed on 1 July. Stokes mortar ammunition was chronically unreliable until replaced by improved designs. Many Mills bombs and rifle grenades prematurely detonated or were duds and a make of rifle cartridge jammed in the breach after firing and had to be scrapped.[17]

even if you somehow manage to time the German attack when not every single shell was stockpiled (because somehow the Germans will know exactly when that is) you still running an attack into that.

Given the number of problems they experienced in the pre-attack bombardment with shell quality among other problems, having stockpiles doesn't necessarily matter, what matters is getting them fired and better yet actually on target. That's why you need coordination and planning especially at this period before reliable wireless communication. Not having a defensive plan to deal with an offensive is a huge problem for for the land line communication net too. Again there is a LOT of work that goes into a serious defensive plan, which is why the Somme was so bloody for the Allies despite their extensive preparations for attack; the Germans prepared heavily too and knew months in advance what was coming.

The British don't need a perfectly formed plan, they just need to be there.

Again no. See how much work the Germans put into preparing for the British offensive. It took months if not years given the state of the defenses:

First day on the Somme - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

There is no way the Germans can attack quickly enough to actually achieve surprise for long enough for this to matter

On that we agree, strategic and tactical surprise is unlikely given how hard the British were trying to gather intel in the area they'd be attacking. That said they wouldn't be able to react quickly necessarily nor necessarily come the right conclusion about what the build up is for given that they were also anticipating some German defensive preparations and build up for a counteroffensive would look similar to defensive reinforcement.

The Germans will obviously spoil the British attack that is not in doubt, but what's the point? What is the actual German goal here? What do they achieve at best a shallow penetration, what do they do then, they get pushed back once all those British counter attack.

Seriously look at the British losses when they actually attack at the Somme, I doubt the Germans can do better than just let them attack their own defences.

On top of this the whole point of the attack at the Somme was to release pressure on Verdun, only doing this does that for them! Doing this achieves what the attack on the Somme was trying to do!

By spoiling the British offensive it prevents them from using their firepower on their terms. Despite the heavy Allied loses during the Somme the Germans were still hit really badly and the spoiling offensive would be to break the preparations, inflict losses on an enemy not set up to defend, and of course buy time to defeat the Russian offensive in the East and free up reserves for the next Allied offensive in France. Stopping the Somme offensive only stops it in one section, it doesn't prevent them from shifting their weight to another.

Once the Allies have their jump off points disrupted they aren't really going to be in a position to attack again in the same sector now that it's clear the Germans will be very ready for them. Plus with Verdun over the French can also attack elsewhere, so having reserves free will be important to counter that.

The British did so poorly because of how long the Germans prepared for a major offensive by the Allies, the Allies in contrast did not build up their defenses anticipating a German offensive. They didn't even have multiple defensive lines set up like the Germans.

Also the Somme offensive was not set up originally to take pressure off of Verdun, it turned into that though because of how bad Verdun was getting for the French. It was supposed to part of a combined series of offensives involving the Russians, Italians, French and British, but Verdun and the Austria offensive against Italy disrupted all those plans.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Take a look at the Battle of Mount Sorrel. As a Canadian, I was taught in school that it kept the Canadian Corps out of the first day of the Somme, but looking it up now I see that that's been debunked. Still a German spoiling attack aiming to draw away forces from the upcoming Somme Offensive, though. In some ways, the strategy behind this attack makes more sense to me: attack in a different sector to try to draw British troops away from the location of all their logistical preparations. I'm no expert, though.

Thank you for the information, I didn't know about that battle, quite interesting.

Probably better for the Germans if they let the British stick their dicks into the meat grinder that was the Somme without stopping them right?

"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."

Not so sure about that. Germany did suffer fewer losses than the Allies in the campaign, but that's a cold comfort given that they could afford fewer losses. Disrupting the offensive might well be more in their interest especially if they could inflict worse losses on the British while they were unprepared to deal with an attack.

 

[Aber]

The British did so poorly because of how long the Germans prepared for a major offensive by the Allies

So, having carefully built up their defensive lines in the best tactical position, the Germans attack out of them and the battle takes place on ground which is worse for them?

 

[Dorknought]

Not that I'm aware of TBH. The only thing I have to go on were accounts from the book about numerous successful German trench raids to grab prisoners in the months leading up to the campaign. I edited my post above to talk about that.

(Unternehmen Sturmbock [Operation Battering Ram]) April 1917

Four German divisions conducted a spoiling attack on the positions of the 1st Anzac Corps of the British Fifth Army. The attack was to delay the advance of the Fifth Army towards the Hindenburg Line, causing as many casualties and destroying as much equipment, particularly artillery, as possible.

