AHWI: No schlieffen plan

[Helmuth48]

This is all common sense - what is the source of your confusion?

I still can't follow your logic. We are talking about an ATL in which Germany does not apply the "Schlieffen Plan". If I understand you correctly, you are making the following assumptions in this:

1. "France will violate Belgian neutrality for an attack on Germany."
   AFAIK Joffre did not get permission for this because his government did not want to damage relations with Britain.
   
   
2. "If the British do not support the Russians in the war against Germany, the Russians will denounce the Anglo-Russian Convention."
   Why will the British be blackmailed with this if it was uncertain anyway that they wanted to renew the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1915?
   
   
3. "The Germans will destroy the Russian army."
   This belief did not prevail in 1914. On the contrary, the expectation was that the Russians and French would win because together they had a much larger army.
   
   
4. "If the French and British do not attack Germany (through Belgium), the Russians will seek rapprochement with Berlin."
   That means a rather big diplomatic defeat for Russia, because then they will have to throw Serbia under the bus. And why would the Germans go along with this when the Russians just wanted war with Germany? This comes across as very unreliable.

All in all, these assumptions are rather speculative and debatable...

 

[Glenn239]

I still can't follow your logic.

If Belgium and Luxembourg were made neutral by agreement of Germany, France and Britain after war broke out, then the military consequences would be the French could not engage in effective offensive operations and the Germans would be free to move east with the bulk of their forces and crush Russia. The Russians would not be happy with that. They would surely view the actions of their allies as a betrayal of Russia, because the effect of their action would be to hand Germany the ability to defeat of Russia.

"France will violate Belgian neutrality for an attack on Germany."
AFAIK Joffre did not get permission for this because his government did not want to damage relations with Britain.

Joffre's Plan XVII was silent on the issue of campaign planning. It stopped at the end of concentration. The reason for that was political - if planning documents leaked that showed the French army was going to invade Belgium, the effect in Britain could be catastrophic. But Joffre was free to draft his plans in such a way as that a move into Belgium could follow after concentration, after the point when Plan XVII goes silent, (ie, about M+18). The means to do that was in using the 4th Army as a 'swing' formation, deployed to the south in one variant, deployed against Belgium in the other. In the event, Joffre ordered the deployment of the 4th Army to the Belgian frontier on 2nd August. The reason for this was, as Joffre himself said, the concentration on the German frontier was useless for a decision. It could not succeed. So, Joffre indicated that when word came in of the German move into Luxembourg that day, he used that to order the concentration of 3 armies on the Belgian frontier.

"If the British do not support the Russians in the war against Germany, the Russians will denounce the Anglo-Russian Convention."
Why will the British be blackmailed with this if it was uncertain anyway that they wanted to renew the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1915?

Why would the British be worried about Russia leaving the Entente in 1915? This is your question? The answer to that is, if Russia were to leave the war, Germany would after that come around on France and defeat her.

"The Germans will destroy the Russian army."
This belief did not prevail in 1914. On the contrary, the expectation was that the Russians and French would win because together they had a much larger army.

If the French army was constrained to the Franco-German border, the Germans could have held the French off with only a fraction of their forces.

"If the French and British do not attack Germany (through Belgium), the Russians will seek rapprochement with Berlin."
That means a rather big diplomatic defeat for Russia, because then they will have to throw Serbia under the bus.

If the Germans are free to turn east, not only would the Russians have to conclude that they would be defeated, they would naturally extend this outcome to Serbia, which as a matter of course would fall to the Central Powers almost as a side show to the main campaign against Russia. The Russians cannot throw the Serbians under the bus, for both the Russians and the Serbians would already be under the bus, thrown there by their allies with the neutrality of Belgium that allows Germany a free hand in the east.

 

[raharris1973]

This is all common sense - what is the source of your confusion?

