Germany goes Total War early on

[Kaiser of Brazil]

As we know it, Germany only really entered Total War production after 1942 under Speer, the production of vehicles and weapons skyrocketed. But that revealed to be far too late to change the tide of the War.

But what if Fritz Todt died in August 1939 and Hitler appointed Speer to prepare for Total War ? What if Germany ramped up their production during 1940-1941 ?

 

[Grey Wolf]

Would you have seen more civilian unrest?

 

[Kaiser of Brazil]

Would you have seen more civilian unrest?

Maybe, but that's the Gestapo and Goebbels' problem.
-Albert Speer, 1940

 

[King Augeas]

Isn't this a complete myth? The reality being that the later increases in production resulted from the early-war increases in industrial capacity?

 

[WarlordGandhi]

As we know it, Germany only really entered Total War production after 1942 under Speer, the production of vehicles and weapons skyrocketed. But that revealed to be far too late to change the tide of the War.

But what if Fritz Todt died in August 1939 and Hitler appointed Speer to prepare for Total War ? What if Germany ramped up their production during 1940-1941 ?

This is a myth that has been disproved. Speers so called "armaments miracle" was a result of German efforts to increase production as far back as 1938. Adrian Tooze's Wages of Destruction (arguably the best book about the Nazi economy) outlines that:

Hitler's Germany was always too hampered by shortages of raw materials, notably crude oil and rubber but also iron ore and coal, animal feed and fertiliser, foreign currency and even labour, to attempt an independent industrial and commercial existence in peace, let alone a campaign of European conquest. For all the ingenuity of cynical opportunists such as Hjalmar Schacht, at the Reichsbank until 1939, and Speer, at Armaments after 1942, Germany passed through a succession of hair-raising financial and resource crises that hampered its armies and helped to bring on the final collapse..

 

[Garetor]

This is a myth that has been disproved. Speers so called "armaments miracle" was a result of German efforts to increase production as far back as 1938. Adrian Tooze's Wages of Destruction (arguably the best book about the Nazi economy) outlines that:

That was a fantastic book. Lays out in stark detail just how hopeless the Nazi situation was.

 

[jmc247]

There was a significant amount of slack, inefficiency, and at times just dumb priorities in the German war production effort. Just look at the number of tanks produced in the Summer of 1940.

Fixing that early would matter more transferring everything produced for civilian into the war effort.

 

[iron]

As we know it, Germany only really entered Total War production after 1942 under Speer, the production of vehicles and weapons skyrocketed. But that revealed to be far too late to change the tide of the War.

But what if Fritz Todt died in August 1939 and Hitler appointed Speer to prepare for Total War ? What if Germany ramped up their production during 1940-1941 ?

My advice?
Don't drink the kool-aid.

That is all

 

[Garetor]

There was a significant amount of slack, inefficiency, and at times poorly placed priorities in the German war production effort. Just look at the number of tanks produced in the Summer of 1940.

Fixing that early would matter more transferring everything produced for civilian into the war effort.

Now, wouldn't that involve an early confrontation with the Wehrmacht, before the big victories that sealed Hitler's reputation. IIRC, part of the problem with Nazi tank production was how deeply the Wehrmacht was involved. They were tinkering at every step, making it more of an artisinal process rather than an industrial one.

There's a great discussion of German tank production in this video.

 

[CalBear]

My advice?
Don't drink the kool-aid.

That is all

I'm pretty sure I understand what you are saying, however, more clarity regarding who this advice is directed toward would help

 

[iron]

Sorry for the cryptic phraseology.
Speer himself (and his kool-aid).
This "total war" thing has been gone over numerous times (on numerous discussion boards I might add).

What really tells the story is the vast amount of research done in the German archives in the past 10-15 years.
Speer was nothing more than the beneficiary of investments and policy decisions made by both Goering and the much maligned Fritz Todt.
Speer also had access to a pool of slave labor that he could put to work (not him personally, the situation is far more complex than that) in these new facilities as they came available.
The Messerschmidt facility around Wiener-Neustadt, RWHG in Silesia, Niebelungen tank plant, Dessau expansion for Junkers (air frames and Jumo engines), Daimler Benz expansion into Wolfsburg (aero engines), realignment and tooling in Germany's shipyards for U-Boot production. Contracts for license manufacture of the FW-190 let to Siebel, Fiesler, AGO and significant expansion of BMW/Bramo for production of it's twin row radial.
And then there's the less sexy things.
Like the Billions of RM sunk into the Synthetic chemistry industries.
Common perception recognizes only two outputs from these facilities: BUNA (synthetic rubber) and Motor Fuels.
The truth is VASTLY different and the sheer magnitude of organic chemistry research (and its employment) in WWII Germany is a thesis waiting to be written.
And our "good Nazi" basically walked onto the stage with most of this ground work already done for him.
What he did do (in conjunction with with Himmler's SS and the prevalent NSDAP apparatus) was "rationalize" the allocations of (by this point:forced) labour and of raw materials.
This results in a total focus driven by production of weapons and leads to the ridiculous situation where there are thousands of aircraft and AFV's delivered with no trained crews to operate them.
And little to nothing in terms of "spares" either.
Some "miracle"...

