Artillery of the Great War in the North American Theater
1917
When 1917 began both sides were planning on how best to employ their new tactics and growing (or dwindling) resources. Neither side was thinking this was the year the Entente nations would collapse. As a result their plans were focused on the near future and imminent threats. In the Confederate States the passage of the Negro Service Bill came as both a reassurance and a source of unease to others. It seemed the nation had turned the corner and ended the fear of renewed Red Rebellion and the growing black Regiments would help take the brunt of the Yankee onslaught. There were however some lingering doubts about these new regiments to faced a determined Yankee attacks. Necessity required these new regiments be placed in some of the heaviest fighting in both Tennessee and Virginia.
On the home front the CSA had reached the peak of its industrial expansion and was now on the decline. Manpower shortages were affecting every aspect of the Confederate economy. By late 1916 CSA had halted the construction of surface warships. They required steel that could better be used to build new artillery piecess and construct submersibles. Confederate Artillery production had peaked and after three years of fighting. The strain on artillery gun tubes and barrels were such that most of the CSA’s artillery park needed replacement. By 1916 replacement requirements were outstripping production, which meant the CSA had to restrict the number of guns per 1000 men to what they. The CSA could no longer continue to expand to match the United States; Further there were only 20,000 trucks in the CSA (and it took 150 trucks to equal the cargo capacity of a single train). As manpower shortages affected production, the CS Army became more and more dependent on railways and pack animals to move equipment and supplies. Inevitably this would cause substantial problems in reacting to any kind of enemy breakthrough or blunting enemy momentum.
Despite the obvious dwindling of resources the CS General Staff did have a few bright spots on the horizon. Overall accuracy of CS guns were improving and new sound ranging equipment was being imported from Britain.This made counter battery fire more accurate than ever. The CSA was also pioneered the science of blast crater analysis. This entailed the measuring of craters made by artillery fire to determine the angle and direction the shell making the crater was fired at. This became more and more important as US air dominance was making aerial observation impossible.
To the north the industrial juggernaut that was the United States only continued to grow. The US was neither faced by a manpower, nor resource shortages. Aside from a few items like cotton, indigo and tobacco the US economy was lacked no resources. Despite growing dissatisfaction with the war and increasing labor disturbances, the US population by in large supported the War. This was shown by the overwhelming re-election of Theodore Roosevelt. Everywhere the US was meeting the demands of the Army thanks to the effective marshaling of resources and logistical success of the US General Staff. While the US was facing problems with tube wear on its artillery pieces, its industrial base was providing replacements and expanding its artillery park, where the CSA could not. The US was also ahead in the science of accounting for and factoring tube wear in its computations. The US was also experimenting in types of weaponry like puke gas, light machine guns, tracked artillery and larger bombers with greater payloads. Despite the limited success of Barrels in 1916 the US had put in an order for 3,000 more to be delivered by June1917. This would mean a world of difference much to the surprise of the General Staff.
Early in 1917 the General Staff disseminated its order that all field Armies should be ready for a major attack on April 22nd, Remembrance Day. This was fine for the 5th and 9th Armies Commanders and their Staff, since these armies had been continuously on the attack since the fall of 1916. These armies had driven the Army of Northern Virginia back into Virginia except for its small toe hold in and around Washington DC. This compares to other US armies in Canada and Tennessee which had largely stalemated through out 1916. After months of fighting four months of rest was what each of these armies needed.
The General Staff considered the recapture of Washington DC its primary objective and the fall of Nashville as its secondary objective for the spring campaigning season. President Roosevelt wanted to celebrate the Fourth of July in the de jura Capitol of the United States. As a result the Eastern or Virginian Front would receive the most reinforcements and artillery support. Despite this all Armies were ordered to attack to keep the CSA from reinforcing the main effort. In the meantime all US armies began a period of refitting and implementation of the new artillery techniques being taught in York, Pa.
