Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

[King Augeas]

There are some good examples of air strikes defeating surface ship forces, but those do more to prove your point since the Germans of 1940 had not remotely the skill of the 1942 USN or IJN carrier aircrew.

A couple years ago I did some research on the German AF actual success against ships at sea 1939-1940. it was actually pretty abysmal. There was a small air unit that had specialized in attacking ships, the used extreme low level tactics, 'skip bombing' in US vernacular. Training pilots in this technique cannot be done in the classroom and requires more than a few hours in the air. Surprisingly the German dive bombing was not as successful as the IJN or USN. They'd not done it, and had given inadequate thought to the technique. It was not the same as dive bombing a stationary land target & the hit rate low. In the Channel Battle of July-August 1940 the German ratio of hits and sunk to bomber sorties was significantly lower than what the USN/IJN had in 1942. That was with the participation of their experienced maritime strike unit. The lack of a torpedo and poor dive bomber techniques meant that overall the hit to sortie ratio was very bad.

& as noted multiple times here the German attacks on the RN will be with RAF opposition. Perhaps at this point a example might be useful. In the summer of 1942 the Brits tried to run a convoy through the Sicillian Channel to Malta. Op PEDESTAL. Three RN carriers covered the convoy. Those had less than 100 fighters, between them. On the first day of opposition to the Brit operation the Axis air forces are credited with 220 bomber sorties vs the Brit ships from Sardinia & Sicilly. Just two hits are credited, one bomb hit the armored deck of the HMS Victorious, shutting down flight ops for part of the day, another damaged a destroyer. So two hits per 120 sorties against a cargo ship convoy with air cover. This with air forces using groups with two years developed experience in attacking ships at sea. Later days after the Brit air cover was removed the hit ratio per sortie went up considerably. Against cargo ships moving at 15 knots or less & dispersed AA cover the hit ratio fell well below 1-50 sorties.

When I return home Sunday maybe I can review and post the numbers I collected two years ago.

Pedestal is an absolutely fascinating operation and probably the most important WW2 battle in European waters. It's surprising that it's not better known - a bit like convoy ONS-5. But there's little glory in convoy escort. You're right to point out the remarkable effectiveness of the RN's fleet defence, particularly in comparison to the utter incompetence shown by the vaunted IJN at Midway (and earlier during the IO raid). But it's not a great example for Sea Lion, as the key to Pedestal was radar-controlled interception, just as the IJN's flaw was a fleet air defence doctrine based on looking around to see if your ships were on fire yet.

However, the point about the LW success rates at sea is most interesting. Earlier in this thread, Glenn asserted in his usual style that "The PK of a hit by a Stuka dive bomber in 1940 vs. a destroyer underway is about 5%-10%." Now, far be it from me to suggest that Glenn pulled that number out of a sea lion's arse, but it would be interesting to see some actual data...

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Maybe an insight into the Siebel Ferries being used as offensive military craft would be useful, seeing as though we like examples to base projected cases from? How about Operation Brazil where the Germans used 23 Siebels to attack Soviet positions on Shuko Island on Lake Lagonda?

“Aftermath
Overall, of 23 German vessels taking part in the operation, 17 were sunk or seriously damaged. Total losses were four different artillery ferries (SF-13, SF-21, SF-12, SF-26) and one infantry boat (I-6), while SF-22 suffered heavy damages. Human losses were heavy for the Germans with 18 killed, 57 wounded and 4 missing. There are scarce details about the Soviet losses, except the naval ones, 6 prisoners were took on the island by Germans. The operation resulted in high losses for the Germans with little result and marked the effective end of offensive Axis operations on Ladoga.”

The page on the Siebel unit the Eastern Ferry Operations Staff has this enlightening observation as well:

“The Siebel ferries of EFO had good armament but they were far too slow and had too short a range for effective operations. They were almost "sitting ducks" to the Soviet patrol boats, gunboats and bombers. As their personnel came from the Luftwaffe, with no sea-going experience, operations in the often harsh weather conditions were extremely difficult.”

 

[Deleted member 94680]

OOB for Operation Brazil
Germans:
11 armed ferries
3 transport ferries
7 infantry boats
Soviets:
1 minesweeper
gunboats and patrol boats
2 motor torpedo boats
garrison with 3 100mm guns

Casualties and losses
Germans:
4 armed ferries lost
1 infantry boat lost
18 KIA, 57 WIA, 4 MIA
Soviets:
1 gunboat damaged
1 patrol boat damaged
2 100mm guns destroyed

So, 11 Siebels go in, 4 don’t make it out - that’s about 30% casualties. This is against 3 coastal pieces and approximately 6 patrol boats and 1 minesweeper. No destroyers or cruisers present.

