A great series of updates, setting up for quite the show. The last four updates need threadmarks though.
April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean
- Thread starter Zheng He
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Well the world would be boring if everyone agreed all the time!
The Seafire was a defensive fighter interceptor - deployed in 42 from small carriers to defend the Landing zones during the invasion of Italy - no sign of a Zero in the Med at the time
Well bringing pilots home is one thing - but they might as well have deployed with Swordfish if safely landing back onboard the carrier was the most important feature then because the Wildcat could not catch the latest German Fighters and Bombers - which is why the Seafire was deployed in the first place - 'despite' its known flaws as a carrier plane - during the landings in Italy - particulalrly when operating off of small escort carriers
And then it made sense to keep it in production as it was the most produced fighter in the UK
Not all Buffalos are created equally - certainly the ones flying out of Singapore and Malaya were not the same as the ones flying out of DEI or Finland (and I note that the Finns were fighting peer minus opposition in the Russians not the peer or peer plus in the case of the Allies fighting Japanese or Germans) - The RAF ones were also supplied with older less powerful engines and the RAF planes were also carrying more equipment - the Dutch stripped theirs down and while the Finns had success against sub par opposition I suspect that they were not carrying as much kit either.
As for the Corsair Myth - well everything I have ever read on it says that the USN distrusted it due to the long nose and the 'bounce' upon landing and the RN desperate for a decent carrier fighter made it work using the long curve approach method. But no supply chain huh? Well if it is a myth its not the first one regarding WW2 I've ever heard - Garand 'ping', Bren too accurate etc etc.
None of the actual story updates have threadmarks, to my understanding this thread may actually predate that feature being available.
Losses to aircraft are bad, the main goal is to kill ships. If the British led forces loose more aircraft, but manage to sink 3 or 4 transports loaded down with troops and equipment in the process, they can ultimately achieve a strategic and tactical victory.
SsgtC
Banned
Yes, but if they cripple their air power in the process of doing that, they could end up being unable to continue operations in the peninsula.
possibly the limiting factor for the Japanese aircraft in defence of the convoy will be ammunition rather than fuel. Unless the air borne Fighters conserve ammunition against a continues wave of attacks there could well come a time when one of the attacking formations arrives over the convoy to little or no defensive opposition, Now whether the Allied planners are aware of this as a tactic rather than just trying to over whelm the defense with sheer numbers is a mute point. I suspect that any such occurrence at this stage of the war would be merely fortuitous.
A consolidated list of the Allied air strike groups (compiled for my own benefit):
***** Updated to fix major error in original compilation *****
From Calcutta:
No. 34 Squadron - 12 RAF Blenheim IVs - trained in skip bombing
No. 60 Squadron - 12 RAF Blenheim IVs - trained in skip bombing
No. 113 Squadron - 12 RAF Blenheim Vs - configured for strafing
No. 353 Squadron - 2 RAF Hudsons - assembly ships
No. 62 Squadron - 12 RAF Hudsons
From HMS Indomitable:
16 FAA Fulmars
From Chittagong:
No. 27 Squadron - 12 Beaufighters
No. 821 Squadron - 8 FAA Albacores - torpedoes
No. 827 Squadron - 8 FAA Albacores - 4 x 500-pound bombs
No. 25 Squadron - 16 RAAF Buffaloes
From Cox’s Bazaar:
??? Squadron - 6 Indian Battles
No. 7 Squadron - 8 Battles
No. 155 Squadron - 8 P-36s
From Akyab:
No. 5 Squadron - 8 P-36s
110 a/c total: 66 bombers (12 strafers), 44 fighters (12 strafers)
140 a/c total: 80 bombers (12 strafers, 12 strafe/bombers, 2 assembly), 60 fighters (12 strafers)
This is going to draw blood.
***** Updated to fix major error in original compilation *****
From Calcutta:
No. 34 Squadron - 12 RAF Blenheim IVs - trained in skip bombing
No. 60 Squadron - 12 RAF Blenheim IVs - trained in skip bombing
No. 113 Squadron - 12 RAF Blenheim Vs - configured for strafing
No. 353 Squadron - 2 RAF Hudsons - assembly ships
No. 62 Squadron - 12 RAF Hudsons
From HMS Indomitable:
16 FAA Fulmars
From Chittagong:
No. 27 Squadron - 12 Beaufighters
No. 821 Squadron - 8 FAA Albacores - torpedoes
No. 827 Squadron - 8 FAA Albacores - 4 x 500-pound bombs
No. 25 Squadron - 16 RAAF Buffaloes
From Cox’s Bazaar:
??? Squadron - 6 Indian Battles
No. 7 Squadron - 8 Battles
No. 155 Squadron - 8 P-36s
From Akyab:
No. 5 Squadron - 8 P-36s
110 a/c total: 66 bombers (12 strafers), 44 fighters (12 strafers)
140 a/c total: 80 bombers (12 strafers, 12 strafe/bombers, 2 assembly), 60 fighters (12 strafers)
This is going to draw blood.