I think it's the cognitive dissonance between the British belief that a) if they fail the Entente, the Russians would confront the CPs, fail against them, and be angry. Yet be more angry against the British who failed them then the CPs who defeated them, and then from there, do a 180 degree policy turn to reconcile with the CPs, whom they just fought over regicidal Serbs of all people, to unite against Britain to go after random scraps of Asian land (southwestern, central, far eastern), and would be strong enough to make irresistible progress...........so Britain better watch out and prevent this at all costs, yet that b) this same Russia that could hold such a grudge against friend who disappoints it in any way, is a safe partner to assist to crushing its main power obstacles, Germany, Austria, and the Ottomans (the first two its former friends by the way), and having gotten that much more powerful in alliance with you, can absolutely be trusted, must absolutely be trusted, to not be grabbing any scraps of Asian land Britain and it have agreed Russia is not entitled to, because Russia is just that honorable. Even though this Russia will be stronger and need Britain's friendship even less.

It seems structured like a "heads, I win, tails, you lose" type of argument, guaranteed to produce a Russian Entente supporting result. IE, a rationalization of something already decided.

 

[NoMommsen]

If Belgium and Luxembourg were made neutral by agreement of Germany, France and Britain after war broke out, ...

... IIRC you mentioned some "agreement" about 'neutralizing' Belgium already in your other post ...

What 'agreement' are you talking about?

There won't be and didn't had to be an 'agreement. ... simply some non-action of ther german as well as the french army regarding belgian territory would completly suffice with the same 'confirmation' as french politics gave IOTL it not to cross into Belgium but only as long as the other bad guy doesn't either from bothe sides.

These two armies might still stand opposite and look across their border grimmly for ... at least a fortnight (?)* or so without any or much of an action. There might be some minor border violations as conducted IOTL without much of a consequense as IOTL until ... the french goverment might still decide: "now or never" and attack the german forces. ... if ... as wished by Joffre over belgian territory ... would be worth another thread of its own (... which have been there a couple IIRC ?).

* what - btw - would fit perfectly well the talk between the russian ambassador and the french President Poincaré at night from 1st to 2nd August when latter reasured the russian - personnaly - that France would ofc fullfill its obligations from their entente and agreements regarding military action against Germany.
But ... he will have to wait until the french national assembly - senate as well as house of deputies - would decised upon. But they couldn't be convene after being summoned - ofc - just the next day (Monday the 3rd August ... even the french had some bureucratical 'rule' to bey) before 10th of August with its assent given latest the 12th August when the mobilisation would have been finished only anyway and the attack beginning on 14th August.
... as it was agreed and protocolled in 1913 the last time.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Why do people who bring up Russia's option to not attack, retreat, mobilize, consolidate, and advance in unison, act as if *boom* they can "drop the mic," then and there, as if this is the ultimate final strategy, for which the CPs have no counter or recourse?

Of course they have recourse. What is it?

This is a German planning exercise. The Russians, fairly obviously have mobilised to deter Austria and simply by mobilising have siphoned off a substantial part of the Austrian Army who are busy advancing to a meeting engagement of disastrous proportions in both Serbia and Galicia.

What is the German plan for winning such a war. Bear in mind the enemy is not obliged to commit suicide and make it easy for you, n will they surrender when you ask them to. Britain is Neutral and can pressure others into Neutrality - like Turkey and as a neutral has free passage of the Dardanelles

Groener - responsible for railways planning in 1914 - would beg to substantially differ with you.
... if you're looking for a quote ... this post might be of some help as the whole discussion I had there about the topic of troop transport into East Prussia.

You are putting a lot of weight on a post facto quote that conveniently does not elaborate on how.

This is a train set consisting of 20,800 individual trains moving at 25 - 35 kph each of 600 ton capacity over a period of 20 days, there is also an advanced element delivering the assault force for the attack on Belgium and defensive forces along the French border prior to being brought up to full strength and a secondary set victualling the fortresses.