If we extrapolate...

 

[Mike D]

Further to note:
For Operation Sea Lion, the Luftwaffe organized the Siebel ferries into two flotillas: Flakkorps I (assigned to 9th Army) and Flakkorps II (assigned to 16th Army). They were intended to provide flank defense against air, ground and surface targets for the First Wave tow formations. Each Siebel ferry would transport a complete flak unit consisting of one 8.8 cm gun and two 2 cm guns plus their three prime movers (although 9th Army planned to transport the necessary towing vehicles and support personnel separately via barges). Upon reaching the invasion beaches, the ferries were to land their flak units and then assist with unloading the larger steamers anchored offshore. The Army rather disingenuously referred to the Siebel ferries as “destroyer substitutes”.

So even the Germans weren’t planning on using these superior vessels as cargo carriers, rather as defensive pickets for the steamers and converted river barges.

I bet getting a prime mover off a "landing craft" onto a beach then reversing it up to another "landing craft" and hooking up an 88mm Flak gun while under fire would have been fun.

 

[King Augeas]

Maybe an insight into the Siebel Ferries being used as offensive military craft would be useful, seeing as though we like examples to base projected cases from? How about Operation Brazil where the Germans used 23 Siebels to attack Soviet positions on Shuko Island on Lake Lagonda?

“Aftermath
Overall, of 23 German vessels taking part in the operation, 17 were sunk or seriously damaged. Total losses were four different artillery ferries (SF-13, SF-21, SF-12, SF-26) and one infantry boat (I-6), while SF-22 suffered heavy damages. Human losses were heavy for the Germans with 18 killed, 57 wounded and 4 missing. There are scarce details about the Soviet losses, except the naval ones, 6 prisoners were took on the island by Germans. The operation resulted in high losses for the Germans with little result and marked the effective end of offensive Axis operations on Ladoga.”

The page on the Siebel unit the Eastern Ferry Operations Staff has this enlightening observation as well:

“The Siebel ferries of EFO had good armament but they were far too slow and had too short a range for effective operations. They were almost "sitting ducks" to the Soviet patrol boats, gunboats and bombers. As their personnel came from the Luftwaffe, with no sea-going experience, operations in the often harsh weather conditions were extremely difficult.”

Bloody hell. What's the freeboard of that bucket? Assuming those are Aryan Supermen, then it's 1 m?

 

[hipper]

Sealion required about 2,000 tons per day minimum, whether over the beach, via port, or air transport. The best over-the-beach they had were the 50 Siebel Ferries, (about 3,000 to 5,000 tons beach capacity) After that, it was a mixed bag of MB's, transports (offshore offloading), or barges (which would have a higher rate of accidents while landing).



Your estimate is more than fair to the Germans for a defensive posture. 1,000 bombers and JU-52's should be able to sustain 100 tons deliveries per day. 50 Siebel ferries - with another 25 to 50 being built per month - should be able to do over 1,000 tons, perhaps even 2,000 tons, per day. 500-1,000 MB's should be able to do over 1,000 tons per day. 2,000 barges with 200 tons capacity each should be able to do over 1,000 tons per day. A

it required much mote than that Glen any reinforcement of men and equipment would require 10’s of thousands of tonnes ammo fueland food is minor by comparison.

besides the USN would not leave their transport ships in an undefended anchorage, at Guadalcanal, why would the KM be braver?

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Bloody hell. What's the freeboard of that bucket? Assuming those are Aryan Supermen, then it's 1 m?

Great picture isn’t it? The wiki page makes mention of them being able to cope with “force 6 waves” but rather them than me!

I loved Halder’s early observation at a test showing of a Siebel:

“Nothing new, may not stand up in surf.”

 

[misterwibble]

Bloody hell. What's the freeboard of that bucket? Assuming those are Aryan Supermen, then it's 1 m?

It'd do fine on a lake. In summer. A small lake.

 

[DaveBC]

it required much mote than that Glen any reinforcement of men and equipment would require 10’s of thousands of tonnes ammo fueland food is minor by comparison.

besides the USN would not leave their transport ships in an undefended anchorage, at Guadalcanal, why would the KM be braver?

Well the KM did leave half their destroyer fleet in an inadequately defended anchorage at Narvik, so there is precedent...

 

[soothsayer]

The first Thompsons in British service were issued in early 1940. Even without them, rifles and hand grenades will cause a slaughter on the barges.

In British Army, limited numbers and RN /RM did not.

Rifles were in limited supply. RA did have rifles for Gunners, Home Guard were down to .30-06.

How far can you (or anybody) thrown grenades.

Under a hail of small, even USN PT boats only closed to 100m of barges.

