Pearl Harbor: The Disaster Which Doomed Imperial Japan (The attack goes wrong)

I am trying to find out if Takeo Yoshikawa or any other Japanese eyes on Oahu were able to provide intelligence to the IJN on the disposition of the fleet in PH in the last few days before the attack? In Tora, Tora, Tora, Mitsuo Fujita and another officer lament finding out that the carriers were no longer there on the eve of the strike.

Was this correct that Nagumo already was aware there were no carriers in port on the morning of the 7th?
 
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I am trying to find out if Takeo Yoshikawa or any other Japanese eyes on Oahu were able to provide intelligence to the IJN on the disposition of the fleet in PH in the last few days before the attack? In Tora, Tora, Tora, Mitsuo Fujita and another officer lament finding out that the carriers were no longer there on the eve of the strike.

Was this correct that Nagumo already was aware there were no carriers in port on the morning of the 7th?
This is correct. Yoshikawa's last intelligence update came 24 hours prior to the attack - in this broadcast, he confirmed that all the battleships but none of the carriers were in port.
 
There is lots of what-if potential in the Opana Point radar detection of the incoming first wave.

The two privates operating the radar detected the first wave at 7:02. They checked their equipment, found it was working properly, then called the contact to their normal chain of command. When they couldn't get hold of their immediate superior, they called the Intercept Center at Fort Shafter. A private answered the phone, but all the plotters were away at breakfast. A Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, who was on his second day, and there really only there for training was the officer who responded with "Don't worry about it", despite repeated pleas from the operators to do something. The US Army preparations were bad, but Tyler seems like a particularly weak link in the causal chain, seemingly taking a bunch of his own initiative to prevent creating a fuss. He looks like a villain, but he was cleared of responsibility in subsequent hearings because he was not trained. Did he consider his role as warming his chair until the real officers came back from breakfast? Was he motivated by trying to prevent embarrassment by sending a false report?

Since Tyler's posting to the Intercept Center seems to be completely random, what if a different untrained junior officer in his place, when confronted by the unexpected had, at minimum, at least decided to do his job, or even better had responded to the incoming reports with the urgency that the radar operators and the switchboard private had?

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Sargon

Donor
Monthly Donor
Apologies it was more a sarcastic response poking a bit of fun at a recent 20 page plus thread with the op trying to argue what a fantastic plan this would be. I don't mean to distract from far more sensible discussion around your idea.

Nothing to apologise for. 🙂

Kimmel remembers to put up torpedo nets in the harbour. Murata is forced to implement Genda and Fuchida's hare brained OTL scheme for dealing with them - selecting volunteers from amongst his B5N crews to destroy the nets by crashing their aircraft onto them.

This goes about as well as it sounds: disastrously. The suicide squads are largely unable to spot, let alone accurately hit the buoys that hold the nets in place, and are lost in futile crash dives, blunting the numbers of attacking B5Ns while achieving little. Only a handful of the remainder, who boldly opt for different attack angles/approaches (including Juzo Mori), achieve meaningful hits, which are insufficient to sink anything from the battle line - the rest find their torpedoes stopped completely cold by the netting.

It's all up to Fuchida's level bombers now, but given that the first phase has gone off half cocked, the Americans have been granted the precious minutes required to mobilise a defence. The AA gunners find the range and stymie the lead bombardiers' aim where they do not outright cause losses; Fuchida's force achieves one or two hits, but Tadashi Kusumi's OTL knockout blow to Arizona is not among them.

Desperate to salvage something out of this disaster, Fuchida diverts the first wave D3As, originally slated to bomb the airfields, to the harbour instead. Armed with land bombs rather than armour piercers, their weapons cause some topside damage but little else - a poor return for the losses they end up incurring.

No thanks to the D3As' emergency redeployment, the airfields are largely spared. As a result, both the withdrawing first wave and the inbound second wave are met by a swarm of interceptors that outnumber and overwhelm Itaya's A6Ms. By the end of the entire affair, Kido Butai's aircrews are gutted, with the loss of many squadron and flight leaders including Fuchida, Murata, Takahashi and Shimazaki.

In his haste to shepherd the few surviving bombers to safety, Itaya does not initially realise he is being tailed on his way back to Kido Butai. By the time he shakes off his pursuers, Kimmel and Short have already figured out the direction in which to send every available land based strike aircraft.

With nothing but a skeleton force providing CAP, Kido Butai's fate is sealed the moment the first B-17s and SBDs appear on the scene. In exchange for trifling American losses, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu are all fatally hit; Nagumo, Yamaguchi and Genda share the fate of these ships. Chuichi Hara can do nothing else but send Shokaku and Zuikaku, the former moderately damaged but still miraculously underway, fleeing westwards and he does not stop running until he reaches Truk Lagoon.