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Given the capabilities of the Allied force, and how they are armed, a lot of the fighting will be at low altitude (dealing with torpedo attacks, skip bombing etc). The long range of the Zero was in part due to experienced pilots running engines lean and other tricks to get the most out of the aircraft. Once you start using full power, and do so at low altitude, your fuel consumption goes up rather dramatically so if the attack comes in waves the covering force on station will have fuel issues, if a relief force arrives before the fighting ends they will be in a better fuel state. Another factor will be with the bulk of the attackers down low, the fighters will be there and the Battles (who can glide bomb but not dive bomb I assume) who are coming in higher may get a free ride (and they need it) like the dive bombers at Midway.
All of the Battles are from No. 7 Squadron, there is a second group of eight independent P-36s (No. 155 Squadron), and there is also another strafing squadron - No. 62 Squadron with Hudsons and you also have 16 FAA Fulmars from Calcutta. There are actually almost 150 aircraft of all types (not including reconnaissance planes) heading for the Japanese convoy.
And yes, ammunition, particularly cannon ammunition is a problem for the Zeroes. Once that runs low they are limited to using their WWI style machine guns against well built Allied aircraft.
And yes, ammunition, particularly cannon ammunition is a problem for the Zeroes. Once that runs low they are limited to using their WWI style machine guns against well built Allied aircraft.
True to an extent but keep in mind there are two Wellington squadrons, an additional Hudson squadron, one Vengeance squadron, and all nine Hurricane squadrons (eight British and one Indian) that are not getting tapped for this operation and that doesn't include the growing number of 10th AF assets in theater. Allied materiel superiority is starting to make itself felt.
Plus long term the Allies and replace and even reinforce better then the Japanese.
Having a few squadrons out of action for a few weeks is bad, but the Japanese will be in a similar position.
That any shipping losses the Japanese suffer will be much harder to replace as well. Potentially crippling the better part of an entire brigade of troops before they can even hit the beach is also a significant strategic blow.
Additional squadrons are flowing in too. In January the RAF will add another Beaufighter squadron and another Hudson squadron.
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
Well in that case, to get back to the floats discussion in the meantime, some more examples (as well as some already covered)
http://warbirdinformationexchange.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=68809
MatthewB
Banned
It’s a testament to both the procurement/logistical folks and the mechanics that they could keep such a disparate array of aircraft in service. Imagine needing parts, compatible tools and the necessary skills to maintain and often rebuild radials from Wright, P&W and Bristol (both poppet and sleeve valve units), plus Rolls Royce and Allison inlines. And everything else, from different tires and suspension components for a dozen aircraft types, to spark plugs, etc, etc.
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1300 Hours, 11 December 1942, 120 Miles South of Ramree Island, Bay of Bengal – The two Blenheim Is from 3 PRU were hugging the wave tops and had shaken the Zeroes patrolling over the convoy. Both of the reconnaissance bombers were headed due north and with damage and wounded crew members aboard the pilots planned to divert to Akyab instead of flying all the way back to Chittagong. However, their mission was a success, updated sighting reports were broadcast back to No. 224 Group’s Headquarters and the tail gunners even claimed one of the pursuing Zeroes.
Onboard the light cruiser Kiso, Lieutenant Fujimoto Hideo, the bridge officer acting as the fighter director had finally gotten the Zeroes that had gone wave hopping after the latest enemy interlopers back up to their patrol altitudes. Rear Admiral Shima was not impressed with the performance of the fighter pilots. He issued orders to the exasperated young lieutenant to instruct the fighter pilots that pursuing retreating enemy aircraft wasted fuel and ammunition and the latest episode even got a Zero shot down for no apparent return.
Making matters worse, another enemy reconnaissance plane had appeared over the convoy ten minutes earlier. This was one was barely visible to the naked eye and had twin engines, twin tails, and was clearly faster than the Zeroes. The combat air patrol had already seen it off once only to have it return a couple of minutes later.
Rear Admiral Shima was convinced enemy bombers were inbound and he ordered the fighter pilots over the convoy and the skippers of the escorts to prepare for imminent air attack. Kiso’s skipper Captain Kawai suggested the convoy turn back and then reverse course at nightfall but Shima insisted on maintaining course. The plan called for the convoy to get to Ramree Island early enough during the night that all of the ships could be unloaded and underway before daylight. Any changes in the convoy’s course would lead to the transports sitting stationary and exposed to air attack the next morning.
