The Germans build carriers, instead of battleships, prior to WW2
- Thread starter ravenscroft
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The better option would have been the He 112 carrier version. Still with out ward retracting gear, but much wider apart.
The IJN order these but later rejected it, for the Zero.
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I,d have to go down into operational nitty,gritty which is time consuming, but cases of fighters supporting Luftwaffe missions as a priority exist, or taking too long to organise the implementation. processing and coordination problems.Not saying that they disregarded KM tasking, but there seemed to exist a significant perception that problems existed cooperation wise. in saying this I recognise that I can’t source confirmation at hand, so this response probably won’t be satisfactory to you. T
What I speculate is trying to be true to the thread context if KM goes carriers. Experimental carriers to Constructed or conversions, which way to go in competitive environment? I offer it as a possible context in the knowledge that their priorities mightn’t be ours which reflect a degree of historical hindsight.
Again, can I emphasize that I am trying shape my response to be true to the fundamental context of the thread. This happens when the KM want carrier aviation (not me) and following this premise, it will shape their options how they proceed. Accepting this, I personally am not saying that the KM is all in on carrier development, just that is the scenario that the thread is encouraging us to explore, and nothing I have said is going to stop a rational RN response to this. You seem to want to respond in a perception weighted with modern ideas about carrier use, and I will offer a logic without the benefit of hindsight which again is open to gainsaying, but I'm endeavoring to be true to the thread and the times, while still not ignoring the 20-30s German rearmament issues.
The domino of logic I am following is this (and I am well aware removing a domino can break the logic, or the dominos may not fall in the way planned.);
- The KM accept naval aviation as a force leveler, deciding to develop a naval aviation element. How much and how soon is a thread free-for-all discussion and does not necessarily mean the exclusion some surface elements, particularly if their early CVE/CVT platforms are civilian conversions.
- How effective the naval aviation becomes is a correlation of how early they start, learning by doing as they say, and the earlier they start the more effective they will be. IOTL the early training platforms, Langley and Argus, are basically 1920s civilian conversions, and looking round the KM will see this and follow their example. That's domino one.
- Domino two is that such work on a civilian conversion does not necessarily exclude other. construction, it's not an all or nothing prospect in the early years, despite the implications of thread responses to date, with the intrinsic costs of this approach less than new hulls. It's not all or nothing this early, it's a developmental step initially.
- Domino three is an assumption that this is successful for the first steps, but looking to upgrade or expand the CV base they will face intractable limitations in competition with the other arms as Germany rearms. Realizing they aren't going to get a new BMW or Mercedes Benz equivalent, seeing as they still want carriers in this thread, do they accept a VW bug instead? They can't get a big new Cadillac like the USN, so instead they are looking what is available short of the big tonnage fleet CV platform, which seems to be all you think they should aim for. Domino three for me is why assume that, when they know its unattainable (they never got the GZ IRL) they don't aim for civilian conversion, despite their limitations of size and speed, but may have to accept them irregardless.
- Accepting this, Domino Four is what platform do they look at? Larger hulls like, Blue Riband winners Bremen or Europe are too obvious and expensive to convert. I've listed some smaller options which would obviously have flow-ons like speed and smaller air groups, but it also has correlations on the TL for development you choose for POD. Later ones offer more scope but again all are functions on how you are going to cut the deck of cards presented.
- Domino Five is the professionalism of the KM. If we've reached this stage and you have a couple of slower smaller platforms, you seem to assume that the KM is going to present them like low hanging fruit for the RN to gobble up. Don't you think that a professional naval body is going to be aware of that? Don't you think it's going to shape the doctrinal development of their use in light of their obvious limitations as platforms? My domino is that the KM isn't going to employ the blue ocean, paint a target on my back doctrine for their use. (Think about 1980s Nato Naval doctrine and Reforger plans. The RN had the small platforms optimized to have a sanitized 1–200-mile bubble round a convoy using small platforms. This wasn't the USN blue water CVN attack carrier doctrine, it was something different and specific to the smaller platform and capabilities. A doctrinal difference and why can't the KM think of their own doctrine ITTL?) My domino here is that well aware of the problems the KM could develop a short exposure, small bubble of air defense doctrine, for employment on raids or brief sorties supporting surface forces. It might not work, and according to our modern sensibilities shouldn't, but they don't know that YET!
- Domino Six is that if they have such ideas, then most of the time the platforms are under the cover of land-based air, let's say Norway. Look at the number of resources the RN based in Scapa and the NA in the face of one or two surface units (Tirpitz et al.) They could be perfectly happy for the RN to expose forces to attrition in trying to attack such targets in secured location. Shuttle them around the many anchorages in Fjord's while you rebuild and train your air groups after any sorties, able to concentrate for operation specific tasks. Work with objectives of limited timeframe and limited exposure with a bubble of short-term air protection the objective. If they are civilian conversions, you may end up with the redundancy of several platforms. It's not like putting a single high value target at risk, and you do have the operational resilience this offers. It's going to tie down precious resources and make the RN's job to protect things like the Russian convoy, so much harder, while greatly improving the tactical flexibility of employment of KM surface forces.