In order to facilitate this there are pre prepared billets, feeding stations for men and horses and camp grounds at the termini in the Eifel which also allow for rapid turn around ( literally) of the rolling stock. There are 26 separate line commanders and its all a state secret so the officers on board only know their pre planned destination and cannot communicate with each other except by telephones at the stations. Not that they necessarily know where the other components of their unit are.

To change this either means turning the train around, which can only be done at specific locations, and rerouting it, to another location which is not equipped to take that number of trains over that time period. Could they figure it out, sure , but its a complete mess for several weeks ( the OTL mobilisation is over 20 days so yes its several weeks) And you also have a civilian economy to run, part of which is based on those trains being released back after 20 days.

Its actually faster to deliver complete units to the original staging area where they can camp, be briefed, the trains turn around and lift the complete unit back the other way and if needs be keep other units in their billets in Germany.

And to do this you have the Railway section all 35 of them, there are another 6 dealing with operations who also have some figuring out to do.



The basic issue with this is pre war the Germans believe two things, They cannot win a long war with France and Russia, they cannot win a quick war against Russia its too big. For Germany to want to attack in the East they have to have a plan to defeat Russia not a hope that well Russia revolution innit, hard coded. OR a belief that they can win a long war.

The second problem is without shooting the diplomats take over.

 

[Nivek]

For Germany to want to attack in the East they have to have a plan to defeat Russia not a hope that well Russia revolution innit, hard coded. OR a belief that they can win a long war

That's the pod,that the 'plan' was shelved after seeing 1905 as a way Russia is a big house of cards

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

That's the pod,that the 'plan' was shelved after seeing 1905 as a way Russia is a big house of cards

But then WW1 starts later because Germany is less aggressive in its foreign policy.

 

[Glenn239]

I think it's the cognitive dissonance between the British belief that a) if they fail the Entente, the Russians would confront the CPs, fail against them, and be angry. Yet be more angry against the British who failed them then the CPs who defeated them, and then from there, do a 180 degree policy turn to reconcile with the CPs, whom they just fought over regicidal Serbs of all people, to unite against Britain to go after random scraps of Asian land (southwestern, central, far eastern), and would be strong enough to make irresistible progress...........so Britain better watch out and prevent this at all costs, yet that b) this same Russia that could hold such a grudge against friend who disappoints it in any way, is a safe partner to assist to crushing its main power obstacles, Germany, Austria, and the Ottomans (the first two its former friends by the way), and having gotten that much more powerful in alliance with you, can absolutely be trusted, must absolutely be trusted, to not be grabbing any scraps of Asian land Britain and it have agreed Russia is not entitled to, because Russia is just that honorable. Even though this Russia will be stronger and need Britain's friendship even less.

It seems structured like a "heads, I win, tails, you lose" type of argument, guaranteed to produce a Russian Entente supporting result. IE, a rationalization of something already decided.

Interesting take. My assumption was slightly different. In discussions of WW1 or WW2, the Russians/Soviets can sometimes be treated like they were characters in a movie, having certain lines, taking certain actions in the script. The idea that the Russians might consider themselves alpha dogs and write their own script, this sometimes I think does not occur to some.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

That's the pod,that the 'plan' was shelved after seeing 1905 as a way Russia is a big house of cards

Thats fine, Germany now believes that Russia can be defeated quickly. Though note OTL it took 3 years and a significant number of failed Russian offensives to achieve this. This BTW changes the mindset of a large number of German decision makers. But then all the infrastructure development OTL in the west is curtailed in favour of an eastern deployment. The Western Deployment is limited to a defensive posture vs France, no need to invade Belgium and Luxemburg. There is no need to immediately invade Russia or for Russia to invade Germany.

And Germany still has to advance a considerable distance to engage the Russian armies with limited logistic capabilities. Limited railways and the wrong gauge, no all weather roads and something of a dilemma. The number of railways in Russia puts a cap on how big an army you can deploy and maneuver. Presumably something will be thought of - and its a good thought experiment. Even with the massive infrastructure available the British and French only ever managed to provide motorised supply about 100 miles from a railhead. You might consider naval supply along the Baltic, but you will need one or more advanced ports and those you have to capture.

