The Germans build carriers, instead of battleships, prior to WW2

When does the conversions happen? How long do they take?

Edit: And what ships are converted? How fast would they be? Something like the Robert Ley at 15.5 knots would be incredibly slow. And a large ship to convert.
Look at some of the earlier posts. If the Nazis are funding the StJ ships and ITTL have inputs into the design unlike IRL, then deliberately put a bigger engine under the bonnet at that stage. if you do you could have two Hilo analogs like the IJN, 25,000 tons, 26 knots and 50+ AC. Timeframe isn’t too nice, 9-18 months possibly, but if you know war is coming then.you might jump off the gun and commence work earlier.
 
When does the conversions happen? How long do they take?

Edit: And what ships are converted? How fast would they be? Something like the Robert Ley at 15.5 knots would be incredibly slow. And a large ship to convert.
Here it comes down to the variable parameters available to contort any time frame figure you might want in your AR. I'll use the IJN as analog since they deliberately used the reconstruction ploy as a cheat to circumvent treaty restrictions and expand their CV resources quickly.
  • Firstly, timeframe wise was the Taiyo class conversions. Three 18,000 ton, 21-22 knot, 30AC jobs laid down as the Nittorru Maru class of liners and built specifically for CV conversion 1938-40. Here the timeframe appears very quick all about 5-6 months.
  • Secondly there is the Zuiho and Chitose class, four 30knot CVLs all laid down as submarine tenders but designed with carrier conversion in mind, and all taking about 12 months to convert. Note these were all smaller hulls 12-13000-tons, than the 17,000-ton German Potsdam hulls.
  • Thirdly there is the Hiyo class, which at 26 knots and 25,000-tons with 50+AC, took between 15-17 months to do, but also had been designed from the keel up to undergo this conversion.
  • Lastly was the Shinyo which was the German SS Scharnhorst and underwent the change when acquired by the IJN in 1940. The conversion here took 15 months, but at no stage had it been designed for its new role, but still ended up a 18,000-ton 21-22knot 30 AC platform.
So how you used these analogs to consider and massage into any inclusion in a German pro-carrier thread a lot comes down to your mindset approaching the thread and outcome. For instance, if you assume the Scharnhorst/Gneisenau/Potsdam trio had all been laid down with KM collusion for carrier conversion and kitted out with faster machinery (say 26-30 knot range like the Zuiho class) would it have been unreasonable to expect a 6-8 month rebuild timeframe given the IJN historic analog and that the hull was built with that in mind. Your decision as the AU narrator. Similar to any thread were the larger Wilhelm Gustloff and Robert Ley had been built with KM and Nazi input, deliberately aiming for a HIyo equivalent for the KM. Assuming that would you plan on them being available 12-14 months from the time work commenced. It all comes down to your AU vision and how to massage a TL to plausibly (in AU terms) produce a desired want. Once they've been built too, would the rebuild possibly start before hostilities commence, say the Munich crisis triggers one being taken in hand 1938? All grist to the AU mill and food to intrigue you with the possibilities. T
 
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The thing is that if there's the threat of German carriers even the captain of Glorious would probably have put up air patrols, improving her chances of surviving.
With a German carrier force the British carriers will most likely have fully navalised Sea Hurricanes instead of Sea Gladiators. The Skua will be Scout- Dive Bomber.
 
With a German carrier force the British carriers will most likely have fully navalised Sea Hurricanes instead of Sea Gladiators. The Skua will be Scout- Dive Bomber.
Isn't that a bit of a reach. IRL, they had the Fulmar and Sea Gladiator, while the RAF still had first call on the Spitfire and Hurricane production? T
 
Isn't that a bit of a reach. IRL, they had the Fulmar and Sea Gladiator, while the RAF still had first call on the Spitfire and Hurricane production? T
Not really, the fact that the German's have a carrier force in service changes things for the FAA. Before they thought the only aircraft their fighters would have to face were unescorted scouts and long range land based aircraft for which the Sea Gladiator and Skua were more than adequate. Now they have to face the possibility of German carrier aircraft including fighters. Whether that carrier fighter is the 109T or the Heinkel He112 a proper Sea Hurricane is the easiest and quickest way to get the FAA a fighter able to cope with it. As for the Skua being a Scout Dive Bomber instead of a fighter dive bomber, that's just recognising that with a high performance fighter in the fleet it can be optimised for the strike role.
 
