Was it wise to demand unconditional surrender in WW2?

[Johnrankins]

After the Franco-Prussian war? The French got off quite light and their indemnity was proportional to the one Napoleon imposed on Prussia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Prussian_War#Prussian_reaction_and_withdrawal

Fair enough. My point was less "It was fair" and more "Losing a war sucks and you have to pay the price because life isn't fair." That said you do have a point. If the French imposed the same indemnity on Prussia that Prussia imposed on them they don't have anything to complain about.

Alsace-Lorraine had been a German province until the French progressively conquered in the 17th-18th centuries, so they didn't even lose territory that was core French, just part of the French historical wars of conquest to achieve their 'natural borders'.

True but it was "French" by then as most people in the area and in the rest of the world saw it as French. That said if there was no WWI and it became "More German" I wouldn't have a problem with it. Like it or not ALL land is stolen land. Not a square foot on this globe hasn't changed hands a number of times since man came out of Africa. Sooner or later you have to let go or you have endless squabbling over it. Frankly I couldn't care less who controls A/L as long as the matter is settled.

And don't forget the French actually declared war on Prussia first. In no way could it be said that the treaty terms were close to that of the Treaty of Versailles (though that was justified in parts due to the damage the Germans caused in France, just not the way it was done immediately after the war given the state of the German economy and ability to pay) or WW2 unconditional surrender (again justified given what the Nazis and Imperial Japanese government had done).

The Allies certainly should have allowed more free trade with Germany. It was the same mistake GB made before the ARW. That is trying to collect taxes after making it difficult to make the money to pay them.

The Napoleonic wars final was extremely light on France after all the damage that was caused. If anything the 20th Century treaties were historical outliers in terms of their harshness because warfare had become wars of entire peoples, rather than an aristocratic pastime that they had full control over in terms of making peace and treaties without much regard to the feelings of the general public.

Also, the fact that they were so bloody and economically devastating. Dozens of tons of shells from WWI are being found every year in France even now. A huge strip of French land was uninhabitable for a long time because of it. Some of it still is IIRC. Now you can say "war is war" and I would agree but the French definitely were going to want Germany to pay for that as long as people are people.

The ARW was more in line with the 20th century treaties due to the nature of the conflict making it one of ideology and the entire people, plus internal social conflict rather than a war of empires like the 7 years war.

Also, GB was 3000 miles and clearly unable to do anything about it. If they could, they wouldn't have lost the war.

 

[Johnrankins]

There were prosecutions and trials. And most of them (e.g. Dönitz, wo was indicted for USW) fell flat (Nimitz pointing out that they did the same). So no, German officers were indicted for things their WAllied counterpart did and got off scot-free.

Like you said they weren't actually convicted and yes, charging Donitz of war crimes because of USW is laughable since we did it much more effectively against the Japanese.

As to why the thing is so vitriolic: Because the WAllies made a point of the war being "just" and they being "right" and their actions in the aftermath (which, no matter of correct, violated centuries of precedent) are justified by them being the "good" people. Thats why. Thats why they get held to a higher standard. Also, don't mix up the WAllies and the Entente. The former are one of the very few alliances in history which can make a claim to being the good guys, while the latter are just a bunch of imperialists which didn't want to share with the new kid.

I have thought for a while that Britain and France should have sold their money pits in Africa and other places to Germany and Italy. The Germans and Italians waste money on money-losing colonies, the Entente picks up some cash and the Kaiser can brag of being King of Nigeria or something. Sure, giving the colonies independence would have been better but was not going to happen due to racial predjudices of the time.

In all of those cases, the moving on was done both by the losers and (more importantly) the victors. Rubbing it in at any opportunity is both unprecedented (e.g. treatment of the French after Napoleon) and unsporting. The latter is the expectation that all civilised nations would fight a war, the loser would be invited to the negotiations to make their case (however strong or weak), there would be some hemming and hawing, the looser would pay and thats that then. The French got that treatment in 1871, and the Germans had every right to expect that treatment in 1917.