- Domino seven, and the final one, is that other additional platforms can be a late-30s developments. I'll use the historical analog of the IJN Hiyo and Shinyo conversions from liners. All built after 1935, they aren't fleet carriers, but they are a bit faster, and with bigger air groups. Since Shinyo was the conversion from Nord-Duetsch SS Scharnhorst, I'll use it as a yard stick. It wasn't a CVE, air group 27-33 (not 16), 20-22 knots (not 16), so it's not quite a CVL but at the same time it's got a little bit more moxie than an escort carrier. How they best use it I don't know, but use them in numbers is possible, and I'm sure the KM would think up some deft options (even if we think them unworkable IOTL). The other thing is there were at least three or four other as capable options in Germany in the late 30s to be possibly available. IOTL has examples of successful employment of small platforms in numbers, the Torc h landings support and the Taffies at Leyte Gulf).
That thing would kill more of its pilots than Allied personel
It has a longer wing and better stall, so should be "slightly" better than seafire
That why I suggested the He112
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Garrison
Donor
But it also really should try and be realistic. The KM entering the war with day a single carrier of dubious effectiveness, that's possible. The KM going all in on carriers in the mid 1930s all but impossible. And the RN making no changes to its own priorities in response? Even less likely.
I think it depends on what they are seen as.
A few scouts to support or maybe replace raiders, a light cruiser replacement or three, anti sub protection or basic air cover for Baltic patrols might be viewed as acceptable. Realistically those could be legitimate roles for KM carriers, but the RN is probably more worried by land based air closer to Germany.
If they get into the North Sea or Atlantic, they'd be more or less a cruiser raider level threat - better scouting, some combat capability and likely a bit less durable but not really any harder to track and hunt than a fast light cruiser and potentially more vulnerable to gunnery and to aerial attack.
They'd maybe look most dangerous paired with one or two heavy ships as they increase the scouting range and put more convoys at risk, but with a smallish air wing and limited ship and aircraft range, and so-so seakeeping compared with a larger carrier, they most likely prompt something like escort carriers for convoy protection and some more thought going into maritime aircraft patrols (and info maritime patrol aircraft), but otherwise get treated much as OTL threats were.
But also, don't underestimate its own difficulties and priorities in trying to get the fleet construction it wanted. They couldn't get back control of their own FAA until 1938. It was this what if that Astrodragon built his own WHW premise to a marvelous result. How realistic it is depending on how much you religiously cling to IOTL events and historic perceptions of them. The best of the AU selects a POD and shape a TL still incorporating IRL events and people. Provided it remains rational and not become an exercise in wishful thinking, then this is how the best of the AU genre thrives.
Even then look at something totally outlandish like Ship Shape and Bristol Fashion (Part of the Falklands TF back in 1939...???), It still made for a great AU yarn incorporating historic personalities and motivation from an outlandish premise, however unlikely the POD, but realistic... Hmmm. It's just that I find the certainty your responses a little inflexible, when you say lines like going all carriers, when I've not declared this. You don't seem to offer counter proposals in the spirit the thread seems to want. My own feeble TL offerings don't say this, MFK or Nieustralis, and are as equally open to attacks on realism if you want to strictly cling closely to IRL historic fact as a matter of dogma. Honestly that's unlikely given Raeder and the KMs background. But I don't preclude some form of balance and hope this thread comes up with alternatives good and bad, and possibly incorporates a different mindset to one dominated by modern perceptions of carrier use. It's all interesting to me. I'm not an either or all guy in my stance, and never indicated it as a panacea or silver bullet solution for the KM woes, and it might be tokenism or ineffective, but that's what the thread concept tenders to us for responses. T
Correct, but that doesn't preclude the KM developing some capability along the lines you detail, and a doctrine to support that. I don't disagree that they would be treated as OTL threats were as you say, but they would introduce an added layer of complexity to any RN response (size of force, type of asset?) and in particular things like the Russian Convoys and their protection, already a difficult and demanding problem, just get an added layer of hassle if you go ahead with them. T
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BTW...
At this time Reichmarine had ferretted away 12 flying boats, Heinkel was designing aircraft for navies overseas and building for DVS, 12 million gold marks of secret "Ruhr Fund"on illegal scrapped ship sales, Naval flying school at Warnemunde, and an aircraft testing sites at Rechlin and Travemunde!