The Confederate Active Defense in the Winter of 1917
After years of fruitless attacks the "Louisvillers" or defensive minded faction finally gained control of the General Staff. This meant the CS would spend 1917 on the defensive, with a new overall strategy to grind down the US Army. Now there would be no more wasteful attempts at a breakthrough of the Yankee lines, instead the CS Army would focus on smaller attacks to disrupt US preparations. (Secretly the CS Strategy was to hold onto as much territory as it could to keep as many states as possible in the CS after the war ended. As a result what offensive the CS would commit would be out West in a futile attempt to keep Seqoyah and all of Texas in the Confederacy). The CS General Staff accurately predicted that the major US effort would be in the eastern theater. As a result the CS General Staff allocated the vast majority of black reinforcements to the Army of Northern Virginia. This would prove disastrous in the months ahead.
Since the winter of 1916 when the US pushed the Army of Northern Virginia back into Virginia and established beachheads south of the Potomac, the Eastern Front had remained largely quiet. The CS needed time to prepare its defenses, so the CS Army stayed quiet, it had little reason to conduct active trench warfare activities like bombardment and counter battery fire. This meant the US had little reason to conduct similar operations, which allowed the ANV to absorb replacements, integrate Black Regiments, reorganize divisions and build up defenses.
This quiet changed at the end of March, when both sides began to prepare for the coming spring slaughter. CS aerial observation confirmed the US buildup in early April, one of the easiest methods to determine possible points of attack was by observation of road construction. CS Batteries would shell US built roads leading to the front and watch how quickly they were rebuilt. This gave CS intelligence a picture of which sectors would be attacked. CS commanders began bombarding US lines and conducting trench raids with there new black regiments to test their metal and prepare them for combat. US commanders began to reciprocate to gain intelligence as the Remembrance Day neared. This was a good means for the CS Artillery to test its new battery identification techniques. These sound location equipment and crater analysis techniques proved successful and were implemented Army wide. It also provided practice in observed fires, which for the CS Army was necessary, because of its continued shell disparity.
As Remembrance Day neared the pleasant winter each army spent had turned into regular trench warfare. Not only were the CS practicing raids but also its defense in depth techniques. Front line units were now lining there first defenses mostly with machine gun crews and a thin force of rifleman. Specialized Assault troops however remained in bunkers in the rear ready to counter attack. Every division formed at least two or three of these battalions made up the youngest, fiercest and best-trained (white) infantrymen. The organization of these units at first weakened the CS Army by transforming the rest of the division into mostly place-holders. The infusion of Negro Regiments helped to reinforce the overall strength of the CS Army divisions.
Remembrance Offensive in Maryland
The battle plan laid down by the US General Staff required the 5th & 7th Army to push into Northern Virginia, while 9th Army kept steady pressure on the CS bulge in Maryland around Washington DC. 7th Army would no longer attack in the Roanoke Valley, but instead focus its efforts in and around the Shenandoah Valley and North West Virginia. 9th Army would drive into Virginia, swinging South East to cut off CS forces in Washington DC. Then all three would push south towards Richmond and decapitate the CS government as the Army of North Virginia had attempted to do to Philadelphia. Because the Eastern Theater would be it primary effort the US General Staff allocated some 6,473 guns and 3,532 mortars, nearly 40% of the nations guns and trench mortars.
While the CS General Staff had accurately predicted in what theater the main blow would fall, they were still unaware where in Virginia the primary effort would be made. The 9th’s army primary attack would fall where the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah and the Army of Northern Virginia’s line met east of Ashburn and West of Leesburg, Va. The attack would fall some 35 miles east of DC in an attempt to flank the Army of Northern Virginia. The US Army went to great pains to achieve secrecy. This included deploying most artillery units as late as possible. Camouflage was also emphasized, hiding guns under canvas tents to make them seem like supply depots and hospitals.
5th and 7th Army would employ the new artillery doctrine, while 9th Army would execute a 1916 style drum-fire bombardment against the CS Forts around Washington. 5th Army’s objective was not to breakthrough the first day but shatter the Army of Northern Virginia’s command structure and prevent reinforcements to the NVA’s Western flank. As taught in the command Artillery School, pieces were towed away and pre-registered then moved into position as late as possible to create surprise. Local batteries that had been conducting harassing bombardment before the battle would be used to calibrate the guns and fire directed targets. As per the new doctrine 77mm field guns would provide rolling barrages of first the frontline and then the second line, and possibly enemy counterattacks. The 105mm howitzers would fire gas and smoke shells aimed not at the defending infantry, but enemy artillery and reinforcements. First US batteries would launched phosgene gas which made enemies put on their gas masks, then they would fire puke canisters which forced CS gunners to remove their masks, only to fire another round of phosgene to choke and poison the rest of the gunners. 155mm guns would focus on enemy communication centers and create walls of steel, which would box in selected units with fire to prevent CS Army reinforcements. The larger guns 210mm and 305mm howitzers would focus on enemy hard points such as concrete bunkers and communications centers.