Meanwhile back in the west the only fortified positions you have are Metz and Thionville, after which its the old positions on the Rhine, and the terrain. All the major forts ( bar 1) here were complete by 1905 but most date to the late 19th century and if armed fairly tough so the French know about them and if they intend to honour the Russian alliance will have to deal with them.

Whatever it is its not going to be a meeting engagement in the open fields of northern France and Belgium. There may be meeting engagements but these are a limited prelude to the investment and assault on the Moselstellung as a whole. You are kinda forced into this because of railways. So you are not going to need every 75 you can lay your hands on you will need a battering train and medium artillery to deal with hasty fortifications - in this sense hasty would mean a 1m thick reinforced concrete roof. Whether you still finance the additional Russian railways they need to do their quick advance into Germany because the German plan is now not to invade France day 1, good question.

Could they, sure. The French have perfectly good 122, 105 and 155 artillery and 305 -400mm howitzer designs available, they just do not see the need pre war. The Railway guns ( which are railway transportable not necessarily mounted) are cut down artillery from warships. The French BTW have been in the artillery ( rafales from the 75's) conquers infantry occupies mode for a while now, but several division commanders did not get the message, and got fired. By late September the French are full on bite and hold so unless the Germans are ok with this they will be counterattacking immediately and suffering massive casualties.

And this is the underlying problem. After about 2 months the very large well equipped technologically sophisticated French armies will be attacking through the fortified positions. French have a bit of form on this. You can assume that the French will do this by bayonet charges a la japonais if you want but they did not OTL and showed no special inclination pre war, the attack a outrance is directly a reaction to the Russians keeping up to 75% of their Bn in reserve in the Russo Japanese war even when attacking. Its an exhortation to use your full force not to do stupid things

You may consider that Russia will collapse in revolution and catastrophe - as in one good kick and the whole rotten edifice will collapse. But that is something you have to cause basing it on the idea that Germans are superior warriors whose inherent military superiority will ensure the destruction of the slavic hordes lickety split is optimistic. On the basis of a few riots a decade ago. Again the 1914 experience outside of Tannenburg is the Russians win rather more than they lose and against the German Army.

But you are basing the existence of Germany on the French and Russians doing what you find convenient, and you have no control over whether they do or not.

No War Credits for you says the Reichstag.

Interesting fact. After 1st Ypres, Nov 14 Falkanhayn tells Bethman Hollweg the Army cannot win the war.

 

[Glenn239]

... IIRC you mentioned some "agreement" about 'neutralizing' Belgium already in your other post ...

What 'agreement' are you talking about?

There won't be and didn't had to be an 'agreement. ... simply some non-action of ther german as well as the french army regarding belgian territory would completly suffice with the same 'confirmation' as french politics gave IOTL it not to cross into Belgium but only as long as the other bad guy doesn't either from bothe sides.

The British in 1870 would have been enormously surprised to discover that no formal treaty was required, because at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War they came to the exact opposite conclusion and signed formal treaties with both warring powers in July that year. In terms of your outline above, where London differed then in their thinking as to yours now was that they were concerned that the French and Germans would, well, sort of indirectly conspire to wind up partitioning Belgium. Each would blame the other for making a new war zone, and each would demand the other withdraws first while refusing to do so themselves. The Italians used a similar sort of trick at the end of their 1911 war against the Ottomans in order to hold on to their Aegean Islands.

These two armies might still stand opposite and look across their border grimmly for ... at least a fortnight (?)* or so without any or much of an action. There might be some minor border violations as conducted IOTL without much of a consequense as IOTL until ... the french goverment might still decide: "now or never" and attack the german forces. ... if ... as wished by Joffre over belgian territory ... would be worth another thread of its own (... which have been there a couple IIRC ?).