I think against convoys in the Atlantic escortcarriers are a really bad investment. There's a lot of bad weather in the North Atlantic during which flight operations are impossible or useless. A fairly small airwing will get depleted (even if it's only through wear and tear and other non-combat losses) fairly quick. Without escorts they're basically defenseless if the convoy has a strong escort (i.e a cruiser or battleship), because it's doubtful if the small airwing will be able to take the escorts out. Then there's the issue of getting to the Atlantic. If it's sailing from Germany, there's a great risk of being attacked by submarines, fleetcarriers, landbased aircraft, which might missionkill it.
Overall I think you'd be lucky if they get two or three raids in the Atlantic before getting sunk. That's a really bad investment.
And all this is apart from the remarkable foresight they'd need to have in the early 30s to even guess that carriers are the future (which even at the start of the war wasn't certain, and even then battleships were far from obsolete).
And obviously if the Germans start buidling carriers, the RN will also respond by either building more fleetcarriers (and fewer battlesjips) or also more escortcarriers. If the latter happens more convoys will be provided with an escortcarrier, so that might lead to a net benefit for the RN, because the mid-atlantic gap will be closed sooner.
Again, I see a doctrinal bias here saying that any carrier's the KM employs, even small ones, is going to be automatically employed in a foray into the Atlantic as a direct attacking force aimed specifically at the convoys. Suppose they are considered implementers, tools to get other raiders into the convoy routes? Out there to support a raider element, short sharp foray to locate and attack any piquet force to get the raider free, then duck back, job done. It's a supplementary role, supporting and not a doctrine that's to do with our ideas of CV employment. But would it work, and if the KM think so not having our historic perspective, would they work towards it? Same if they get Norway. It becomes their unsinkable land-based carrier, ducking out to raid convoys to Russia, or supporting a surface foray by the Tirpitz or Scharnhorst and the like. Look at most of the larger CV conversion, not commenced till after the outbreak of war, but 9-12 months down the line they are starting to become available. By that time Germany is in Norway so at that point they might become an increasing worry for the RN particularly if used for short specific taskings that are hard to counter. This isn't our doctrine, but I'm trying to hypothesize how an already carrier orientated KM (if only in a limited fashion) might try to utilize any smaller platforms they have, and that doesn't necessarily mean to me that they will commit as attackers them the way every seems to be preoccupied with. They will be directed by thinking planners who will be quite aware of the limitations of whatever platforms they have. They aren't going to put them out there as low hanging fruit to be harvested or employ them in some Wagnerian death ride in the best Nazi tradition, without some realistic approach to the tasks undertaken. We seem to attribute a very one-dimensional cardboard cutout kind of planning ability that will be how they are employed and committed to tasks. At least give credit that here were some very deft operational minds in the KM in reality and think that they will work to their strengths and be aware of the weaknesses and try not to expose them willy nilly without some countervailing potential of reward. T
That has the same issues. Deployment in the Atlantic is a bad idea. A single carrier won't survive. A TF gets a significant part of the RN on its tail.
They did get Norway OTL. Landbased airforce worked fine from there (and was actually more of a threat in the arctic then the U-boats or the surfacenavy). Carriers don't benefit the KM in their operations in the arctic.
I do give them credit: there are very good reasons why they didn't invest in carriers.
Never said they didn't, just that this is the founding context of this thread and was to postulate if they did. I'm just trying to post in the spirit of that idea. Implausible and highly unlikely IRL but let's shake the tree and see what fall's out my approach is when we get involved in something like this. T
Thought experiment: in the late 1920's, some visionaries in the German Peacetime Navy decided to think outside of the box and figured that the best way to beat the Royal Navy in a future matchup is to figure out the next big thing and beat the British into getting it into service. So they devise a master plan that has the navy focus on submarines and torpedo planes, rather than on battleships.
The events of Matapan and the sinking of the Prince of Wales would prove them right in the medium-long run. (The battle of Midway would of course prove that due to the requirements of maximum speed for launching a torpedo, in the very long run torpedo bombers were useless against a fleet of AA-equiped ships combining their fire.)
On paper, it's doable.
In practice:
1) The 'revolutionary' wing of the new Nazi navy advocating torpedo bombers would have to get past the old guard of WWI veteran sailors turned Nazi revisionists. As true old school admirals go, their aim for the Navy would still be to 'have the biggest one'. So a tiny aircraft would never survive their phallus-envy in regard to their British colleagues.
2) After that, they still would have to face Herman Goering who's basic view was, "If someone has aircraft, it should better be me, if not me, no one should have aircraft"
The events of Matapan and the sinking of the Prince of Wales would prove them right in the medium-long run. (The battle of Midway would of course prove that due to the requirements of maximum speed for launching a torpedo, in the very long run torpedo bombers were useless against a fleet of AA-equiped ships combining their fire.)
On paper, it's doable.
