I wonder is Speer has an ego problem since he is in charge of a country ruling from a city that he designed? Stassen needs to go as we don't need that in a possible Cuba analogue.
Plus considering how Speer marriage went OTL should Frau Speer be concerned.
To be fair to Speer, Hitler was the one who told him what to build long before Speer even thought of actually becoming Führer, once Speer did become Führer however, he merely continued (and heavily refined) the plans that had been come up with; since Berlin needed to be rebuilt and redesigned anyway.
He probably does have an ego problem trough, he is a Nazi after all. (
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As for Stassen, he hasn't gone anywhere for now, as the update below shows; which we will now get too.
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PART 35
Never Conduct Diplomacy While Drunk
"They have always told me that the definition of insanity is trying to same thing over and over again and expecting a different outcome to come out of whatever you are trying in each attempt, I however say that this long held notion is wildly incorrect; as recent events have shown me that the true definition of insanity is humanity as a whole"
- Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
(Continued from last time......................)
The cat and mouse nature of the greater international game that was the Cold War was such that it made the possibility that events occurring on the ground in any particular region of the globe – the maneuverings of high-ranking officials behind the scenes in the highest halls of governance – or even a simple misunderstanding or miscalculation on the part of one side or the other, could at any point or time cause the existing international tensions to escalate to the point where the metaphorical red line between "cold" and "hot" war (and thus, potential worldwide armageddon) could be veered along way too closely for anyone's comfort by the great powers of the time – or even crossed entirely in the worst case scenario; a scarily real and ever looming threat for the denizens of the blue planet that we as human beings call our home.
Of course, the world has up to this point managed to successfully not cross that line (the events of 1985 and 86 withstanding of course), but it has come very close to doing so on more then one occasion – one of these occasions (and the one that perhaps got closest to causing a war between the West and Germany) was the Algerian Crisis of 1960; which we will now talk about as we pick back up from where we left off in the last chapter.
Figure 1: the Vice President of the United Arab Republic, Hafez al-Assad, meets with American Secretary of State Richard Nixon during the latter's visit to Baghdad in June of 1960, the visit was apart of a greater diplomatic rapprochement between Cairo and Washington that occurred during the Algerian Crisis of 1960; and Arab-American cooperation would ultimately prove crucial in helping end the crisis peacefully
Across the Atlantic from Algeria, the reaction of top Western governmental officials and members of these countries general populaces to the events in Algeria, while quite mixed in nature, would prove to be one of great concern, to say the least. Since the end of the Second World War in 1946, Free France had been one of the few remaining "democratic" nation-states or territories that still laid within the so called
"sea" of fascist and totalitarian thought that was North Africa and the neighboring regions of the Mediterranean, and it's incredibly strategic position within this so called "sea" as a bulwark against the further spread of these right-wing thoughts into the rest of the African continent meant that the continued existence of the Gaullist regime quickly became a core tenant of American and British foreign policy during the time period – thinking which would lead to both countries pouring significant amounts of financial and material support into Free France to help prop up it; even as the foundation of the entire Free French state continued to slowly disintegrate underneath it. As such, the swift and bloody collapse of the Free French state that came about in the spring of 1960 as a direct result of the OAS coup d'etat in Algiers – and the nationalist rebellions in other colonies that would follow the events in Algeria, would come as a significant blow to the foreign policy goals of the West and their overall position in the Cold War. The UAR's ensuing invasion of Algeria would ultimately do little to alleviate the pain of this blow for the West, in fact, it would only serve to dredge up old and long-standing concerns about
"Arab expansionism" and the potential that said expansionist maneuvers had to upset the
"current balance of power" (an admittedly moot point considering how far the UAR had expanded by that point), causing a further exacerbation of what was already an extremely tense situation as a direct result.
On the other hand, for every individual in the West that saw the UAR's invasion of Algeria as an aggressive and illegal military action against the
"de jure" sovereign territory of an American and British diplomatic ally, there were another three individuals (including many within the halls of government) that sympathized in some shape or manner with the plight of the Algerian Arabs – many of these same individuals would in turn also see the UAR's actions as justified measures of national defense against fascism and it's spread to the African continent, which they considered to be a far greater threat to the international balance of power then Arab expansionism (the matter of oil aside). Furthermore, despite what one might be lead to believe from reading and watching propaganda material of the time, many top officials in the governments of leading Western countries had in fact actually begun to slowly view the UAR in a generally more favorable light in the years leading up to the Algerian Crisis, a shift in thinking which would lead to the idea of pursuing diplomatic rapprochement with the Cairo government becoming an increasingly attractive one to many officials within the halls of governance in Western nations, however, several significant obstacles – including (among other things) the UAR''s long standing military and diplomatic ties with Berlin, the already aforementioned concerns regarding Arab expansionism – and strong opposition to the pursing of diplomatic measures with Cairo from the British government, would ultimately come to stand in the way of any Western government actively seeking rapprochement with Cairo at the time, leading to relations between the UAR and the West remaining relatively cold and hostile in the months leading up to the breakout of the crisis.
