Alternative History Armoured Fighting Vehicles Part 4

Sounds like potential "What if Captain Rarey....." timeline on the order of Allan Cameron's "Sir John Valentine Carden Survives"
From the little information provided in the linked monograph, it seems to me that Rarey focused primarily on the mobility and availability/reliability/maintainability aspects of tanks, and not their armament and armor.

A partial expertise-focus like that is fine, as long as other experts handle the other aspects, and the final design achieves a good balance. But part of the US Army's tank problem in the 1920s and 1930s was the absence of someone with a Guderian-like ability to correctly envision future tank usage and what it would imply for that "good balance", plus the rank or prestige to make final determinations and get them acted on without further debate. Apparently Rarey wasn't that person...at least on the second count, and apparently on the first as well.
 
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Ordnance officers like Rarey, Colby and Barnes were in their role by not imposing the core requirements and only working on the design aspects. In this regard they are closer to say Heereswaffenamt 6 with Ernst Kniepkamp or the officers of the French Directorate of Armament Production.

The problem, as noted, was in the requirements imposed by the using arms themselves. This is why Ordnance sometimes had to suggest very light tanks with casemates or 1-man turrets with thick armor and a 37mm gun to stay within very low weight limits, and why 3 inches of armor was not attempted after it was noted to be necessary against AT guns in 1937-38 per the observations of the Spanish Civil War. No weight budget to do that.

The US armed services had the rather strange focus on making tanks excessively suitable for North America (hence the weight limits) even though they de facto could only be used in Europe which would have justified moving closer to European trends.
 
The US armed services had the rather strange focus on making tanks excessively suitable for North America (hence the weight limits) (...)
Certainly we see in the history a misguided concern that tank weight must be kept under load limits for existing civilian bridges within US training-exercise locales, but that same tail-wagging-the-dog mis-prioritization shows up in the monograph I linked, with the load limits of the Army's existing portable bridging systems for future foreign war-theatres taken as determinative of an upper limit for US tanks...as if there was no need to consider whether the cost of buying and deploying higher-capacity bridges would be a worthwhile expenditure if it meant the difference between light tanks that lose fights, and heavier tanks that win fights.
 
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Certainly we see in the history a misguided concern that tank weight must be kept under load limits for existing civilian bridges within US training-exercise locales, but that same tail-wagging-the-dog mis-prioritization shows up in the monograph I linked, with the load limits of the Army's existing portable bridging systems for future foreign war-theatres taken as determinative of an upper limit for US tanks...as if there was no need to consider whether the cost of buying and deploying higher-capacity bridges would be a worthwhile expenditure if it meant the difference between light tanks that lose fights, and heavier tanks that win fights.
While it looks a reasonable proposition that heavier tanks will win, WW2 suggests otherwise (eg Battle of France, Germany vs KV1s early in Barbarossa, Shermans and Cromwells against late war German armour [1]). In fact, WW2 experience suggests that better used tanks win, even if they are lighter.

And with that in mind, won't four or five light tanks on the right side of the river be much more effective than two or three heavier ones that are stuck on the wrong side because there are no suitable bridges?

[1] Matildas vs Italian tanks in the desert are a clear case of heavier being better, but it's not that common otherwise.
 
Regarding bridges, that particular argument has been trotted out over and over since at least the 1920s...as Bougnas has just been telling us...always to suggest that the then-current bridges are ideal, and buying new ones with more weight capacity would be so expensive and disruptive that no discussion of heavier tanks can be considered, even if there are plausible arguments that those heavier tanks would be more likely to prevail in combat.

My view is that assured achievement of the Army's end goal of prevailing requires that the combat arms must determine what they need to prevail, then the support arms determine how to support the combat arms. Always.

If the Army determines that light tanks are the way to go because they're most likely to lead to a win...fine. But if tanks with more armor and heavier armament will be more likely to win, get them, and get heavier bridges.
 
