How "should" WWII in 1940 have gone?

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

Why would Italy jump in if the French were still in decent shape and not collapsing?

Because Mussolini is an idiot.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I think if you could have replaced the 1940 officers and men of the BEF and French Armies with the same officers and men who were fighting the campaigns of the Summer of 1918 they would have done a far better job.

I mean just look at the shit show that was the French defence of Sedan - it was not that they failed in their attempt to defeat the crossing - they just completely failed to attempt to defeat it - for 3 days - while the Germans desperately sorted out the worlds most armoured traffic jam!

Concentration of forces to defend against the point of an attack was not some form of new and fantastical military art - we saw the Coalition do it before the battle of Quatra Bras and subsequently Waterloo, Lee do it during the Maryland campaign an we should have seen it at Sedan.

55th Division was as we know shattered by heavy Stuka attacks (in leu of sufficient artillery) and rendered ineffective for teh rest of the battle by the heaviest and most intense Luftwaffe attack of the entire war on the Divisions Bunkers and trenches and this mighty air attack inflicted a staggering......56 casualties.

I think soldiers of the Great War who suffered far heavier losses through sustained artillery bombardments and knew to actually bury their telephone cables might not have broken in such a fashion.

And very unlikely to have had situations such as the the panic of Bulson where an incorrect rumour regarding approaching tanks when the German armour was still on the other side of the river resulted in the 55th Division units abandoning their positions and heavy equipment.

Yes, Sedan is a example of a poorly trained formation succumbing to a well organized attack by well trained soldiers. Theres a hundred examples of this in WWII, Third rate formations hustled into defeat by battalion Division, corps, or army trained and confident. One example is the recommendation of the X Corps artillery commander to hold fire on the 12th as Guderians corps closed to the Meuse river and organized for the next days crossing. The artillery officer and the corps commander failed to recognize the impending assault crossing and thought to reserve ammunition and keep their 172 cannon hidden until the enemy infantry army closed up. Thus Guderian handfull of rifle battalions prepared for the river crossing entirely unmolested.

Another example is the decision of the 55th Div commander to move his CP during the air attack. The poorly rehearsed HQ staff and technicians failed to move the CP in stages, but instead disconnected all communications before the new CP was set up. This added to the confusion and fear as the artillery, infantry, and everyone else were cut off.

On the morning of the 14th The X Corps commander had a robust reserve of two infantry regiments and two tank battalions. But, the poor state of training means the artillery failed to support the counter attack, the infantry went to ground from long range German MG fires, and the tanks plunged ahead unsupported and uncoordinated with the rifle companies. Later in the day the XX Corps commander Flavigny managed to botch preparations for a combined counter attack of a armored division and the first rate 3rd Infantry div. What should have been a hammer blow to Guderian vulnerable bridgehead never even started.

The action of the First Army in the Gembloux gap showed what properly trained and prepared French infantry divisions could do against armored formations. Had similar soldiers been at Sedan, or Dinant, Guderian and Rommel would have had a far tougher time of it.

 

[RedSword12]

The German plan was suicidal and the product of Germany's desperate strategic position, had the French been able to better coordinate their counterattacks, to better communicate, the German spearhead would have been cutoff and the war would have ended right there.

We are too used to blaming the French and seeing the German victory as a natural one... when it was a very, very stupid plan that succeeded due to a combination of bad French doctrine and luck.

If a plan works, it's not stupid. Fact of the matter is it was Germany's best shot at winning the war in a single campaign, given what the Germans knew at the time. It was actually a good plan, chosen in no small part because of German awareness of the French military's ponderous command and control. The German General Staff looked at the evidence, and came up with a winning strategy, while the French did not. Riskiness does not a bad plan make. The best commanders are those that can navigate the marshes of risk and dodge the consequences. There's a reason Napoleon said he'd rather have a lucky general than a skilled one. If someone keeps rolling sixes, it's because they have something to do with it. It's really tiring how armchair generals upon seeing any element of risk will immediately issue condemnation for "stupidity," as if war is not an inherently risky activity.

