His Martian novels were published in 1908-1912. Lenin used to joke about them.
Stars and Sickles - An Alternative Cold War
- Thread starter Hrvatskiwi
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Very true but cultural memory is a funny thing and sometimes certain works really take off in the imaginations of other countries.
Well Lumumba was assassinated IOTL. There wasnt an ABAKO revolt but Kasa-Vubu (who became president IOTL instead of Bolikango), used his presidential powers to oust Lumumba and several of his supporters from power. Mobutu used this opportunity to seize control of the military and murdered Lumumba, then dissolved his body in acid so that his grave couldnt be honoured. IOTL Dag Hammarskjold was UN secretary general and he was very hesitant to actually intervene in the secessions (although eventually they did against Katanga). ITTL, a more active and involved UN (as a holdover from having administered the territory directly), and no Kasa-Vubu presidency allows Lumumba to prevail.
I really enjoy his Martian novels, but there are definitely some funny parts about them. But also some interestingly forward-thinking content too, like some musings ok environmental destruction.
Edit: good to see you here @WotanArgead
Also welcome @Cudymcar
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Glad to see that the Congo is not only doing well but also actively funding anti Apartheid forces and helping the MPLA, even if they aren't full on communists, I really hope they'll be able to eventually liberate Southern Africa from minority rule.
With the removal of Uranium from Katanga to Rhodesia would we see Rhodesia and South Africa start to work on nuclear weapons?
Wonder if this could not end up with Congo developing their own nukes in response
We absolutely could see that happening. South Africa did have its own nuclear weapons programme IOTL.
I mean... its only the logical response.
I know this is kind of weird, but here lets see 3 characters and what their life is by the 1970s. In the 'Stars and sickles' timeline
1)
Abel Abraha. By late 1970s, this man is extremely unhappy that the damn Somalians defeated his great country in war. He is dejected and broken that despite passing on vital info, Siad Barre's troops were least affected by it and his nation has lost a huge chunk of its land forever. He has now retired and works in an Addis Ababa newspaper.
2)
Kamal Al-Jumblat. In the 1950s and 60s, this man worked as an agent for Gamal Abdel Nasser. He passed on vital inputs to Anti-British movements and the Egyptians. Despite his liberal stance he cooperated with Arab Nationalism. In the mid 60s he supported FLOSY but was unhappy when they were defeated and radical Marxists of the NLF took over instead. Even worse, the new government put him in jail because of his liberal writings (which causes them to suspect that he is a western agent). Thus by the late 70s, he rots in jail.
3)
Ico Ochoa. He was eventually proven right! Portugal did fall in not 10, but just 4 more years. Being in the MPLA, he got some good positions in the city administration of Luanada but after Nito Alves's coup, everything changed. The council communist Ochoa was charged with treason and revisionism and sent to labour camp in the forest where he remains to this day!
Hey @The Banker I'm glad you're enjoying this timeline and all but I'd prefer if you didn't post stuff from your Cold War Generator on here? I don't want to generate any potential confusion about the content of my timeline.
For instance someone reading your post there (since you literally said "in the Stars and Sickles timeline") could believe that these are characters in the timeline, or that details I havent mentioned (such as forest labour camps in Angola) are canon.
Also if you want to promote interest in your Cold War generator you could always do so in your own thread?
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Chapter 95: There Isn't a Place Where Peace Reigns at Night - Rwanda and Burundi (Until 1980) (Part 1)
The small but densely populated nations of Rwanda and Burundi have long been intertwined in their history. A long and murky precolonial history was defined by the relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples. The Twa People (in the past referred to as pygmies) were also present; a small ethnic group believed to have inhabited the region far longer than the Hutu and Tutsis. All three of these peoples speak Bantu languages, but seem to have represented waves of migration into the region over the centuries. Prior to the arrival of European colonists, the peoples of Rwanda-Burundi were organised under native kingdoms, where the agrarian Hutu were largely beneath the pastoralist Tutsis. Whilst some Hutus were able to achieve high office by merit, and certain particular sub-groups of Tutsi were very low in the social hierarchy, generally the caste system in Rwanda-Burundi favoured the Tutsis over the Hutu. The arrival of European colonisers, rather than upending this social hierarchy, actually ossified it. The Germans, who annexed the region into their colony of German East Africa, allowed the Rwandan and Burundian monarchies to maintain their authority, albeit at the cost of their sovereignty. The transfer of control over the colony from Berlin to Brussels saw a significant change in the relationship between the European rulers and their colonial subjects. The Belgians were far more involved in the territory than the Germans; the road network was significantly extended, as was the cultivation of cash crops, predominantly coffee and cotton in the rich volcanic soils of the region. This policy of course radically increased the profitability of the territory, but at a significant human cost; four famines ravaged the native population between 1916 and 1944 due to failures of the smaller food crops. Without being compelled to produce the more valuable commodities, it is likely that these famines could have been avoided. The Belgians also bureaucratised the ethnic caste system; formalising the hierarchy of tribal chiefs and sub-chiefs under the two Mwami (kings) in a manner that heavily favoured Tutsis. This hierarchy was based on the pseudoscientific "Hamitic hypothesis", which claimed that the Tutsis were of East African origin and were racially superior to the Hutus, a holdover of the "racial science" of the nineteenth century constructed to favour colonialism and white supremacy. By utilising the Tutsis as intermediaries, the Belgians ensured that most of the Hutu anger at their exploitation was directed at the Tutsi elite, rather than the European colonialists. Identity cards were handed out to subjects which specified their ethnicity (Hutu/Tutsi/Twa). In doing so, the Belgians eliminated the ability to shift between the different castes for their local subjects, something that did occur in the pre-colonial and German colonial periods from time to time. Another major impact the Belgians had was the proselytisation of Catholicism. Protestant missions were also allowed to operate but their influence was limited by a lack of subsidies; whereas the Catholic missions were funded by the government. An elite Catholic secondary school was established in Rwanda, but by the time of independence, there were barely 100 Africans educated beyond the secondary level in Rwanda and Burundi. The dissolution of Belgium and the transfer of Ruanda-Urundi from a UN Trust Territory under Belgian governance to a direct UN administration was largely a formality; the same governing structures remained intact. Unlike in Congo, the UN didn't set a date for independence. The more anachronistic governing structures in Ruanda-Urundi was believed to necessitate a longer presence than in Congo.
Mwami Mutara III Rudahigwa, the six foot-nine monarch of Rwanda
Nevertheless the growth of anti-colonial settlement in the Congo strongly influenced politics in Ruanda-Urundi. A cash economy had been developed since the end of the war, largely to facilitate movement of Rwandan and Burundian labour to the mines of Katanga province and the sugar plantations of Uganda. There was also a shift in the attitude of the local Catholic church authorities; an old, conservative Walloon generation was largely replaced with a younger Flemish clergy which saw in the Hutus' plights parallels with their own position relative to Walloons prior to Belgium's dissolution. A small group of Hutu notables had been educated by the Catholic Church and sought to push against Tutsi political control. The Church, which had once supported the pre-existing Tutsi hegemony, had now turned against it. Tension between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples began to intensify in the mid-1950s. July 1956 saw the publication in Congolese newspaper La Presse Africaine supposedly written by an anonymous Rwandan priest detailing historic wrongdoings by the Tutsi elite against the Hutu. This was followed up with many other articles about interethnic relations and history in Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, King Mutara III Rudahigwa and the Tutsi elite denied a history of abuse and inequality. In September, a parliamentary election was held, with universal male suffrage. The population were permitted to vote for sub-chiefs, of whom 66% of those elected were Hutu. Higher positions, however, were still appointed and all of these positions were filled by the Tutsi. The results of these elections concerned the Tutsi elite, who feared that their power was slipping. King Mutara and his supporters began to agitate for immediate independence, hoping to solidify their political position. Seeing this, the Hutu counter-elite started to prepare to challenge the Tutsi elite head-on. Notable figures in this Hutu counter-elite were Grégoire Kayibanda and Joseph Gitera. Kayibanda had been active as an editor in at least two Catholic magazines (L'Ami and Kinyamateka) and had also been a board member for the TRAFIPRO food cooperative. Kayibanda founded the Mouvement Social Muhutu (Social Movement for Hutu People, MSM) political party. Gitera was more of a firebrand than Kayibanda. Gitera called for the abolition of the monarchy as early as 1957, but his rhetoric focused on class concerns over ethnic conflict. Gitera founded the Association Pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (Association for Social Promotion of the Masses, APROSOMA).
In 1958, Gitera visited King Mutara III at his palace at Nyanza. Mutara III treated Gitera with contempt, seeing him as an unruly subject acting above his station. The king even went so far as to throttle Gitera, and called him and his APROSOMA followers "inyangarwanda" ("haters of Rwanda"). Whilst some in the Hutu counter-elite had maintained hope that the monarchy could be used as a symbol of national unification in a future, equitable Rwanda, the king's abuse of Gitera shattered any such hopes. MSM, APROSOMA and Catholic publications took a harsher stance against monarchical power. The exposure of Mutara III's behaviour caused a rift between the king and the UN authorities, but attempts by the UN to limit his power were met with large demonstrations by Tutsis and regional chiefs (both Hutu and Tutsi). Early 1959 saw the UN establish a commission tasked with preparing Rwanda for independence. Elections were scheduled for the end of that year. Gitera began a campaign seeking the destruction of the kalinga, the royal drum which was a key symbol of monarchical power (akin to the crown jewels for the Queen of England). A paranoid Mutara III fled with the drum to Burundi, where he would die from a brain hemorrhage brought on by alcohol abuse. Persistent rumours that the king was murdered by the French or the Catholic Church further inflamed tensions back in Rwanda. Mutara III's brother was installed by the Tutsi elite, without input from the United Nations authority, as King Kigeli V Ndahindurwa. After Kigeli V's coronation, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (Rwandan National Union, UNAR) party was established under the leadership of François Rukeba. UNAR was a pro-monarchy party, but was not controlled by the king. Instead it was founded by François Rukeba, a Hutu (but of mixed parentage). UNAR was an ethnically-mixed party, but was predominantly Tutsi and aligned itself more with the Tutsi and traditional elites than with the Hutu counter-elite. UNAR promoted a policy of Africanisation, replacing European history with Rwandan history in the education programme, and seeking to limit the power of the Catholic Church and French influence in the economic activity of the kingdom. Gitera falsely claimed that the Catholic Church's anti-UNAR stance represented support for his party, and Kayibanda had the MSM rebranded as the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu (Party of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu, PARMEHUTU).