In practice:
1) The 'revolutionary' wing of the new Nazi navy advocating torpedo bombers would have to get past the old guard of WWI veteran sailors turned Nazi revisionists. As true old school admirals go, their aim for the Navy would still be to 'have the biggest one'. So a tiny aircraft would never survive their phallus-envy in regard to their British colleagues.
2) After that, they still would have to face Herman Goering who's basic view was, "If someone has aircraft, it should better be me, if not me, no one should have aircraft"
OK people Here's a synopsis of some speculative high points in the spirit of this thread for a pro-carrier evolution of the KM into WW2 Feel free to hack and laugh, just trying to make you think.
- 16,700-ton 19-knot NDL liner Zeppelin interred in Norway 1914, handed over post war as part of reparations. Repurchased early 20s with Weimar covert assistance become covert training platform at same time as Lipetsk flight training in soviet Russia commences 23/24. Work done prior to Leningrad transfer and notional sale to the Soviets at this time, but for FAA training in reality. Reichsmarine does not keep Versailles pre-dreadnaughts operational, cost supporting new construction and covert Anti Versailles programs. Base line for carrier work.
- 1930 15,000-ton 17-knot Munchen burns and capsizes in NY, salvaged and rebuilt 1932, ITTL taken over during reconstruction and becomes second CV platform. Even if nothing else the new KM has two moderately useful skill platforms at low cost without interfering with other constructions (PB's anyone?)
- Slice and dice the rest of the 30s how you want. (Strength through Joy ships Wilhelm Gusthoff and Robert Ley both 25,000 tons+ built with CV conversion in mind similar to IJN Hiyo ships?), But the KM has a sound training and experience base for FAA ops and expansion, even if the platforms are not fleet CV level. Perhaps more importantly the surface fleet builds aren't impacted by these changes.
- WW2 kicks off as IRL, involvement in Wesserbung and Norway and navy at the decision of the TL narrator. What happens at this time is that lets say three of the 1935 or later ships begin CVL conversion. Say all of the NDL ships 18-20,000tons undergo Shinyo or analog conversions taking 9-12months, 27 AC, CVL armament, 20-22knots, possibly followed in due course by their bigger Strength through Joy conversions. Too far-fetched for your palate/ Maybe, but other AUs have gone farther. But if those assets are on hand, experienced and available, the KM would use them, even if differently to us.
- From this arise employment scenarios, Let's take Operation Rheinubung since it's a recent visit for me. Bismarck is accompanied by Scharnhorst (the NDL version not BB) ITTL and here it detects Suffolk, DBing her and sinking her, also shooting down recon AC from Iceland and then immediately withdrawing., having released the Bismarck into the NA with no damage and no shadowers. Possible scenarios arePO_17 type panic? without damage and oil slick Bismarck successfully reaches Brest? Thing is it's a limited employment of a limited platform and creates a whole slew of possibilities for the AU narrator to generate, yet the Scharnhorst heads straight back to Norway, never involving itself in subsequent events. Doesn't need the NA sortie that everyone seems to be saying it must.
- Similarly, how do you want to slice and dice the Battle of the Barents Sea and Convoy JB-51W with a couple of these German CVLs involved., Battle of the North Cape or Operation Berlin in the NA anyone? Things about all of these it a vastly complicates the RN problems of maintaining a counter force and the ongoing complexities to counter their existence. And it doesn't necessarily require these ships to be exposed riskily, or committed willy nilly into the NA, just the tactical freedom it offers the KM selectively employed is worth its weight in gold. Plus, a case can be made (if the AC can be shaken free from the Luftwaffe). that the sheer redundancy of having 5-7 of these platform's eventually on call (I'd personally doubt this could be achieved, but how good is your AU imagination?), gives a scope of freedom for planning that the KM never had IOTL.
Thing is late 1920s is there anyone who thinks that you can mass enough air power to kill a battleship, particularly with the current/near future engines available? I mean the POW sinking wasn’t just the issue of a battleship being attacked by air power without enough escort but also another “Golden BB” of the shaft damage like the destruction of Hood. Betting that torpedo bombers can score crippling “one shots” isn’t exactly best odds, unless you are talking about attacks the size of the late war USN.
Then of course you get into questions of the air group, pre radar you have to assume either continuous CAP, or something like the RNs armoured deck, so either you need a large enough carrier to operate both significant numbers of fighters and strike aircraft or a smaller airgroup on a more protected hull. And of course you still have to craft your navy to be able to protect the carriers in any likely North Sea engagement, particularly if you go for something between an escort carrier and a light carrier that still won’t be able to run away from any surface threat.
Even figuring that somehow this gets a green light, what likely timeframe are we talking about? Assuming a late 20s decision can you get the funding for the carrier and air group (which remember from RN figures is going to cost more than an equivalent cruiser hull), given the political difficulties getting the Deutschland class ordered, mid 30s? That doesn’t give Germany much time to develop doctrine, test the designs in exercises and get a follow on hull(s) by war.