Yes, there have been plenty of threads on options if Belgium is not violated, but none have ever established what the French could realistically do with their huge army in that case. Their artillery was high velocity flat trajectory difficult to employ against any sort of hilly or well dug in positions.

* what - btw - would fit perfectly well the talk between the russian ambassador and the french President Poincaré at night from 1st to 2nd August when latter reasured the russian - personnaly - that France would ofc fullfill its obligations from their entente and agreements regarding military action against Germany.

All perfectly normal and expected - the relations between the French and Russians were more straightforward than those between the French and British, due primarily to conflicting British doctrines, (privately vs in the mind of the British public).

 

[Helmuth48]

Why would the British be worried about Russia leaving the Entente in 1915? This is your question? The answer to that is, if Russia were to leave the war, Germany would after that come around on France and defeat her.

That is indeed my question. When Russia leaves the alliance, it is impossible for France to win the war. French leaders will realize that and choose to negotiate to end the war. With that, it is not necessary for the Germans to defeat France.

If the French army was constrained to the Franco-German border, the Germans could have held the French off with only a fraction of their forces.

You rather greatly overestimate the strength of the German army. The German military leaders thought they needed half of their army to stop the French. Defeating Russia with the other half of their army was considered impossible, at most occupying Russian Poland in cooperation with Austria-Hungary. It could only be hoped that after repelling French and Russian offensives the enemy would be willing to negotiate.

If the Germans are free to turn east, not only would the Russians have to conclude that they would be defeated, they would naturally extend this outcome to Serbia, which as a matter of course would fall to the Central Powers almost as a side show to the main campaign against Russia. The Russians cannot throw the Serbians under the bus, for both the Russians and the Serbians would already be under the bus, thrown there by their allies with the neutrality of Belgium that allows Germany a free hand in the east.

With the above in mind, the Russians will not easily conclude that they will be defeated; it will really take a longer war for that to happen.

 

[NoMommsen]

...

Groener - responsible for railways planning in 1914 - would beg to substantially differ with you.
... if you're looking for a quote ... this post might be of some help as the whole discussion I had there about the topic of troop transport into East Prussia.

You are putting a lot of weight on a post facto quote that conveniently does not elaborate on how.

This is a train set consisting of 20,800 individual trains moving at 25 - 35 kph each of 600 ton capacity over a period of 20 days, there is also an advanced element delivering the assault force for the attack on Belgium and defensive forces along the French border prior to being brought up to full strength and a secondary set victualling the fortresses.

In order to facilitate this there are pre prepared billets, feeding stations for men and horses and camp grounds at the termini in the Eifel which also allow for rapid turn around ( literally) of the rolling stock. There are 26 separate line commanders and its all a state secret so the officers on board only know their pre planned destination and cannot communicate with each other except by telephones at the stations. Not that they necessarily know where the other components of their unit are.

To change this either means turning the train around, which can only be done at specific locations, and rerouting it, to another location which is not equipped to take that number of trains over that time period. Could they figure it out, sure , but its a complete mess for several weeks ( the OTL mobilisation is over 20 days so yes its several weeks) And you also have a civilian economy to run, part of which is based on those trains being released back after 20 days.

Its actually faster to deliver complete units to the original staging area where they can camp, be briefed, the trains turn around and lift the complete unit back the other way and if needs be keep other units in their billets in Germany.

And to do this you have the Railway section all 35 of them, there are another 6 dealing with operations who also have some figuring out to do. ...

... well ... it's not only this one citation I'm putting 'weight' on. This quote was rather kinda 'finishing move' for a discussion I had in this thread from post #54 on page 3 until the quoted post #169 on page 9 where said topic of railway possibilioties was intensly discussed with a heap of primary sources as well (you might have a look there).