Grégoire Kayibanda, founder of PARMEHUTU
As inter-ethnic rivalry began to heat up, the UN administration attempted to prevent nationwide violence from breaking out. A trio of Tutsi chiefs was arrested by the UN authorities who were calling for violence against PARMEHUTU leaders. The UNAR submitted a protest letter to the UN Trust Territory authority, signed by many sub-chiefs. On 1st Novermber 1959, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, one of the few Hutu subchiefs and a known supporter of PARMEHUTU, was attacked by a gang of Tutsi youths, motivated by his refusal to sign the protest letter. Mbonyumutwa managed to escape with his wife without being seriously harmed, but a rumour swept the nation that Mbonyumutwa was killed. The latter's failure to appear publicly in the aftermath of the attack suggests that he was willing to take advantage of the situation to politically mobilise Hutus. The next two days saw a Hutu protest in Ndiza outside the home of Athanase Gashagaza, a Tutsi chief who was Mbonyumutwa's direct superior in the traditional aristocratic hierarchy. On the second day, violence sparked. Hutu vigilantes, yelling the slogan "for God, the Church, and Rwanda" killed two Tutsi officials and drove Gashagaza into hiding. A Hutu, Mbonyumutwa, was named as Gashagaza's replacement in the hopes of preventing violence. But the spark had already been struck. A wave of arson attacks throughout the country targeting Tutsi dwellings spread throughout the country, and protests turned to riots. The pitiful UN garrison, which was really just a rebranded Belgian colonial force, numbered only 300, and couldn't ensure the safety of Tutsis. A large-scale migration of Tutsis into Congo, Uganda and Tanganyika commenced whilst reinforcements were sent from the UN garrison in Congo. Kigeli V requested permission from the Trust authority to mobilise his own armed force to maintain law and order, but this was refused, as the UN administrators assumed it would lead to civil war. Ignoring the refusal, Kigeli V mobilised a militia (although "mob" might be a more accurate descriptor). On 7th November, Kigeli put his army on the move, and ordered the arrest and killing of a number of prominent Hutu leaders. Gitera's brother was among those killed. Many of the PARMEHUTU leaders who were arrested would be tortured by UNAR officials at the royal palace. Kayibanda had gone into hiding, and could not be found by the royal militia, so they focused instead on the capture of Gitera. An APROSOMA-led militia was quickly scrabbled together, which took a stand at a hill near Save, at the approaches to Gitera's home town of Astrida. The royal militia didn't attempt to storm the APROSOMA position at the top of the hill, lacking the military expertise to attack a prepared enemy on high ground. UN forces arrived on 10th November, preventing bloodshed and allowing Gitera's escape. Whilst UNAR remained more powerful than the Hutu parties, they now saw the UN as no different to the colonial authorities, and believed (falsely) that they had thrown their lot in with the Hutu side[222]. The UN also forced the King to release captured PARMEHUTU leaders or face deposition. PARMEHUTU got a major boost from the Tutsi coup. APROSOMA's ethnically-inclusive policy became much less popular after the violent attempts to suppress opposition by the Tutsi elite, regardless of what had actually sparked the situation. PARMEHUTU leaders, believing that the longer the UN was present in Rwanda, the better they could consolidate their influence, lobbied the Trust authorities to postpone elections scheduled for January 1960 to July. In March a high-level UN delegation arrived in Rwanda. Wanting to give the image of having widespread popular support, all three major parties held demonstrations. This devolved into violence however and the sight of Tutsis homes on fire left a lasting impression on the UN delegation. The United Nations declared the election plans unworkable and cancelled them, instead organising a round-table discussion with representatives from APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU, and UNAR [223]. The Nyanza Conference, held in April, was largely unsuccessful. PARMEHUTU and UNAR in particular were unwilling to work with each other or to share power in a national unity government. The UN representatives argued that if necessary, APROSOMA would be installed in order to maintain ethnic parity. PARMEHUTU and UNAR officials argued that an APROSOMA government would be unpopular and have no mandate. The insurmountability of the different parties' interests forced the UN to set a date for elections in January 1961. They also stated that they would be free elections with UN forces at voting stations to prevent electoral violence or vote-rigging. All parties agreed: APROSOMA believed they could successfully campaign on the promise of peace; PARMEHUTU considered their win a foregone conclusion, and UNAR believed that the Tutsi sub-chiefs could pressure their subjects effectively enough to become the ruling party.
Neighbouring Burundi was also inhabited by Hutu, Tutsi and Great Lakes Twa people, but their monarchy was less committed to ethnic rivalry than in Rwanda. Whilst Burundi also had a disproportionately Tutsi aristocracy, the king and his closest councillors were of the Ganwa people; a distinct social group that regardless of its (uncertain) ancestral origins, was perceived as an ethnic group apart from the Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. This "royal line" was dominated by two clans which often competed for control over the state; the Bezi and the Tare. The most important politician of the independence period in Burundi was Louis Rwagasore. Rwagasore was a son of Mwami Mwambutsa IV, King of Burundi. Rwagasore saw the dissolution of Belgium and the transfer of Burundi to United Nations authority as presenting an opportunity for native control over commercial activity in the kingdom. In June 1957 Rwagasore founded a federation of cooperatives, the Coopératives des Commerçants du Burundi (Traders' Cooperatives of Burundi, CCB) in order to empower native commerce. Whilst the remnants of Belgian colonial interests, now under France's control, opposed the CCB, it proved extremely popular with the Swahili traders of the capital Usumbura. In its first public meeting, the CCB drew a crowd of 200 merchants and managed to secure several favourable contracts with exporters. The CCB would eventually run into financial trouble, the causes of which are uncertain in the historical record. Opponents of Rwagasore claimed that he was embezzling significant sums from the CCB, whilst his supporters claim that French commercial interests were operating to clandestinely undermine the CCB. In any case, the financial trouble necessitated an international campaign seeking investment. This campaign was unsuccessful, although it did allow him to forge a good personal relationship with Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika. Rwagasore would end up acquiring credit for the CCB from the Supreme Land Council, an advisory body with royal oversight which had some influence on the national budget.
Louis Rwagasore, Prince of Burundi, head of UPRONA and Burundi's first Prime Minister
Shortly after the CCB fiasco, Rwagasore became involved with the nascent Union pour le Progrès national (Union for National Progress, UPRONA) political party. UPRONA was quickly able to secure the early financial support of the Swahili population in Bujumbura, particularly the traders. Rwagasore had sought replication of the concerning inter-ethnic situation in neighbouring Rwanda; rallying Tutsis and Hutus alike to his cause. Nevertheless, UPRONA couldn't avoid being drawn into the competition between the Ganwa clans. The French mercantile interests in Burundi had encouraged the creation of the Parti Démocratique Chrétien (Christian Democratic Party, PDC) affiliated with the Tare clan in order to counteract Rwagasore's appeals to economic nationalism. The PDC was founded by Jean-Baptiste Ntidendereza, whose brother Joseph Biroli would be party president. Both were Tare. The Bezi, of which Rwagasore was a member, were closely associated with UPRONA. Rwagasore also fell out with his father, Mwambutsa IV, with whom he was never particularly close. The Mwami had encouraged prospective political opposition to Rwagasore, as to ensure that his power remained unchallenged. Having benefitted from relationships with the Belgian/French colonial interests in Burundi, Mwambutsa also disliked the manner with which Rwagasore targeted colonialism in his appeals to the Burundian masses. Rwagasore's political programme promised modernisation, and sought to establish a constitutional monarchy. UPRONA sought to be a broad-based coalition that would rule through consensus, and would be non-aligned in the international competition between the Soviet and US-led blocs. Trying to ensure that Burundi wouldn't encounter the pitfalls of the ethnic party system in Rwanda, both Hutus and Tutsis were put into high-level positions in UPRONA, which was intentionally structured to split important positions equitably between the two major ethnic groups. Despite Rwagasore's best efforts, UPRONA hadn't truly cultivated a mass political base. This may have actually helped it maintain its cohesion, however, as a mass political movement would likely skew towards Hutu interests, considering the country's demography. Rwagasore's populist tendencies and dominance of the party did lead many of the chiefs who had initially formed UPRONA to leave, including founding member Léopold Biha, a close confidany of King Mwambutsa IV.
PDC functionaries began a smear campaign against Rwagasore. They claimed (because of rumours that Mwambutsa IV had decided that Rwagasore's younger brother Charles would succeed him instead of the elder brother Rwagasore) that UPRONA was merely a vehicle Rwagasore intended to use to become king; Rwagasore responded with a promise that, king or not, he would fight for the people of Burundi. In 1959, Tare leader Pierre Baranyanka questioned whether Mwambutsa's marriage to Rwagasore's mother Kanyonga was legitimate according to Burundian custom; implying that he was a bastard with no claim to the throne. Antipathy grew, especially as UPRONA made inroads into Baranyanka's district of Ndora-Kayanza, which the Belgians had appointed him chief of in 1929. Baranyanka, enraged, threatened to have Rwagasore's in-laws living in nearby Rukecu raped by Twas. As the political competition between Baranyanka and Rwagasore grew, the latter began to carry a gun on him at all times, fearing assassination. Some hope remained for a peaceful transition to independence, however. On July 15th 1960, as neighbouring Congo began to descend into the chaos of its immediate post-independence, Rwagasore released a joint communique with Joseph Biroli appealing for calm, and stating that Burundi had "the unique chance... to create in the heart of Africa an island of peace, tranquility and prosperity". As parties made preparations for the 1961 legislative elections, the PDC allied with other parties to create an anti-UPRONA coalition, the Front Commun (Common Front, FC). UPRONA won the elections, which had 80% turnout, with 58 of 64 seats in the legislative assembly won by Rwagasore's party. Angered by their loss, PFC supporters in Mukenke, Kirundo Province, rioted and attacked UPRONA members. Rwagasore appealed to his supporters not to be provoked by this violence, and the UN authorities quickly restored order. With a clear mandate as formateur, Rwagasore brought the defeated parties into government. Pierre Ngendandumwe, a well-educated Hutu from the PDC, was named deputy prime minister. Rwagasore's brother-in-law, André Muhirwa, became Minister of the Interior, significantly decreasing the likelihood of a coup. Despite the strong democratic mandate of Rwagasore's national unity government, the Tare were still angered, perceiving Rwagasore's victory as a Bezi takeover, even though the formateur sought to appease them by appointing a Tare as Director of Tourism.
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[222] IOTL, this was kinda the case. The UN Trust Territory under Belgian administration essentially lead to multiple layers of power in Rwanda and Burundi: Hutu / Tutsi / Belgian / UN (ascending order); but in effect the UN had very little influence over the mechanisms of power. ITTL, with the dissolution of the Belgian state, you have an administrative apparatus largely staffed by Belgians (now French and Dutchmen officially) but where they are overseen by UN superiors. This helps keep things from being too set up to "screw" non-compliant leadership. IOTL the Belgians had decided to side with the Hutus. Many of them, in the church and without, saw this as a good thing, toppling an unfair aristocracy. Others simply saw resurgent monarchical and Tutsi power as a threat to their economic interests. They really opened Pandora's Box though. ITTL however without the direct Belgian administration you don't get figures like Guy Logiest, who stacked things in the Hutus' favour in preparation for independence.
[223] IOTL, the Belgians ignored the UN's recommendations to postpone elections and instead pressed ahead with them.
Mwami Mutara III Rudahigwa, the six foot-nine monarch of Rwanda
Nevertheless the growth of anti-colonial settlement in the Congo strongly influenced politics in Ruanda-Urundi. A cash economy had been developed since the end of the war, largely to facilitate movement of Rwandan and Burundian labour to the mines of Katanga province and the sugar plantations of Uganda. There was also a shift in the attitude of the local Catholic church authorities; an old, conservative Walloon generation was largely replaced with a younger Flemish clergy which saw in the Hutus' plights parallels with their own position relative to Walloons prior to Belgium's dissolution. A small group of Hutu notables had been educated by the Catholic Church and sought to push against Tutsi political control. The Church, which had once supported the pre-existing Tutsi hegemony, had now turned against it. Tension between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples began to intensify in the mid-1950s. July 1956 saw the publication in Congolese newspaper La Presse Africaine supposedly written by an anonymous Rwandan priest detailing historic wrongdoings by the Tutsi elite against the Hutu. This was followed up with many other articles about interethnic relations and history in Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, King Mutara III Rudahigwa and the Tutsi elite denied a history of abuse and inequality. In September, a parliamentary election was held, with universal male suffrage. The population were permitted to vote for sub-chiefs, of whom 66% of those elected were Hutu. Higher positions, however, were still appointed and all of these positions were filled by the Tutsi. The results of these elections concerned the Tutsi elite, who feared that their power was slipping. King Mutara and his supporters began to agitate for immediate independence, hoping to solidify their political position. Seeing this, the Hutu counter-elite started to prepare to challenge the Tutsi elite head-on. Notable figures in this Hutu counter-elite were Grégoire Kayibanda and Joseph Gitera. Kayibanda had been active as an editor in at least two Catholic magazines (L'Ami and Kinyamateka) and had also been a board member for the TRAFIPRO food cooperative. Kayibanda founded the Mouvement Social Muhutu (Social Movement for Hutu People, MSM) political party. Gitera was more of a firebrand than Kayibanda. Gitera called for the abolition of the monarchy as early as 1957, but his rhetoric focused on class concerns over ethnic conflict. Gitera founded the Association Pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (Association for Social Promotion of the Masses, APROSOMA).