Sturmbock was also to deprive the British of the means to attack Gruppe Arras as it fought the Battle of Arras (9 April to 16 May 1917) and Gruppe Quéant (XIV Reserve Corps) on its southern flank. The German commanders hoped to gain time to prepare more defences and to show that the retirement to the Hindenburg Line had not diminished German morale or the ability to attack. The Fifth Army was recovering from the First attack on Bullecourt (11 April) and preparing for a bigger effort (the Battle of Bullecourt 3–17 May 1917).

In 1933 Charles Bean, the Australian official historian, wrote that 23 infantry battalions and attached storm troops, amounting to 16,000 men, had attacked 4,000 Australian troops, reached the objective in only one place and had soon been forced back, with about double the casualties that they had inflicted. Bean wrote that in his war diary, Rupprecht had concluded that apart from the destruction of 22 guns Sturmbock had been something of a failure and cost about nine per cent of the attacking force.

 

[Ian_W]

So, having carefully built up their defensive lines in the best tactical position, the Germans attack out of them and the battle takes place on ground which is worse for them?

Wiking is traditionally German, in that he thinks the correct decision on the defense is to counter-attack.

Note this is good at doing well enough in individual battles to make clear in your memoirs that losing the war wasn't your fault.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

So, having carefully built up their defensive lines in the best tactical position, the Germans attack out of them and the battle takes place on ground which is worse for them?

Generally allowing the enemy to attack you on his terms is rather dangerous. Plus defending with 6 divisions against 13 British and 6 French on July 1st necessitated holding. If they have attacking forces in sufficient number and attack in May before preparations are ready in a limited area against a foe not prepared to defend is something else altogether.

(Unternehmen Sturmbock [Operation Battering Ram]) April 1917

Four German divisions conducted a spoiling attack on the positions of the 1st Anzac Corps of the British Fifth Army. The attack was to delay the advance of the Fifth Army towards the Hindenburg Line, causing as many casualties and destroying as much equipment, particularly artillery, as possible.

Sturmbock was also to deprive the British of the means to attack Gruppe Arras as it fought the Battle of Arras (9 April to 16 May 1917) and Gruppe Quéant (XIV Reserve Corps) on its southern flank. The German commanders hoped to gain time to prepare more defences and to show that the retirement to the Hindenburg Line had not diminished German morale or the ability to attack. The Fifth Army was recovering from the First attack on Bullecourt (11 April) and preparing for a bigger effort (the Battle of Bullecourt 3–17 May 1917).

In 1933 Charles Bean, the Australian official historian, wrote that 23 infantry battalions and attached storm troops, amounting to 16,000 men, had attacked 4,000 Australian troops, reached the objective in only one place and had soon been forced back, with about double the casualties that they had inflicted. Bean wrote that in his war diary, Rupprecht had concluded that apart from the destruction of 22 guns Sturmbock had been something of a failure and cost about nine per cent of the attacking force.

Thanks for the info about the operation.
A few things that jump out: 1917 isn't 1916 and the experienced ANZACs aren't the Pals Battalions of the Somme. Plus the operation was planned and executed in a couple of days to try to take advantage of the recent transfer of units, meaning the attack was really fly by the seat of your pants affair without the necessary training that should precede such an attack against fortified positions, especially for a night attack, which requires extensive preparations. The forces involved were given about 24 hours to prepare. Preparations were delayed and the Aussies got settled in before the attack went off as evidenced by their well placed, camouflaged MGs nests and unexpected outposts.

Predictably the rush job screwed things up:

German attack on Lagnicourt - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The 4th Ersatz Division attacked with four battalions, Regiment von Hugo and Regiment von Warnstedt the brigade commander, Genaralmajor von Mechow retaining the Stoßtruppen and III Battailon, IR 361 as a reserve under his command. The advance ran into trouble as soon as it began, German artillery firing short; a flare signal warning the artillery was fired but went unnoticed and the signal was repeated, which silhouetted the advancing troops. The second and third waves hurried forward to escape the German bombardment and bunched up and Australian posts were encountered far in advance of the positions that were thought to be occupied, the recent move forward of the Australian outpost line having gone undetected. Australian small-arms fire was sufficient to stop the German advance; soon after dawn another tow companies went forward to plug a gap in the centre of the attack but German artillery-fire failed to suppress the rifle and machine-gun fire from the Australian infantry and at 3:00 p.m. the attacking troops were ordered to retire.