QUOTE="Mike D, post: 18836686, member: 75936"]I've heard a rumour that if a large enemy invasion fleet is sailing towards you then it's possible for you to put people on ships that wouldn't normally live there. The "battle" will be an hour at most outside harbour, you don't need to give them somewhere to sleep or feed them. They'll be back in their normal barracks by nightfall.[/QUOTE]

Half the small fleet is at sea each night.

Destroyers, etc, are at various stages of readiness. Many are at “warm boiler” status, some on 12 hrs notice with cold furnaces.

Ship’s captains will not want “extras” disrupting their ships teamwork.

How many German infantrymen will have ever fired from a moving boat at a fast moving warship that's firing 4", 2lb and 20mm HE back at them? I'd suggest that by the time British ships are pulling next to barges and giving them the choice of surrender or be slaughtered by Marines or the ship's crew with personal weapons the machine gunners on the German side will be well and truly suppressed, if not well and truly dead.[/QUOTE]

Read my earlier text. RN does NOT have 20mm at time!

Only fleet units, destroyers and above have 40mm. There are many more barges than destroyers and up.

None of these units will be stopping or slowing in the channel, with S-boots around, one of the most effective destroyer and small boat killers in channel.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

It'd do fine on a lake. In summer. A small lake.

Good catch. Lake Huron on a windy day would throw one of those.

 

[sloreck]

I can imagine the ASBs getting involved by giving the RN loudspeakers and recordings of "The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald", musical accompaniment for the Siebel Ferries as they deal with the Channel sea states.

 

[YYJ]

Trying to think of other real world contemporary examples of the hit rate in close range naval engagements analogous to what would be expected in a Sealion opposed Channel crossing . Two that come to mind are:

Sydney vs. Kormoran. Both ships almost stationary, so almost no differential movement. Both ships stable gun platforms. Range ~1000 yards. Outcome: a ton of hits in a short time. Both ships destroyed, one pummeled to bits, one fatally wounded by luckyish shots and because it was not a military vessel. Kormoran’s problem was not running out of ammo, but the light guns overheating. Conclusions? Advantage goes to the one who fires first.

Raid on St Nazerre. Night action. Converted WW1 destroyer and many MGBs and MTBs vs. a lot of land based AAA. Royal Navy side nominally stable gun mounts because military vessels although maneuvering hard. German side stable gun mounts because on land. Outcome: RN light forces mostly shot to bits in a short time, although some escaped. The destroyer was not affected and managed to run the gauntlet and complete its mission.

Overall conclusions: Military ships take a lot more to sink them than civilian ships. Close range actions are much deadlier than long range battles like Espero. Light warships in a confined space, like a harbor raid or a convoy, are much more vulnerable in a scrap than say Schnellboats at 40 knots with room to maneuver.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Pedestal is an absolutely fascinating operation and probably the most important WW2 battle in European waters. It's surprising that it's not better known - a bit like convoy ONS-5. But there's little glory in convoy escort. You're right to point out the remarkable effectiveness of the RN's fleet defence, particularly in comparison to the utter incompetence shown by the vaunted IJN at Midway (and earlier during the IO raid). But it's not a great example for Sea Lion, as the key to Pedestal was radar-controlled interception, just as the IJN's flaw was a fleet air defence doctrine based on looking around to see if your ships were on fire yet.

However, the point about the LW success rates at sea is most interesting. Earlier in this thread, Glenn asserted in his usual style that "The PK of a hit by a Stuka dive bomber in 1940 vs. a destroyer underway is about 5%-10%." Now, far be it from me to suggest that Glenn pulled that number out of a sea lion's arse, but it would be interesting to see some actual data...

ONS-5 (nice to know some one else has heard of it) - was 'thee' most important naval engagement of the 'thee' most important battle of the war - and the Allies didn't even realise it at the time - or at the time that they had just effectively won the Battle of the Atlantic

The Germans absolutely realised it - they called it Black May

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Bloody hell. What's the freeboard of that bucket? Assuming those are Aryan Supermen, then it's 1 m?

Less Aryan Supermen, more 'Heath Robinson'

 

[Jellico]

Alison Brooks Why Sealion is Not an Option for Hitler to Win the War

It does seem to fall into line with her direct quotes from German instructions and other sources covering the German side of planning.

My favourite bit.

"Premature crossing by higher staff will be valueless"

To quote the Simpsons "That's why they call it Fort Sensible."

