Given the response to the latest chapter, I'm gonna go ahead and declare it TEMPORARILY NON-CANON until a solution can be found. We all seem to be on different pages here, so I'll try to summarize the various points being brought up, regardless of what I think of their validity:-The deal is stupid, to a degree which cannot even be accepted by simply stating that Carter made a bad call in the context of the story.Ultimately, as a writer, I would like to find a final solution as close as possible to what I originally posted (Soviets get Pakistan and India, the US and USSR support each other in their middle eastern wars, the Cold War is effectively over), because I do have some interesting things I'd like to do with that region eventually, and Jimmy Carter ending the Cold War is a pretty great "Holy Shit!" moment which puts the 1980 election up in the air.
-India was Soviet-leaning anyway.
-The Commonwealth would completely lose their shit over India being surrendered to the Soviets.
-Both the USA and the USSR would be giving up on nations they'd previously invested in relations with.
-Carter doesn't need Soviet support in Iran.
-Allowing such dramatic Soviet expansion would be political suicide for Carter, no matter what he gains in the trade.
-The deal means nothing for tensions between NATO and the Soviets in Europe.
-America, ultimately, is offering the Soviets nothing but empty promises.
As for the people looking forward to Pat Robertson, he'll be introduced soon, but he won't become a major player until the 1984 Presidential Election, which is a long way off.
OK, I understand what you want to do here, but the problem is that I just don't think it's politically possible, in the context of early 1980 - less than 5 years after the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, when the Soviet Union was still perceived by many people as being in a dangerously expansionist phase, when it'd invaded Afghanistan only half a year earlier, when the (leftist) Sandinistas had overthrown the Somoza regime in Nicaragua the previous summer, when Carter was already under harsh criticism from the right for what was viewed as a dangerously soft stance toward the Kremlin, when pressure was building on said Kremlin to live up to its human-rights obligations under the Helsinki Treaty in Eastern Europe, when the pressures that would lead to the rise of Solidarity were building in Poland, when there was deep alarm (though in fact the rebuilding process was already well under way) about the perceived state of the U.S. armed forces - with all that, it is simply not politically feasible for Carter to do something so dramatic as you're proposing. The perceived "surrender" of Pakistan, a longstanding U.S. ally, and still more India - a democracy, notwithstanding its friendly ties with the USSR - to the Soviet sphere of influence is going to send a HUGE chunk of the American political spectrum into a berserk state when it finds out just what happened - and it's just going to be plain impossible for something like that to stay secret for very long, particularly not in the post-Watergate climate when people were deeply, deeply suspicious of government secretkeeping. I remember those years firsthand, being in high school in those years (as I've said before), so trust me on this. What you propose is, when you get right down to it, just not plausible in its current form, and I am very much afraid that you may end up having to rethink that part of the story.
The thing about it is...if you want to get the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to cooperate against terrorism and even to be tacitly allied, I think you can do it, as 037771 suggested, without the U.S. surrendering the lion's share of the Indian Subcontinent to the Soviet sphere of influence, especially given that you've already established that TTL, Carter didn't blast the Soviets for invading Afghanistan. This is already a big change that you can work from, and I think you can set up a greater degree of Soviet-American cooperation in the Middle East without Carter "giving away the store" in south Asia.
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