Quite some time - the first of class wasn't commissioned until 15 April 1941.
Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)
- Thread starter Not James Stockdale
- Start date
The RN has plenty of battleships to go round, given what they allocated to stop the invasion. With Revenge at Plymouth and Hood and Nelson at Rosyth on anti-invasion duties, you still have Rodney and Repulse at Scapa to stop any German breakout, plus Resolution and Royal Sovereign to cover convoys, as well as Furious. Hood and Nelson might not be released if German heavy units are available, as they were there to protect the East Coast. In any case, the Kriegsmarine has only one capital ship available at the time of Sealion (Scharnhorst under repair following torpedo hit from Acasta, Gneisenau repairing after torpedo hit from Clyde, Deutschland repairing after torpedo hit from Spearfish). As such, the only forces available for a breakout into the Channel are Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper, with Prinz Eugen working up and able to join if necessary. If you're thinking about waiting until other ships are available, then the RN will also gain from new builds - King George V was available at about the same time Scharnhorst and Gneisenau returned.
Just because the beachhead is contained doesn't mean that there's no fighting. The food and water requirements are the same in a contained or mobile situation. Mobile warfare needs a lot more fuel, yes, but if the Germans are contained, they'll need more artillery, rifle and MG ammunition because they're going to be continually engaged, even if it is low-level fighting.
Motor launches aren't barges, they're a lot more manoeuvrable. They are equally vulnerable, though. The Raid on St Nazaire was just that, a raid; there was no intention to seize and hold the port, and the force committed was not sufficient to do so. They took heavy casualties in the assault and withdrawal; from 18 small craft, only four made it back to the UK. This was facing minimal naval opposition, just fire from coastal guns. If this is a model for Sealion, it's one that's unlikely to be successful.
Even assuming no RN or RAF resistance, how do you supply the forces in the UK over the winter? I wouldn't want to take a Siebel ferry through a Channel storm, and if you face a multi-day storm, then your forces ashore are going to start running out of supplies.
First off, any way of deploying mine barriers will rely on ships that will otherwise be escorting convoys; is this a more worthwhile use of them, especially since they may well be sunk while laying the barriers. The Kriegsmarine's ability to lay mines is going to decay over time due to losses, rather than ramping up. Secondly, you're not going to be able to deploy an effective mine barrier near the British coast - British coastal artillery and surface ships will discourage the minelayers, and coastwatchers will identify the location of the minefields, making sweeping much easier. And finally, mine barriers worked against the RN in the Mediterranean because the RN could rely on the RAF and USAAF to hit the convoys. Here, the RN is the main weapon against German convoys, and it can bust through mine barriers if it needs to - it does have a pretty impressive minesweeping capability, plus every significant warship has paravanes for self-defence against mines.
Coastal batteries cannot prevent the RN acting in the Channel. The coastal guns the Germans had at Calais scored just two kills. Only one warship was sunk in the Channel by coastal artillery, the USS Corry, providing fire support on D-Day, and she may have struck a mine instead. Looking at the coastal guns at Guadalcanal you used as an inspiration for this, they could not stop the IJN operating in the New Georgia Sound, nor bombarding Henderson Field at will. The only thing that stopped the IJN were the USN surface forces in the area. Establishing coastal batteries in Britain will also put extra stress on the logistical situation. Coastal guns, and their ammunition, are heavy. Also, we can't neglect the effect of British coastal batteries on German shipping - it's slower, and likely to spend a lot of time stationary when unloading, while the Germans have no way to suppress the British guns. The British had a lot of heavy guns at Dover, plus more along the coast. Between Dover and the entry to the Solent (leaving out the defences around Portsmouth), there were 21 6in guns, two 9.2in guns, two 4in, and the 14in at Dover.
Finally, night is no guarantee of safety from aircraft; remember, the FAA was trained for night attacks on shipping.
This is a remarkably risky thing to rely on. What if no airfield is captured, or if it is captured, it's been cratered heavily? Relying on night parachute drops, without a lot of practice, even with the radio navigation beams, is going to result in a lot of misdrops. And what happens if the RAF starts to put up night fighters?
Britain could survive, but it would be tricky; the coastal convoys did carry a significant portion of the coal going to the south. Going around Scotland and coming in from the west would allow convoys to reach Portsmouth and ports west of there. This would be slower, but there was slack in the system. Dover, Folkestone, Newhaven and Shoreham would likely be cut off, though the latter three are within the likely occupation zone.
As above, there were enough British battleships to put three into the Channel if needed, while maintaining significant forces elsewhere in the world. The Channel isn't a great environment for U-boats - it's too shallow, and full of mines from both sides. Maintaining a significant force of U-boats in the Channel will also mean taking them from the Atlantic, and hence freeing up British escorts to move to the Channel. Torpedo boats are a more reasonable threat, but they are heavily outnumbered by British destroyers and coastal forces, as well as being tied to the German convoys, reducing their ability to hunt effectively.
