Germany goes Total War early on

Would Germany perform better ?

  • Yes, with the extra armaments they can actually win

    Votes: 8 9.5%
  • Yes, not enough to win the war but maybe extend it for a year

    Votes: 22 26.2%
  • Maybe, really depends on how they use them

    Votes: 20 23.8%
  • No, it's irrelevant if the Oil production isn't also increased

    Votes: 34 40.5%

  • Total voters
    84

BooNZ

Banned
That would go under the ‘dumb priorities’ part of my comment.

Some of the generals craft a new doctrine for warfare focused on combined arms and above all speed while the production people have their heads stuck preparing for the last war where mountains of munitions were used to gain a couple yards of ground. Far from unheard of and actually quite typical though still not helpful.
Actually the Germans maintained those dumb priorities on the the Eastern front to a lessor extent over the entire war - using superior firepower to inflict disproportionate losses on far more numerious Russian forces, while fending off enemies on multiple other fronts.
 
Actually the Germans maintained those dumb priorities on the the Eastern front to a lessor extent over the entire war - using superior firepower to inflict disproportionate losses on far more numerious Russian forces, while fending off enemies on multiple other fronts.

By late '42 and into '43 what had worked for Germany had mostly stopped working for a combination of factors not present in '41. The Soviets became wise while the Germans refused to adapt to new realities. The smartest thing Germany could have done would have been to make peace before the Soviet's adapted, but good luck with that. Outside that the Germans should have moved away from the offensive that mostly worked for them in '39-'42. By '42/'43 the German war effort at least in the East needed to think entirely differently. That didn't happen.

When I say differently look at the plans for what to do in regards to say the Kursk matter and its not flashy, but Guderian, Speer and Rommel handed in the hybrid WW1/WW2 strategy that would have been better then the alternatives for that front (well outside making peace).
 
Based on WW1 logic it was not dumb I would agree with you there. But, too much of a focus on the lessons of the last war is often the thin line between victory and defeat in major wars over the last two centuries. The last war goggles motivated or influenced a lot of decisions down to the invasion of the USSR. If Germany could win against Russia with a fraction of their troops committed in the last war... then logically they should have been able to win easier with most of their troops committed for the next one. But, that assumes everything is the same other then the politicians.
It had nothing to do with planning for the last war, it was planning to fight a war that no one could count on being over in a few weeks. The army needed a substantial stockpile of munitions to fight with and Nazi Germany had to strike a balance as to what to produce and lacking 20/20 hindsight they had to make sure they didn't wind up with an army being driven back when it ran out of fuel and ammo.
 
It had nothing to do with planning for the last war, it was planning to fight a war that no one could count on being over in a few weeks. The army needed a substantial stockpile of munitions to fight with and Nazi Germany had to strike a balance as to what to produce and lacking 20/20 hindsight they had to make sure they didn't wind up with an army being driven back when it ran out of fuel and ammo.

The point that lacking 20/20 hindsight it makes sense could be used with most war production efforts in history including the French in the interwar period.

What made sense at the time lacking foresight is one question... what military machine had the better foresight and optimal plans and organization is another and how could nation’s military machine have better planned beforehand for the wars to come is yet another.
 
the synthetic oil program was inefficient since the process is inefficient, but it was made worse by not pushing completion until the war was nearly over. so they basically bore the costs but did not have time to reap the benefits.

the same thing was done with the producer gas vehicles, they were only implemented during wartime, thus you have the cumbersome attachments to deal with under dire conditions but no time for the fuel savings to be stockpiled.

in a practical sense, the Soviets grasped how desperate the German fuel situation was during their period of cooperation. if they had stockpiled fuel, they might have pushed the Soviets for grains and/or minerals?
 
The point that lacking 20/20 hindsight it makes sense could be used with most war production efforts in history including the French in the interwar period.