At 0540 on April 22nd, 1917 the first salvos were largely gas and high explosive (HE). LT. Foote recalled that: “Unlike before there was no preliminary shelling just one vast momentary upheaval, like the bowels of the earth suddenly opened up.” After a few moments to catch everyone who would be caught by surprise, US guns shifted targets. Counter Battery was the next priority, using the mixture of phosgene and puking gas and HE. This became a great success, as guns without gunners were useless. Once enemy guns were neutralized, US batteries switched back to targeting enemy infantry. They targeted hard points, barbed wire, headquarter and communication. The different batteries and gun calibers shifted around them as per their priority. Locations would be shelled for a while then stopped to encourage the enemy to expose themselves. Trench mortars bathed the front lines and provided cover as US raiding parties ventured out to cut wire and Fire Support teams observed the damage. As abruptly as it started it stopped at 1040. Before the CS Army could gather its wits US forces had moved into no mans land and were attacking CS positions.
By and large it was effective the CS Army was stunned at the ferocity, suddenness and accuracy of the fire. This helped to return some of the surprise that had been missing from the battlefield since 1914. Some CS Division Artillery Chiefs panicked. One even telegraphed the ANV headquarters declaring “the Yankees have invented some kind of machine to register their guns without firing!!! All of my gun crews are down!!!” However by the end of the day CS Units had regrouped and effective counter battery had resumed. Though it failed to cause a breakthrough it had inflicted heavy casualties and allowed US forces to capture over 3km in one day. One bright spot to the CS General Staff was that the black regiments proved as reliable as their white counterparts, despite an incident of the 1st Richmond Howitzers firing on the retreating black soldiers outside of Round Hill, Va. The heavy reinforcement of this front paid.
An over looked aspect of the attack was the heavy use of barrels. More than 200 barrels were used by 5th and 7th Army in their attack. These helped to flatten wire and break up stubborn machine gun positions. Each infantry division was given 12-20 barrels to use as they saw fit, as per the barrel doctrine of supporting infantry instead of massing barrels like in Tennessee. (See next section).
Over the next weeks the 5th Army would suffer 60,000 casualties in its drive south, consistently pushing south and inflicting 55,000 casualties on the Confederacy. By May 11th t the attack ran out of steam, 5th Army captured 18km. The losses the confederates experienced, negated any idea of a large counter attack. Pushing the line running north and south near Aldie, Va. Despite 5th Army’s success it would be overshadowed by the events unfolding around Nashville Tennessee.
Barrel Roll Offensive
For most of the war Custer’s 1st Army was notorious for a lack of imagination. 1st Army’s favorite method of attack was frontal assault. During this period 1st Armies Chief of Staff Joseph T. Dickman was primarily concerned with not allowing 1st Army come to disaster, and doing what he could to minimize casualties. Working in conjunction with General Custer’s aide Major Abner Dowling, the two more than once prevented needless fourth attacks after the first three failed. Their influenced saved countless lives.
The rumor around the Army was that the 1st Army was a dead end for promotion above Brigade Commander. The tactics imposed by Custer prevented success and therefore promotion. Most sensible officers above Brigadier General avoided service in the First Army if they could. However this changed in late 1916, as Custer had decided to put his scheme of grand Barrel offensive into action. Suddenly Custer dismissed his Chief of Staff and invited BG Seymour du Pont to become his new Chief of Staff. Joseph T. Dickman had served dutifully but was too well connected back in Philadelphia, Dowling and Custer feared he may tip off the General Staff. Custer decided that he needed a competent yet unpopular officer with the General Staff. They found such an officer in Seymour du Pont.
