Here I'd really have to agree to differ at least a little. IRL the constraints imposed were very much of the nature of the British system and the austerity and interservice rivalry was inherently what limited it. Remember it was only in 1938 that they regained control of the FAA from the RAF. Events that shaped the procurement policy and aircraft development had little real reflection on the reality of likely opposition and far more on the RFPs from the MAP and the availability of funding. The entire saga of developments like the Skua, Fulmar and other late 30s designs. Blackburn Roc (1938) & Skua (1937) were both responses to air ministry Specs. and the Fulmar was an adaptation of P.4/34 light bomber which had been adapted for naval use. All could be characterized by long delays and lead times in response to the changing air situation of the late 30s. So too, you could present a case that they were the result of no KM FAA threat and the non-existence of German carriers, but equally I'd tender that they were as much a symptom of the British aerial industry and bureaucracy of the period. The Sea Hurricane variants offer an excellent proponent and one which I like myself as the AH alternative but look at the delays IRL of its introduction in 1940-41, delayed by the RAF priority of acquisition. Could this be countered, probably yes given a major clear threat, but what timeframe are we talking about to get such a clear and effective response, Hmm... Also let's offer that these programs as presented are covert ones for the KM, beyond a training carrier or two. Is the FAA response going to be quick and timely in its arrival. All food for thought. I'm not trying to be negative; I just have a very cynical and doubting regard for the constraints the UK had inflected upon its own arms of the period and its reflected in this. T
Yes, the Skua was specifically built with a rival with carriers in mind, in the form of course of the IJN, so the appearance of another navy with carriers may not have caused too much of a change. However, by the late '30s I think the IJN was retreating as a priority as the threat of Germany loomed, so it would also seem possible that the British naval aircraft programme could have been accelerated to meet a German carrier threat.
The Skua was built to a 12 December 1934 spec, hit the air in early 1937, and had 11 production aircraft flying by the end of 1938, so that's about 48 months from initial spec to small scale production. There were 190 Skuas ordered six months
before the prototype flew, which is hardly evidence that the bureacracy was slow.
The Val specifications were issued on 11 August 1936 and 40 were built late 1939, starting with just three aircraft by September 1939 and only about six in October. Deliveries to operational units started in 1940. So that's effectively about 38 months from spec to small scale production.
Whether a 12 month difference between the Japanese effort and the British effort means that the British system was problematic is open to question, given the Skua's dual role and the strains of the British industry and economy. The fact that a naval dive bomber was a far smaller part of the overall British defence plan than it was to the Japanese war aims may well be very significant.
The Brits got the Hurricane and Spit into service before any comparable aircraft bar the 109, so they weren't that incompetent.