 

[Jacarí]

If a plan works, it's not stupid. Fact of the matter is it was Germany's best shot at winning the war in a single campaign, given what the Germans knew at the time. It was actually a good plan, chosen in no small part because of German awareness of the French military's ponderous command and control. The German General Staff looked at the evidence, and came up with a winning strategy, while the French did not. Riskiness does not a bad plan make. The best commanders are those that can navigate the marshes of risk and dodge the consequences. There's a reason Napoleon said he'd rather have a lucky general than a skilled one. If someone keeps rolling sixes, it's because they have something to do with it. It's really tiring how armchair generals upon seeing any element of risk will immediately issue condemnation for "stupidity," as if war is not an inherently risky activity.

There is always risk in war... but that long unprotected flank was suicidal, that campaign has been gamed to death on the years after WW2, it never works becausae it was far too risky. Carl made an excellent summary of the number of mistakes the French made just in the immediate area of the breakthrough, without any one of them the crossing would have likely failed, and that doesnt even touch the possibility of the obvious pincer movement against the armored spearhead once it raced ahead of the infantry.

The Germans didnt come up with a winning strategy calmly conjured by a staff, they tried a Hail Mary because, due to economic reasons, they simply had to win outright otherwise they would be simply delaying defeat.

They rolled the dice on a dumb plan because they had no choice.

And it worked, to everyones surprise.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

There is always risk in war... but that long unprotected flank was suicidal, that campaign has been gamed to death on the years after WW2, it never works becausae it was far too risky. Carl made an excellent summary of the number of mistakes the French made just in the immediate area of the breakthrough, without any one of them the crossing would have likely failed, and that doesnt even touch the possibility of the obvious pincer movement against the armored spearhead once it raced ahead of the infantry.

The Germans didnt come up with a winning strategy calmly conjured by a staff, they tried a Hail Mary because, due to economic reasons, they simply had to win outright otherwise they would be simply delaying defeat.

They rolled the dice on a dumb plan because they had no choice.

And it worked, to everyones surprise.

Even sticking to Dyle (which at least was planned and reasonably well understood) rather than jumping into Breda (which was a surprise to pretty much everyone) might have been enough to crash the German's party.

Personally, I'd think that while Dyle could grind the northern attack to a halt (more likely if there's at least token Belgian cooperation) something extra around Sedan would be needed to stop the German breakthrough. But as Carl has shown, there's plenty of cases where a halt or a delay was within reach but either not taken or completely missed due to confusion.

A bold and daring gamble against a fossilised commander and weak and confused national leadership was worth a try in the circumstances -and it worked like a charm - but it came very close to failure and any one (and almost certainly any two) of many plausible changes could have transformed it into a hubristic failure.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

Why would Italy jump in if the French were still in decent shape and not collapsing? There is no Mediterranean strategy available in this scenario.

If France and Britain hold, there is no Mediterranean War and probably no Eastern Front. Hitler didn’t want a two front war. Stalin would probably stay out of it and see who comes out on top. Given the disparity in potential manpower and resources, if the French and British can hold on and adapt to the German way of war, the Allies would win. It would probably be a slog though.

 

[tomo pauk]

The German plan was suicidal and the product of Germany's desperate strategic position, had the French been able to better coordinate their counterattacks, to better communicate, the German spearhead would have been cutoff and the war would have ended right there.

We are too used to blaming the French and seeing the German victory as a natural one... when it was a very, very stupid plan that succeeded due to a combination of bad French doctrine and luck.

Had not the German plan succeeded also because Germans were doing the modern warfare better than the French in 1940?

 

[Lee-Sensei]

Because Mussolini is an idiot.

In OTL, he only jumped into the war when it looked like the France was going to surrender quickly (and he was right about that). He made a lot of dumb choices. So did Hitler. So did the Japanese, Churchill, Stalin and many other historical figures, but there was usually a rationale for their choices.

 

[WeissRaben]

Because Mussolini is an idiot.