In 1958, Gitera visited King Mutara III at his palace at Nyanza. Mutara III treated Gitera with contempt, seeing him as an unruly subject acting above his station. The king even went so far as to throttle Gitera, and called him and his APROSOMA followers "inyangarwanda" ("haters of Rwanda"). Whilst some in the Hutu counter-elite had maintained hope that the monarchy could be used as a symbol of national unification in a future, equitable Rwanda, the king's abuse of Gitera shattered any such hopes. MSM, APROSOMA and Catholic publications took a harsher stance against monarchical power. The exposure of Mutara III's behaviour caused a rift between the king and the UN authorities, but attempts by the UN to limit his power were met with large demonstrations by Tutsis and regional chiefs (both Hutu and Tutsi). Early 1959 saw the UN establish a commission tasked with preparing Rwanda for independence. Elections were scheduled for the end of that year. Gitera began a campaign seeking the destruction of the kalinga, the royal drum which was a key symbol of monarchical power (akin to the crown jewels for the Queen of England). A paranoid Mutara III fled with the drum to Burundi, where he would die from a brain hemorrhage brought on by alcohol abuse. Persistent rumours that the king was murdered by the French or the Catholic Church further inflamed tensions back in Rwanda. Mutara III's brother was installed by the Tutsi elite, without input from the United Nations authority, as King Kigeli V Ndahindurwa. After Kigeli V's coronation, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (Rwandan National Union, UNAR) party was established under the leadership of François Rukeba. UNAR was a pro-monarchy party, but was not controlled by the king. Instead it was founded by François Rukeba, a Hutu (but of mixed parentage). UNAR was an ethnically-mixed party, but was predominantly Tutsi and aligned itself more with the Tutsi and traditional elites than with the Hutu counter-elite. UNAR promoted a policy of Africanisation, replacing European history with Rwandan history in the education programme, and seeking to limit the power of the Catholic Church and French influence in the economic activity of the kingdom. Gitera falsely claimed that the Catholic Church's anti-UNAR stance represented support for his party, and Kayibanda had the MSM rebranded as the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu (Party of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu, PARMEHUTU).
Grégoire Kayibanda, founder of PARMEHUTU
As inter-ethnic rivalry began to heat up, the UN administration attempted to prevent nationwide violence from breaking out. A trio of Tutsi chiefs was arrested by the UN authorities who were calling for violence against PARMEHUTU leaders. The UNAR submitted a protest letter to the UN Trust Territory authority, signed by many sub-chiefs. On 1st Novermber 1959, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, one of the few Hutu subchiefs and a known supporter of PARMEHUTU, was attacked by a gang of Tutsi youths, motivated by his refusal to sign the protest letter. Mbonyumutwa managed to escape with his wife without being seriously harmed, but a rumour swept the nation that Mbonyumutwa was killed. The latter's failure to appear publicly in the aftermath of the attack suggests that he was willing to take advantage of the situation to politically mobilise Hutus. The next two days saw a Hutu protest in Ndiza outside the home of Athanase Gashagaza, a Tutsi chief who was Mbonyumutwa's direct superior in the traditional aristocratic hierarchy. On the second day, violence sparked. Hutu vigilantes, yelling the slogan "for God, the Church, and Rwanda" killed two Tutsi officials and drove Gashagaza into hiding. A Hutu, Mbonyumutwa, was named as Gashagaza's replacement in the hopes of preventing violence. But the spark had already been struck. A wave of arson attacks throughout the country targeting Tutsi dwellings spread throughout the country, and protests turned to riots. The pitiful UN garrison, which was really just a rebranded Belgian colonial force, numbered only 300, and couldn't ensure the safety of Tutsis. A large-scale migration of Tutsis into Congo, Uganda and Tanganyika commenced whilst reinforcements were sent from the UN garrison in Congo. Kigeli V requested permission from the Trust authority to mobilise his own armed force to maintain law and order, but this was refused, as the UN administrators assumed it would lead to civil war. Ignoring the refusal, Kigeli V mobilised a militia (although "mob" might be a more accurate descriptor). On 7th November, Kigeli put his army on the move, and ordered the arrest and killing of a number of prominent Hutu leaders. Gitera's brother was among those killed. Many of the PARMEHUTU leaders who were arrested would be tortured by UNAR officials at the royal palace. Kayibanda had gone into hiding, and could not be found by the royal militia, so they focused instead on the capture of Gitera. An APROSOMA-led militia was quickly scrabbled together, which took a stand at a hill near Save, at the approaches to Gitera's home town of Astrida. The royal militia didn't attempt to storm the APROSOMA position at the top of the hill, lacking the military expertise to attack a prepared enemy on high ground. UN forces arrived on 10th November, preventing bloodshed and allowing Gitera's escape. Whilst UNAR remained more powerful than the Hutu parties, they now saw the UN as no different to the colonial authorities, and believed (falsely) that they had thrown their lot in with the Hutu side[222]. The UN also forced the King to release captured PARMEHUTU leaders or face deposition. PARMEHUTU got a major boost from the Tutsi coup. APROSOMA's ethnically-inclusive policy became much less popular after the violent attempts to suppress opposition by the Tutsi elite, regardless of what had actually sparked the situation. PARMEHUTU leaders, believing that the longer the UN was present in Rwanda, the better they could consolidate their influence, lobbied the Trust authorities to postpone elections scheduled for January 1960 to July. In March a high-level UN delegation arrived in Rwanda. Wanting to give the image of having widespread popular support, all three major parties held demonstrations. This devolved into violence however and the sight of Tutsis homes on fire left a lasting impression on the UN delegation. The United Nations declared the election plans unworkable and cancelled them, instead organising a round-table discussion with representatives from APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU, and UNAR [223]. The Nyanza Conference, held in April, was largely unsuccessful. PARMEHUTU and UNAR in particular were unwilling to work with each other or to share power in a national unity government. The UN representatives argued that if necessary, APROSOMA would be installed in order to maintain ethnic parity. PARMEHUTU and UNAR officials argued that an APROSOMA government would be unpopular and have no mandate. The insurmountability of the different parties' interests forced the UN to set a date for elections in January 1961. They also stated that they would be free elections with UN forces at voting stations to prevent electoral violence or vote-rigging. All parties agreed: APROSOMA believed they could successfully campaign on the promise of peace; PARMEHUTU considered their win a foregone conclusion, and UNAR believed that the Tutsi sub-chiefs could pressure their subjects effectively enough to become the ruling party.
Neighbouring Burundi was also inhabited by Hutu, Tutsi and Great Lakes Twa people, but their monarchy was less committed to ethnic rivalry than in Rwanda. Whilst Burundi also had a disproportionately Tutsi aristocracy, the king and his closest councillors were of the Ganwa people; a distinct social group that regardless of its (uncertain) ancestral origins, was perceived as an ethnic group apart from the Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. This "royal line" was dominated by two clans which often competed for control over the state; the Bezi and the Tare. The most important politician of the independence period in Burundi was Louis Rwagasore. Rwagasore was a son of Mwami Mwambutsa IV, King of Burundi. Rwagasore saw the dissolution of Belgium and the transfer of Burundi to United Nations authority as presenting an opportunity for native control over commercial activity in the kingdom. In June 1957 Rwagasore founded a federation of cooperatives, the Coopératives des Commerçants du Burundi (Traders' Cooperatives of Burundi, CCB) in order to empower native commerce. Whilst the remnants of Belgian colonial interests, now under France's control, opposed the CCB, it proved extremely popular with the Swahili traders of the capital Usumbura. In its first public meeting, the CCB drew a crowd of 200 merchants and managed to secure several favourable contracts with exporters. The CCB would eventually run into financial trouble, the causes of which are uncertain in the historical record. Opponents of Rwagasore claimed that he was embezzling significant sums from the CCB, whilst his supporters claim that French commercial interests were operating to clandestinely undermine the CCB. In any case, the financial trouble necessitated an international campaign seeking investment. This campaign was unsuccessful, although it did allow him to forge a good personal relationship with Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika. Rwagasore would end up acquiring credit for the CCB from the Supreme Land Council, an advisory body with royal oversight which had some influence on the national budget.
Louis Rwagasore, Prince of Burundi, head of UPRONA and Burundi's first Prime Minister
Shortly after the CCB fiasco, Rwagasore became involved with the nascent Union pour le Progrès national (Union for National Progress, UPRONA) political party. UPRONA was quickly able to secure the early financial support of the Swahili population in Bujumbura, particularly the traders. Rwagasore had sought replication of the concerning inter-ethnic situation in neighbouring Rwanda; rallying Tutsis and Hutus alike to his cause. Nevertheless, UPRONA couldn't avoid being drawn into the competition between the Ganwa clans. The French mercantile interests in Burundi had encouraged the creation of the Parti Démocratique Chrétien (Christian Democratic Party, PDC) affiliated with the Tare clan in order to counteract Rwagasore's appeals to economic nationalism. The PDC was founded by Jean-Baptiste Ntidendereza, whose brother Joseph Biroli would be party president. Both were Tare. The Bezi, of which Rwagasore was a member, were closely associated with UPRONA. Rwagasore also fell out with his father, Mwambutsa IV, with whom he was never particularly close. The Mwami had encouraged prospective political opposition to Rwagasore, as to ensure that his power remained unchallenged. Having benefitted from relationships with the Belgian/French colonial interests in Burundi, Mwambutsa also disliked the manner with which Rwagasore targeted colonialism in his appeals to the Burundian masses. Rwagasore's political programme promised modernisation, and sought to establish a constitutional monarchy. UPRONA sought to be a broad-based coalition that would rule through consensus, and would be non-aligned in the international competition between the Soviet and US-led blocs. Trying to ensure that Burundi wouldn't encounter the pitfalls of the ethnic party system in Rwanda, both Hutus and Tutsis were put into high-level positions in UPRONA, which was intentionally structured to split important positions equitably between the two major ethnic groups. Despite Rwagasore's best efforts, UPRONA hadn't truly cultivated a mass political base. This may have actually helped it maintain its cohesion, however, as a mass political movement would likely skew towards Hutu interests, considering the country's demography. Rwagasore's populist tendencies and dominance of the party did lead many of the chiefs who had initially formed UPRONA to leave, including founding member Léopold Biha, a close confidany of King Mwambutsa IV.
PDC functionaries began a smear campaign against Rwagasore. They claimed (because of rumours that Mwambutsa IV had decided that Rwagasore's younger brother Charles would succeed him instead of the elder brother Rwagasore) that UPRONA was merely a vehicle Rwagasore intended to use to become king; Rwagasore responded with a promise that, king or not, he would fight for the people of Burundi. In 1959, Tare leader Pierre Baranyanka questioned whether Mwambutsa's marriage to Rwagasore's mother Kanyonga was legitimate according to Burundian custom; implying that he was a bastard with no claim to the throne. Antipathy grew, especially as UPRONA made inroads into Baranyanka's district of Ndora-Kayanza, which the Belgians had appointed him chief of in 1929. Baranyanka, enraged, threatened to have Rwagasore's in-laws living in nearby Rukecu raped by Twas. As the political competition between Baranyanka and Rwagasore grew, the latter began to carry a gun on him at all times, fearing assassination. Some hope remained for a peaceful transition to independence, however. On July 15th 1960, as neighbouring Congo began to descend into the chaos of its immediate post-independence, Rwagasore released a joint communique with Joseph Biroli appealing for calm, and stating that Burundi had "the unique chance... to create in the heart of Africa an island of peace, tranquility and prosperity". As parties made preparations for the 1961 legislative elections, the PDC allied with other parties to create an anti-UPRONA coalition, the Front Commun (Common Front, FC). UPRONA won the elections, which had 80% turnout, with 58 of 64 seats in the legislative assembly won by Rwagasore's party. Angered by their loss, PFC supporters in Mukenke, Kirundo Province, rioted and attacked UPRONA members. Rwagasore appealed to his supporters not to be provoked by this violence, and the UN authorities quickly restored order. With a clear mandate as formateur, Rwagasore brought the defeated parties into government. Pierre Ngendandumwe, a well-educated Hutu from the PDC, was named deputy prime minister. Rwagasore's brother-in-law, André Muhirwa, became Minister of the Interior, significantly decreasing the likelihood of a coup. Despite the strong democratic mandate of Rwagasore's national unity government, the Tare were still angered, perceiving Rwagasore's victory as a Bezi takeover, even though the formateur sought to appease them by appointing a Tare as Director of Tourism.
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[222] IOTL, this was kinda the case. The UN Trust Territory under Belgian administration essentially lead to multiple layers of power in Rwanda and Burundi: Hutu / Tutsi / Belgian / UN (ascending order); but in effect the UN had very little influence over the mechanisms of power. ITTL, with the dissolution of the Belgian state, you have an administrative apparatus largely staffed by Belgians (now French and Dutchmen officially) but where they are overseen by UN superiors. This helps keep things from being too set up to "screw" non-compliant leadership. IOTL the Belgians had decided to side with the Hutus. Many of them, in the church and without, saw this as a good thing, toppling an unfair aristocracy. Others simply saw resurgent monarchical and Tutsi power as a threat to their economic interests. They really opened Pandora's Box though. ITTL however without the direct Belgian administration you don't get figures like Guy Logiest, who stacked things in the Hutus' favour in preparation for independence.