The son of Henry A. du Pont Senator of Delaware and one of the original organizers of the General Staff, he was also the godson of Emory Upton. He entered West Point in 1894 and on graduation he was placed in an Artillery Battery with 5th Army Headquartered in Valley Forge, PA. There he was often invited back to dine with his godfather Emory Upton in Philadelphia. At first he was marked as a rising young star, known for his innovative thinking and experimentation with Artillery Infantry Cooperation. However when Charles Francis Adams Jr. took over as Chief of Staff in 1891, the General Staff took a decidedly conservative turn and Du Pont fell out of favor with the War Department. DuPont started the War as an Artillery Regiment Commander; he was innovative in imbedding his officers with the local infantry companies. His Batteries performed capably during 5th Armies withdrawal from Southern Pa and was promoted to Brigadier General and head of the IX Corp Artillery Brigade in 1915. As head of Corp Artillery he oversaw the Artillery preparation for the 4th Battle of the Roanoke and the coordination of artillery between the Barrels and Artillery. He was made subsequent head of Artillery for all of 5th Army for the rest of the 1916 Campaign in Maryland.
When he was made to Chief of Staff of 1st Army in November of 1916, he was informed by Custer of his plan for a great sweeping Barrel offensive for spring of 1917. DuPont agreed to keep this information from the War department and immediately set to acquiring the best and brightest officers he could find. Suddenly 1st Army became a magnet for misfit officers with reputations for results, but not following the rules. The most famous of course was Irving Morrel the Great War’s Barrel expert. He was not alone; others include Colonel George Brookmiller an artillery wizard who worked closely with DuPont in the 5th Army, Major Dwight Ironhewer an automotive expert and a pioneer for automotive re-supply over unimproved terrain, Colonel Charles T. Menoher an Army Air Service Officer who was a proponent of close air-infantry cooperation.
Over the next six-month Custer, Dowling, DuPont and his wunderkinds set out to break the Confederate line, with the largest Barrel Offensive in world history. Their first mission was to accumulate enough Barrels. They agreed that 400 massed Barrels were optimal. 300 for the initial attack with another 100 in reserve to replace the expected breakdowns and destroyed. The US was the largest producer of Barrels on the planet it also incorporated Barrels into its operations more than any other nation. However current Barrel doctrine required that Barrels be spread in Battalion size formations between divisions and not massed. This meant that an army wide attack would see barrels scattered 12 to 30 per division, which usually had operational control over 12km span in the west. To gather these many Barrels the staff secretly sent significantly less barrels than it usually did in its attacks. Sending 1 or 2 when it usually sent a dozen, then lying that all other barrels had been destroyed. By March 1917 it was clear that only 380 Barrels could be massed. Now that the required numbers were gathered they were organized into nothing less than a Barrel Brigade comprising three Barrel Columns, each over 100 strong.
The overall plan called for three Corps of 10 infantry divisions, 2 Cavalry divisions and the new Barrel brigade to attack 1km west of White House Tennessee opposite the Army of Kentucky. The Barrels would be massed along a 12 km front flat plain, which led straight to the Cumberland River. Its first objective was to break through the Army of Kentucky’s lines and capture White House Tennessee. This would put US heavy guns in striking distance of downtown Nashville, which allowed the 1st Army artillery to flatten Nashville. The attack was set for April 22nd, Remembrance Day if the weather stayed dry.
In preparation for the bombardment Morrell’s Barrel crews and Brookmiller’s Batteries practiced coordinating. The rate of march of the Barrels would set the pace of the Artilleries lifting fires. COL Brookmiller also had each gun moved off the line to be pre-registered. 77mm field guns would provide rolling barrages of first the frontline and then the second line, and possibly enemy counterattacks. The 105mm howitzers would fire gas and smoke shells and counter-battery fire. 155mm guns would focus on enemy communication centers and box fires, which would prevent the arrivals CS Army reinforcements. The larger guns 210mm and 305mm rail guns would focus on enemy hard points such as concrete bunkers, White House Tennessee and vital crossroads. 302 Trench mortars would also be employed to attack the Confederate front line trenches and keep up with advancing infantry providing indirect fire where the barrels could not. In preparation for the attack MAJ Ironhewer stockpiled excess trucks and convinced the war department to deploy him the Battalion of experimental tracked wreckers, behemoths that could tow away damaged Barrels. He also got approval for the deployment of experimental self-propelled 105mm howitzers. These were 105mm guns mounted to a civilian’s tractors body.