Yes, but a cowardly idiot. The one and only reason he jumped in is because he was convinced the war was done already. If that's not a given (even less than OTL, at least), then Mussolini will keep faffing.
Not that he couldn't end up in the war through other stumbles, but he won't just declare war on France and Britain if he thinks they still have fight in them.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Yes, Sedan is a example of a poorly trained formation succumbing to a well organized attack by well trained soldiers. Theres a hundred examples of this in WWII, Third rate formations hustled into defeat by battalion Division, corps, or army trained and confident. One example is the recommendation of the X Corps artillery commander to hold fire on the 12th as Guderians corps closed to the Meuse river and organized for the next days crossing. The artillery officer and the corps commander failed to recognize the impending assault crossing and thought to reserve ammunition and keep their 172 cannon hidden until the enemy infantry army closed up. Thus Guderian handfull of rifle battalions prepared for the river crossing entirely unmolested.

Another example is the decision of the 55th Div commander to move his CP during the air attack. The poorly rehearsed HQ staff and technicians failed to move the CP in stages, but instead disconnected all communications before the new CP was set up. This added to the confusion and fear as the artillery, infantry, and everyone else were cut off.

On the morning of the 14th The X Corps commander had a robust reserve of two infantry regiments and two tank battalions. But, the poor state of training means the artillery failed to support the counter attack, the infantry went to ground from long range German MG fires, and the tanks plunged ahead unsupported and uncoordinated with the rifle companies. Later in the day the XX Corps commander Flavigny managed to botch preparations for a combined counter attack of a armored division and the first rate 3rd Infantry div. What should have been a hammer blow to Guderian vulnerable bridgehead never even started.

The action of the First Army in the Gembloux gap showed what properly trained and prepared French infantry divisions could do against armored formations. Had similar soldiers been at Sedan, or Dinant, Guderian and Rommel would have had a far tougher time of it.

Yes unfortunately 55th Divisions commander was more interested in building fortifications and digging trenches than carrying out individual and joint unit training.

Even simple things like 'walking the ground' had not been done and due to units moving around a lot

And this commander famously ate a rug when he discovered that a junior officer on his own initiative had taken his very green anti tank gun unit to a disused quarry to actually fire their 25mm Hotchkiss AT guns.

I see that as obvious initiative but Brigadier Gen Henri Lafontaine rewarded First Lieutenant Delas with 15 days confinement!

And during the 3 days of the battle many sub units had been switched around between sub commands - in one case all the companies of a 'battalion' were from different battalions and lacked any real cohesion and the organisation of the Division has been described as 'Chaotic'.

We have many examples of French units and even individuals performing very well during the battle of France - its just unfortunate that where it critically mattered the principle units were very poorly led and had not conducted realistic training.

There are as you say plenty of similar examples of Sedan.

I guess the old maxim "Good order makes men brave" is apt in the example of the 55th

 

[Cryhavoc101]

There is always risk in war... but that long unprotected flank was suicidal, that campaign has been gamed to death on the years after WW2, it never works becausae it was far too risky. Carl made an excellent summary of the number of mistakes the French made just in the immediate area of the breakthrough, without any one of them the crossing would have likely failed, and that doesnt even touch the possibility of the obvious pincer movement against the armored spearhead once it raced ahead of the infantry.

The Germans didnt come up with a winning strategy calmly conjured by a staff, they tried a Hail Mary because, due to economic reasons, they simply had to win outright otherwise they would be simply delaying defeat.

They rolled the dice on a dumb plan because they had no choice.

And it worked, to everyones surprise.

I guess the issue was that it continued to work despite it being risky.

Norway - although that was tied in with the Kreigsmarine getting utterly wrecked and the campaign ending with things going very badly in France.

Battle of France and Low Lands - could have gone very wrong for them and any drawn out battle becomes difficult to sustain for Nazi Germany.

Battle of Crete - again we see victory snatched from the jaws of defeat - not by the Germans themselves who had been effectively defeated by the mostly Kiwi troops but by the mistaken actions by a handful of commanding officers and lack of obvious counter attacks by the defenders at Maleme which should have ended the battle on the first day and prevented the Germans from using it as an airhead.

Barbarossa and Battle of Moscow - here the wheels start to come off and the Heer suffers about a million casualties which would be mostly among its veteran infantry companies and arguably it never really recovers.

We see the same thing with the Japanese offensive - early relatively cheap victories lulled them into a false sense of superiority and they were slow to accept the new reality in places like Guadalcanal and PNG when faced with superior quality enemies.