[223] IOTL, the Belgians ignored the UN's recommendations to postpone elections and instead pressed ahead with them.
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Things are looking tense but hopefully with a powerful Congo at their side, these countries can avoid the chaos that followed and especially avoid the genocide
Chapter 96: When There is Peace, Daggers are Used for Shaving - Rwanda and Burundi (Until 1980) (Part 2)
Burundi's post-independence stability relative to its Rwandan neighbour can largely be traced to Louis Rwagasore's ability to maintain an inclusive, broad-based government. Whilst there was still tension between elements of the Tare clan and Rwagasore's government, the assassination attempt that Rwagasore feared never came to pass [224]. To appease Tare opponents, he appointed several of them as ambassadors to various friendly nations, providing those individuals with a prestigous position in the new government (and the perks of international travel). Rwagasore maintained cordial, if somewhat distant relations with Lumumba's Congo, but his close personal friendship with Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere faciliated ties not only with Dar es Salaam but with Peking as well. Chinese aid was instrumental in the economic modernisation of Burundi, which saw the construction of two hydroelectric dams [225], the expansion of infrastructure providing drinking water, and the construction of a port on Lake Tanganyika to encourage regional trade. The largely agrarian economy of Burundi also benefitted from Chinese provision of tractors and other agricultural equipment, allowing Burundi to increase production of coffee, tea and sugar. Economic integration between the Burundi-Rwanda economic union (which had been retained from the colonial and UN administration) and Tanganyika was encouraged as steps towards a confederal East African Union. Despite an increase in overall economic prosperity, anxieties about a potential spillover of conflict from Rwanda to Burundi haunted Burundian politics. Rwagasore could not step down from office due to internal divisions in the party between Paul Mirerekano, a Hutu and an old friend of Rwagasore's who had been an important composer of UPRONA's political programme (who had nevertheless not been a member of the first UPRONA government) and André Muhirwa. Rwagasore was still the arbiter of UPRONA's policy, but he would need to see more consensus between his party members before relinquishing his hold on power. Determined not to get directly involved in the events in Rwanda, Rwagasore refused entry of UNAR Tutsi rebels into Burundi in 1963, forcing them instead to operate out of bases in Uganda and Congo[226]. In 1977, Mwami Mwambutsa passed away[227]. Irritated by Rwagasore's move to reduce the monarchy's political influence through the adoption of a new constitution in 1964 which turned Burundi into a constitutional monarchy, Mwambutsa had named his younger son, Charles Ndizege, as monarch. Whilst some supporters of Rwagasore were irritated with this, claiming that Rwagasore was the rightful claimant, in the interests of political stability and separation of powers Rwagasore renounced his claim and congratulated his younger brother on his coronation. Ndizege took the regnal name Ntare V.
In Rwanda, the January 1961 elections resulted in a clear victory for PARMEHUTU. A referendum in July on the issue of whether or not to retain the monarchy gave the government an unambiguous mandate to abolish the monarchy. Kigeli V went into exile, moving between various East African cities. The first government of independent Rwanda was lead by Prime Minister Grégoire Kayibanda, who appointed Dominique Mbonyumutwa as President. The Kayibanda government promoted a policy of international non-alignment, focusing instead on the establishment of ties with various countries around the globe. Kayibanda's government did little to face issues of corruption and economic inefficiency, however. They also instituted a number of 'democratisation' measures that were used in order to dilute the influence of the Rwandan Tutsis. Quotas were established in secondary schools and the civil service which limited Tutsis to a mere 9% of spots, proportionate to their total population. Whilst it is understandable that Tutsis couldn't retain as large a role as they had in administration prior to independence, this pushed a number of experienced civil servants out of work, and exacerbated ethnic tensions due to high unemployment rates. Many of the now jobless Tutsis were unable to find alternative employment. Rather than emphasising a united Rwandan identity regardless of ethnicity, Kayibanda maintained the pre-independence ID system, which still specified ethnic affiliation.
PARMEHUTU policies continued to encourage Tutsi emigration from Rwanda. Some of these Tutsi were allowed into Burundi, although the Rwagasore government limited the influx in order to not upset too much the ethnic balance in their kingdom, and some also fled to Tanganyika, but the majority resettled in the border regions of Uganda and Congo (in the latter these Tutsi refugees were referred to as "Banyamalenge"). Burundi's refusal to let in UNAR rebels, along with Rwagasore's constant efforts to maintain good relations with Kayibanda, convinced the latter to retain the economic union with Burundi[228]. 1963 saw a major incursion by UNAR rebels that crossed the border from Congolese South Kivu into Rwanda. This attack was repelled by the Rwandan gendarmerie, but cross-border night raids from Congo continued to be a problem for Kayibanda and his government. The recruitment of not-insignificant numbers of Banyamalenge into the Congolese military, and the cross-border raids convinced Kayibanda that Lumumba was seeking to overthrow his government and put in place a pliant regime. In reality, Lumumba cared little for the going-ons on in Rwanda, focusing instead on competition with the Rhodesians and South Africans. The vast size of Congo simply allowed UNAR rebels to operate in remote areas of South Kivu without Congolese government support. The language used in anti-Tutsi rhetoric by PARMEHUTU officials became ever graver; the UNAR rebels who infiltrated at night were referred to as inyenzi ("cockroaches") due to their disappearance in the daylight. This dehumanising language was soon extended to the Tutsi population that still lived in Rwanda. The threat of the UNAR rebels to the Rwandan state was also exaggerated in the minds of the PARMEHUTU leadership and their supporters; rather than a multinational conspiracy, the raiding rebels were fractured and largely operated independently. Whilst their raids were a serious threat to the lives of civilians living in the border areas, as well as to security forces personnel, a Tutsi march on Kigali wasn't likely, at least without significant foreign support.
Juvénal Habyarimana
In July 1973, the Kayibanda government was toppled by a coup d'état headed by his defense minister, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana. Despite some initial overtures to the Tutsi population, Habyarimana soon reversed course to perpetuate the anti-Tutsi policies of his predecessor. In 1975, Habyarimana established his own political party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (National Revolutionary Movement for Development, MRND) and outlawed all others. A 1978 constitution implemented by the MRND defined Rwanda as a presidential republic with no term limits. Habyarimana, the only name on the ballot, was also elected to a five-year term as President.
===
[224] IOTL Rwagasore was assassinated by a Greek national in the employ of the PDC. Details are uncertain, but it appears that the factor that pushed the PDC to go through with the assassination was encouragement by the Belgian resident. ITTL no Belgian resident, the PDC don't dare to kill Rwagasore without Western support.
[225] IOTL such economic modernisation wouldn't occur until the late 1970s and early 1980s under the purview of Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, a military dictator of Burundi.
[226] IOTL, the pro-Tutsi governments that came about in the aftermath of Rwagasore's assassination allowed these rebels to operate out of Burundi, which further inflamed ethnic tensions in Burundi itself.
[227] IOTL, a Hutu coup in 1965 toppled the Burundian monarchy, which went into exile and Mwambutsa himself ended up living out the rest of his life in Switzerland. ITTL, the monarchy isn't topped.
[228] IOTL this union was dissolved due to the post-Rwagasore Burundian government's harbouring of UNAR rebels.
In Rwanda, the January 1961 elections resulted in a clear victory for PARMEHUTU. A referendum in July on the issue of whether or not to retain the monarchy gave the government an unambiguous mandate to abolish the monarchy. Kigeli V went into exile, moving between various East African cities. The first government of independent Rwanda was lead by Prime Minister Grégoire Kayibanda, who appointed Dominique Mbonyumutwa as President. The Kayibanda government promoted a policy of international non-alignment, focusing instead on the establishment of ties with various countries around the globe. Kayibanda's government did little to face issues of corruption and economic inefficiency, however. They also instituted a number of 'democratisation' measures that were used in order to dilute the influence of the Rwandan Tutsis. Quotas were established in secondary schools and the civil service which limited Tutsis to a mere 9% of spots, proportionate to their total population. Whilst it is understandable that Tutsis couldn't retain as large a role as they had in administration prior to independence, this pushed a number of experienced civil servants out of work, and exacerbated ethnic tensions due to high unemployment rates. Many of the now jobless Tutsis were unable to find alternative employment. Rather than emphasising a united Rwandan identity regardless of ethnicity, Kayibanda maintained the pre-independence ID system, which still specified ethnic affiliation.
PARMEHUTU policies continued to encourage Tutsi emigration from Rwanda. Some of these Tutsi were allowed into Burundi, although the Rwagasore government limited the influx in order to not upset too much the ethnic balance in their kingdom, and some also fled to Tanganyika, but the majority resettled in the border regions of Uganda and Congo (in the latter these Tutsi refugees were referred to as "Banyamalenge"). Burundi's refusal to let in UNAR rebels, along with Rwagasore's constant efforts to maintain good relations with Kayibanda, convinced the latter to retain the economic union with Burundi[228]. 1963 saw a major incursion by UNAR rebels that crossed the border from Congolese South Kivu into Rwanda. This attack was repelled by the Rwandan gendarmerie, but cross-border night raids from Congo continued to be a problem for Kayibanda and his government. The recruitment of not-insignificant numbers of Banyamalenge into the Congolese military, and the cross-border raids convinced Kayibanda that Lumumba was seeking to overthrow his government and put in place a pliant regime. In reality, Lumumba cared little for the going-ons on in Rwanda, focusing instead on competition with the Rhodesians and South Africans. The vast size of Congo simply allowed UNAR rebels to operate in remote areas of South Kivu without Congolese government support. The language used in anti-Tutsi rhetoric by PARMEHUTU officials became ever graver; the UNAR rebels who infiltrated at night were referred to as inyenzi ("cockroaches") due to their disappearance in the daylight. This dehumanising language was soon extended to the Tutsi population that still lived in Rwanda. The threat of the UNAR rebels to the Rwandan state was also exaggerated in the minds of the PARMEHUTU leadership and their supporters; rather than a multinational conspiracy, the raiding rebels were fractured and largely operated independently. Whilst their raids were a serious threat to the lives of civilians living in the border areas, as well as to security forces personnel, a Tutsi march on Kigali wasn't likely, at least without significant foreign support.
Juvénal Habyarimana
In July 1973, the Kayibanda government was toppled by a coup d'état headed by his defense minister, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana. Despite some initial overtures to the Tutsi population, Habyarimana soon reversed course to perpetuate the anti-Tutsi policies of his predecessor. In 1975, Habyarimana established his own political party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (National Revolutionary Movement for Development, MRND) and outlawed all others. A 1978 constitution implemented by the MRND defined Rwanda as a presidential republic with no term limits. Habyarimana, the only name on the ballot, was also elected to a five-year term as President.
===
[224] IOTL Rwagasore was assassinated by a Greek national in the employ of the PDC. Details are uncertain, but it appears that the factor that pushed the PDC to go through with the assassination was encouragement by the Belgian resident. ITTL no Belgian resident, the PDC don't dare to kill Rwagasore without Western support.
[225] IOTL such economic modernisation wouldn't occur until the late 1970s and early 1980s under the purview of Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, a military dictator of Burundi.
[226] IOTL, the pro-Tutsi governments that came about in the aftermath of Rwagasore's assassination allowed these rebels to operate out of Burundi, which further inflamed ethnic tensions in Burundi itself.
[227] IOTL, a Hutu coup in 1965 toppled the Burundian monarchy, which went into exile and Mwambutsa himself ended up living out the rest of his life in Switzerland. ITTL, the monarchy isn't topped.
[228] IOTL this union was dissolved due to the post-Rwagasore Burundian government's harbouring of UNAR rebels.
Sadly it seems Rwanda falls to a military rule, hopefully this won't last long nor lead into the genocide
I can't give away too much, but even though Rwanda's fate has been pretty convergent with OTL thus far, it won't stay that way.