However, as the situation in Algeria and Tunisia began to spin further and further out of control, it would soon become apparent to most (even many of those that had previously opposed any sort of rapprochement measures) Western officials that there was an urgent and immediate need to at least open some kind of active diplomatic dialogues about the situation with the authorities in Cairo – especially when they considered the fact that their only
"ally"[/b] in the region, Free France – had essentially all but collapsed into oblivion in the wake of both the OAS takeover of Algeria and the active nationalist rebellions that were occurring in many of the other colonies that comprised the French Empire at the time. Therefore, American and British officials would soon reopen their old diplomatic channels with Cairo, and talks would soon begin between the two sides in earnest, despite significant concern among some individuals in the West that the UAR would not be amicable to the olive branch that the West was about to extend out for the state to grab.
However, Arab officials; including President Nasser and Vice President Assad in particular, had in actuality long been looking for a suitable excuse to break off their country's ties with the German Reich – which, while seen by them as useful for the purposes that it served, were considered to be in the long-term "non-maintainable" due to Cairo and Berlin's wildly different geopolitical interests – which many of these officials (correctly) perceived would eventually clash at some point. At the same time however, one must not equate such a "Bismarckian" way of thinking with the UAR possessing any sort of strongly positive viewpoint towards the countries of the West, which they most certainly did not, instead, it would be more accurate for one to say that Cairo's ultimate decision to actively pursue (at least temporary) rapprochement with the west was one that was based out of pragmatism and a general concern for the state's security; rather then out of any sort of ideological or personal reasons on the part of any top Arab officials. Nevertheless, the fact that both sides went into the initial talks with essentially the same goals in mind would ultimately mean that the road to successful dialogue was a considerably more straightforward process then either side had previously expected – the ultimate result of which would be the UAR and the West agreeing in principle to work together on the Algerian issue, with later talks over other mutually shared concerns and issues tentatively scheduled for a later date.
Figure 2: Dr. Friedrich Weber,
Reichminister for Foreign Affairs from 1951 to 1966; now most famous for his involvement during the Algerian Crisis of 1960
The Germans (and to a lesser extent, the Italians) on the other hand – despite being caught somewhat off-guard by Vichy's decision to unilaterally involve itself in the Algerian Conflict without the prior consultation of the Pact, would nevertheless swiftly act to try and prevent the UAR and the West from gaining the initiative in North Africa by throwing the Reich's entire support behind their "ally" in Vichy, support which would be echoed loudly to the world during a now famous speech given by Albert Speer on Reich Central Television on June 1st, 1960, during which he pledged that "Germany would not only stand by her allies in their greatest time of need, but that it would also actively pursue the implementation and execution of any measures political or military deemed necessary to ensure the protection France's internal and foreign security"; a pledge which Speer would come to back up with action when he ordered the immediate deployment of nearly 1,000 security troops and other military assets to Algeria on June 4th. Interestingly enough, this increasingly aggressive posture taken up by the Reich during the early weeks of the crisis was in actuality quite a deviation from the Speerist doctrine of "Praktische Diplomatie" (English: Practical Diplomacy) that had served as the guiding principle of German foreign policy since the early 1950's, however – the looming threat that the increasingly antagonistic and Western-neutral UAR had begun to pose to both German and Axis military and political security in the Mediterranean, a threat which would most have most assuredly been enhanced in it's severity if Algeria or even the entirety of the Maghreb fell to the control of Cairo – would ultimately prove too substantial for even the normally pragmatic and cool-headed Speer to completely ignore, forcing the German government to take decisive action to protect itself and it's allies against what it perceived to be a threat to their mutual security.
This initial chosen course of action taken by the German government – while immensely popular with the governments of the other Tripartite Pact states and the average citizen of the Reich, would come to fail miserably in it's main objective of forcing the UAR and the West to relent on the Algerian issue through shows of force (such as the deployment of military assets to Algiers), instead – the actions of the Germans would only serve to strengthen (rather then weaken) the fragile foundation of the alliance of convenience between the UAR and the West, strengthen the resolve of both sides to continue fighting Berlin on the Algerian issue; and cause a general exacerbation of international tensions.as the crisis continued to escalate with each day that passed, Of course, the Germans could not back away from the course that they had taken – lest they risk losing face and giving a win to the West, thus – Berlin would come to find itself forced to continue along down the road they had taken themselves; largely in a (possibly futile) attempt to try and find a way to still achieve all of their geopolitical goals in spite of the increasingly out of control nature of the crisis at hand.