The 3rd Guard Division attacked with the III, I and II Bataillonen, Lehr Regiment, on the right and the I, II and III bataillonen, Guard Fusilier Regiment, on the left and Grenadier Regiment 9 in reserve to hold the Siegfriedstellung. The three battalions on the left flank were echeloned (stepped back) to the left in case the 38th Division advance was stopped short. The Guards were on unfamiliar ground, having had no time for reconnaissance. Regiment Guard Fusilier had billeted 10 mi (16 km) back until nightfall on 14 April when it began its approach march in cold and stormy weather.
....
On the right flank, the III Bataillon Regiment Lehr crossed the path of a battalion of the 2nd Guard Reserve Division and was so badly delayed that it reached its assembly area an hour late. The regiment advanced at 4:00 a.m. instead of 3:00 a.m., its attack was spotted immediately and driven under cover except on the right. Some troops got into Lagnicourt with the 2nd Guard Reserve Division and retired at the same time, the left flank remaining until 8;00 p.m.[32]

German prisoners complained about the short notice of the attack and lack of time to reconnoitre, which was also noted in the divisional after-action reports read by Rupprecht. Moser called the operation the latest example of a big attack on the western front and that a memorandum was published containing a collation of the reports. The Germans had found that the Australian Lewis guns had been of great effectiveness, "cleverly emplaced and bravely fought" and many reports noted the need for a similar weapon.[39]

In 1939, the authors of volume XII of Der Weltkrieg, the Reichsarchiv official history, wrote that the success of the attack was limited by the short notice and insufficient artillery support. The authors agreed with Moser that several days were necessary to arrange a night attack but disagreed that the situation at Arras was too dangerous to delay; the preparations could have been carried out over a longer period and been camouflaged to retain surprise.[40] Jack Sheldon wrote in 2015 that the Fifth Army reacted to the attack by consolidating its positions in the area as quickly as possible. That the Australians had been surprised and that their artillery had been vulnerable led to more advanced posts being established and many more clashes between patrols in no man's land.[41]

Most of the casualties came from well-positioned machine-guns and because some troops attacked late and were impeded by marshy ground, one battalion being delayed so badly that it attacked at dawn.[40]

So the big lesson here is that the operation was botched by the planners rushing it, but even then still missed out on the chance to hit the Aussies before they got settled in, which negated the entire reason to rush the attack. That and don't attack entrenched Aussies without serious preparations.

I appreciate the sharing of the info about this attack, but I don't necessarily think it is a model for how a prepared large spoiling attack would do against new British divisions in 1916 who were still training as of May.

Wiking is traditionally German, in that he thinks the correct decision on the defense is to counter-attack.

Not sure where you're getting that, I'm simply curious about what could have happened in the event of a pre-emptive attack against the Somme offensive preparations.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Of course not, but a successful defense takes a LOT more than just being present. The Germans put in months of work to prepare for the Allied offensive, which enabled them to survive the severe damage inflicted by the mine attacks on July 1st.

So does a successful offensive. One of the reasons offensives were so costly in WWI was that it took months to prepare for them, and those preparations were all but impossible to hide from the enemy. The Royal Flying Corps will spot the German build up and the Entente will prepare for the coming offensive. Now the British Army in 1916 has problems, most of it's raw and hastily trained, there aren't enough guns and there are serious quality control issues with the shells. However the advantages of the defence in 1916 will mostly negate those problems.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

So does a successful offensive. One of the reasons offensives were so costly in WWI was that it took months to prepare for them, and those preparations were all but impossible to hide from the enemy. The Royal Flying Corps will spot the German build up and the Entente will prepare for the coming offensive. Now the British Army in 1916 has problems, most of it's raw and hastily trained, there aren't enough guns and there are serious quality control issues with the shells. However the advantages of the defence in 1916 will mostly negate those problems.

If the Brits prepare to defend, then their offensive is derailed.
However it doesn't take that long to launch a short limited offensive, as evidenced by Neuve Chapelle with it's 15 minute hurricane bombardment and of course the heavy trench raids the Germans launched in the run up to the Somme with most successful. Then there is the issue of offensive preparations looking like a defensive build up as well, which was also underway for the Germans.

The French for instance on the Somme surprised the Germans despite their buildup, so there is the possibility that the Brits could well make a similar mistake of thinking since the Brusilov offensive was underway and Verdun that the Germans simply wouldn't do something as audacious as attacking their offensive buildup.

As to a British defense...this was a shallow raid to disrupt the British build up and British defensive lines were not built up because the Brits were going to be leaving them behind anyway, which negates all the advantages of the defense that the Germans enjoyed IOTL. Not only that, but more often than not the attackers had all the advantages when breaking in the enemy line (standard bite and hold tactics that worked very well in WW1) and only really ran into trouble when trying to exploit that success, which by the very nature of this spoiling attack it wouldn't even be set up to do.

In fact some of the only reasons the German defenses held on the Somme on day 1 was the rushed nature of the offensive, which was 2 months earlier than British commanders wanted, with all the resulting problems in training and tactics, and the shell issues you mentioned. Not so much a problem the following year for the Brits.