As educated your mentions might be I have to admitt I prefer standing with the statements of

- the chief of the railway department of the Great General Staff since 1912 until the war who had continiuosly trained the men of the railway system as a whole to do exactly what you've describe on the shortest of note in the shortest time. On level the level of army inspectorates it had already be trained, for autumn 1914 it was planned to exercise a sudden 'switch' of deployment for the whole in a days time for the whole Reich.​

- the chief or the railway department predecessing the above from 1903 to 1906 'notorious' Hermann von Staabs who in his maybe evenen more notorious 'Aufmarsch nach zwei Fronten' also stated it completly possible to move half (even a wee bit more) of the german forces into East Prussia and Silesia. ... and even decribed such a moe in said writing.​

These are two explicit experts on the matter of militarily transport and esp. troop transport of the German Realm in the early 20th century who both state such a deployment for an eastern approach was completly feasable given the means of the railway system ot their time and should not be compared to todays 'knowledge' as compared to these ole' days is obviously much lesser capable (... esp. in Germany but similar I experienced during my time in the UK as well).
Unfortunatly for as 'late born' Groener never wrote an elaborated tractate on this matter - at least nothing I could find so far aside the rather wee sketch I presented in this post.

... and therefore all of the above mentioned is what I put 'weight' on to support the feasibility of an eastern deployment in force.

 

[NoMommsen]

@Glenn239
... in your stetements you use an awful lot of times "would", "could", "should" regarding british, russian, french decision makers and what they might have or should have or would have thought on contempletated.

Aside your own deliberations ... could you name any source hinting at any british decision makers 'fearing' a russian switch of side as you describe it or any russian decision maker contemplating a switch toward the CP side ? ... from ... let's say 1912 onwards?

I never came along such and therefore would be gratefull to be hinted at.

 

[Glenn239]

That is indeed my question. When Russia leaves the alliance, it is impossible for France to win the war. French leaders will realize that and choose to negotiate to end the war. With that, it is not necessary for the Germans to defeat France.

If the French make peace with the Germans after the Russians have done so, then that's the ultimate British nightmare of a continental Triplice in place of the shattered Entente. The British did not want that, they want the Entente.

You rather greatly overestimate the strength of the German army. The German military leaders thought they needed half of their army to stop the French. Defeating Russia with the other half of their army was considered impossible, at most occupying Russian Poland in cooperation with Austria-Hungary. It could only be hoped that after repelling French and Russian offensives the enemy would be willing to negotiate.

The German assumptions were within the context of Belgium being a war zone. We're talking now of a Franco-German war on the frontier only, about 150 miles, little of it suited to the offensive.

With the above in mind, the Russians will not easily conclude that they will be defeated; it will really take a longer war for that to happen.

The Russians will conclude that the neutralization of Belgium will have been done behind their backs in order to deliver the bulk of the German army against them.

 

[Glenn239]

These are two explicit experts on the matter of militarily transport and esp. troop transport of the German Realm in the early 20th century who both state such a deployment for an eastern approach was completly feasable given the means of the railway system ot their time and should not be compared to todays 'knowledge' as compared to these ole' days is obviously much lesser capable (... esp. in Germany but similar I experienced during my time in the UK as well).

When the Kaiser and Moltke had their argument, the Kaiser stated that he would send his whole army east to defeat the Russians, (ie, all 8 armies at once), and Moltke replied to the effect that this would leave the army in the east without supplies. The rail system could handle the entire German army going east at once. But, it could have handled one army, then another, then another, then another sort of thing.

 

[Glenn239]

Aside your own deliberations ... could you name any source hinting at any british decision makers 'fearing' a russian switch of side as you describe it or any russian decision maker contemplating a switch toward the CP side ? ... from ... let's say 1912 onwards?

Grey said it directly in one of the dispatches during one of the Balkans crises, literally, that it was feared that if Britain did not support Russia that Russia would wind up coming out of the crisis on the side of the Central Powers. It would take me about a million years to dig up the exact quote and date though. During the Crisis, Bertie (in response to an inquiry from London on the possible neutralization of the Western Front) said this which is similar to the discussion,

Gooch 446-475

(no.453)
If the French undertook to <remain on the defensive> the Germans would first attack Russia, and if they defeated them, they would then turn around on the French.