At the same time COL Menoher was teaching his Air service squadrons how to work in close support with Barrels and Infantry. COL Menoher began his career as an artillery officer, but he transferred to the Army Air Service as he realized Air’s powers tactical potential against ground troops. His radical ideas hurt his promotion and he languished in one air staff position after another until tapped by Chief of Staff Du Pont. Once the attack took place the First Army air group’s fighter and bomber missions would be primarily tactical ground support. This went against conventional air services doctrine, which focused on air dominance. This placed prime emphasis on counter balloon and air observation, through attacks against airfields.
The bombardment began on April 22nd at 0440 am. The first salvos were the same mixture of phosgene, puke gas and HE as in the Virginia gassing of CS Artillery. This was also accompanied by a preparatory bombardment by medium 105mm and 155mm and heavy howitzers 201mm and greater howitzers focusing on communication centers, bunkers and cross roads. Five hours later the preparatory bombardment began by 77mm field guns and trench mortars on the frontline. This was a creeping barrage moving 200m an hour across no man’s land, with the Barrel division followed closely by the six infantry divisions. The surprise of the artillery battalion’s accurate fire without registration, like in Maryland was complete. Confederate Infantry fled in wake of the onslaught and for the first time in two years true breakthrough was achieved. As per the preparation the field guns and mortars lifted on time as to secondary trenches. The 1st army advanced 5 miles in one day. The CS line was completely shattered. Within three days 1st Army had taken White House and pushed the Army of Kentucky beyond the Cumberland River. After three years of fighting the CSA lacked the capacity for an effective counter attack. Despite the injection of Negro regiments, US attacks across the CS front prevented effective reinforcements. The decision to send most reinforcements to Virginia seriously hindered the Army of Kentucky and its neighboring Army of the Mississippi from regrouping.
Cumberland River Crossing
By April 26th the Confederate finally established a defensive line south of the Cumberland River. This however provided no barrier for the First Army Wunderkinds. Within a week the 1ST Army Staff planned a crossing of the Cumberland. The plan was the brainchild of LTC Morrell and COL Brookmiller. The plan called for a feint towards the one railroad link CS maintained across the Cumberland directly north of Nashville. There the Army of Kentucky maintained one division to secure its crossing and destroy it if need be. North of the crossing is where most of the US heavy Artillery battering Nashville was located. After the feint US forces would cross 4km west opposite Lakewood, Tennessee. For one week the elite of US infantry and sapper battalions practiced crossing the river in coordination with trench mortar battalions and pioneer pontoon companies.
On May 4th the bombardment began at 0500, the US began its same mixture of phosgene and puke gas used on Remembrance Day, across the CS line. This again was followed by a lifting fire quick bombardment across the CS line with the majority of heavy guns centered at the lines behind the Rail crossing north of Nashville. 0700 two divisions feinted an attack at the rail bridge still held by CS forces. Despite heavy Artillery support, this feint led to heavy casualties after more than a two-hour attack, the main attack came at a natural curve in the river 4km east. At 1000 specialized assault units and pioneers crossed the Cumberland. After a two-hour bombardment of trench mortars and field guns, these specialized infantry units established fought to establish a bridgehead on the opposite side of the Cumberland. Meanwhile sappers fought to construct six pontoon bridges across the river. The plan required that at least 4 bridges be operational before the Barrels began crossing. By 1200 three bridges successfully traversed the river, not waiting for the other three LTC Morrell’s Barrels began crossing. 1300 all six bridges were across the river and both infantry and Barrels were crossing south and continuing there punishing drive southward. The battle was complete success as the drive again was capturing more than 5 miles a day. Within three days First Army forced the CS Army withdrawal from Nashville.