What made sense at the time lacking foresight is one question... what military machine had the better foresight and optimal plans and organization is another and how could nation’s military machine have better planned beforehand for the wars to come is yet another.
And what they did was perfectly reasonable and rational and probably correct in preparing for the war they faced. Germany didn't need more tanks in 1940 or 1941, it needed a logistics system that could support the ones they had and that was simply beyond the means of the Nazi war economy.
 
There's one very simple fact, right at the start of the war, that proves how poorly prepared Germany was for a war, and how much it lacked: the severe shortage of tanks that meant that, not only severall Panzer divisions had to be equiped with non-german tanks right in 1939 (the Pz 35 and Pz 38) but also the need to keep the Pz I in service. A completely useless training tank.
 
The whole system was wedded to the old German doctrine of manoeuvre warfare. It would be necessary to tear down the existing system and rebuild from scratch. Within the context of WW2 this was impossible for Germany while engaged in the war. Furthermore Germany lacked the resources and manpower to win the war once Blitzkrieg had failed. Had Germany decided to mobilise for total war they could have prolonged the war but that is all. Having failed to defeat Britain and then picking a fight with the US and the Soviet Union Nazi Germany was doomed by the end of 1941. The best that coud be hoped for was a stakemate and that was incredibly difficult to achieve in 1942 and 1943. After summer 1943 there was no chance even of a draw.
 
There's one very simple fact, right at the start of the war, that proves how poorly prepared Germany was for a war, and how much it lacked: the severe shortage of tanks that meant that, not only severall Panzer divisions had to be equiped with non-german tanks right in 1939 (the Pz 35 and Pz 38) but also the need to keep the Pz I in service. A completely useless training tank.

With which Germany still beat France abd chased Britain out of Europe in 1940
 
One of the bits of trivia overlooked in much of this analysis is that Germany was not supposed to fight more than a couple months war in 1939. Hitler was operating under the assumption neither Britain nor France would actually engage in war over Poland. He was a bit nonplussed they actually declared war in September 1939 & even more confused when they did not sensibly stand down in October after Poland ceased to exist. The time line in Hitlers fantasy word was a war vs the USSR, probably in 1941, after another 18+ months of preparation, but certainly not before mid 1940. He several times spoke of the "final battle with France" circa 1942, or 1943 & his guidance to the Wehrmacht was based on that. Hitler never believed he'd fight a actual war with Britain at all. A accommodation between the two Aryan nations was how it played out in Hitlers mind.

All this fuzzy thinking led to a full on war with Britain and France for which nazi Germany was largely unprepared, and in many respects could not have properly prepared for. With just five years to build a entire army, air force, and navy from the token Reichesweher of 1934 there was just not enough time to do everything to the satisfaction of armchair generals possessed of little real experience and overstuffed with hindsight.
 
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With which Germany still beat France abd chased Britain out of Europe in 1940

So? I didn't say they were bad tanks, quite the opposite. But it shows that Germany had to start the war allready short on their intended main tanks (the PzIII/PzIV) and had to depend on foreign designs and production. Right in 1939.
 
[snip]That inefficiency was built into nazi administration, fix it and you don't have the nazis running Germany anymore.

The second part runs into another myth, that the German civilians were living a life of luxury at the expense of military production. The fact is consumer goods and luxuries were expensive & rarer in Germany in 1939 than in other nations.

Correct - which is why Germany resorted to confiscations of food, coats, blankets and shoes among other things from occupied countries. Some of this was sent to the army but much was distributed among civilians.
 
What the Germans need to do before 1939 is to trade more with the Russians for more oil. It needed a stockpile at least double of what it had to have a remote shot at taking down Russia.
 
Correct - which is why Germany resorted to confiscations of food, coats, blankets and shoes among other things from occupied countries. Some of this was sent to the army but much was distributed among civilians.