 

[Jacarí]

Suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that Moltke the Younger is replaced by an unnamed general who recognizes the Schlieffen Plan is little more than a fantasy.

That is because it IS A FANTASY... there was no such thing as the Schlieffen Plan, only a memo written by a retired General using inexistent units.

Btw, the German Army was quite pessimistic about its chances, only they thought those would get increasingly worse thereafter so, "better now than later".

The military didnt go to war expecting their attack to succeed, they went in believing that was their only shot since they expected the UK to be an enemy no matter waht.

The civilian government on the other hand had a more nuanced view and considered other options, and were flabbergasted when became aware that the army had only ONE plan which entailed Belgium, but in the end were overruled.

At one point, when Grey mentioned the possibility of keeping the French and German armies standing still on the border, the Germans were ecstatic... until they realized it meant keeping most of the German army doing nothing while the Russians ran rampart.

But then Grey backed out and pretended he never said that, because his ambassador to France asked if he was mental.

So... what would be needed is the German army believing the UK would not go to war... and they were unwilling to believe that after its behavior in 1912.

 

[Helmuth48]

If the French make peace with the Germans after the Russians have done so, then that's the ultimate British nightmare of a continental Triplice in place of the shattered Entente. The British did not want that, they want the Entente.

It is really your belief that the British think that when the continental powers make peace, they will form an anti-British alliance? After they have fought each other so hard? That's rather far-fetched... You assume that British thinking was really so irrational and paranoid? That might be true for some politicians, but unlikely for British politics as a whole.

The entente was not that fixed, as I said before even Grey in 1914 thought of denouncing the Anglo-Russian convention in 1915.

 

[raharris1973]

It is really your belief that the British think that when the continental powers make peace, they will form an anti-British alliance? After they have fought each other so hard? That's rather far-fetched... You assume that British thinking was really so irrational and paranoid? That might be true for some politicians, but unlikely for British politics as a whole.

The entente was not that fixed, as I said before even Grey in 1914 thought of denouncing the Anglo-Russian convention in 1915.

Maybe they were, maybe they were not. We cannot rule it out.

It is certain that various British officials and press people left behind enough signals to demonstrate that they were Entente through thick and thin types, committed to Entente solidarity, and rationalized it by the imperative to stay allied with the partners and not have them turned against Britain.

Would they have followed through on their Entente no matter what logic with the Germans making it harder to sell to the broader British public by not attacking Belgium, by not attacking west at all, and doing an east first or an entirely defensive/counter-offensive strategy? Maybe they would have. Or maybe they would have backed off.

They would have deserved explosive brain hemorrhages for their thought crimes had they remained determined on inserting themselves into a war that Germany was fighting defensively, but that doesn't mean they would have absolutely avoided that course of action.

 

[Glenn239]

It is really your belief that the British think that when the continental powers make peace, they will form an anti-British alliance?

Possibly, but Germany did not require an actual Triple Alliance, it simply required the French and Russians to be pro-German neutrals, and the British at that point would be the second power in Europe. Or, if Germany enacted a war of conquest, they would impose the Treaty of Brest Litovsk on the Russians, but this time there will be no Versailles to reverse course, and in the West the French will have to make peace and reassess their relationship with the British. Or, if the outcome of the Franco-German war was more like in 1940, then presumably the Germans could demand the lease of French Atlantic and Channel ports, like occurred in 1940.

The entente was not that fixed, as I said before even Grey in 1914 thought of denouncing the Anglo-Russian convention in 1915.

As already stated, the British in 1915 agreed to the Russian annexation of Constantinople, the adhesion of Russia to the Entente being so important. This was on top of the September 1914 London Declaration, in which Britain bound itself along with Russia and France not to make an independent peace with Germany. The Entente was the policy.