The fundamental problem for an advancing army in the Great War was that a breakthrough was quickly cauterized by reinforcements by railroad. The massed barrel division solved this problem, at an average advance now of 7 miles a day Confederate could not respond. Barrel’s 57mm destroyed any infantry machine gun position and hard points the infantry could not handle. Barrels ruptured the line, kept up firepower with the infantry, self-tracked 155mm guns broke up any positions they could not. At this point MAJ Ironhewer’s expertise became paramount. Ironhewer was a logistic expert and one of the few officers that planned for what happened when infantry advanced beyond the range of its artillery cover. Ironhewer’s logistics made the advance successful, helping to keep the barrel breakdown’s to around 20% as opposed to the usual 33% average seen in most armies. He also prioritize trucks to set up mobile barrel works. COL Mehoner of the Air Service provided the indirect firepower when the tracked guns and trench mortars couldn’t keep up.
On its drive south the Cumberland COL Morrel’s Barrels destroyed a train full of CS reinforcements with their 57mm guns. The CS had been relying more and more heavily on rail movement and pack animals. The lack of trucks hindered the CS Army from forming an effective defense against the new Barrel warfare. Once US forces began moving so deep as to putting CS trains in danger the General Staff was at its wits end. By May 15th, 1st Army had out flanked Nashville and was stalled for a new big push either towards Memphis or Mirfreesboro. By June 10th, the US had resumed its offensive and was again heading towards Murfreesboro. On June 20th the Army of Kentucky officially asked for an armistice. President Roosevelt granted the armistice on the Tennessee front alone, despite GEN Custer’s objections.
Drive towards the Rappahannock
By June 10th, the 7th Army had forced the Army of the Shenandoah back to Middletown, 5th Army had forced the Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw to Centerville, and 9th Army had forced it to abandon Washington DC. After a three week bombardment by 300mm rail guns and 305mm siege mortars; and the expenditure of more than 2 million shells, 9th Army Artillery succeeded in wrecking the forts defending Washington, DC. As 5th Army pushed south-east and Washington’s defenses proved untenable. The Army of Northern Virginia elected to abandon DC. It’s staff quickly realized that the damage it would do fighting block to block, would be nearly as a great to CS forces as the attacking US. After the CS Army had suffered almost 240,000 casualties or prisoners taken, since the spring campaigns had begun. The US had only suffered 250,000, which shows how effective the barrel doctrines have been. The close fighting in the Battle of Louisville during the Second Mexican War was as hard on defenders as attackers. US forces occupied the former capitol on June 1st. Drunk 9th Army soldiers held a mock meeting in the remnants of the House of Representative Chambers and reaffirmed the districts ties to the Union.
After First Army’s stunning success outside Nashville the General Staff could not help but take notice. After the fall of Nashville all field armies were directed to adopt the new barrel doctrine. After a week of rest all armies east of the Appalachians were prepared to continue the offensive south. Sadly after three years at the command of 5th Army GEN James Wadsworth Jr. had to be relieved after suffering a stroke. He was replaced with Seymour du Pont the former Chief of Staff of the 1st Army.
The War Department’s mass order of barrels was now paying huge paying dividends. Now all Armies east of the Mississippi had enough barrels to use in a mass deployment similar to 1st Army. As the big offensive in Virginia began US forces finally broke through the ANV defenses for the first time in the War. The US advanced more than 5 miles a day. Unlike 1st Army, however these Armies had not worked out how to keep artillery along with its advancing barrels and infantry. This meant that their advances were limited to how fast its artillery could be moved. Luckily unlike their enemy in the CS Army the US had plenty of trucks. When the US finally achieved a breakthrough and moved into open country the movement of artillery became easier.
The rapid advance posed new problems for US artillery batteries. Previously the US had days if not weeks to lay their guns and orient there fires towards the enemy and exactly calibrate there positions. Now gun crews were having to learn to shoot and move after only a few hours of being in position. New shooting procedure often called hip-shoot procedures were invented. In this fluid battlefield heavy rail-guns were meaningless as there were no tracks to move on or concrete or defenses in depth to pulverize. Here field guns and the 105 and 155mm were the most important weapons. US artillery was also concerned for the first time with its own safety. As the lines became fluid gun Batteries had to worry about pockets of CS soldiers still active and fighting behind US lines. Batteries had to detail gun crews to defense with the new light machine guns.
The Eastern Commands were also forced to adopt the tactical air support pioneered by US forces. Now fighter scouts that were normally tasked with harassing enemy observation were instead supporting infantry where less mobile artillery could not. This created new challenges for the pilots who had to fear the CS planes and fire from ground units. Luckily overwhelming US air dominance helped mitigate such dangers.