I'm really not convinced the supply chain battle will last far into 1941, even without RN and RAF interference, because of the weather issues described above. Setting that aside, while the shipping density goes down, the importance of those ships goes up. You can get ashore just fine if 20% of your shipping is sunk, but if 20% of the supplies you rely on are sunk, you're in trouble. I'm not convinced that the RN will find it more difficult to enter the Channel as time goes on; coastal batteries were so inaccurate they're almost irrelevant, and I've outlined the difficulties with mines above.
Doing it by night doesn't get rid of RAF fighters - the RAF has night fighter units available, and as time goes on, they're going to get more airborne radar.
Fighter Command cannot stop the Luftwaffe generating sorties, I agree, because generating sorties is just a function of how many aircraft can take off. What they can do is reduce the effectiveness of the sorties. If Fighter Command can, say, cause German level bombers to fly their attacks on shipping at high altitude (as they often did during the Channel Battles), functionally reducing their hit rates on destroyers to zero, then it doesn't matter how many sorties the Luftwaffe generates, they're doing nothing. The fighting in the Pacific and Mediterranean showed that having a CAP (even a small one) greatly reduced the effectiveness of strikes against shipping.
The Luftwaffe isn't fighting to defend their homeland, the RAF and RN are; do you think this might have an effect on how determined they might be? In September 1940, the Luftwaffe had 2,650 strike and fighter aircraft arrayed against Britain, counting forces in Norway. If we only count serviceable aircraft, though, this number drops to 1,790. You could increase the number of serviceable aircraft, but this will mean lessening the effort against Britain in the run-up to Sealion, allowing the RAF to strengthen. Most of the strike aircraft are level bombers, which were minimally effective against manoeuvring warships; it doesn't matter how many strikes these generate, you're not going to do much damage to the RN.
Also, if the Luftwaffe shoots their bolt in the first day, or even in the first three days, then it's going to give the British an opening.
A lot of this is wishful thinking. As I keep pointing out, Gibraltar can only fall with Franco's acceptance, which he's not going to give without serious concessions by the Germans. Persuading the Italians to take Malta is going to be hard, as Mediterranean Fleet and Force H were still strong even leaving out the ships selected for anti-invasion duties. Logistical problems will reduce the German ability to invade Egypt, as there's not enough ports, trucks or trains to support a proper invasion. Italian East Africa and Iran were both occupied by forces from British India; Sealion doesn't stop these forces from taking their historical actions. The Twins and Bismarck are months away from being available at the time of Sealion, and the RN planned to retain a significant reserve to prevent any German breakout. People arguing that every RN battleship will be deployed to the Channel are wrong.
Some RN captains will ram, yes; after all Ajax rammed a caique during the attack on the Lupo convoy, a situation where taking damage was even more risky. Accidental (or semi-accidental) ramming was also pretty common in night actions. Where I disagree is that it will be policy, as some on here suggest.
Both sides are exposed at 200 yards in theory. In practice, the RN hit rate is good, while the hit rate from improvised mounts has gone from non-existent to minimal. Remember the comparison with submarines, which were typically engaged at close ranges like this, had proper mounts and sights for their guns, and trained crews, but which only scored two hits on RN ships over the entire war. The RN will engage at close ranges because this allows them to bring every weapon they have available to bear.
What aren't you building to build the MFPs and Siebels in these numbers? What if the minelayers you're relying on get sunk escorting the first day's convoys? Why rely on coastal guns that hit very few targets during the war?
I've refuted this point repeatedly during this post, but again, it relies on inaccurate coastal guns, a minelaying capability that might not survive the early engagements and will decay over time, and the RN not doing any minesweeping.
Yes, a bunch of reservists, plus the Canadian and New Zealand divisions, three British infantry divisions, two reinforced brigades, a tank brigade and an armoured division. Yes, they might be underequipped, but so will the Germans; a lot German heavy equipment will be sunk in the Channel or end up in the wrong place due to scattered convoys, or had been left behind, or will be delayed in disembarking due to the limited ship-to-shore capabilities the Germans have.
Again, mines and coastal artillery will be much less effective than you think. British air strikes will also be very nasty; there are a number of FAA squadrons earmarked for anti-invasion duties, well equipped and well trained for attacking ships, especially at night
Twelve knots isn't that hard to catch, especially with destroyers and cruisers that can make 30+kts. Without specialised landing craft, unloading them across a beach will be difficult, and they'll be easy targets for British coastal artillery. Unloading at ports is easier, but it means capturing a port intact.
Overlord's logistics were more complex than Sealion's, yes, because it was a larger landing. Still, it gives an idea of what needs to be done to get ashore and established. Looking at Allied landings of comparative size, like Torch or Anzio, might be better.