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In Italy alone the British and US armies used 3000 Bailey bridges. The US Army spent $50,000 on the Bailey bridge they bought to test before adopting the design. A Sherman cost about $55,000. A Bailey bridge also required a dozen or so trucks to carry it. So it's not hard to see that the cost of buying new bridge equipment is going to bite pretty heavily. In the real world, funds are limited so it becomes a reasonable question - do you reduce the cash you can spend on tanks by about 20% by getting bigger tanks and then the bridging gear and trucks to carry them, or do you have 20% extra to spend on tanks that will be cheaper by themselves and also because you haven't spend bundles on new bridges?

There's also the school of thought that says that one major reason the Allies won is that the Axis ignored the need to listen to the support arms and became over-stretched, while the Allies didn't. Isn't Rommel said to be the classic example of someone who lost because he concentrated on combat and ignored the support?
 
I've never understood why the US concentrated on radial engines for tanks. They make a vehicle unacceptably tall, unless they are turned on their side. Indeed why weren't there more effort to turn the radial engines on their side? It would solve the height issue.

It's more complicated when the necessary right angle transfer case (to re-direct the vertical crankshaft to horizontal, so the driveshaft can connect it to the transmission) is considered. If that transfer case has to go under the engine, so that the top of the engine remains unobstructed for cooling and particularly for the gear-driven cooling fan, then the engine has to be removed for maintenance of the transfer case...which will need oil changes, so that's a required engine removal each time.

There's also the power loss in that transfer case, and its own height, and its weight, and its cost.

Radial engines, especially the (lightly) supercharged types the American used, were very light for the power they delivered, and were off-the-shelf component - comes in handy when one needs to make tanks/AFVs by many thousands after the short notice. Abundance of already existing spare parts was also a boon, especially for a country that will be sending their tanks half a globe away. These radials were also as short as possible, that helps with keeping the vehicle length compact, and reduces the weight of armor required. Lastly, absence of liquid cooling system was one less thing that designers need to worry about, and there is no space requirement for that.

The M18 Hellcat used the additional crankcase, that lowered the 'propeller shaft', so the whole vehicle was lower than the M3 or M4 medium tanks. Prop shaft that is set lower allows for the turret to be set lower, for a fixed internal height of the turret.
 
There's also the school of thought that says that one major reason the Allies won is that the Axis ignored the need to listen to the support arms and became over-stretched, while the Allies didn't. Isn't Rommel said to be the classic example of someone who lost because he concentrated on combat and ignored the support?
The support arms of the 'big' Axis countries were ill able to cater for the megalomanical appetite of the these countries. There is no logistical tail that can support Axis past 1941.

Rommel had no support he needed - be that wrt. fuel, ammo, fighting hardware, or manpower - and had ever less of support as the N. African campaign was unfolding, with Germany trying to break the Soviet Union at land, and UK at sea. When Commonwealth (includes armed forces on the terrain, and Churchill) was making mistakes, Rommel was fast to punish them. When Commonwealth figured out the game, Rommel was toast.
 
In Italy alone the British and US armies used 3000 Bailey bridges. The US Army spent $50,000 on the Bailey bridge they bought to test before adopting the design. A Sherman cost about $55,000. A Bailey bridge also required a dozen or so trucks to carry it. So it's not hard to see that the cost of buying new bridge equipment is going to bite pretty heavily. In the real world, funds are limited so it becomes a reasonable question - do you reduce the cash you can spend on tanks by about 20% by getting bigger tanks and then the bridging gear and trucks to carry them, or do you have 20% extra to spend on tanks that will be cheaper by themselves and also because you haven't spend bundles on new bridges?

There's also the school of thought that says that one major reason the Allies won is that the Axis ignored the need to listen to the support arms and became over-stretched, while the Allies didn't. Isn't Rommel said to be the classic example of someone who lost because he concentrated on combat and ignored the support?
Absolutely a balance is needed. But, it also makes no sense to go in the Polish direction...tanks that are cheaper so you can spend money on other things, but they lose on the battlefield.

Nothing is so poor an economic choice as a tank that will be destroyed in its first battle because it's not as effective as the enemy's tank that cost a little more. Winners get the luxury of arguing among themselves as to whether they might have gotten away with spending a little less. Losers don't get any luxuries.