Not really, the fact that the German's have a carrier force in service changes things for the FAA. Before they thought the only aircraft their fighters would have to face were unescorted scouts and long range land based aircraft for which the Sea Gladiator and Skua were more than adequate. Now they have to face the possibility of German carrier aircraft including fighters. Whether that carrier fighter is the 109T or the Heinkel He112 a proper Sea Hurricane is the easiest and quickest way to get the FAA a fighter able to cope with it. As for the Skua being a Scout Dive Bomber instead of a fighter dive bomber, that's just recognising that with a high performance fighter in the fleet it can be optimised for the strike role.
Here I'd really have to agree to differ at least a little. IRL the constraints imposed were very much of the nature of the British system and the austerity and interservice rivalry was inherently what limited it. Remember it was only in 1938 that they regained control of the FAA from the RAF. Events that shaped the procurement policy and aircraft development had little real reflection on the reality of likely opposition and far more on the RFPs from the MAP and the availability of funding. The entire saga of developments like the Skua, Fulmar and other late 30s designs. Blackburn Roc (1938) & Skua (1937) were both responses to air ministry Specs. and the Fulmar was an adaptation of P.4/34 light bomber which had been adapted for naval use. All could be characterized by long delays and lead times in response to the changing air situation of the late 30s. So too, you could present a case that they were the result of no KM FAA threat and the non-existence of German carriers, but equally I'd tender that they were as much a symptom of the British aerial industry and bureaucracy of the period. The Sea Hurricane variants offer an excellent proponent and one which I like myself as the AH alternative but look at the delays IRL of its introduction in 1940-41, delayed by the RAF priority of acquisition. Could this be countered, probably yes given a major clear threat, but what timeframe are we talking about to get such a clear and effective response, Hmm... Also let's offer that these programs as presented are covert ones for the KM, beyond a training carrier or two. Is the FAA response going to be quick and timely in its arrival. All food for thought. I'm not trying to be negative; I just have a very cynical and doubting regard for the constraints the UK had inflected upon its own arms of the period and its reflected in this. T
 
Does the KM still build the Scharnhorst class? If not, do they still attempt op Weserübung without them

Without getting rid of all treaties, it hard to change. Part of the AGNT was to keep KM in fixed lanes.

Edit: Ok, so according to the OP it's just that Germany builds carriers instead of the Bismarcks.

Unlikely.
Britain is stuck with older treaties, and limited with carrier tonnage. If it breaks, Japan goes off the chart.

It still has a major BB/BC fleet from WW1, making solo carrier fleet a non-shorter.
 
With a German carrier force the British carriers will most likely have fully navalised Sea Hurricanes instead of Sea Gladiators. The Skua will be Scout- Dive Bomber

I agree, with a floating modern fighter treat, the FAA would "have to" have a real fighter. Hurricane the quickest and easiest to get aboard.

Fulmar can dive bomb and take the role of "interceptor" / scout / diver". Skua can quietly be passed over.

A common engine will help on board logistics
 
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Without getting rid of all treaties, it hard to change. Part of the AGNT was to keep KM in fixed lanes.

That was what i was wondering about. If Germany doesn't build battleships (or well, a fleet which have other obvious uses than raiding british shipping), but instead builds carriers, cruisers and submarines. Then would Britain not respond to a pretty obvious naval build up aimed at them? If so, what kind of RN would be around to counter the KM at an alt Weserübung?

Or with an earlier clear threat, does Britain begin rearming sooner? Are they as willing to appease Germany if they are further along with rearming?
Unlikely.
Britain is stuck with older treaties, and limited with carrier tonnage. If it breaks, Japan goes off the chart.

It still has a major BB/BC fleet from WW1, making solo carrier fleet a non-shorter.
I agree that it isn't likely, i was just going by what the op was suggesting.
 
I agree, with a floating modern fighter treat, the FAA would "have to" have a real fighter. Hurricane the quickest and easiest to get aboard.

Fulmar can dive bomb and take the role of "interceptor" / scout / diver". Skua can quietly be passed over.

A common engine will help on board logistics
Is the Henley sufficiently close to the Hurricane to simplify spares and maintenance needs that this could be a driver to have them used together.
The Skuas should still be useful in secondary theatres.
 
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Or with an earlier clear threat, does Britain begin rearming sooner? Are they as willing to appease Germany if they are further along with rearming?

Britain is building to max of treaty regardless.

With AGNT, KM is only 1/3 of RN. 2/3 of RN can be elsewhere, and 300 yrs of history can take on KM.
 
Possible, but unlikely.

The carrier had ceased being a function weapon system with conflict between the Captain and Air Group.

Many years later, Admiral Sir William Davis would write:

“D’Oyly Hughes was known to be a very difficult headstrong chap. But alas Heath was not by a long chalk in the Fleet Air Arm First X1. Mentally and character-wise Heath was no flier and the last person in the world to put alongside D’Oyly-Hughes”.

And

As the enquiry would establish, the aeroplanes were not armed. Why? Gross negligence by the ship’s Captain? Or had ground crews already begun stripping them to begin the substantial job of fitting extra fuel tanks needed for Operation Paul?