ToV was unprecedented in that it was set long before the major power(s) of the other side arrived. The re-negotiations to which are so often pointed would have gone on before the singing. If you exclude the loser, you signal that they are not worth talking to - a colonial nation. Property to be divided. See the treatment of the Chinese.

That is the attitude I refer to. What did you expect to happen? The Germans to meekly thank them for their punishment and open up the precedent that you could simply do to them whatever you wanted?

True, and if a sane government took over Germany and implemented most of its foreign policy as respect to border changes I would have little problem with it prior to the invasion of Rump Czechoslavakia which wasn't German.

 

[Johnrankins]

I don't think a border province really fits the meaning of 'core'. After all Algeria was France's 4th Shore, with more French people there than in all of A-L, but look what happened there. Without WW1 and another generation is would probably be German in culture and language especially once Berlin released it's political grip on the region and the people felt like they weren't occupied. No one likes being treated like an occupied country and facing major change, like being switched from one country to another that speaks a different language and has a different political system than they're used to, so that, rather than a strong sense of French nationalism, was probably more a factor in Alsatian feelings.

A/L was French for over a century by that point IIRC, too much time passed for it to be considered "German" any longer.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Even the Reich's Unconditional Surrender really wasn't. Donitz knew that the WAllies, at minimum, were going to follow the Hague Conventions and he sent Jodl to negotiate terms (primarily to allow more of the German population and Wehrmacht to escape to areas under WAllied control). Ike let that run for two days before demanding "Unconditional Surrender" be signed. God alone knows how many Germans escaped the tender mercies of the NKVD/Red Army and life under the DDR (which was, after Stalin's death, probably a WORSE police state than the Soviet Union) thanks to that "Unconditional Surrender".

Donitz’s intentions weren’t remotely so noble when he sent out Keitel to Eisenhower. What he was actually trying to do was a desperate attempt to split the Allies, force a breach in the terms of Yalta, and turn the British and Americans against the Soviets. The British became quickly aware of the German strategy through the efforts of their code-breakers, and passed this on to Eisenhower who then shut the Germans down hard when they came to him offering a conditional surrender only to the Western Allies. Eisenhower also didn’t wait two days before laying down the law, rather he informed the Germans that he’d cease accepting the staggered surrenders within two days when they first showed up and they responded by letting things drag for those two days before finally agreeing. That doing so saved Germans fleeing westward lives from the Soviets was more of a happy accident then the intent behind Donitz’s actions. Of course, Donitz was more then happy to seize on the idea as a post-facto justification for his actions when he had to make himself look good to his western captors and public opinion.

Plus, what prompted the attempt was the surrender of German forces in Italy, which Donitz believed he could use as the wedge issue. Prior to that, Donitz tried to faithfully carry out Hitler's last wishes on that point, which is the reason Hitler appointed the Admiral as his successor and not Goering or Himmler, who had already been involved in "treasonous" surrender discussions with the Allies.

 

[Intosh]

I have read that the demand of unconditional surrender greatly assisted German and Japanese propaganda and helped prevent internal dissension since it helped the Axis powers to paint the Allies as intending to impose the harshest possible peace. Was it wise to make the demand? What might have been the consequences of dropping it?

The Western Allies and the Soviet Union didn't want a replay of Germany "Stab in the Back" propaganda.

And given the depth of inhumanity, the Germans sunk in during WW2, nobody wanted to negotiate with them.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The Western Allies and the Soviet Union didn't want a replay of Germany "Stab in the Back" propaganda.

And given the depth of inhumanity, the Germans sunk in during WW2, nobody wanted to negotiate with them.

It was basically an off the cuff remark by FDR without consulting his allies, but Stalin liked it, as it ensured post-war there would be power vacuum left in central Europe, while Churchill was apoplectic for the same reason as well as others, but too subordinate in the alliance for his opinion to matter. Plus it was basically a done deal once it got into the press. Negotiations were considered, after all Stalin supposedly authorized a couple attempts, but they didn't get far.