 

[pjmidd]

I don't expect the kind of FFO wank to happen for the french troops in NA, imo they will have couple of tough years ahead just fighting not to be evicted from NA by a likely greatly augmented Rommel and the italians,

And how exactly are these Axis Wundertruppen meant to get to North Africa if they are facing the combined British and French Navy's backed by airbases in Tunisia as well as Egypt? I'm sorry but if France fights on from Africa , the chances are high North Africa is over very quickly due to Axis not being able to supply/reinforce and the Allies hitting from both sides.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Because Mussolini is an idiot.

He was also an opportunist.

He did not jump in with the Germans because he thought they needed his help.

He jumped in with the Germans by declaring war on 10th June - this was the day the French government abandoned Paris - simply to get a seat at the victors table as it was then clear that France was done and by extension so was Britain.

I hate using quotes but I think its apt in this case where he famously quipped 5 days before declaring war "I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conference as a man who has fought" and it sort of made sense as any peace deal could have netted Italy territory it would have really struggled to gain through military means.

I don't think he really appreciated that the bloody perfidious British would keep on fighting.

And he was not alone in that assumption.

 

[Jacarí]

Had not the German plan succeeded also because Germans were doing the modern warfare better than the French in 1940?

True, the Germans were better, no doubt about that... but they took a huge risk, one that shouldnt have worked... like in Norway... or Poland... but in war everything is relative.

FUnny enough Barbarossa was, on paper, the less risky offensive they undertook.

 

[Jacarí]

In OTL, he only jumped into the war when it looked like the France was going to surrender quickly (and he was right about that). He made a lot of dumb choices. So did Hitler. So did the Japanese, Churchill, Stalin and many other historical figures, but there was usually a rationale for their choices.

Yes, but a cowardly idiot. The one and only reason he jumped in is because he was convinced the war was done already. If that's not a given (even less than OTL, at least), then Mussolini will keep faffing.
Not that he couldn't end up in the war through other stumbles, but he won't just declare war on France and Britain if he thinks they still have fight in them.

Because Mussolini is an idiot.

He was also an opportunist.

He did not jump in with the Germans because he thought they needed his help.

He jumped in with the Germans by declaring war on 10th June - this was the day the French government abandoned Paris - simply to get a seat at the victors table as it was then clear that France was done and by extension so was Britain.

I hate using quotes but I think its apt in this case where he famously quipped 5 days before declaring war "I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conference as a man who has fought" and it sort of made sense as any peace deal could have netted Italy territory it would have really struggled to gain through military means.

I don't think he really appreciated that the bloody perfidious British would keep on fighting.

And he was not alone in that assumption.

Sacro Egoismo... that has been Italian policy for decades.

In WW1 they had an alliance with the CPs and a secret one with France, when they day came, they would stab someone on the back.

Then the Marne happened and the AHs and Turks seemed about to crumble... so time for some stabby, stabby

When case yellow began they were in secret negotiations with the wallies.

Then France was ran over... so time for some stabby, stabby.

It wasnt Mussolinni... not that I would defend the clown.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

True, the Germans were better, no doubt about that... but they took a huge risk, one that shouldnt have worked... like in Norway... or Poland... but in war everything is relative.

FUnny enough Barbarossa was, on paper, the less risky offensive they undertook.

Less risky than what? Fighting France? I can see arguments for and against that.

 

[Jacarí]

Less risky than what? Fighting France? I can see arguments for and against that.

Poland was an offensive by a green army that had a skeleton garrison and a lot of propaganda protecting its back.

Norway was an amphibious operation in the backyard of the largest naval power in the world.

France was a land offensive against an enemy superior in every numerical metric, one executed on a suicidal fashion that could cost you the war.

Barbarossa was an offensive against an army that had just executed most of its officers, showed incredible incompetence at fighting a small country and had a lot of minorities and dissidents inside of them...

On paper, which one was the least risky of the lot?

 

[Jacarí]

I guess the issue was that it continued to work despite it being risky.

Norway - although that was tied in with the Kreigsmarine getting utterly wrecked and the campaign ending with things going very badly in France.

Battle of France and Low Lands - could have gone very wrong for them and any drawn out battle becomes difficult to sustain for Nazi Germany.