While PoW would likely never be assigned to the Channel, why do you think she'd never fire her main armament against small targets? There's plenty of cases of battleships engaging destroyers and similar targets with their main batteries. Coastal guns have minimal chances to hit her; how much damage did coastal guns do against battleships off the Normandy Beaches, Anzio, Cherbourg?
A) There's no reason to assume the RN will commit to a daylight battle, but B) if they do, I think you overestimate how much damage it'll do to the RN. Yes, German bombing sank several destroyers during 1940, but the majority were stationary, or in confined waters and could not manoeuvre. A couple more were escorting convoys, and were thus slowed by the need to protect their charges, while others, like Delight, were alone when attacked, and could not benefit from the AA network of the fleet.
What do the British need reserves for? The invasion's come, and given the likely losses to the Kriegsmarine, the Germans can't land anywhere else in the UK. Crushing the beachhead is all you need the reserves for.
Yes, it would be better for Britain if Sealion is defeated at sea. It's still plausible that the Germans get ashore, in some form, though, given the size of the assault convoys and the scale of the attempted assault. Amphibious assaults cause a lot of confusion and disruption, even when they have been practised and rehearsed for years, let alone when they've been savaged by a fleet offshore. I think you underestimate how much damage that confusion can do. Imagine you're a German battalion commander for Sealion. You've landed in the wrong place, and don't have detailed maps for where you are. One of your companies is with you, but the second is six miles down the coast and the third is either in the Channel or on the other side of it. You have some heavy weapons, but no artillery support because you don't know where the battery that was supposed to provide it for your battalion is. You don't know when reinforcements and resupply are coming, and you don't know if your higher command knows where you are to send them to you. You might be able to pull together a larger force from other stragglers from other mis-landed units, but that will take time that the British will use to reinforce and prepare. And then you've got to head in land, and fight your way across a canal line with pillboxes along its length, dominated by heights on the opposite bank from you (the Royal Military Canal). The British forces in those pillboxes and on those heights might not be perfectly trained, equipped and led, but they do have enough ammunition, they know the terrain, they're fighting from good, prepared positions, and they know they can call on artillery support and reinforcements if needed. I know this is a contrived scenario, but it's certainly not inconceivable as a situation that the Germans ashore might find themselves in.
This is a good point, and it's one that's going to really harm the Germans. They're going to be having a lot of contact with the Royal Navy.
As my example above outlines, small unit tactics can only take you so far; the disorganisation means that units will be landing without, or greatly separated from, the equipment they need to carry out their objectives. A unit that needs to cross the RMC will need bridging equipment, but if that's landed in the wrong place, they're going to really struggle to cross it.
Glenn239 said:
The RN didn't have to cross the minefields off Tunisia because the RAF and USAAF were making good practice hitting the shipping from the air, and there was no pressing need to commit ships. The Italians, who could dedicate ships to minelaying, rather than needing them to escort convoys, were laying them out of sight of British controlled land, and could threaten British minesweeping efforts with surface force, had advantages when it came to minelaying the Germans didn't. The minefields in the Sicilian Channel were also far enough from British bases that the RN could not leave their bases, sweep them, and return to base all under the cover of night, unlike in the English Channel. All of this means that the Italian minefields were a more effective deterrent than German ones would be.
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I could have sworn they were earlier.
Oh well. I guess it will be Dad's army in a row boat with a contact mine.
And if the second wave and resupply convoys travel during the day as planned the RN might not find too many targets?
hipper
Banned
no time at all there were already minefields in place prior to thr invasion, remote. ontrolled minefields in fact, covered by costal artillery.
Two of the E Class Destroyers and the entire I Class we’re capable of being converted to carry 60 mines each.
Here they are in action:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texel_Disaster
Deleted member 94680
Ah, someone’s found the Auftragstaktik page on wiki, I see.
So, now we’re supposed to believe that a Feldwebel, three cooks, two Stabsgefreiter from a different Company’s signal section and a rag-tag bunch of soldat from various sections are going to be able to break out of a beachhead against a Company with it’s full ToE defending from prepared emplacements and interior lines? Okaaaaaaay...
For fucking real, and even if they DID, where the bloody fuck are they going to go?
Pretty much. Could a rag tag group or two break out of the beach heads? Maybe! Could they find their way inland? Maybe even that too! But what are they going to eat! What are they going to drink! The moment they encounter any locals its a race to silence them before the local home guard commander gets a phone call. And they WILL be being hunted by regular units too!
Well, it worked in Kelly's Heroes. And they had only a Sherman, the germans will have a real german Pzkfw.
Ahh but according to the cunning German plan above
It seems only fair if the Germans can lay their minefields around the beachhead after landing the English can too. Say... across the gaps in the German fields. It seems only fair to help them out.
I'm just worried if she waits too long the battle will be over already, s'all.
Grand Admiral Thrawn
Donor
I would pay money to see a movie where Sealion is actually a bank heist, a few low level officers risking all of the KM and LW to get the gold. Would make the most sense ad to why the Germans would try it.