As to the relative cost of tanks and bridges: the modern cost of a double/single Bailey Bridge (just a materials kit, and the most basic configuration) from Chinese suppliers, with actually superior quality (stronger steel, and fully hot dip galvanized instead of just lead-painted), is roughly US$50 a meter. Inflation since WWII has been very roughly 17X, so a WWII bridge might be estimated at US$3 a meter. Say the average WWII constructed bridge was about 50 meters, so that'd be more like $150 of materials. The US$50K for a test bridge is not likely representative of what was paid in volume, which is the right comparison.

Obviously that $150 doesn't include ancillaries and labor, whereas the tank cost for comparison does include those elements. But still, tanks were far more expensive on a unit basis than bridge kits. They contained lots of machining, a considerable proportion of armor steel, much more complicated fabrication, more-precise welding, lots of electricals and hydraulics, a powertrain, many moving parts, several guns, etc.

That's not to say that tanks and bridges don't have to both be paid for out of whatever budget you have. But, just as you can lose battles by not having good enough bridges or POL supplies or any other logistical and infrastructure element, you also can lose battles by having tanks that aren't as good as the other side's...perhaps because you went cheap on them.
 
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As to the relative cost of tanks and bridges: the modern cost of a double/single Bailey Bridge (just a materials kit, and the most basic configuration) from Chinese suppliers, with actually superior quality (stronger steel, and fully hot dip galvanized instead of just lead-painted), is roughly US$50 a meter. Inflation since WWII has been very roughly 17X, so a WWII bridge might be estimated at US$3 a meter. Say the average WWII constructed bridge was about 50 meters, so that'd be more like $150 of materials. The US$50K for a test bridge is not likely representative of what was paid in volume, which is the right comparison.

Obviously that $150 doesn't include ancillaries and labor, whereas the tank cost for comparison does include those elements. But still, tanks were far more expensive on a unit basis than bridge kits. They contained lots of machining, a considerable proportion of armor steel, much more complicated fabrication, more-precise welding, lots of electricals and hydraulics, a powertrain, many moving parts, several guns, etc.

That's not to say that tanks and bridges don't have to both be paid for out of whatever budget you have. But, just as you can lose battles by not having good enough bridges or POL supplies or any other logistical and infrastructure element, you also can lose battles by having tanks that aren't as good as the other side's...perhaps because you went cheap on them.

I finally found a cost for Bailey bridges - $900,000 per mile to manufacture in the USA according to an article in The Military Engineer in 1945. They built 113 miles of them so the cost was about $10 million. It was about 35 bridges per mile, so each bridge mass-manufactured in the USA cost $26,000. That makes spending $50k to import a British bridge seem reasonable given its weight etc.

$26k may sound a lot for a bridge, but an article in The Army Engineer in 1945 states that each involved over 34,000 pieces with very fine tolerances required, and that each would provide a "double double" span of 150ft weighing about 100 tons. So these were big bits of kit, and the considerable trouble they had with the gauges (which were vital to ensure compatability) prove that they were not roughly built.

A Sherman tank cost about $45,000-55,000, so you get two locally-made bridges for one M4 tank - but that doesn't involve the 35 trucks needed to carry a Bailey. Assuming they were 2 1/2 tonners, there's an extra $100,000 there plus the extra 40 or so men to pay.

So let's assume a bigger Bailey-style bridge needs an extra six trucks, at $18,000, plus the bridge itself at $26,000. Now we're looking at each bridge costing as much as an M4, or 1.5 times as much as an M2 Medium.

The US Army's pre-war 10 ton pontoon bridge needed four semi trailers, four 6 ton trucks, two trailers and and two tractors carrying over 1000 parts. When upgraded to 25 tons the pontoons became impossible to manhandle and a crane was needed. The 25 ton pontoon bridge needed 16 semi trailers - a dramatic increase in costs.

The point is that to discount bridging costs, especially when you have not estimated those costs, is arguably ignoring vital factors in the US Army's pre-war thinking. In fact there seems to be no evidence for a claim that the USA Army failed to consider whether they should upgrade their bridges to get bigger tanks - they may well have considered it very deeply and found that it was cost-prohibitive. After all, they made a roughly similar calculation in WW2 when they decided that it was more important to ship M4s than Pershings, because they could ship (if I recall correctly) four M4s for every Pershing, and four M4s would be more efficient at ending the war.