Battle of Crete - again we see victory snatched from the jaws of defeat - not by the Germans themselves who had been effectively defeated by the mostly Kiwi troops but by the mistaken actions by a handful of commanding officers and lack of obvious counter attacks by the defenders at Maleme which should have ended the battle on the first day and prevented the Germans from using it as an airhead.

Barbarossa and Battle of Moscow - here the wheels start to come off and the Heer suffers about a million casualties which would be mostly among its veteran infantry companies and arguably it never really recovers.

We see the same thing with the Japanese offensive - early relatively cheap victories lulled them into a false sense of superiority and they were slow to accept the new reality in places like Guadalcanal and PNG when faced with superior quality enemies.

It continued to work, but can you honestly say that you would choose such a plan unless you know a long war is just a slow, guaranteed defeat for you?

The KM wasnt "utterly wrecked", it suffered losses in the execution of a HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL operation, another suicidal one, but succeed they did much to the shame of the RN.

Any campaign in France that doesnt end in a quick German victory means an eventual German loss. That is it.

Crete is different, it was caused by bad intel, in all the other cases above, the Germans knew what they were getting into.

The German army never recovered from Barbarossa, but they didnt have a false sense of superiority, their army WAS superior to all others, no doubt about it... but being the best doesnt mean that you are infallible, the Soviets refused to roll over and die... died by the millions... traded blood and space for time... they learned... and they won.

 

[RedSword12]

There is always risk in war... but that long unprotected flank was suicidal, that campaign has been gamed to death on the years after WW2, it never works becausae it was far too risky. Carl made an excellent summary of the number of mistakes the French made just in the immediate area of the breakthrough, without any one of them the crossing would have likely failed, and that doesnt even touch the possibility of the obvious pincer movement against the armored spearhead once it raced ahead of the infantry.

The Germans didnt come up with a winning strategy calmly conjured by a staff, they tried a Hail Mary because, due to economic reasons, they simply had to win outright otherwise they would be simply delaying defeat.

They rolled the dice on a dumb plan because they had no choice.

And it worked, to everyones surprise.

The "long, unprotected flank" was not suicidal. The initial reckless push westwards was done in full knowledge of the French sluggishness, and it yielded significant dividends in the effective destruction of two of four French tank divisions in the area, after which they actually paused for a few days and let the foot infantry deploy into the salient to defend the flank before they resumed their advance to the channel. When they reached the channel, the salient's left flank was well-protected. The French would have had considerable difficulty breaking through that "long, unprotected flank." And the Luftwaffe was well-positioned to parry any French counterattacks by forcing them to disperse en route, which is exactly what happened when the French tried to deploy their armored reserves during Case Red. Just because Case Yellow was the best plan available to the Germans, doesn't mean it was just a hail mary.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

It continued to work, but can you honestly say that you would choose such a plan unless you know a long war is just a slow, guaranteed defeat for you?

The KM wasnt "utterly wrecked", it suffered losses in the execution of a HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL operation, another suicidal one, but succeed they did much to the shame of the RN.

Any campaign in France that doesnt end in a quick German victory means an eventual German loss. That is it.

Crete is different, it was caused by bad intel, in all the other cases above, the Germans knew what they were getting into.

The German army never recovered from Barbarossa, but they didnt have a false sense of superiority, their army WAS superior to all others, no doubt about it... but being the best doesnt mean that you are infallible, the Soviets refused to roll over and die... died by the millions... traded blood and space for time... they learned... and they won.

No I would not choose to do what they did 'without hindsight' as they were the plans of lunatics - which is partially why they succeeded - but so much could have gone wrong!

Well as for the German fleet being wrecked - the KM lost 10 fleet destroyers (of 20), 1 Heavy Cruiser (of 2) , 2 light cruisers (of 6) and 6 Submarines and 21 transport representing 10% of its then total transport fleet tonnage.

A further 2 'torpedo boats' (light destroyers) and 15 smaller warships were also sunk

Of the remaining surface fleet at the end of the campaign only 3 Crusiers and 4 fleet destroyers were operational - the rest of the ships damaged including both Battleships and the other 2 cruisers as well as the other remaining destroyers sustained damage during the campaign.

If that is not being wrecked then I am not sure what is?