 

[soothsayer]

OOB for Operation Brazil
Germans:
11 armed ferries
3 transport ferries
7 infantry boats
Soviets:
1 minesweeper
gunboats and patrol boats
2 motor torpedo boats
garrison with 3 100mm guns

Casualties and losses
Germans:
4 armed ferries lost (3 grounded, 1 scuttled, Post enemy fire)
1 infantry boat lost (enemy fire)
18 KIA, 57 WIA, 4 MIA
Soviets:
1 gunboat damaged
1 patrol boat damaged
2 100mm guns destroyed

So, 11 Siebels go in, 4 don’t make it out - that’s about 30% casualties. This is against 3 coastal pieces and approximately 6 patrol boats and 1 minesweeper. No destroyers or cruisers present.

If we extrapolate...

The fine print....?

Actually no Siebels where outright sunk!!

Only one infantry boat.



“The EFO suffered losses during a raid to destroy Soviet radio station, lighthouse and coastal artillery emplacement on the strategically important island of Sukho(Suhosaari in Finnish) 37 km from the Southern coast of Ladoga, at the main supply route to Leningrad.[4][5] The idea of the operation was presented to the Germans by the Finnish Lieutenant General Paavo Talvela.[6] The German-run operation, codenamed Operation Brazilbegan on 22 October 1942. Though the radio station and the lighthouse were torched and the coastal artillery on the island was destroyed, the landing was eventually repulsed and, in a running battle, the flotilla was harassed by Soviet aircraft, torpedo-boats, and gunboats all the way back to its base along the northern shore of Lake Ladoga. When approaching Sukho island, one light ferry (SF 12) run aground and several other ferries went to assist it. However one of the light ferries (SF 22) was hit by Soviet coastal artillery fire and one heavy (SF 13) and one light ferry (SF 26) that had gone to assist the grounded ferry (SF12) also became grounded despite of the efforts to get them loose. Ultimately, all three had to be abandoned. During the return voyage one heavy ferry (SF 21) had to be scuttled when it started to take in water so badly that they would not have made it back to the base. Infantry boat (I 6) assigned to the ferry was also lost.

Losses suffered by the EFO during the raid were heavy artillery ferries SF 13 (grounded) and SF 21 (damaged, later scuttled), light artillery ferries SF 12 (grounded) and SF 26 (grounded) and infantry boat I 6—casualties for the naval and landing forces were 18 men dead, 57 wounded, and 4 missing.[7][8] One of the lost ferries was taken over by the Russians.”

 

[varyar]

"We lost five ships but only one sank outright," doesn't seem like an exceptionally optional outcome to me. But I must admit I'm not a sailor.

 

[GDIS Pathe]

Destroyers, etc, are at various stages of readiness. Many are at “warm boiler” status, some on 12 hrs notice with cold furnaces.

Good thing this particular group is moving into the channel at top speed with orders to kill as many German as possible

Only fleet units, destroyers and above have 40mm. There are many more barges than destroyers and up.

I'm sure seasick infantrymen shooting from unpowered river barges will be amazingly effective against destroyers. It's not like they can be swamped by the wake on a DD let alone its heavier armament

None of these units will be stopping or slowing in the channel, with S-boots around, one of the most effective destroyer and small boat killers in channel.

I'm sure the S-Boats will be totally effective against an RN Taskforce that number over 50 cruisers and destroyers plus a battleship plus 700 armed trawlers and lighter craft. Against less than a dozen KM Warships and 20 S-Boats, who have to defend some thousand + unpowered unseaworthy barges, it seems like a perfectly fair fight am I right?

Actually no Siebels where outright sunk!!

Yes because their commanders would have totally grounded perfectly seaworthy craft wouldn't they?

 

[soothsayer]

Good thing this particular group is moving into the channel at top speed with orders to kill as many German as possible



I'm sure seasick infantrymen shooting from unpowered river barges will be amazingly effective against destroyers. It's not like they can be swamped by the wake on a DD let alone its heavier armament



I'm sure the S-Boats will be totally effective against an RN Taskforce that number over 50 cruisers and destroyers plus a battleship plus 700 armed trawlers and lighter craft. Against less than a dozen KM Warships and 20 S-Boats, who have to defend some thousand + unpowered unseaworthy barges, it seems like a perfectly fair fight am I right?



Yes because their commanders would have totally grounded perfectly seaworthy craft wouldn't they?

The point was it is not so quick and so easy and back for breakfast as many make out.

As 700 small craft, most have only RNR, etc with at best WW1 3 pdrs, little firing practice and mounted in small boats bobbing around no better than barges. Most have only Lewis guns and are going to have slug it out with barges

The RN units, most are not in the channel and at Hull etc. Like the 35 odd S-boots, with a third unavailable, the 50 odd, is about a third less.

RN command made it very clear capital ships would not be wasted on this. They are needed for B.B./BC later and raiders.