There has been some questioning of the wisdom of it given the impact it had on the anti-Nazi resistance:
http://www.thehistoryreader.com/mod...urrender-questioning-fdrs-prerequisite-peace/

Though it is hard to see how the Allies could have allowed Germany to avoid occupation, disarmament, or to hold on to any territory taken after the war. There was just too much fear of a round 3.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

It was basically an off the cuff remark by FDR without consulting his allies, but Stalin liked it, as it ensured post-war there would be power vacuum left in central Europe, while Churchill was apoplectic for the same reason as well as others, but too subordinate in the alliance for his opinion to matter.

Not true. FDR had consulted with Churchill and the War Cabinet on the idea in the months beforehand. Churchill was also far from “apoplectic” about it. He expressed reservations about it’s framing, but otherwise was fully in support of it. The idea that it had a substantial impact on anti-Nazis resistance likewise has little foundation.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Not true. FDR had consulted with Churchill and the War Cabinet on the idea in the months beforehand. Churchill was also far from “apoplectic” about it. He expressed reservations about it’s framing, but otherwise was fully in support of it. The idea that it had a substantial impact on anti-Nazis resistance likewise has little foundation.

They mused with the idea, but nothing was decided on. He only expressed full support in public, he had a lot of problems with what was done.
I literally just cited a book that tackles this topic and refutes pretty much your entire post.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

They mused with the idea, but nothing was decided on. He only expressed full support in public, he had a lot of problems with what was done.

Except he did not. At no point in 1943-45 did he object to the idea of unconditional surrender. At most, he only objected too it’s presentation. That the British agreed to the policy before it's public announcement is made black and white by the content of the cables and discussion between Churchill, Roosevelt, and the British war cabinet. That the announcement was also pre-planned and not off-the-cuff is likewise made entirely clear by the notes Roosevelt was reading off when he made it, which (save for the allusion to the Civil War) contained word-for-word what he announced and he had shown it to Churchill beforehand. Why Roosevelt later claimed they were off the cuff is unclear*, but the overwhelming evidence we have from the time is it was neither off the cuff, unagreed upon, or a surprise.

*Churchill's reasons for making his own claims about being surprised in his memoirs are more transparent, as he attempted to rewrite history to improve his own image by exploiting both the post-war controversy over Unconditional Surrender and the blooming Cold War.

I literally just cited a book that tackles this topic and refutes pretty much your entire post.

No, you cited an article which indulges in a lot of German apologia and misrepresentation of the facts in an attempt to force the moral onus of ending the European War off of the German leadership, where it belongs, and onto the WAllies. What’s more, you pretty clearly latched onto it since it’s the first thing that comes up on google in the relevant search.

 

[Johnrankins]

It was basically an off the cuff remark by FDR without consulting his allies, but Stalin liked it, as it ensured post-war there would be power vacuum left in central Europe, while Churchill was apoplectic for the same reason as well as others, but too subordinate in the alliance for his opinion to matter. Plus it was basically a done deal once it got into the press. Negotiations were considered, after all Stalin supposedly authorized a couple attempts, but they didn't get far.

There has been some questioning of the wisdom of it given the impact it had on the anti-Nazi resistance:
http://www.thehistoryreader.com/mod...urrender-questioning-fdrs-prerequisite-peace/

Though it is hard to see how the Allies could have allowed Germany to avoid occupation, disarmament, or to hold on to any territory taken after the war. There was just too much fear of a round 3.

I think the minimum Allied demands would be something like this

1) ALL senior Nazi Party officials are handed over to the allies, say
Gauleiter and up.
2) ALL SS officers of the rank of Lt. Col. and up are handed over to the Allies
3) Germany goes to 1920 borders - East Prussia which goes to Poland.
4) The dismantling of Germany's entire war industry and its automotive and airplane industry as well.
5) ALL German armed forces are disbanded and Germany is put under Allied occupation. German marshalls and admirals need to sign the surrender document.
6) War crimes trials are to be conducted by the Allies.