The other half of that is the relevant admirals dismissing the signals intel warning of the German ships sortie. Its possible that will happen with a carrier shipping out with the ugly sisters.
 
Here I'd really have to agree to differ at least a little. IRL the constraints imposed were very much of the nature of the British system and the austerity and interservice rivalry was inherently what limited it. Remember it was only in 1938 that they regained control of the FAA from the RAF. Events that shaped the procurement policy and aircraft development had little real reflection on the reality of likely opposition and far more on the RFPs from the MAP and the availability of funding. The entire saga of developments like the Skua, Fulmar and other late 30s designs. Blackburn Roc (1938) & Skua (1937) were both responses to air ministry Specs. and the Fulmar was an adaptation of P.4/34 light bomber which had been adapted for naval use. All could be characterized by long delays and lead times in response to the changing air situation of the late 30s. So too, you could present a case that they were the result of no KM FAA threat and the non-existence of German carriers, but equally I'd tender that they were as much a symptom of the British aerial industry and bureaucracy of the period. The Sea Hurricane variants offer an excellent proponent and one which I like myself as the AH alternative but look at the delays IRL of its introduction in 1940-41, delayed by the RAF priority of acquisition. Could this be countered, probably yes given a major clear threat, but what timeframe are we talking about to get such a clear and effective response, Hmm... Also let's offer that these programs as presented are covert ones for the KM, beyond a training carrier or two. Is the FAA response going to be quick and timely in its arrival. All food for thought. I'm not trying to be negative; I just have a very cynical and doubting regard for the constraints the UK had inflected upon its own arms of the period and its reflected in this. T

Yes, the Skua was specifically built with a rival with carriers in mind, in the form of course of the IJN, so the appearance of another navy with carriers may not have caused too much of a change. However, by the late '30s I think the IJN was retreating as a priority as the threat of Germany loomed, so it would also seem possible that the British naval aircraft programme could have been accelerated to meet a German carrier threat.

The Skua was built to a 12 December 1934 spec, hit the air in early 1937, and had 11 production aircraft flying by the end of 1938, so that's about 48 months from initial spec to small scale production. There were 190 Skuas ordered six months before the prototype flew, which is hardly evidence that the bureacracy was slow.

The Val specifications were issued on 11 August 1936 and 40 were built late 1939, starting with just three aircraft by September 1939 and only about six in October. Deliveries to operational units started in 1940. So that's effectively about 38 months from spec to small scale production.

Whether a 12 month difference between the Japanese effort and the British effort means that the British system was problematic is open to question, given the Skua's dual role and the strains of the British industry and economy. The fact that a naval dive bomber was a far smaller part of the overall British defence plan than it was to the Japanese war aims may well be very significant.

The Brits got the Hurricane and Spit into service before any comparable aircraft bar the 109, so they weren't that incompetent.
 
I am not sure if its already been discussed but assuming in this scenario Germany are still ad hearing to the AGNA then they can only build aircraft carriers at a 35% ratio to the UK.

This basically allows them 2 Carriers with potentially 2 building (in 1939 Britain had 6 and had laid down 5 between 1937 and April 1939) when they abandoned the AGNA - and those 2 initial ships could only be about 19,500 tons each and it is interesting to note that GZ was 50% heavier than that.

AGNA OTL ran from 18 June 1935 and was abandoned on 28 April 1939
For what it's worth (1) 35% of 135,000 tons (the British Empire's tonnage quota in the WNT) is 47,250 tons and if they'd known about the British plan for a post-quota force of fourteen 23,000 ton aircraft carriers by the middle 1940s Germany could have had 112,700 tons (35% of 322,000 tons).

For what it's worth (2) Jane's Fighting Ships for 1938, 1939 and 1940 say the declared (as opposed to the real) standard displacement of Graff Zeppelin & Aircraft Carrier B was 19,250 tons. The books also say that both ships were laid down in 1936 and Jane's 1940 says that Aircraft Carrier B was launched in January 1940 and named Deutschland.
 