Shima’s concerns about impending air attacks did not take long to materialize. At 1315 hours, eight P-36s from No. 5 Squadron appeared over the convoy and immediately engaged the Japanese fighters overhead. The furball did not last long, outnumbered over two to one, the RAF pilots executed a quick shoot and scoot mission claiming a Zero and an Oscar for one P-36 shot down and another damaged that would go on to ditch off Ramree Island. Ten minutes later the eight P-36s from No. 155 Squadron arrived and shot down two Zeroes for the loss of two Mohawks. While No. 155 Squadron’s fighters tangled with the combat air patrol, No. 27 Squadron’s 12 Beaufighters arrived coming at the convoy from head on at high speed and on the deck. The Beaufighters split up into pairs and strafed the six escorting destroyers, causing heavy casualties among exposed personnel and varying degrees of topside damage with their forward firing 20mm cannons. One Beaufighter went down courtesy of the task force’s anti-aircraft guns, and the rest were gone before the covering fighters had a chance to react.
Onboard the cruiser Kiso, Rear Admiral Shima immediately realized what was going on. These were suppression raids meant degrade his defenses. The main attacks had yet to materialize. Shima ordered Captain Kawai to contact Mingalodon for additional fighter coverage and for the first time he began to question whether or not he was going to survive the next few hours.
Shortly after the latest group British aircraft departed, Shima received good news and bad news. The good news was in the form of 18 additional fighters for the combat air patrol, 12 Zeroes and six Oscars. The bad news was a report from one of the seaplane tender Sanyo Marue’s Jake floatplanes detailing the sighting of an enemy cruiser force approximately 100 miles west of Ramree Island and heading southeast. In addition to air attacks, Shima now had to prepare for a possible surface action.
Onboard the light cruiser Kiso, Lieutenant Fujimoto Hideo, the bridge officer acting as the fighter director had finally gotten the Zeroes that had gone wave hopping after the latest enemy interlopers back up to their patrol altitudes. Rear Admiral Shima was not impressed with the performance of the fighter pilots. He issued orders to the exasperated young lieutenant to instruct the fighter pilots that pursuing retreating enemy aircraft wasted fuel and ammunition and the latest episode even got a Zero shot down for no apparent return.
Making matters worse, another enemy reconnaissance plane had appeared over the convoy ten minutes earlier. This was one was barely visible to the naked eye and had twin engines, twin tails, and was clearly faster than the Zeroes. The combat air patrol had already seen it off once only to have it return a couple of minutes later.
Rear Admiral Shima was convinced enemy bombers were inbound and he ordered the fighter pilots over the convoy and the skippers of the escorts to prepare for imminent air attack. Kiso’s skipper Captain Kawai suggested the convoy turn back and then reverse course at nightfall but Shima insisted on maintaining course. The plan called for the convoy to get to Ramree Island early enough during the night that all of the ships could be unloaded and underway before daylight. Any changes in the convoy’s course would lead to the transports sitting stationary and exposed to air attack the next morning.
Shima’s concerns about impending air attacks did not take long to materialize. At 1315 hours, eight P-36s from No. 5 Squadron appeared over the convoy and immediately engaged the Japanese fighters overhead. The furball did not last long, outnumbered over two to one, the RAF pilots executed a quick shoot and scoot mission claiming a Zero and an Oscar for one P-36 shot down and another damaged that would go on to ditch off Ramree Island. Ten minutes later the eight P-36s from No. 155 Squadron arrived and shot down two Zeroes for the loss of two Mohawks. While No. 155 Squadron’s fighters tangled with the combat air patrol, No. 27 Squadron’s 12 Beaufighters arrived coming at the convoy from head on at high speed and on the deck. The Beaufighters split up into pairs and strafed the six escorting destroyers, causing heavy casualties among exposed personnel and varying degrees of topside damage with their forward firing 20mm cannons. One Beaufighter went down courtesy of the task force’s anti-aircraft guns, and the rest were gone before the covering fighters had a chance to react.
Onboard the cruiser Kiso, Rear Admiral Shima immediately realized what was going on. These were suppression raids meant degrade his defenses. The main attacks had yet to materialize. Shima ordered Captain Kawai to contact Mingalodon for additional fighter coverage and for the first time he began to question whether or not he was going to survive the next few hours.
Shortly after the latest group British aircraft departed, Shima received good news and bad news. The good news was in the form of 18 additional fighters for the combat air patrol, 12 Zeroes and six Oscars. The bad news was a report from one of the seaplane tender Sanyo Marue’s Jake floatplanes detailing the sighting of an enemy cruiser force approximately 100 miles west of Ramree Island and heading southeast. In addition to air attacks, Shima now had to prepare for a possible surface action.
Remember, ITTL the Allies fixed up a near intact Zero on Ceylon and put it through its paces. They know exactly what it can and can't do. Plus, the P-36 was one of the few Allied fighters that could turn with the Zero and the Oscar.
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