Of course, even as their governments continued to maintain an overtly belligerent and hostile stance in public – the behind the scenes reality of the affair shows that officials on both sides of the Steel Curtain were working around the clock from the very first day of the crisis to try and find a diplomatic solution to solve it, these efforts would result in officials from both sides agreeing to an initial round of informal preliminary talks in Washington, DC, which were scheduled to be held between June 8 and June 14. However, while the talks would indeed go ahead as planned – incident would strike when a meeting on June 11 between German Foreign Minister, Friedrich Weber, and American Secretary of State, Richard Nixon, was interrupted by a visibly intoxicated Harold Stassen – who reportedly, according to both a Reich Central Television report on the meeting that aired on June 12, and Nixon's own memory of the incident; launched into a drunken tirade against Weber, Nixon, and the German nation. The talks would end almost immediately after the incident's occurrence, and in response to it, the Germans would announce that they were officially recalling their US Ambassador, Karl Carstens, from his post in Washington in protest; with a subsequent telegram sent to the White House by Weber on June 16th stating that "Germany had no desire to conduct diplomacy with a nation who is a lead by a man that cares more about the bottle then following proper diplomatic protocol".
Figure 3: A German U-Boat patrolling in the Atlantic Ocean during the Algerian Crisis; circa 1960.
Among the many consequences that would come to stem from the (in)famous "Drunken Tirade" and the events surrounding it, the most immediately felt of them would have to have been the unprecedented deterioration of German-American (and to a lesser extent, German-British) diplomatic relations that occurred in the initial days after the incident – attempts by Washington officials to try and smooth things over with the Reich would come to of no immediate avail however, as Berlin, who felt gravely insulted by what they perceived to be "at best" a move of extreme idiocy and carelessness, and at worst a direct attack on them by a foreign head of state; were found by US, British and Arab officials to be completely and utterly disinterested in pursuing any sort of diplomatic solutions regarding Algeria. Furthermore, Western officials would at the same time begin to come to the belief that Germany, whom they perceived at the time to have not seen any diplomatic solutions readily available to them after the failure of past talks, and the nature in which they had failed – had decided to begin making preparations for war with ACT and the UAR rather then come back to the table that they believed to be non-existent. Of course, much of this was merely wild speculation and thinking at the time, but much of it would actually come to be confirmed in the late days of June, when Western officials discovered that not only had Berlin ordered an intensification of it's military presence in Algeria, but that it had also ordered the Kriegsmarine to increase U-Boat Patrols in the Atlantic as well.
Ultimately, the time period between late June and mid July would prove to be the most crucial point of the entire crisis – as it was during this period in particular that German-American diplomatic relation were at their lowest (as a result of the Drunken Tirade, as stated above), and it was also the time period where the world was closest to actually crossing that proverbial red line between "cold" and "hot" war that would have resulted in the breakout of a Third World War – and most contemporaries of the time and historians of today agree that one wrong flinch on either side during this period would have actually resulted in that line being crossed as a result. In fact, there was even an incident where a German U-Boat patrolling near the American Atlantic Coast suddenly lost all contact with Berlin, and soon came across a lone American sub patrolling the same area, due to these communication issues – this U-Boat under an initial assumption that war had actually broken out above them, soon began preparations to launch it's payload at American targets – communication was however quickly restored with command when it was discovered that it was an internal issue with the electronic systems, forcing the U-Boat to not only disengage and return to friendly port to check and see if the systems needed more extensive repair, but also potentially save all of humanity in the process.
Figure 4: Reporters from major Western and European news networks gather outside the now famous courthouse in Marsaxlokk, Malta – where ACT, German and Arab officials met in the Summer of 1960 to discuss an agreement to end the Algerian Crisis, awaiting news on how the proceedings inside were going, the coverage that these networks gave is still seen to this day as some of the most griping and important television in human history; and the networks would ultimately be there from the first day of the proceedings to the last.
In the end however – it would be the sweet and soothing words of diplomacy, rather the angry statements of aggression, that would ultimately triumph at the end of day after a series of heated and tenuous back-channel talks between officials from both the German and American governments was able to successfully convince the former to return to the discussion table. It would however, be another three months, a ceasefire, and another series of heated and tenuous diplomatic discussions between German, French, American, British and Arab officials before anything concrete would come about.
Come about it would however, and on September 2nd, 1960, officials from all five states would announce the formal signing of the "Marsaxlokk Accords"; marking the formal end of both the Algerian War and the Algerian Crisis. However, while war was indeed avoided, it was far past the point of it being too late to prevent the damage that had been done from being done, what had been done, and now, Algeria sat divided in two; and any semblance of the Arab-German friendship that existed before had officially died and been buried in the same literal and metaphorical or literal grave that had been dug for Charles de Gaulle and Harold Stassen.