But I (again) digress.

Ron

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

There was a significant amount of slack, inefficiency, and at times just dumb priorities in the German war production effort. Just look at the number of tanks produced in the Summer of 1940.

Fixing that early would matter more transferring everything produced for civilian into the war effort.

That inefficiency was built into nazi administration, fix it and you don't have the nazis running Germany anymore.

The second part runs into another myth, that the German civilians were living a life of luxury at the expense of military production. The fact is consumer goods and luxuries were expensive & rarer in Germany in 1939 than in other nations. A lot of complex reasons for that, including general nazi economic policy. US journalist Seymour Herch spent six months in German & parts of occupied Europe from late 1940 to April 1941. His reports published in book form titled 'Patterns of Conquest, has many long descriptions of conditions in Germany that winter. The rigid, complex, and severe rationing of essentials and luxuries inside Germany is described. The corruption, blackmarket, and endemic cheating on that rationing system is also described. The cheating was most apparent among the nazi party membership, who ironically were better treated by the rationing system that non nazi citizens. Also described is the system of currency manipulation and outright looting that redirected consumer goods and luxury items from France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway to Germany.

All this was typical of the smoke and mirrors that characterized nazi financial administration during the 1930s & to the end. Getting to the level of hypereffciency of Britan, or the US level requires someone else other than the nazis administrating Germany and occupied Europe

 

[Garrison]

Certainly there was inefficiency in the German armaments industry in 1940 but consider that in 1933 it barely existed at all. In intervening years it had expanded at breakneck speed, not exactly conducive to achieving maximum efficiency. This was compounded by the rapid technological obsolescence of many of the weapons introduced at the beginning of the expansion. The tank force of 1940 was still heavily dependent on the Panzer I and II, which were little more than training vehicles. The Luftwaffe found that its current generation of aircraft no longer had any qualitative edge during the Battle of Britain and aircraft like the He 280 were suggesting the era of piston driven aircraft was already coming to a close. if this wasn't bad enough events on the battlefield dictated constant changes in priority. Up until the fall of France it made sense to focus on ammunition production for what might be a drawn out campaign in the west. Then when Britain refuses to make peace the emphasis shifts to the Luftwaffe and the U-Boats and when they prove unable to knock out the British the emphasis shifts to acquiring the resources needed to maximize the output of German and Western European industry to face off against the might of the Anglo-American war machine.

So basically the inefficiency of 1939-40 was pretty much inescapable and as others have pointed out even if you did wave a magic wand over German industry so everyone was adopting the best practices and most efficient methods there wasn't the food, labour or raw materials to take advantage of it.

 

[BooNZ]

There was a significant amount of slack, inefficiency, and at times just dumb priorities in the German war production effort. Just look at the number of tanks produced in the Summer of 1940.

Fixing that early would matter more transferring everything produced for civilian into the war effort.

I believe this to be the myth referred to earlier on this thread.

The lacklustre tank production for much of the war (and especially between the fall of France and the start of Barbarossa) can be attributed to the German prioritisation of munition production and the diversion of iron-steel resources relating thereto. Such German 'inefficiencies' can often be attributable to the diversion of scarce resources (eg steel and manpower) to varying priorities.

All this was typical of the smoke and mirrors that characterized nazi financial administration during the 1930s & to the end.

In many cases the Germans only had smoke and mirrors to work with.

Getting to the level of hypereffciency of Britan, or the US level requires someone else other than the nazis administrating Germany and occupied Europe

Towards the end of 1940 the British had already burnt though their available resources and were begging the US for handouts. It's simply a case of overwhelming resources being available, rather than an inherently superior Allied efficiencies.

 

[jmc247]

I believe this to be the myth referred to earlier on this thread.

The lacklustre tank production for much of the war (and especially between the fall of France and the start of Barbarossa) can be attributed to the German prioritisation of munition production and the diversion of iron-steel resources relating thereto. Such German 'inefficiencies' can often be attributable to the diversion of scarce resources (eg steel and manpower) to varying priorities.

That would go under the ‘dumb priorities’ part of my comment.

Some of the generals craft a new doctrine for warfare focused on combined arms and above all speed while the production people have their heads stuck preparing for the last war where mountains of munitions were used to gain a couple yards of ground. Far from unheard of and actually quite typical though still not helpful.