Chapter 97: The Crowned Crane Bows - Uganda (Until 1980) (Part 1)
The British protectorate of Uganda, in contrast to many of London's other African colonies, was unique in that it was organised into a system of sub-imperialism. After the imposition of British imperial sovereignty, the kingdom of Buganda had largely collaborated with the British against rival kingdoms such as the Bunyoro who had opposed the British. In the post-WWII environment, the native kingdoms jockeyed with the British around local authority. Other significant players in Uganda were the Ugandan Asians, immigrants and their descendants from Britain's South Asian holdings. These Ugandan Asians were given a monopoly over cotton-ginning, a major contributor to the Ugandan economy, due to a British belief that the racist assumption that the Asians were intrinsically more efficient and entrepeneurial. In 1949, disgruntled Baganda (the demonym of Buganda) rioted and burnt down the houses of pro-British chiefs. The rioters put forward three demands to the colonial authorities: the right to bypass government-instituted price controls on export sales of cotton; the removal of the Asian monopoly over cotton ginning; and the right to have their own representatives in local government replace British-appointed chiefs. They were also critical of the Buganda Kabaka (king), Frederick Walumgembe Mutesa II for his inattentiveness to the needs of his people. British governor, Sir John Hall, regarded the riots as the work of communist agitators and rejected the recommended reforms.
Kabaka Frederick Walumgembe Mutesa II, King of Buganda and first President of Uganda
Post-war British retreat from India, the rise of pan-Africanism and a more liberal British Colonial Office set Uganda on a path to self-rule. In 1952 Hall was replaced by the reformist Sir Andrew Cohen, former Undersecretary for African Affairs in the Colonial Office. The new government removed obstacles to African cotton ginning, rescinded price discrimination against African-grown coffee, encouraged cooperatives, and established the Uganda Development Corporation. He reorganised the legislative council to include native representatives from throughout Uganda. Political reform caused a sudden proliferation of political parties, alarming the old guard centred around the traditional kingdoms. A 1953 speech in London by Cohen referring to the possibility of an East African Federation in the vein of Rhodesia-Nyasaland worried Ugandans, who saw the Central African Federation (rightfully) as a vehicle for settler interests. Fearing dominance by the white Kenyan minority (as it turned out, this group would flee Kenya in the aftermath of Kenya's break-up), the political class amongst the Ugandan natives started to view Cohen's reforms with suspicious. Kabaka Mutesa II demanded that Buganda be separated from the protectorate and transferred to Foreign Office jurisdiction, effectively denying Cohen's authority over his kingdom. In response, Cohen had the Kabaka deported to London. This backfired spectacularly, as the once-unpopular Kabaka became a symbol of resistance amongst his people. The Baganda chiefs and administrative apparatuses of the kingdom mounted a two year campaign of obstructionism until Cohen relented and allowed the Kabaka to return to his homeland. Cohen managed to secure Mutesa's agreement to partipate in a future federal Ugandan state, but was forced to concede powers to Mutesa that the Baganda Kabaka hadn't held since 1889, namely the power to appoint and dismiss chiefs in his kingdom, who had prior been appointed by the British governor, effectively making the Kabaka an absolute monarch in his territories.
A new grouping of Baganda referring to themselves as "The King's Friends" rallied around the newly-empowered king. The King's Friends were conservatives who insisted on a primary position for the Buganda kingdom amongst the Ugandans, entertaining participation in a united Uganda only if the Buganda Kabaka was head of state. Another political force in Baganda was the Democratic Party (DP) which emerged from Catholics in Baganda. The Catholic Church had educated a small group of Baganda, including the DP leader Benedicto Kiwanuka. These Catholics felt excluded by the Protestant Baganda establishment (the Kabaka and other high-level positions had to be Anglicans by law). Elsewhere in Uganda, despite often divergent interests between the regions, political unity was prompted by opposition to Bugandan domination. Buganda, after all, composed 2 million of the 6 million total Ugandans. In 1960, Milton Obote, a leader amongst the Nilotic Langi people of northern Uganda, formed a broad-based party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), to represent the non-Baganda. That same year, the London Conference was held to outline the future contours of an independent Ugandan state. It quickly became clear that Bugandan autonomy and a strong unitary state were fundamentally incompatible, and no compromise was made. The British announced that they would hold elections in March 1961 for "responsible government", the penultimate step before independence.
Milton Obote, first Prime Minister and Second President of Uganda and head of the Uganda People's Congress
In Buganda, the "King's Friends" urged a total boycott of the election because their attempts to secure provision of future autonomy had been rebuffed by the British. Buganda was allotted 21 out of 82 seats in the National Assembly. Braving public pressure, DP supporters went out to the polls, and as such the Democratic Party won 20 out of 21 Buganda seats. They also won a number of seats outside of Buganda, and despite the UPC winning slightly more of the popular vote, the DP ended up with an artificial majority in the Ugandan legislature. Benedicto Kiwanuka became the first Chief Minister of Uganda, a post equivalent to the Prime Minister but in a not-yet-independent state. Immediately regretting their boycott of the elections, the King's Friends established a political party, the Kabaka Yekka (King Only, KY) and began voicing support for a federated Uganda. In order to take power from the DP, the UPC and KY entered into a marriage of convenience. They reached a compromise that in a coalition government, the Kabaka could appoint Buganda's representatives to the National Assembly, as well as Mutesa taking the position of ceremonial Head of State. This coalition defeated the DP government in the April 1962 election. The coalition took 67 seats (43 UPC, 24 KY) to the DP's 24. The UPC-KY coalition led Uganda into independence in October 1962, with Obote as Uganda's Prime Minister and Mutesa II as President. Whilst on paper the UPC was in a powerful position, in reality it was a full-time job for Obote. Notable regional party bosses in the UPC included Obote himself, George Magezi (who represented the Bunyoro), Grace Ibingira (of the Anhole Bantu people of Uganda's southwest), and the reactionary representative of the neglected West Nile district, Felix Onama. All of these figures expected the government to deliver material benefits for their people, as well as allowing them to exercise patronage and being granted a ministerial position. Furthermore, Obote's politically-motivated acknowledgement of Buganda's special status emboldened other groups to demand such status; the Busoga chiefdoms banded together to demand official recognition of their newly-defined monarch, the Kyabasinga. The Iteso people, who had never recognised a precolonial king, claimed the title "Kingoo" for their political boss, Cuthbert Joseph Obwangor.
In January 1964, Obote's authority was challenged by a mutiny of army officers. Like many other newly independent states in Africa, their armed forces demanded an increase in pay and promotions in exchange for stability. Onama, the Minister of Defense, went to speak with the mutineers face-to-face, but was promptly taken hostage. Obote acceded to the mutineers' demands, and he selected a popular junior officer, Idi Amin, to be his protégé. Amin would be frequently promoted over the next couple of years. Later that year, Ibingira mounted an intra-UPC challenge to Obote's leadership. Conspiring with Ibingira, Mutesa instructed KY MPs to join the UPC, planning to take over the party from the inside by forming an Ibingira-KY alliance. They were unable to pull off this hostile takeover, however, as before all the KY MPs could join the UPC, enough DP and other figures in the National Assembly had drifted over to UPC patronage networks, and Obote was able to dissolve the KY-UPC coalition whilst still maintaining a majority in the National Assembly. Obote finally felt strong enough to push against Buganda and limit their disproportionate power. The vehicle to do so was addressing the issues of the "lost counties" of Bunyoro. These counties had been transferred from Bunyoro to Buganda during the imposition of British authority in the region as a punishment for Bunyoro resistance and a reward for Bugandan collaboration with the imperial power. A plebiscite was held in the lost counties, which overwhelmingly came out in favour of reunification with Bunyoro. During the plebiscite, the Kabaka had mobilised 300 Baganda veterans to intimidate voters, but these were counteracted by the massing of 2,000 Bunyoro veterans on the frontier between the two kingdoms, an implicit threat of civil war in the event of the Kabaka interfering with the plebiscite. This also of course shifted the National Assembly seats from the lost counties outside of KY control. Ironically, the weakening of the perceived threat from Buganda caused some fraying inside the UPC. Dissatisfaction with the plebiscite outcome caused the KY to started agitating for Bugandan independence. Seeking to cow the centrifugal forces in the UPC and finally get the Kabaka in line, Obote ordered Idi Amin to arrest Mutesa II. The Baganda monarch was able to escape from his palace into exile, whilst many of his close advisors were killed as the government troops assaulted his palace. Outraged by this unilateral use of military force against a domestic political figure, DP, KY and many of the UPC representatives pushed through a no confidence vote in the National Assembly. Only the radical John Kakonge didn't vote against Obote. Opposition to the Prime Minister was greatest amongst the southern Bantu representatives. With Amin's assistance, Obote mounted a coup against his own government, and arrested opposition leaders. A new republican constitution was forced through and Buganda was divided into four geographically-defined districts and was placed under direct martial law. Mutesa II would die three years later in London under suspicious circumstances. The official story is that he died from self-inflicted alcohol poisoning, but individuals who saw him earlier that day noted his sobriety and good spirits. Many believe he was assassinated by being force-fed vodka by intruders.
Awon'go Idi Amin Dada, Third President (and Dictator) of Uganda
The UPC became the only legal party. Obote issued the "common man's charter", echoing Nyerere's call for African socialism. However the corrupt Obote placed economic nationalisation plans in the hands of an Asian millionaire who financed the UPC. Obote established a feared secret police, the innocuously-named General Service Unit (GSU). In December 1969 Obote was assassinated with a grenade detonation[229]. Amin immediately moved to take control of the country, claiming that he would punish the murderers, even though its highly likely that Amin himself was behind the assassination. Brigadier Pierino Okoya, one of Amin's only rivals amongst the senior officers, escaped with some loyal troops to neighbouring Tangyanika[230]. Amin quickly went to work arresting political opponents, falsely accusing them of a grand conspiracy against the late President, and having them executed.
===
[229] IOTL, the grenade didn't detonate. Amin would instead coup Obote in 1971 preemptively, as Obote realised that he was planning to take power.
[230] IOTL, Okoya would be assassinated, most likely on Amin's orders in 1970.
Kabaka Frederick Walumgembe Mutesa II, King of Buganda and first President of Uganda
Post-war British retreat from India, the rise of pan-Africanism and a more liberal British Colonial Office set Uganda on a path to self-rule. In 1952 Hall was replaced by the reformist Sir Andrew Cohen, former Undersecretary for African Affairs in the Colonial Office. The new government removed obstacles to African cotton ginning, rescinded price discrimination against African-grown coffee, encouraged cooperatives, and established the Uganda Development Corporation. He reorganised the legislative council to include native representatives from throughout Uganda. Political reform caused a sudden proliferation of political parties, alarming the old guard centred around the traditional kingdoms. A 1953 speech in London by Cohen referring to the possibility of an East African Federation in the vein of Rhodesia-Nyasaland worried Ugandans, who saw the Central African Federation (rightfully) as a vehicle for settler interests. Fearing dominance by the white Kenyan minority (as it turned out, this group would flee Kenya in the aftermath of Kenya's break-up), the political class amongst the Ugandan natives started to view Cohen's reforms with suspicious. Kabaka Mutesa II demanded that Buganda be separated from the protectorate and transferred to Foreign Office jurisdiction, effectively denying Cohen's authority over his kingdom. In response, Cohen had the Kabaka deported to London. This backfired spectacularly, as the once-unpopular Kabaka became a symbol of resistance amongst his people. The Baganda chiefs and administrative apparatuses of the kingdom mounted a two year campaign of obstructionism until Cohen relented and allowed the Kabaka to return to his homeland. Cohen managed to secure Mutesa's agreement to partipate in a future federal Ugandan state, but was forced to concede powers to Mutesa that the Baganda Kabaka hadn't held since 1889, namely the power to appoint and dismiss chiefs in his kingdom, who had prior been appointed by the British governor, effectively making the Kabaka an absolute monarch in his territories.
A new grouping of Baganda referring to themselves as "The King's Friends" rallied around the newly-empowered king. The King's Friends were conservatives who insisted on a primary position for the Buganda kingdom amongst the Ugandans, entertaining participation in a united Uganda only if the Buganda Kabaka was head of state. Another political force in Baganda was the Democratic Party (DP) which emerged from Catholics in Baganda. The Catholic Church had educated a small group of Baganda, including the DP leader Benedicto Kiwanuka. These Catholics felt excluded by the Protestant Baganda establishment (the Kabaka and other high-level positions had to be Anglicans by law). Elsewhere in Uganda, despite often divergent interests between the regions, political unity was prompted by opposition to Bugandan domination. Buganda, after all, composed 2 million of the 6 million total Ugandans. In 1960, Milton Obote, a leader amongst the Nilotic Langi people of northern Uganda, formed a broad-based party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), to represent the non-Baganda. That same year, the London Conference was held to outline the future contours of an independent Ugandan state. It quickly became clear that Bugandan autonomy and a strong unitary state were fundamentally incompatible, and no compromise was made. The British announced that they would hold elections in March 1961 for "responsible government", the penultimate step before independence.