And a US tank to fit on the old18 ton bridges didn't have to be anything like the 10 ton 7TP Polish tank or the Polish tankettes. The Somua S35 is widely said to be one of the best tanks of the early war at 19.5 tons; the A10 Cruiser was fairly good at 14 tons; the excellent Pz38(t) was less than 10 tons; the late Stuart M3 was 15 tons.

Seen in that light, and given the lower costs of lighter tanks (the M3 was about $30,000) can't it be said that the US Army may have been better off NOT spending the cost of upgrading their bridges at the time, and instead concentrating on building the world's best 18 ton tank, something which could have resulted in a very useful vehicle like a slower, more heavily armoured and upgunned M3? Wouldn't that have allowed them higher numbers that would have allowed better training and doctrine development, compared to getting significantly smaller numbers of bigger tanks because each tank would cost about 30% more and they'd also have to cut back tank numbers further to pay for the new bridging equipment?

We also know what happens to armies that say that they must have the best tank regardless of bridge load issues; :)

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More tanks v bridges....

By the way, a recent 170m Bailey bridge in New Zealand cost $6.5 million or the price of 6 Shermans (adjusted for inflation and currency). So the $150/metre charge is obviously way out of whack considering what they really cost. That NZ cost seems cheap compared to Bailey bridge modern costs in other countries. The Bailey bridge is widely reputed to be an outstanding piece of design, and older bridging kits probably cost a lot more per foot and per tonne of carrying capacity.
 
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I could use some help.. I am working on something based in a timeline that it's the mid 90's and the cold war is still going on. As in no unified Germany etc. But the focus is on a unit of what I am calling Light Dragoons in the US army. They came about as a experiment during the late 60's and using a combo of V100's and V150's plus Dodge M37's but I don't know what they be upgraded with by the 1990's roll's around outside of Humvee's which I don't want to us since I want them to be unique . So any help would be appreciated
 
I could use some help.. I am working on something based in a timeline that it's the mid 90's and the cold war is still going on. As in no unified Germany etc. But the focus is on a unit of what I am calling Light Dragoons in the US army. They came about as a experiment during the late 60's and using a combo of V100's and V150's plus Dodge M37's but I don't know what they be upgraded with by the 1990's roll's around outside of Humvee's which I don't want to us since I want them to be unique . So any help would be appreciated
If they are anything more than a security unit, like the Air Force Security Police units that used Cadillac Gage armored vehicles in Vietnam, you are going to want more off-road mobility than what a 4x4, especially an armored one, can provide. The GDLS LAV I and LAV II but probably the most likely options for a light, wheeled force in the 1980s and 1990s, especially since the Marines already use them, too, and LAVs would also provide an amphibious capability that could be useful as an actual cavalry unit.
 
Seen in that light, and given the lower costs of lighter tanks (the M3 was about $30,000) can't it be said that the US Army may have been better off NOT spending the cost of upgrading their bridges at the time, and instead concentrating on building the world's best 18 ton tank, something which could have resulted in a very useful vehicle like a slower, more heavily armoured and upgunned M3? Wouldn't that have allowed them higher numbers that would have allowed better training and doctrine development, compared to getting significantly smaller numbers of bigger tanks because each tank would cost about 30% more and they'd also have to cut back tank numbers further to pay for the new bridging equipment?
What might be expected from a 'Chad M3' tank, with regard to the armor, firepower and mobility?
3-men turret, or the 2-men turret remains?
 
T52 MGMC - Sherman tank hull with a 40mm Bofors cannon and two 50 cals on what looks like a armored ball turret.
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Although build as a SPAAG, how beneficial could such a vehicle be in a infantry support role (especially urban combat)?
 
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I have to say that it would be an extremely difficult weapon to aim accurately and search for new targets. Having said that I love it.
 
T52 MGMC - Sherman tank hull with a 40mm Bofors cannon and two 50 cals on what looks like a armored ball turret.
I'm curious about the sighting system, neither the photo of the model nor actual vehicle gives a good view of it.
I'm assuming a 3-man crew, driver & commander in the hull with a poor sod gunner you hope isn't prone to motion sickness in the turret?
 
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