Seymour Hersh in the afore mentioned 'Pattern of Conquest' described how currency exchange rates imposed by Germany on the occupied nations made it easy for German soldiers and visiting businessmen to purchase large quantities of food, clothing, and consumer goods, while the locals saw these things becoming unaffordable, and often unavailable due to rationing restrictions. That is German occupation soldiers could purchase all the Dutch cheeses they wanted at great prices in German currency, which the Dutch were required to accept. Whereas the Dutch could purchase only what their ration allowance permitted, and that only with inflating Dutch currency.
 

Deleted member 1487

By late '42 and into '43 what had worked for Germany had mostly stopped working for a combination of factors not present in '41. The Soviets became wise while the Germans refused to adapt to new realities. The smartest thing Germany could have done would have been to make peace before the Soviet's adapted, but good luck with that. Outside that the Germans should have moved away from the offensive that mostly worked for them in '39-'42. By '42/'43 the German war effort at least in the East needed to think entirely differently. That didn't happen.

When I say differently look at the plans for what to do in regards to say the Kursk matter and its not flashy, but Guderian, Speer and Rommel handed in the hybrid WW1/WW2 strategy that would have been better then the alternatives for that front (well outside making peace).
The issue by 1943 wasn't so much Soviet learning, they still had a long way to go, but the fact that the US was finally fighting with it's full weight in naval, land, and air operations that seriously bloodied the German and Italian militaries. That and L-L was hitting new heights, while attrition and economic warfare had pushed Germany over the edge in terms of peak quality manpower and equipment. In a one front war Germany and her allies could have taken the USSR of 1943 and beyond even with L-L, but not with the UK and US joining in and getting increasingly powerful, while Germany was falling behind technologically and in terms of output. The RAF bombing of the Ruhr really did serious damage by summer 1943 and it was only down hill from there.

The problem with making peace after betraying Stalin was that any peace would at best be temporary in 1941-42 and it seriously looked to everyone like the USSR was about to collapse even in 1942; the success of Uranus was relatively unexpected and thereafter there was no chance of a peace deal. I don't know what sort of different thinking in the East would have done given the strategic air war's increasing successes in 1943 and the enormous material and manpower advantages the Allies had. Certainly it is arguable that being on the defensive could have preserved their strength in 1943, but all that does is delay the inevitable and make it more costly all around.
 
the synthetic oil program was inefficient since the process is inefficient, but it was made worse by not pushing completion until the war was nearly over. so they basically bore the costs but did not have time to reap the benefits.

the same thing was done with the producer gas vehicles, they were only implemented during wartime, thus you have the cumbersome attachments to deal with under dire conditions but no time for the fuel savings to be stockpiled.

in a practical sense, the Soviets grasped how desperate the German fuel situation was during their period of cooperation. if they had stockpiled fuel, they might have pushed the Soviets for grains and/or minerals?
And there it is...
The reply I was waiting for.

So let's talk about organic chemistry and the overall validity of the investment made into the field.

Ready to go?

FYI ? Fischer-Tropsch.org is a basic fundament.

This brings me back around to my initial thesis stated upthread: most folks have no concept of organic chemistry.
Even less as with regards to the basic fundaments that would keep such a facility online in the 9/44 to 5/45 timeframe.
Out of the big (IG Farben, Bosch, BASF, Erdol AG[RWHG]) Companies involved in synthetic production in Nazi Germany? All of these corporations experienced significant complications as with regards to "car loading". (and delivery by the DRB) .
And that was kind of because the WAllies had "Messed" the railway net up to a point where nobody could rely on "anything" getting from here to there.

And hence the utter collapse of Germany.
 
...
So let's talk about organic chemistry and the overall validity of the investment made into the field.

not sure of your point(s) on the synthetic fuels program? my points were that the program, built in fits and starts, could have allowed a degree of autarky but for fact the plants were only completed near/during wartime (is that confused? or confusing? sorry)

IIRC they had approx. 10m barrels capacity by 1938 and approx. 36m barrel capacity by 1943 (at which point it does not matter?)

the producer gas apparatus can be seen as "cheap, dumb ass" synthetic plant since it converts everything to fuel by burning it! once again they deployed those or rather mandated them too late.
 
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