 

[JSchafer]

German production is limited by resource shortages. Building 20000 Tanks a month won’t change a thing when you don’t have the men and oil to operate them. War is not a strategy game where all you need is initial resource to build a unit and it’s done. Building more planes or submarines or tanks would take resources away from other areas and make them inoperable. Just like the triangle of armor firepower and mobility there has to be compromises and sacrifices.

America and Soviets were the main producers of oil and had access to rubber etc. They are able to streamline the process and just build and build.

 

[Garrison]

That would go under the ‘dumb priorities’ part of my comment.

Some of the generals craft a new doctrine for warfare relaying on combined arms and above all speed while the production people have their heads stuck preparing for the last war where mountains of munitions were used to gain a couple yards of ground. Far from unheard of and actually quite typical though still a problem.

But its not dumb if you appreciate the realities of the situation. No one expected the French to fall in six weeks even after Manstein's plan was adopted. The Wehrmacht had to plan for months of warfare and that meant having the munitions available to fight it, what's the point of having hundreds more tanks if they have no ammo to fight? Also Sickle Stroke wasn't some brilliant synthesis of combined arms. It was a plan cooked up after Germany was already at war and rejected by most of the German high command as far too risky and they weren't wrong about that either. It could have failed so many ways and it took an enemy who played into it and failed to show much in the way of energy or determination for it to work.

 

[jmc247]

But its not dumb if you appreciate the realities of the situation. No one expected the French to fall in six weeks even after Manstein's plan was adopted. The Wehrmacht had to plan for months of warfare and that meant having the munitions available to fight it, what's the point of having hundreds more tanks if they have no ammo to fight? Also Sickle Stroke wasn't some brilliant synthesis of combined arms. It was a plan cooked up after Germany was already at war and rejected by most of the German high command as far too risky and they weren't wrong about that either. It could have failed so many ways and it took an enemy who played into it and failed to show much in the way of energy or determination for it to work.

Based on WW1 logic it was not dumb I would agree with you there. But, too much of a focus on the lessons of the last war is often the thin line between victory and defeat in major wars over the last two centuries. The last war goggles motivated or influenced a lot of decisions down to the invasion of the USSR. If Germany could win against Russia with a fraction of their troops committed in the last war... then logically they should have been able to win easier with most of their troops committed for the next one. But, that assumes everything is the same other then the politicians.

What makes logical sense and what pans out are two separate things. The French war effort obviously gets lower marks for completely preparing for the last war down to the creation of super trenches.

 

[Drunkrobot]

I also question if there was even political will in Germany for total mobilisation early on. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith argue in The Dictator's Handbook that autocratic states both start wars more casually and fight wars more casually in contrast to democracies. Essentially, as the ruling coalition gets wider and wider across a nation, the relative sacrifice each member of the coalition must make in order to increase military expenditure gets smaller, and the more likely that goods secured by victory will be shared across all of the nation, so in the case of war democracies are more ready to go for maximum effort. Of course, Germany did eventually put everything it had into the fight, and the USSR did the same the moment the Patriotic War started, but that could be explained by the stakes they were in: By 1943 it was clear to the German regime that they were under existential threat, with especially the top members likely facing the gallows, while for the Soviets it was clear form the start that their only choices were victory or extermination.

For Germany's ruling class of party officials and businessmen, flush from the astonishing conquest of all of Western Europe including the ancient enemy France, and gearing up to fight the Soviet Union which just humiliated itself in Finland (another case of my point: The Soviets didn't need to conquer Finland, while Finland obviously needed to defend its independance) to think "We're in dire straits, we need to give everything we've got if we want to win", you're going to need srom pretty persuasive rhetoric from Hitler (how can a cause be extraordinarily difficult and destined to succeed at the same time?).

 

[ennobee]

As we know it, Germany only really entered Total War production after 1942 under Speer, the production of vehicles and weapons skyrocketed. But that revealed to be far too late to change the tide of the War......

Germany was by all means on total war production since 1935, meaning that military equipment had absolute priority over everything else. In 1942, they just ramped up their output by using all resources, including some that were unthinkable just months before and others that months before even they themselves didn't know they had.

The reason for that was that now suddenly with allied bombers showing up over Hamburg for the first time since 1933, they were on the defensive and had to scramble to survive.

So if we turn things around. Instead of asking what would happen if Germany in 1940 had the military output of 1942, we ask what would HAVE HAPPENED for Germany to have that output in 1940... The best answer I can think of is that Hitler miscalculated himself in France, that the Blitzkrieg wasn't over in two months and that by December of 1940, the Allie's were camping at Cologne's city walls.