Milton Obote, first Prime Minister and Second President of Uganda and head of the Uganda People's Congress
In Buganda, the "King's Friends" urged a total boycott of the election because their attempts to secure provision of future autonomy had been rebuffed by the British. Buganda was allotted 21 out of 82 seats in the National Assembly. Braving public pressure, DP supporters went out to the polls, and as such the Democratic Party won 20 out of 21 Buganda seats. They also won a number of seats outside of Buganda, and despite the UPC winning slightly more of the popular vote, the DP ended up with an artificial majority in the Ugandan legislature. Benedicto Kiwanuka became the first Chief Minister of Uganda, a post equivalent to the Prime Minister but in a not-yet-independent state. Immediately regretting their boycott of the elections, the King's Friends established a political party, the Kabaka Yekka (King Only, KY) and began voicing support for a federated Uganda. In order to take power from the DP, the UPC and KY entered into a marriage of convenience. They reached a compromise that in a coalition government, the Kabaka could appoint Buganda's representatives to the National Assembly, as well as Mutesa taking the position of ceremonial Head of State. This coalition defeated the DP government in the April 1962 election. The coalition took 67 seats (43 UPC, 24 KY) to the DP's 24. The UPC-KY coalition led Uganda into independence in October 1962, with Obote as Uganda's Prime Minister and Mutesa II as President. Whilst on paper the UPC was in a powerful position, in reality it was a full-time job for Obote. Notable regional party bosses in the UPC included Obote himself, George Magezi (who represented the Bunyoro), Grace Ibingira (of the Anhole Bantu people of Uganda's southwest), and the reactionary representative of the neglected West Nile district, Felix Onama. All of these figures expected the government to deliver material benefits for their people, as well as allowing them to exercise patronage and being granted a ministerial position. Furthermore, Obote's politically-motivated acknowledgement of Buganda's special status emboldened other groups to demand such status; the Busoga chiefdoms banded together to demand official recognition of their newly-defined monarch, the Kyabasinga. The Iteso people, who had never recognised a precolonial king, claimed the title "Kingoo" for their political boss, Cuthbert Joseph Obwangor.
In January 1964, Obote's authority was challenged by a mutiny of army officers. Like many other newly independent states in Africa, their armed forces demanded an increase in pay and promotions in exchange for stability. Onama, the Minister of Defense, went to speak with the mutineers face-to-face, but was promptly taken hostage. Obote acceded to the mutineers' demands, and he selected a popular junior officer, Idi Amin, to be his protégé. Amin would be frequently promoted over the next couple of years. Later that year, Ibingira mounted an intra-UPC challenge to Obote's leadership. Conspiring with Ibingira, Mutesa instructed KY MPs to join the UPC, planning to take over the party from the inside by forming an Ibingira-KY alliance. They were unable to pull off this hostile takeover, however, as before all the KY MPs could join the UPC, enough DP and other figures in the National Assembly had drifted over to UPC patronage networks, and Obote was able to dissolve the KY-UPC coalition whilst still maintaining a majority in the National Assembly. Obote finally felt strong enough to push against Buganda and limit their disproportionate power. The vehicle to do so was addressing the issues of the "lost counties" of Bunyoro. These counties had been transferred from Bunyoro to Buganda during the imposition of British authority in the region as a punishment for Bunyoro resistance and a reward for Bugandan collaboration with the imperial power. A plebiscite was held in the lost counties, which overwhelmingly came out in favour of reunification with Bunyoro. During the plebiscite, the Kabaka had mobilised 300 Baganda veterans to intimidate voters, but these were counteracted by the massing of 2,000 Bunyoro veterans on the frontier between the two kingdoms, an implicit threat of civil war in the event of the Kabaka interfering with the plebiscite. This also of course shifted the National Assembly seats from the lost counties outside of KY control. Ironically, the weakening of the perceived threat from Buganda caused some fraying inside the UPC. Dissatisfaction with the plebiscite outcome caused the KY to started agitating for Bugandan independence. Seeking to cow the centrifugal forces in the UPC and finally get the Kabaka in line, Obote ordered Idi Amin to arrest Mutesa II. The Baganda monarch was able to escape from his palace into exile, whilst many of his close advisors were killed as the government troops assaulted his palace. Outraged by this unilateral use of military force against a domestic political figure, DP, KY and many of the UPC representatives pushed through a no confidence vote in the National Assembly. Only the radical John Kakonge didn't vote against Obote. Opposition to the Prime Minister was greatest amongst the southern Bantu representatives. With Amin's assistance, Obote mounted a coup against his own government, and arrested opposition leaders. A new republican constitution was forced through and Buganda was divided into four geographically-defined districts and was placed under direct martial law. Mutesa II would die three years later in London under suspicious circumstances. The official story is that he died from self-inflicted alcohol poisoning, but individuals who saw him earlier that day noted his sobriety and good spirits. Many believe he was assassinated by being force-fed vodka by intruders.
Awon'go Idi Amin Dada, Third President (and Dictator) of Uganda
The UPC became the only legal party. Obote issued the "common man's charter", echoing Nyerere's call for African socialism. However the corrupt Obote placed economic nationalisation plans in the hands of an Asian millionaire who financed the UPC. Obote established a feared secret police, the innocuously-named General Service Unit (GSU). In December 1969 Obote was assassinated with a grenade detonation[229]. Amin immediately moved to take control of the country, claiming that he would punish the murderers, even though its highly likely that Amin himself was behind the assassination. Brigadier Pierino Okoya, one of Amin's only rivals amongst the senior officers, escaped with some loyal troops to neighbouring Tangyanika[230]. Amin quickly went to work arresting political opponents, falsely accusing them of a grand conspiracy against the late President, and having them executed.
===
[229] IOTL, the grenade didn't detonate. Amin would instead coup Obote in 1971 preemptively, as Obote realised that he was planning to take power.
[230] IOTL, Okoya would be assassinated, most likely on Amin's orders in 1970.
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Sad to see Uganda falls to Idi Amin, hopefully butterflies can eject him from power sooner than OTL
Chapter 98: The Conqueror? - Uganda (Until 1980) (Part 2)
The rule of Idi Amin would coincide with the darkest period in Ugandan history. The brutality of the illiterate dictator of Uganda would lead to his acquisition of a number of unflattering epithets amongst opponents: "The Butcher of Africa" and "Black Hitler" amongst them. Amin's mercurial and erratic governance would lead to widespread economic hardship, corruption and human rights abuses.
Despite his promises to institute "democracy" in Uganda, Amin quickly turned post-Obote Uganda into a military dictatorship. Despite Obote's death, Amin nevertheless sought to marginalise the Langi and Acholi peoples who Obote had drawn his strongest support from. In July 1971, Amin had soldiers from these ethnic groups slaughtered in the Jinga and Mbarara barracks. By early 1972, over 5,000 soldiers of Langi and Acholi extraction (and around 2,000 civilians from these groups) had disappeared. A more well-known racist policy of Amin's, ostensibly pursued in the interests of economic nationalism, was the expulsion of the Ugandan Asians. Indophobia was not uncommon in Uganda amongst the indigenous populations due to the South Asian population's relative prosperity and economic influence. Obote's administration had tried to restrict economic activity of Asians, particularly those born outside of Uganda, but Amin's junta intensified the abuse of this population. The 40,000 or so Ugandan Asians (23,000 of whom were citizens of Uganda) were ousted and their assets redistributed to officers loyal to Amin. This immediately had a deleterious effect on the economy of Uganda. The Asian population owned 90% of the businesses in the country and as such provided 90% of the tax revenue. Without this population, there were few people left in the country with the skills to manage commerce. The manufacturing sector shrunk, as did GDP. Real wages would drop throughout Amin's rule in Uganda, and the country's economic woes were compounded by British and American bans on the import of Ugandan coffee in reaction to Amin's human rights abuses. 500 Ugandan-based Hadrahmi Arab merchants were also killed by Amin's security forces. The seizure of Ugandan Asian assets was followed up shortly after by a seizure of British-owned businesses as well.
Amin mounted a diplomatic campaign in order to secure foreign aid. His seizure of British businesses was well-received by the Congolese and Soviets, the latter of whom became the primary provider of military materiel. Funds provided by Léopoldville to Kampala were utilised in a large expansion of the military, which was largely recruited by groups deemed loyal to Amin: the Kakwa and Lugbara ethnic groups (Amin's parents' peoples), Equatorians (South Sudanese), Nubians and Congolese mercenaries, as well as Muslims from the West Nile province. The first significant challenge to Amin's leadership was the Arube mutiny of March 1974 [231], named for its ringleader, Brigadier Charles Arube. The primary structural cause for the mutiny was dissatisfaction amongst Christian Lugbara officers over Amin's increasing recruitment of foreigners and Muslims. Tensions within the internal military structure led to often violent disputes between different military factions, and the torture of Amin's detractors by the State Research Bureau (SRB), which was the Amin-era replacement of the GSU. A campaign of assassination against high-ranking Lugbara officers ordered by Amin provoked the Arube mutiny. After returning from training in the Soviet Union, Arube and his supporters attempted a coup, and were successful in taking Kampala. The coup itself was a close-run thing. An attack on the Presidential Palace by the putschists eventually resulted in the deaths of the 30-strong presidential bodyguard, but Arube's insistence that the capture of Amin wait until he had arrived, and Amin's murder of Arube upon the latter's entrance to the palace, halted the assault. The putschists, now leaderless, surrendered to the loyalist Marine Regiment which arrived shortly thereafter. Surviving by the skin of his teeth, Amin redoubled his efforts to take complete control of the military, recruiting almost exclusively amongst foreigners and Muslims. Muslims (mostly Kakwas and Nubians) came to occupy 80% of the top military positions and 87.5% of cabinet positions, despite comprising only 5% of the total Ugandan population. A ramping up of both military expansion and political suppression led to a wave of defections amongst senior ministers to foreign countries, notably the UK.
Idi Amin posing with a WWII-vintage Panzerschreck
Over the border in Tanganyika, Ugandan opposition movements, supported by the Nyerere government, continued to build their strength. Two separate organisations, one comprised largely of Acholi and Langi exiles under the command of Brigadier Okoya, the other comprised of Banyankole and Banyarwanda leftists under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni. Under Nyerere's direction, these two groups formed a "Popular Front" in opposition to the Amin government. Nyerere's support of the anti-Amin leftists is often portrayed in histories as one of the last Soviet-Chinese proxy conflicts before the Sino-Soviet rapproachement, with Tanganyika supported by Peking and Uganda by Moscow. But in reality, Soviet interest in the region was always limited. It is more accurate to define the contest as a Tanganyikan-Congolese rivalry. Although both anti-imperialist and pan-Africanist in outlook, Lumumba and Nyerere had vastly different visions of the future for a liberated Africa. Nyerere's Ujamaa ideology was far more rooted in African tradition and equitability whilst less developmentalist than the Congo. Nyerere saw Lumumba as attempting to ape the development of Eurasian nations, whereas Lumumba saw Nyerere as naive, and as someone whose policies would keep Africans poor and ignorant. The Congolese sought to install friendly regimes in all of their many borders in order to ensure stability, whereas Nyerere hoped to construct an East African Federation to bring peace to the region. Whilst Museveni was a real ideological fellow-traveller to Nyerere, Okoya simply sought the support of an opponent to the Congolese-backed Amin regime. In early 1973, Museveni announced the formation of the "Front for National Salvation" (FRONASA) and published a manifesto targeting Amin, titled "an indictment of a primitive fascist". Although FRONASA was initially very small, it would have an outsized impact on Ugandan politics in the future.