Basically, the terms would be little different than Unconditional Surrender. The Allies could not trust the Germans after their post-WWI behavior. The "Stab in the Back" myth, if nothing else, made this necessary.

 

[Rufus Shinra]

Basically, the terms would be little different than Unconditional Surrender. The Allies could not trust the Germans after their post-wwI behavior. The "Stab in the Back" myth, if nothing else, made this necessary.

But what about asking Alsace-Lorraine whether it wants to be annexed by Germany after the war?

 

[Intosh]

It was basically an off the cuff remark by FDR without consulting his allies, but Stalin liked it, as it ensured post-war there would be power vacuum left in central Europe, while Churchill was apoplectic for the same reason as well as others, but too subordinate in the alliance for his opinion to matter. Plus it was basically a done deal once it got into the press. Negotiations were considered, after all Stalin supposedly authorized a couple attempts, but they didn't get far.

There has been some questioning of the wisdom of it given the impact it had on the anti-Nazi resistance:
http://www.thehistoryreader.com/mod...urrender-questioning-fdrs-prerequisite-peace/

It seems for me that the entire anti-nazi resistance was finished post July coup. So in august 1944, it was to late to negotiate.

And even if the western allies accepted some cease of fire magically in august 1944, the Soviets will be able to crushed everything in winter/spring 1945. I doubt that the western allies will give the Germans some "Lend Lease" to fight the Soviets.

 

[Intosh]

But what about asking Alsace-Lorraine whether it wants to be annexed by Germany after the war?

After WW2 asking the Alsatians and the Mosellans if they want to be germans ?

Nobody in 1945 wanted to be german, even the "gentle" Americans living on another continent had some plans to erase Germany as an industrial nation.

In 1945, even the Austrians decided that they are not Germans anymore.

 

[Johnrankins]

But what about asking Alsace-Lorraine whether it wants to be annexed by Germany after the war?

That depends on how the French feel about it. The odds are that A/L would want to remain French in an overwhelming vote so a plebiscite could be held if the French want to rub it in.

 

[Rufus Shinra]

After WW2 asking the Alsatians and the Mosellans if they want to be germans ?

That depends on how the French feel about it. The odds are that A/L would want to remain French in an overwhelming vote so a plebiscite could be held if the French want to rub it in.

I was asking since it was seriously suggested earlier in the thread.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Saipan also resulted in the deaths of around 90% of the civilian population. Somewhere around 30% of the entire civilian population were clearly suicides, the rest were a combination of "assisted suicide" where IJA personnel told everyone it was time to go forward to prepare the way for the Emperor and proceeded to shoot them or use grenades/satchel charges and civilians hiding in caves, either with or without IJA personnel who refused to surrender/exit and were killed by U.S. personnel.

Now, overlay that on just the Southern 1/3 of Kyushu. THAT was the way the Imperial Japanese thought wars should be fought. Unconditional surrender (which was, of course, as such things always are, very much conditional) was the only real option.

....

Okinawa might be a better model for estimating actual resistance on Kyushu. Note the ratio of surrendered to dead of between 7% & 10% on Okinawa, as opposed to less than 1% on Betio, Pleilieu, Saipan, ect... A lot of complex reasons for that, but as Col Yahara describes it was because they could evade discipline in the larger Okinawa battle, unlike the confined Saipan & Betio islands. On heavily populated Kyushu it would have been far more difficult for the Army & Police to enforce several million civilians and poorly led militia into truly fanatical resistance.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Except he did not. At no point in 1943-45 did he object to the idea of unconditional surrender. At most, he only objected too it’s presentation.

Do you have some links or books with that info? Atikinson's Army at Dawn says otherwise, as did that book I linked already.