Unfortunately, he is still there with both carriers when Enterprise, Saratoga and Lexington, a vengeful Bull Halsey leading them, come a-calling several days later...

Engagingly done. This would indeed be completely disastrous.


Sargon
 

Sargon

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Monthly Donor
I do wonder if they would actually have broken off or convinced themselves said merchant ship hadn't been able to get off a report and press on? Given the aggression of the IJN and the optimism they displayed with other operations I suspect they would have talked themselves into continuing the attack.

As for PODs, a couple of last minute ones. The USS Ward's report of the engagement with the midget sub is taken seriously, or one of the subs washes up inside Pearl harbor before the attack. Or the radar report from Opana Point is likewise taken seriously, perhaps because the B-17 flight arrived earlier or wasn't scheduled for that weekend. These are a bit last minute but they might provoke a more effective air defence.
Bigger picture, the codebreakers get lucky and penetrate Japanese codes sooner, allowing the USN to ambush the Kido Butai.

Aye, there's some useful PODs which could give some warning, enough to rain on Nagumo's parade.

If Tamon Yamaguchi was in command, sure. But this is plodding, boring, cautious Chuichi Nagumo we're talking about here, and this is his first outing so victory disease and the overconfidence that comes with it have yet to set in. He turns back, I'm pretty sure.

Fair point. On this occasion his caution could actually be useful.


Sargon
 
A sub could slip away and wait until it is reasonably distant before sending a radio message.
Of course but how long to wait if say within 500miles of PH? Maybe 6hrs or 100mi and that means a relatively strong transmission getting received which would be hard to brush off as coincidence. I would think any sub skipper running across the KB steering east is going to make him want to not waste too much time but maybe to shadow the fleet for a a number of hours to be able to make a detailed contact report.
 
Apologies it was more a sarcastic response poking a bit of fun at a recent 20 page plus thread with the op trying to argue what a fantastic plan this would be. I don't mean to distract from far more sensible discussion around your idea.
Say what you will but I am not apologizing for posing that scenario as a what if and whether foolish or not it was one worthy of discussion and was something Chester Nimitz himself was very grateful didn't occur so go ahead and crap on him if you must.
 

Driftless

Donor
A variation on the too early start of the Doolittle operation?

The Kido Butai is spotted and sufficiently ID'd at extreme launch range(by submarine/PBY?). The first wave takes off, with every thought of losing significant numbers of planes and crews to running out of fuel on the return trip (They're expending fuel at an advanced rate during the attack), as well as the expected combat losses. Nagumo closes the range somewhat to increase the chance of saving some of those planes and crews. The second wave is launched, but still from farther out than preferred. No chance of the third wave

Meanwhile, Pearl has more time to organize the AA land defense, the Battleships are at high alert, with AA batteries manned and supplied, water-tight doors are shut, and more of the USAAC fighters are fueled and armed, and some of the other aircraft are diverted to other islands, if possible. Keep the ships in harbor - loss in deep water would be potentially worse that the OTL attack.

Having a solid location for the KIdo Butai, counter attacks may be attempted. The US aerial attacks may be unproductive, but serve as cover for US Subs (hopefully ones using the older working torpedes).

The net result: much higher damage to the skilled pilot and crew base of the Kido Butai, lower losses to the US warships in harbor. (Some damage is maybe useful to keep the fleet from counter-productive counter-attacks). The Kido Butai losing ships, or damage to some of the carriers is gravy.

The US home front is still scared shitless and mad-as-hell. FDR still gives the "Date that will live in Infamy" speech and the DoW is declared.
 
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The obvious, low hanging fruit, is that the massive conglomeration of American aircraft on pearl are readied. This both smashes the IJN attack and potentially portions of the Kido Butai in one. The aircraft were capable enough and in range already, without having to move around CVs and the like. This can be coupled with things like torpedo nets, cruisers being readied for sorties, maybe even the CVs being pulled in close. Just the AAA being readied would seriously harm the attackers.

Think about it: PH has everything needed to totally defeat the attack.

What it requires is a degree of foreknowledge. Maybe it's the US consul finding out that the KB has sailed to the mid Pacific, maybe that's guided in by a sub report or aerial report right before the action.

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End result?
The attacks do relatively little at a great cost. The survivors return home to find elements of the KB burning to the waterline. Surviving CVs are caught between sailing away and fighting USN CVs. Damaged ships are ran down by cruisers.
 

Garrison

Donor
If Tamon Yamaguchi was in command, sure. But this is plodding, boring, cautious Chuichi Nagumo we're talking about here, and this is his first outing so victory disease and the overconfidence that comes with it have yet to set in. He turns back, I'm pretty sure.
An interesting alternate would be if Nagumo was struck down as Halsey was prior to Midway and thus Yamaguchi is assigned and perhaps does things slightly different, leading to the Kido Butai being spotted and pressing on regardless. Might mean there is a Battle of Hawaii to open the war in the Pacific.
 