After three and a half months since the beginning of the Remembrance Day offensives the Army of Northern Virginia began to disintegrate. The biggest single gain occurred in early July when US forces advanced more than 15 miles in a single day. In one day 5th Army forces attacked from a position 3km north of Manassas, captured Manassas and continued advancing until they captured Independent Hill 13 miles south. The US continued to make gains like these until mid August. After the Army of Northern Virginia crossed south of the Rappahannock requested a ceasefire. The US accepted a ceasefire on all fronts on August 18th, 1917.
Toronto Offensive
As bad as the Confederacy was at the beginning of 1917, Canada was worse. By 1917 much of Canada’s industries had been over run and only a thin belt of industry running between Calgary, Winnipeg, Thunder Bay, Toronto and Montreal remained intact. Like its CS allies Canada could no longer replace its artillery losses. US Mountain Soldiers had captured Banff in the Rockies effectively cutting Canada off from its pacific Allies. The US Navy had effectively cut off reinforcements of manpower and material from Great Britain. As a result the BEF fighting in Canada had to rely on Canadian reinforcements to make up its losses. Despite these set backs the Canadians fought on certain their defeat met the end of the Canada’s existence.
In 1916 the Canadians were employing 6 guns per thousand infantrymen along the Ontario and Quebec fronts. Because of its isolation and lack of resources it was fielding no more than 3.5 guns per thousand infantrymen. As a result this severely hindered the Canadian military to conduct harassing bombardment and counter battery fire. This increased the numbers of casualties the Canadians took and allowed the US to redeploy artillery as needed in away it could not do against the Confederacy. Here if artillery were moved the losses to US infantry would prove acceptable and the Canadians would likely have to move their guns to withstand the US bombardment. This allowed US Corp Commanders in Ontario and Quebec for concentration of firepower that had gun to infantrymen ration greater than the Germans used in Verdun or the 9th Army north of Washington. An increasingly effective technique was pushing Canadian and BEFC forces against river destroying their bridges and overwhelming them with heavy artillery until they surrendered.
Like its Counter parts facing the CSA 4th Army, which was responsible for all Canadian territory from Manitoba to Nova Scotia, was told to be ready for battle for Remembrance Day. Though 4th Army was ready weather conditions allowed for no more than raid on enemy trenches. The real offensive began when the weather cleared and the roads dried up enough on May 8th. The 4th Army was driving from a line north of Mississauga towards Toronto’s line of defenses. These lines became known as the Grierson line the first commander of the BEFC who ordered its construction in 1914. These defensive positions included concrete pillboxes and airtight bunkers that protected against gas attacks and bombardments. New features had been added in 1916 like special anti tank ditches and obstacles. Finally it had protective bunkers for the best of Canada’s remaining artillery.
Fourth Army also relied heavily on barrels widely distributed among its divisions. The first US attacks employing barrels and the new artillery doctrine pioneered south succeeded in pushing the Canadians back to the Grierson line by June 1st, 1917. However the defense proved to formidable to breakthrough. After the fall of Nashville 4th Army adopted the tactics of mass barrel attacks as well. Instead of driving straight into the Grierson line, General Hunter Liggett ordered the US forces to wheel west of Toronto and link up its Corps driving up from Michigan.
After the US accepted the Confederate ceasefire more and more resource were being sent north to force the Canadian surrender. After the UK asked for a cease fire new naval resources became available. This allowed the US Great Lakes squadron to clear mind fields close to the coast and provide protection against Canadian submersibles. By September US Great Lake battleships were bombarding the Grierson Line and edging closer to Toronto itself.This put US infantry within gun range of Canada's own Battleships many with 10 in guns. The US completed its outflanking of the Grierson line by mid September and were fighting in the western suburbs of Toronto. After a siege of nearly nine months Toronto fell. Having outlasted all of its allies Canadian Forces surrendered and peace returned to North America.
(The Final Part will include unique North American battlefields, their artillery missions and the conclusions drawn from the war by Artillery experts on both sides).
(Though I guess that is a TL-191 staple that any US commander not named Morrell has to be a buffoon.)