As Amin built up his military power, he sought to gain a reputation as a successful conqueror. In February 1976 he started to make announcements that he would be investigating the relationship of the Ugandan kingdoms to Kavirondo, which he (falsely) stated may have belonged to pre-colonial Ugandan kingdoms. This provoked panic in the Kavirondese capital of Kisumu, with ker Oginga Odinga scrambling to find foreign allies. Kirinyaga-Kenyaland to the east was too much of a threat; the militarily-weak Rift Valley Republic to the north sought to keep out of any conflict with Amin, and the Equatorian government was on decent terms with Kampala, making good money out of the provision of mercenaries to Uganda. The invasion would finally come in February 1977. 15,000 troops of Amin's 25,000-strong military machine crossed into Kavirondo. The Kavirondese armed forces were more akin to a gendarmerie than a real army, and were quickly pushed back to the capital. Odinga fled to Tanganyika. He had maintained a terse relationship with Nyerere in the past, but now he had nowhere left to go. Ugandan troops in Kavirondo embarked on an ad hoc terror campaign of rape, looting and mutiliation. Particularly disturbing was Muslim troops' atrocities committed against churches associated with the Legio Maria church, whose leader Simeo Ondetto had fled to the Rift Valley Republic's capital of Lodwar. The Legio Maria had been told not to oppose the invaders, and many were massacred en masse. This martyrdom of the Legio Maria followers would be a major catalyst for the religion's expansion in the post-Amin era. Amin's aggression was denounced by many African leaders, but he was also rhetorically defended by the Congolese and their client states, as well as by the King of Morocco. Nyerere began to seriously plan for military action against Amin, even considering offers from Rhodesia-Nyasaland to provide well-trained and equipped mercenary forces in exchange for cutting off support to anti-Rhodesian black African movements sheltered in Tanganyika. In the end a wider East African war was averted by the mediation of Somalian president Siad Barre, resulting in the Mogadishu Accords. Despite rhetorical support from some African nations, Amin's aggression in Kavirondo left him with little real support internationally. The Congolese were more concerned with events in Angola, seeing the Great Lakes region as a secondary consideration. The British, who had initially welcomed Amin's coup and further distanced themselves over the course of the 1970s, finally broke diplomatic relations off in 1977. The Soviets had cooled on their support for Amin, with more important priorities elsewhere and starting to see Amin as too much of a proverbial live wire. The Somalians were focused on their issues with Ethiopia, and simply wanted peace and stability to their south. Nevertheless, Amin was able to complete his conquest of Kavirondo, and the calls for withdrawal from the United Nations General Assembly were ignored.
The Mogadishu Accords couldn't restrain Amin's megalomania for long. On October 25th, 1978, Ugandan forces crossed the border with Tanganyika and attacked the Kagera Salient, a disputed territory which Amin claimed was rightfully part of Uganda. They were repulsed by Tanganyikan artillery, but returned in force five days later, driving the defenders out of the salient. Amin announced the annexation of Kagera and had the only bridge along the Kagera river (which divided the salient from the rest of Tanganyika) destroyed. His forces in Kavirondo also started making probing attacks to their south, but couldn't engage in any large-scale offensives due to the need to garrison occupied Kavirondo. Nevertheless Amin started considering an offensive campaign to take Bukoba, Mwanza and Musoma, thus encircling the entirety of Lake Victoria. He would never get the opportunity to pursue these ambitions, however. After engaging in an orgy of violence and looting in Kagera ($108 million worth of Tanganyikan economic assets were lost) as well as forcible kidnapping of young women and girls into sexual slavery in Uganda, the invaders were ousted by a Tanganyikan counterattack. Although initially offering anaemic resistance to the Ugandan military, proper mobilisation of the Tanganyikan People's Defense Force (TPDF) made a Tanganyikan victory inevitable. Within a few months, Dar es Salaam had mobilised 150,000 members of the people's militias. Despite the Ugandan military numbering around 20,000 at this time, only 3,000 were ever in Kagera at once. Infighting and a focus on crime instead of the maintenance of defensive positions left the Ugandan military unprepared for a Tanganyikan counteroffensive, which the Ugandans foolishly thought impossible due to the destruction of the bridge over the Kagera river. In mid-November, Tanganyikan forces crossed a pontoon bridge and drove the Ugandan soldiers out of Kagera, many of whom were drunk. A bailey bridge was then built on the ruined Kagera bridge, and BM-21 Grads were driven across the river. The TPDF considered another Ugandan incursion a possibility as long as the high ground at Mutukula on the Ugandan side of the border stayed out of Tanganyikan hands. Whilst training their new conscript militias for an offensive, the TPDF settled into defensive positions. Christmas Day 1978 saw a major artillery bombardment by the TPDF BM-21s. The Ugandan forces were shaken by the destructive capabilities of the rocket batteries, which they called "Saba-Saba". After weeks of heavy shelling, the TPDF would cross the border and take Mutukula the very next day. In reprisal for the killing of civilians in Kagera, the town was destroyed and many civilian killings carried out. This was not done on Nyerere's orders, and he was horrified to find out about these indiscriminate attacks. He decreed that no further targeting of civilians would be tolerated.
===
[231] The 1972 attempt by Ugandan exiles in Tanzania to topple Amin is butterflied away by Obote's death.
Despite his promises to institute "democracy" in Uganda, Amin quickly turned post-Obote Uganda into a military dictatorship. Despite Obote's death, Amin nevertheless sought to marginalise the Langi and Acholi peoples who Obote had drawn his strongest support from. In July 1971, Amin had soldiers from these ethnic groups slaughtered in the Jinga and Mbarara barracks. By early 1972, over 5,000 soldiers of Langi and Acholi extraction (and around 2,000 civilians from these groups) had disappeared. A more well-known racist policy of Amin's, ostensibly pursued in the interests of economic nationalism, was the expulsion of the Ugandan Asians. Indophobia was not uncommon in Uganda amongst the indigenous populations due to the South Asian population's relative prosperity and economic influence. Obote's administration had tried to restrict economic activity of Asians, particularly those born outside of Uganda, but Amin's junta intensified the abuse of this population. The 40,000 or so Ugandan Asians (23,000 of whom were citizens of Uganda) were ousted and their assets redistributed to officers loyal to Amin. This immediately had a deleterious effect on the economy of Uganda. The Asian population owned 90% of the businesses in the country and as such provided 90% of the tax revenue. Without this population, there were few people left in the country with the skills to manage commerce. The manufacturing sector shrunk, as did GDP. Real wages would drop throughout Amin's rule in Uganda, and the country's economic woes were compounded by British and American bans on the import of Ugandan coffee in reaction to Amin's human rights abuses. 500 Ugandan-based Hadrahmi Arab merchants were also killed by Amin's security forces. The seizure of Ugandan Asian assets was followed up shortly after by a seizure of British-owned businesses as well.
Amin mounted a diplomatic campaign in order to secure foreign aid. His seizure of British businesses was well-received by the Congolese and Soviets, the latter of whom became the primary provider of military materiel. Funds provided by Léopoldville to Kampala were utilised in a large expansion of the military, which was largely recruited by groups deemed loyal to Amin: the Kakwa and Lugbara ethnic groups (Amin's parents' peoples), Equatorians (South Sudanese), Nubians and Congolese mercenaries, as well as Muslims from the West Nile province. The first significant challenge to Amin's leadership was the Arube mutiny of March 1974 [231], named for its ringleader, Brigadier Charles Arube. The primary structural cause for the mutiny was dissatisfaction amongst Christian Lugbara officers over Amin's increasing recruitment of foreigners and Muslims. Tensions within the internal military structure led to often violent disputes between different military factions, and the torture of Amin's detractors by the State Research Bureau (SRB), which was the Amin-era replacement of the GSU. A campaign of assassination against high-ranking Lugbara officers ordered by Amin provoked the Arube mutiny. After returning from training in the Soviet Union, Arube and his supporters attempted a coup, and were successful in taking Kampala. The coup itself was a close-run thing. An attack on the Presidential Palace by the putschists eventually resulted in the deaths of the 30-strong presidential bodyguard, but Arube's insistence that the capture of Amin wait until he had arrived, and Amin's murder of Arube upon the latter's entrance to the palace, halted the assault. The putschists, now leaderless, surrendered to the loyalist Marine Regiment which arrived shortly thereafter. Surviving by the skin of his teeth, Amin redoubled his efforts to take complete control of the military, recruiting almost exclusively amongst foreigners and Muslims. Muslims (mostly Kakwas and Nubians) came to occupy 80% of the top military positions and 87.5% of cabinet positions, despite comprising only 5% of the total Ugandan population. A ramping up of both military expansion and political suppression led to a wave of defections amongst senior ministers to foreign countries, notably the UK.
Idi Amin posing with a WWII-vintage Panzerschreck
Over the border in Tanganyika, Ugandan opposition movements, supported by the Nyerere government, continued to build their strength. Two separate organisations, one comprised largely of Acholi and Langi exiles under the command of Brigadier Okoya, the other comprised of Banyankole and Banyarwanda leftists under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni. Under Nyerere's direction, these two groups formed a "Popular Front" in opposition to the Amin government. Nyerere's support of the anti-Amin leftists is often portrayed in histories as one of the last Soviet-Chinese proxy conflicts before the Sino-Soviet rapproachement, with Tanganyika supported by Peking and Uganda by Moscow. But in reality, Soviet interest in the region was always limited. It is more accurate to define the contest as a Tanganyikan-Congolese rivalry. Although both anti-imperialist and pan-Africanist in outlook, Lumumba and Nyerere had vastly different visions of the future for a liberated Africa. Nyerere's Ujamaa ideology was far more rooted in African tradition and equitability whilst less developmentalist than the Congo. Nyerere saw Lumumba as attempting to ape the development of Eurasian nations, whereas Lumumba saw Nyerere as naive, and as someone whose policies would keep Africans poor and ignorant. The Congolese sought to install friendly regimes in all of their many borders in order to ensure stability, whereas Nyerere hoped to construct an East African Federation to bring peace to the region. Whilst Museveni was a real ideological fellow-traveller to Nyerere, Okoya simply sought the support of an opponent to the Congolese-backed Amin regime. In early 1973, Museveni announced the formation of the "Front for National Salvation" (FRONASA) and published a manifesto targeting Amin, titled "an indictment of a primitive fascist". Although FRONASA was initially very small, it would have an outsized impact on Ugandan politics in the future.
As Amin built up his military power, he sought to gain a reputation as a successful conqueror. In February 1976 he started to make announcements that he would be investigating the relationship of the Ugandan kingdoms to Kavirondo, which he (falsely) stated may have belonged to pre-colonial Ugandan kingdoms. This provoked panic in the Kavirondese capital of Kisumu, with ker Oginga Odinga scrambling to find foreign allies. Kirinyaga-Kenyaland to the east was too much of a threat; the militarily-weak Rift Valley Republic to the north sought to keep out of any conflict with Amin, and the Equatorian government was on decent terms with Kampala, making good money out of the provision of mercenaries to Uganda. The invasion would finally come in February 1977. 15,000 troops of Amin's 25,000-strong military machine crossed into Kavirondo. The Kavirondese armed forces were more akin to a gendarmerie than a real army, and were quickly pushed back to the capital. Odinga fled to Tanganyika. He had maintained a terse relationship with Nyerere in the past, but now he had nowhere left to go. Ugandan troops in Kavirondo embarked on an ad hoc terror campaign of rape, looting and mutiliation. Particularly disturbing was Muslim troops' atrocities committed against churches associated with the Legio Maria church, whose leader Simeo Ondetto had fled to the Rift Valley Republic's capital of Lodwar. The Legio Maria had been told not to oppose the invaders, and many were massacred en masse. This martyrdom of the Legio Maria followers would be a major catalyst for the religion's expansion in the post-Amin era. Amin's aggression was denounced by many African leaders, but he was also rhetorically defended by the Congolese and their client states, as well as by the King of Morocco. Nyerere began to seriously plan for military action against Amin, even considering offers from Rhodesia-Nyasaland to provide well-trained and equipped mercenary forces in exchange for cutting off support to anti-Rhodesian black African movements sheltered in Tanganyika. In the end a wider East African war was averted by the mediation of Somalian president Siad Barre, resulting in the Mogadishu Accords. Despite rhetorical support from some African nations, Amin's aggression in Kavirondo left him with little real support internationally. The Congolese were more concerned with events in Angola, seeing the Great Lakes region as a secondary consideration. The British, who had initially welcomed Amin's coup and further distanced themselves over the course of the 1970s, finally broke diplomatic relations off in 1977. The Soviets had cooled on their support for Amin, with more important priorities elsewhere and starting to see Amin as too much of a proverbial live wire. The Somalians were focused on their issues with Ethiopia, and simply wanted peace and stability to their south. Nevertheless, Amin was able to complete his conquest of Kavirondo, and the calls for withdrawal from the United Nations General Assembly were ignored.