That the British agreed to the policy before it's public announcement is made black and white by the content of the cables and discussion between Churchill, Roosevelt, and the British war cabinet. That the announcement was also pre-planned and not off-the-cuff is likewise made entirely clear by the notes Roosevelt was reading off when he made it, which (save for the allusion to the Civil War) contained word-for-word what he announced and he had shown it to Churchill beforehand. Why Roosevelt later claimed they were off the cuff is unclear*, but the overwhelming evidence we have from the time is it was neither off the cuff, unagreed upon, or a surprise.

*Churchill's reasons for making his own claims about being surprised in his memoirs are more transparent, as he attempted to rewrite history to improve his own image by exploiting both the post-war controversy over Unconditional Surrender and the blooming Cold War.

Per the Roosevelt Presidential library it seems the issue was around FDR including Italy in the statement rather than just Germany and Japan as they had talked about before and the way that FDR laid things out was different than what they had talked about previously, in which the approved statement said 'total elimination of german and japanese war power', not through unconditional surrender. Whatever FDR read was not what had been agreed upon.
https://fdr.blogs.archives.gov/2017/01/10/the-casablanca-conference-unconditional-surrender/

What might have startled Churchill, and led to later confusion, is FDR’s inclusion of Italy because Churchill had argued that they should leave the door open for a separate peace treaty with Italy. The manner in which FDR said it might also have surprised Churchill as it was a departure from the approved statement. After saying rather formally that “peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Japanese war power” FDR lapsed into his folksy storytelling mode. “Some of you Britishers know the old story — we had a General called U.S. Grant. His name was Ulysses Simpson Grant but in my, and the Prime Minister’s, early days he was called “Unconditional Surrender” Grant. The elimination of German, Japanese and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan.”

What Churchill agreed to was quite a bit different, but he ended up supporting it at the conference because he was the junior partner in the alliance at that point and that would only increase as Soviet and American military power increased and the British only got relatively weaker.

No, you cited an article which indulges in a lot of German apologia and misrepresentation of the facts in an attempt to force the moral onus of ending the European War off of the German leadership, where it belongs, and onto the WAllies. What’s more, you pretty clearly latched onto it since it’s the first thing that comes up on google in the relevant search.

I didn't say that any thing other than unconditional surrender was acceptable to the Allies, rather quite the opposite. There is a case to be made that the war could have ended sooner had the Allies been willing to negotiate, but that wasn't politically feasible, especially if it left the Axis powers any of their ill-gotten gains, which a negotiated settlement that the German anti-Nazi plotters demanded. Of course considering the book was written by the grandson of one of the July plotters who was executed for his role in the bomb plot, it isn't surprising that he made the case he did. There probably would have been more support for the assassination plot within the German military had they been presented with something other than unconditional surrender, one that might have succeeded, but again, that was politically unfeasible for the Allies, especially after Stalingrad and given the British being burned in 1938 in the Venlo Incident.

I presented it as an alternate argument to the consensus initially, but in looking up reviews the case made hasn't been refuted by historians, though the book is over 10 years old.

 

[Rufus Shinra]

Given what happened the last time Germany was left to go with a slap on the hand, 'hell no' is the only decent answer to any surrender that doesn't involve a thorough purge of the system that allowed nazism to come into power so easily. Killing a couple leaders doesn't absolve the system from the crimes against humanity it so gleefuly did.

 

[Michele]

You just answered your question why the ToV was far worse than the treaty itself implies.

That attitude.

What did you expect? "Yes master, may I please have another?"

Exactly. The only problem is that the master has to be ready and willing to provide another. In 1946, the masters were; and one of them did indeed provide another as soon as needed (1953). And undoubtedly, the Germans learned their lesson.

On the contrary, after 1919, the masters weren't ready to provide another; and pretty soon, they did not even have boots on the ground to be ready to do that. So the Germans could begin believing in the stab-in-the-back legend. By after 1929, the masters really did not want to spend the money that would have allowed them to provide that necessary another, so having a harsh treaty in place became useless, and even counterproductive.