What if an aircraft returning from the first strike misjudges its landing and comes down hard, setting off a chain of explosions that sink a Japanese carrier? The other five will be intact, of course, but they'll have to abandon a number of aircraft, weakening Japan further down the line?

RC
 
If the Sub spots the KB on the morning of 8th and gets a report off later in the day. Then A) by KB orders they will still press home the attack even if the 100% know they were spotted. But with 8 or so hours of separation that could put what 250+ miles between the Sub and the KB as they are both going art of site directions. So would the KB really consider this as being spotted? The KB can’t read the msg and they cant even tell what type of ship it was from can they? Heck it is a long way off it could just be a US surface vessel call in for some reason that happened along the KB Back trail. Sort of as it is probably 100 miles or so off to one side of the KB.
Are you telling me that the KB was going to turn tail is so much As a radio message within 200 miles of them and about 100 off thier track was transmitted? I really doubt that.
 
Of course but how long to wait if say within 500miles of PH? Maybe 6hrs or 100mi and that means a relatively strong transmission getting received which would be hard to brush off as coincidence. I would think any sub skipper running across the KB steering east is going to make him want to not waste too much time but maybe to shadow the fleet for a a number of hours to be able to make a detailed contact report.
Two thoughts occur to me. The signals intel detachment aboard the KB may not intercept the submarines transmission. Their signals intel was fairly efficient, but if they are scanning a different portion of the frequency range than the sub is transmitting on that moment it could be missed entirely. More likely is the Japanese have no idea of the content of the message. While they were first rate at signal analysis they had a fair amount of trouble breaking other folks codes. AFAIK they were unable to penetrate the codes used by the USN submarines. So, they may or may not detect the transmission, but they can only guess its content. If its made from close by then its a logical guess its a contract report. If not then ???
 
I very much doubt the IJN would be able to know the content of any traffic but only be able to deduce the proximity of a transmission being made. Very unlikely they would call off the attack however they might be more ready for a PH alerted to their coming attack?
 
On Dec 5 Combined Fleet HQ ordered Nagumo to take the following actions regarding an unexpected encounters and Nagumo blinkered instructions to his fleet:
- render enemy or third nation warships or merchant vessels incapable of signaling , attack and sink if necessary
- Panamanian, Norwegian and Greek vessels are considered to be hostile enemy shipping.
However, Soviet vessels were excluded, to a point. Japan had been informed of the passage of several Soviet freighters and were not too surprised to spot the Uritsky on 5 Dec, bound for Vladivostok with Lend-Lease materiel. Scouts maintained long range surveillance, vigilant to any possible radio transmissions that may reveal Kido Butai's presence to the world. After several tense hours, the Soviet vessel continued on it's way without emitting any signals. It isn't clear today if the Uritsky even spotted the IJN, but postwar reports reveal the Japanese were prepared to sink the Uritsky if it showed any sign of revealing the presence of the task force to anyone else.
"And I Was There" Layton, pp. 260-263
 
I would be curious to see what the Japanese would do if Pearl was a disaster for them. They still have the capacity to do pretty much everything they did historically in SEA, but if they've lost the bulk of the Kido Butai for little gain then they are, by their own doctrine, screwed.

Given that the KB was smashed 6 months later I doubt that the war, if continued, would look especially different then it did historically. The USN has a better correlation of CV forces, but doesn't have the tanker assets needed to prosecute a war in SEA.

I suspect that there too much institutional momentum for the war to be ended, so maybe we can preserve Yorktown as a museum this time.
 

Garrison

Donor
I would be curious to see what the Japanese would do if Pearl was a disaster for them. They still have the capacity to do pretty much everything they did historically in SEA, but if they've lost the bulk of the Kido Butai for little gain then they are, by their own doctrine, screwed.

Given that the KB was smashed 6 months later I doubt that the war, if continued, would look especially different then it did historically. The USN has a better correlation of CV forces, but doesn't have the tanker assets needed to prosecute a war in SEA.

I suspect that there too much institutional momentum for the war to be ended, so maybe we can preserve Yorktown as a museum this time.
Of the attacks in December and January I think the only one that would be directly affected would be Wake Island. With no Japanese carriers lurking the the relief force probably presses on. The other obvious question is the Philippines, but I don't think the USN would be tempted to send a relief force there having already largely abandoned the original Plan Orange. The IJN are going to be desperately looking for a chance to bring their battleships into action and even they might have consider expedients to get carrier cover, like cutting pilot training times.
 
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