The Mogadishu Accords couldn't restrain Amin's megalomania for long. On October 25th, 1978, Ugandan forces crossed the border with Tanganyika and attacked the Kagera Salient, a disputed territory which Amin claimed was rightfully part of Uganda. They were repulsed by Tanganyikan artillery, but returned in force five days later, driving the defenders out of the salient. Amin announced the annexation of Kagera and had the only bridge along the Kagera river (which divided the salient from the rest of Tanganyika) destroyed. His forces in Kavirondo also started making probing attacks to their south, but couldn't engage in any large-scale offensives due to the need to garrison occupied Kavirondo. Nevertheless Amin started considering an offensive campaign to take Bukoba, Mwanza and Musoma, thus encircling the entirety of Lake Victoria. He would never get the opportunity to pursue these ambitions, however. After engaging in an orgy of violence and looting in Kagera ($108 million worth of Tanganyikan economic assets were lost) as well as forcible kidnapping of young women and girls into sexual slavery in Uganda, the invaders were ousted by a Tanganyikan counterattack. Although initially offering anaemic resistance to the Ugandan military, proper mobilisation of the Tanganyikan People's Defense Force (TPDF) made a Tanganyikan victory inevitable. Within a few months, Dar es Salaam had mobilised 150,000 members of the people's militias. Despite the Ugandan military numbering around 20,000 at this time, only 3,000 were ever in Kagera at once. Infighting and a focus on crime instead of the maintenance of defensive positions left the Ugandan military unprepared for a Tanganyikan counteroffensive, which the Ugandans foolishly thought impossible due to the destruction of the bridge over the Kagera river. In mid-November, Tanganyikan forces crossed a pontoon bridge and drove the Ugandan soldiers out of Kagera, many of whom were drunk. A bailey bridge was then built on the ruined Kagera bridge, and BM-21 Grads were driven across the river. The TPDF considered another Ugandan incursion a possibility as long as the high ground at Mutukula on the Ugandan side of the border stayed out of Tanganyikan hands. Whilst training their new conscript militias for an offensive, the TPDF settled into defensive positions. Christmas Day 1978 saw a major artillery bombardment by the TPDF BM-21s. The Ugandan forces were shaken by the destructive capabilities of the rocket batteries, which they called "Saba-Saba". After weeks of heavy shelling, the TPDF would cross the border and take Mutukula the very next day. In reprisal for the killing of civilians in Kagera, the town was destroyed and many civilian killings carried out. This was not done on Nyerere's orders, and he was horrified to find out about these indiscriminate attacks. He decreed that no further targeting of civilians would be tolerated.
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[231] The 1972 attempt by Ugandan exiles in Tanzania to topple Amin is butterflied away by Obote's death.
Sad to see Uganda and it's neighbors suffering under Amin, hopefully he'll be toppled soon and with more stable countries around like Congo and Somalia will prevent or at least lessen the effects of a civil war
Chapter 99: Slaying the Beast - Uganda (Until 1980) (Part 3)
Tanganyikan aims in the Kagera war were initially defensive, but when Idi Amin refused to acknowledge Tanganyikan sovereignty over the region and sue for peace, Nyerere and the TPDF leadership were forced to consider their next moves now that the initiative was theirs. Ugandan exile leaders convinced Nyerere that capture of the southern towns of Mbarara and Masaka would cause a disintegration of the Ugandan Armed Forces (UAF) and spark a popular uprising that would topple the Amin regime. The TPDF began its advance in mid-February 1979. After taking the border town of Katera, the Tanganyikans began their advance to the Simba Hills, which overlooks the Lukoma air strip and is en route to Masaka. The night before the attack, the TPDF brigadiers began planning the assault and ended up drinking, coming up with the idea (after some beers) that they would broadcast over the radio that various foreign forces ("Americans", "Chinese", "South Africans"[232]) were in position, tricking the Ugandan military into believing that they were the target of an international coalition. Incredibly, the ruse worked. Ugandan units had begun withdrawing en masse, and the TPDF was able to rout the remaining forces. Sorties by Ugandan air wings did scatter some troops on the initial advance, but TPDF deployment of SA-7 portable SAMs thinned out the Ugandan planes. The Tanganyikans claimed to have downed 19 Ugandan aircraft in the Battle of Simba Hills. The remaining Ugandan units were annihilated by volleys of rockets fired from the BM-21s. On 13th February, the Hills and the Lukoma air strip were secured. The parallel thrust towards Mbarara was slower than the advance towards Masaka due to hillier terrain and poorer infrastructure. On 21st February the TPDF's 206th Brigade attacked the Gayaza Hills to the south of Mbarara. Fierce fighting ensued, and the TPDF 20th Battalion, pursuing retreating Ugandan forces, was drawn into an ambush by the Ugandan 2nd Paratrooper Battalion. Intense fighting forced the Tanganyikans to reinforce and eventually flank the Ugandan positions. 24 Tanganyikans were killed in the ambush, and the Tanganyikan soldiers who survived the ambush were dubbed the "Red Army" by their comrades due to their combat experience. On 25th February the TPDF began shelling of Mbarara, forcing a Ugandan retreat. Mbarara was then taken without resistance.
Ugandan Armed Forces troops (APCs supplied by Czechoslovakia)
Back in the east, the TPDF dislodged the garrison at Kalisizo, 28 kilometres to the south of Masaka. As the demoralised Ugandan troops retreated to Masaka, a column of civilians fled the city. They were actually fleeing their own troops, not the Tanganyikans, due to the Ugandan army's reputation for harassment of civilians. The TPDF encircled Masaka on three sides. The Ugandan garrison commander, Brigadier Isaac Maliyamungu, ordered forces under his control to probe the TPDF positions to find an opportunity for a counterattack, but these efforts were rebuffed. On 23rd February, a massive nighttime bombardment was commenced by the Tanganyikan "Saba-Saba" launchers. In the meanwhile, divisions began to emerge between the defenders. Sudanese, Congolese and West Nile officers showed a lack of desire to risk their forces against the Tanganyikan army, seeing the war as irrelevant to their home regions. Some of the units under their command ended up withdrawing to Lukaya. On the morning of the 24th, the TPDF attacked. Several units of the Ugandan Army mutinied (including the supposedly elite "Suicide Battalion") and fled. The lack of coherent resistance by the Ugandan army once again allowed the Tanganyikan military to achieve their objectives easily. Masaka was taken in a matter of hours. With Masaka and Mbarara taken and the Ugandans in disarray, Nyerere ordered his army to halt their advance. Believing that a Tanganyikan occupation of Kampala would be bad for his nation's image and make them look expansionist, Nyerere instead left it to the Ugandan rebels to march on the capital [233].
This wasn't the case in occupied Kavirondo, however. TPDF and Kavirondo exile forces marched north into the small Ugandan-occupied country. The cowed Ugandan military retreated ahead of the TPDF, allowing the latter to liberate the small nation without any notable resistance. Wherever the army of liberation marched however, they found burnt-out houses and traumatised survivors. The small pro-business nation that had the highest standard of living in the interlacustrine region had, in the short space of two years, been practically razed to the ground. The vaults of the Imperial Solomonic Bank in Kehancha, Kisumu and Lodwar had been entirely emptied. The looting and destruction of practically all held wealth in the country would lead post-Amin Kavirondo to complete dependence on Tanganyikan and Chinese economic aid.
Tanganyikan T-55 and infantry escort
As the TPDF was settling into their position on the Masaka-Mbarara axis, the Ugandan exiles were organised into a government-in-exile, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) governed by a 30-man National Consultative Committee (NCC). The armed rebel militias were organised into the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), around 2,000-strong. The UNLA advanced along the only road from Masaka to Kampala. This road passed through Lukaya, a town 39km to the north of Masaka. After that, the route continued on a 25km causeway that went through a swamp until it reached Nabusanke. Amin rejected a plan to destroy the causeway, on the basis that it would impede a future counterattack. An initial attempt to catch the rebels on the causeway by the UAF was repulsed by a barrage of BM-21s (who the rebels had requested be brought along with them on the march to Kampala, despite some misgivings from elements of the TPDF command). This then resulted in an attempt by the UAF to flank the causeway around the swamp and cut off the UNLA forces. The UNLA forces drove across the causeway and pushed west, cutting off the UAF from supply. The rebels convinced the TPDF to drive forward from Masaka to pin the UAF forces between them and the UNLA. The UAF forces surrendered and were held in captivity by the Tanganyikans. UNLA troops continued their advance towards Kampala, clearing the road and captured Mpigi. The UNLA continued on to Entebbe, taking the airport and thus eliminating the Ugandan Army Air Force as a threat, before taking Kampala with minimal resistance. The UNLA rebels were celebrated upon their entry to the capital as "bakombozi" (liberators). Amin himself fled to Morocco[234]. Soon thereafter, Jinja was taken, along with the key Owen Falls hydroelectric dam, which was captured fully intact. Some Ugandan units offered stiff resistance in the West Nile region, where many of Amin's close followers were from. Nevertheless, they were defeated. The conflict came to a dark end with FRONASA-aligned militias engaging in civilian killings throughout the province. The Uganda National Liberation Front established itself as the new government, with Yusuf Lule, a former DP politicians with a reputation as a political moderate, as the fourth President of Uganda.
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[232] IOTL it was "Americans", "Israelis" and "Cubans".
[233] Historically, Muammar Gaddafi sent an expeditionary force to assist Amin, which the Ugandan rebels were unable to defeat without Tanzanian assistance. ITTL, no Gaddafi regime in Libya means Uganda is on its own, and Nyerere isn't forced to commit his forces to a full conquest of Uganda.
[234] IOTL, Amin fled to Saudi Arabia.
Ugandan Armed Forces troops (APCs supplied by Czechoslovakia)
Back in the east, the TPDF dislodged the garrison at Kalisizo, 28 kilometres to the south of Masaka. As the demoralised Ugandan troops retreated to Masaka, a column of civilians fled the city. They were actually fleeing their own troops, not the Tanganyikans, due to the Ugandan army's reputation for harassment of civilians. The TPDF encircled Masaka on three sides. The Ugandan garrison commander, Brigadier Isaac Maliyamungu, ordered forces under his control to probe the TPDF positions to find an opportunity for a counterattack, but these efforts were rebuffed. On 23rd February, a massive nighttime bombardment was commenced by the Tanganyikan "Saba-Saba" launchers. In the meanwhile, divisions began to emerge between the defenders. Sudanese, Congolese and West Nile officers showed a lack of desire to risk their forces against the Tanganyikan army, seeing the war as irrelevant to their home regions. Some of the units under their command ended up withdrawing to Lukaya. On the morning of the 24th, the TPDF attacked. Several units of the Ugandan Army mutinied (including the supposedly elite "Suicide Battalion") and fled. The lack of coherent resistance by the Ugandan army once again allowed the Tanganyikan military to achieve their objectives easily. Masaka was taken in a matter of hours. With Masaka and Mbarara taken and the Ugandans in disarray, Nyerere ordered his army to halt their advance. Believing that a Tanganyikan occupation of Kampala would be bad for his nation's image and make them look expansionist, Nyerere instead left it to the Ugandan rebels to march on the capital [233].
This wasn't the case in occupied Kavirondo, however. TPDF and Kavirondo exile forces marched north into the small Ugandan-occupied country. The cowed Ugandan military retreated ahead of the TPDF, allowing the latter to liberate the small nation without any notable resistance. Wherever the army of liberation marched however, they found burnt-out houses and traumatised survivors. The small pro-business nation that had the highest standard of living in the interlacustrine region had, in the short space of two years, been practically razed to the ground. The vaults of the Imperial Solomonic Bank in Kehancha, Kisumu and Lodwar had been entirely emptied. The looting and destruction of practically all held wealth in the country would lead post-Amin Kavirondo to complete dependence on Tanganyikan and Chinese economic aid.
Tanganyikan T-55 and infantry escort
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[232] IOTL it was "Americans", "Israelis" and "Cubans".
[233] Historically, Muammar Gaddafi sent an expeditionary force to assist Amin, which the Ugandan rebels were unable to defeat without Tanzanian assistance. ITTL, no Gaddafi regime in Libya means Uganda is on its own, and Nyerere isn't forced to commit his forces to a full conquest of Uganda.
[234] IOTL, Amin fled to Saudi Arabia.
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