Garrison

Donor
Here I'd really have to agree to differ at least a little. IRL the constraints imposed were very much of the nature of the British system and the austerity and interservice rivalry was inherently what limited it. Remember it was only in 1938 that they regained control of the FAA from the RAF. Events that shaped the procurement policy and aircraft development had little real reflection on the reality of likely opposition and far more on the RFPs from the MAP and the availability of funding. The entire saga of developments like the Skua, Fulmar and other late 30s designs. Blackburn Roc (1938) & Skua (1937) were both responses to air ministry Specs. and the Fulmar was an adaptation of P.4/34 light bomber which had been adapted for naval use. All could be characterized by long delays and lead times in response to the changing air situation of the late 30s. So too, you could present a case that they were the result of no KM FAA threat and the non-existence of German carriers, but equally I'd tender that they were as much a symptom of the British aerial industry and bureaucracy of the period. The Sea Hurricane variants offer an excellent proponent and one which I like myself as the AH alternative but look at the delays IRL of its introduction in 1940-41, delayed by the RAF priority of acquisition. Could this be countered, probably yes given a major clear threat, but what timeframe are we talking about to get such a clear and effective response, Hmm... Also let's offer that these programs as presented are covert ones for the KM, beyond a training carrier or two. Is the FAA response going to be quick and timely in its arrival. All food for thought. I'm not trying to be negative; I just have a very cynical and doubting regard for the constraints the UK had inflected upon its own arms of the period and its reflected in this. T
So boiling it down you are proposing yet another scenario where the Germans can completely change their strategy with no down side while the British are of course utterly incapable of reacting to this change because they are somehow too hidebound and resource limited. The idea that the British will just do exactly what they did OTL while the Germans run rings round them just implies that you already know your idea won't hold up in any vaguely realistic scenario.
 
Always interested to source information so what is the M.J. Whitley title you refer to? Hear from you soon. T
"German Capital Ships of World War Two" which with Whitley's books on German Cruisers, Destroyers and Coastal Forces of World War Two are important sources for Kriegsmarine related threads.

For example "German Capital Ships of World War Two" is where I discovered that the planned completion dates for Graff Zeppelin and Aircraft Carrier B at October 1935 were May 1939 and November 1939 respectively. According to that book CV-B was laid down on 30.09.36 when most other sources say that she was laid down in 1938.
Due to slipway availability Aircraft Carrier B was the first to be laid down on 30/09/36 and Aircraft Carrier A followed on 28/12/36.
Except Whitley may not have known that 30.09.36 was probably a typo for 30.09.38 as she was built on the same slip as Prinz Eugen which was launched on 22.08.38. So what if the order of building was reversed with Aircraft Carrier B laid down first (i.e. on 23.04.36) instead of Prinz Eugen?
 
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For what it's worth the predecessor of the Aichi D3A "Val" dive bomber (first flight January 1938) was the Aichi D1A "Susie" that made its first flight in 1934. This aircraft was based on the Heinkel He 66 which in turn was the export version of the He 50 which made its first flight in 1931.
 
The thing to remember too is that the carrier itself is only half the weapon. The aircraft to fly off it are the other half. Post Versailles, Germany is banned an Airforce, though they are to work covertly to subvert these provisions. The thing is even when this is successful, what aircraft that become available will be largely under the sway of Goering. He will not allow for any plans that will compete with the expansion of his beloved Luftwaffe. Getting the hulls is just part of the struggle. . As Astrodragon portrayed in his WHW trilogy, the RN struggled with the RAF control of aviation and IRL didn't get back its FAA until 1938. Compound that bun fight with the factionalism and internal power struggles of the interwar Germany, to imagine how hard it is for such an endeavor to be successful. It's a fascinating conundrum and I've done my own take of this, MFK - Hitlers FAA but it's an issue requiring both aircraft and hulls. IMHO the deck is stacked against a powerful force being developed for that reason, and you'll notice that even with my thread, most of the MFK is largely land based aircraft for that reason. Enjoy and I'd be interested in your thoughts if you can come up with anything. T (PS. Her's my Rheinubung thread on the German carriers use if you want a look. Operation Rheinubung. )
For what it's worth the Luftwaffe had 3 aircraft carrier squadrons in September 1939 and after war was declared increased that force to 6 squadrons consisting of 3 Bf109 & 3 Ju 87 squadrons. They weren't absorbed into the mainstream of the Luftwaffe until the middle of 1940 which was after construction of Graff Zeppelin was suspended.
 
For what it's worth (1) 35% of 135,000 tons (the British Empire's tonnage quota in the WNT) is 47,250 tons and if they'd known about the British plan for a post-quota force of fourteen 23,000 ton aircraft carriers by the middle 1940s Germany could have had 112,700 tons (35% of 322,000 tons).

That is what I am referring too.
But both sides lack the necessary slips to much more.

For what it's worth (2) Jane's Fighting Ships for 1938, 1939 and 1940 say the declared (as opposed to the real) standard displacement of Graff Zeppelin & Aircraft Carrier B was 19,250 tons. The books also say that both ships were laid down in 1936 and Jane's 1940 says that Aircraft Carrier B was launched in January 1940 and named Deutschland

19,000t is probably correct in 1938, before extras were added to allow for heavier naval converted aircraft. Bulges were added.

Breyer has 19,250 as official standard.
23k actual, 27k construction.
 
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