An Age of Miracles Continues: The Empire of Rhomania
- Thread starter Basileus444
- Start date
Welp, the only way out for Ibrahim now is through roman field fortifications, that is if he wants to get out.... After all, Egypt is enough to feed his army.
Hmph, let Ibrahim squeal. If Syria-Palestine's interior is going to become a wasteland, the let it be one for now. Sure getting a peace in the East is very important, but letting Ibrahim survive it is not. Let him and his army starve, and send him, alone, skin and bones back to Persia.
Syria-Palestine can be resettled by Roman veterans, or new landlords, it is free land for the Empire, and paid land for its citizens.
On a happier note - this was fantastic!
Syria-Palestine can be resettled by Roman veterans, or new landlords, it is free land for the Empire, and paid land for its citizens.
On a happier note - this was fantastic!
Looks like the noose is tightening around Ibrahim’s neck.
But how many men will be needed for this “grand gesture” to bring Theodor to the peace table? Is Demetrios considering committing more men to push further into Europe at the cost of not smashing the Ottomans?
But how many men will be needed for this “grand gesture” to bring Theodor to the peace table? Is Demetrios considering committing more men to push further into Europe at the cost of not smashing the Ottomans?
Some Aragonese pretender who managed to hold on to the Balearic islands, Sardinia and Corsica (if I'm not mistaken). Don't recall the name.
I took it to mean that Theodor will likely prefer to destroy both empires in one fell swoop with the most massive army he can possibly muster rather than take a humiliating peace once the campaign becomes unwinnable.
Fun update! Between this and Wrestle Kingdom it is a great start to the weekend!
I understand you like naming ITTL generals after OTL generals from the same place (not necessarily the same time). It would be one hell of a subversion if one day we were introduced to Arthur Wellesley - and his Three Laws of Motion
Demetrios enslaving the rebels is a grisly fate but it makes sense given his lack of options and the fact that it is still the early 17th Century - slavery is (unfortunately) still going strong ITTL and OTL. Later-day historians will look back on him with scorn but so it goes.
The run of good-to-excellent non-Roman generals continues. Add Turgut Reis and Sinan Pasha to the list of von Mackensen, Vauban, Casimir, the Archbishop, etc. What is Rome doing wrong that they can't churn out generals as good as the ones facing them? Does the Roman School of War/General Staff need a total revamp? Rome's enemies are obviously doing something right when selecting/training their leaders. What's the "secret sauce" and how does Rome catch up once this war ends?
I understand you like naming ITTL generals after OTL generals from the same place (not necessarily the same time). It would be one hell of a subversion if one day we were introduced to Arthur Wellesley - and his Three Laws of Motion
Demetrios enslaving the rebels is a grisly fate but it makes sense given his lack of options and the fact that it is still the early 17th Century - slavery is (unfortunately) still going strong ITTL and OTL. Later-day historians will look back on him with scorn but so it goes.
The run of good-to-excellent non-Roman generals continues. Add Turgut Reis and Sinan Pasha to the list of von Mackensen, Vauban, Casimir, the Archbishop, etc. What is Rome doing wrong that they can't churn out generals as good as the ones facing them? Does the Roman School of War/General Staff need a total revamp? Rome's enemies are obviously doing something right when selecting/training their leaders. What's the "secret sauce" and how does Rome catch up once this war ends?
I understand that re: Europe, but in Asia Rome fought in the Eternal War too - yet the Ottomans have capable secondary leaders and the Romans quite frankly don't match up there. Rome's best non-theater commander in the Levant is Alexios Gabras, who's already proven (twice!) that if you give him a command larger than a strategos he's sorely lacking.
The Roman deficiency in leadership at the divisional level (for lack of a better word) is staggering. The Ottomans get Sinan Pasha, the Romans get a cowardly pensioner who runs at the first sign of trouble. Not to mention Blucher's subordinates in the West.
Let's operate under the assumption that the Lascaris cousins are a match for Blucher and Ibrahim. I don't believe that personally, but let's make the assumption for the sake of argument. Each side's subordinate leaders is a gross mismatch in terms of quality. So how does Rome fix that for the next war - and there will be a next war, there's always a next war.
Turgut Reis was good, but what I got from the chapter was that he was solid, but otherwise unremarkable and when he faced real resistance he got smashed twice and while he managed to withdraw in good order, it could be argued that he got away only because the majority of the troops facing him were still very new. Plus he only got to attack Palestine and Egypt in the first place because the main Roman army was tied down slowly but successfully grinding down a set of extremely valuable forts. The Ottoman army, despite some success in the field, strategically is in an untenable situation. They are withering on the vine and unless they make a major attack on Roman lines and come away with a decisive victory, which seems unlikely, they are going to lose this campaign badly along with a lot of their empire.
Though I do agree that something needs to be done in the training of junior officers. It may just be a problem of not having enough qualified candidates due to the rapid expansion of the military but it seems that the Roman military machine would benefit greatly from an expansion to their officer training school, and perhaps a change is necessary in the school's curriculum.
Both of the Ottoman commanders mentioned in the update learned their ropes in India, and did so in an army that has essentially been on the march non-stop since the time of Ibrahim's father's campaigns. Roman armies tend to dedicate their efforts to defensive maneuvering -- and defending requires a lot less innovation and adaptability when you have stout fortresses and deep supply lines.
I also think that it's consistent with pre-Byzantine Roman history as well: as Rome ceased offensive operations and the sort of probing campaigns that really strain commanders' abilities, as their armies became garrisons with offensive capabilities essentially, the quality of its subordinates gravitated towards a stable baseline of "competent but corseted by tradition, inertia and risk aversion".
Notably, every time Rome is shocked out of this complacent security in its borders, as its commanders are forced to adapt or die as their supplies are cut-off or they're forced to pursue their enemies, new subordinates rise to the top as they demonstrate their abilities. Rome's commanders seem to go through a pretty consistent pattern of desperate adaptation, brilliant innovation, then prolonged stagnation.
EDIT: I think Demetrios, the Megas Domestikos and the two main Strategoi will look back on the army's performance, and may come across some previous reports documenting the very problem I mention above (the predictable cycle of stagnation precipitating a dramatic correction), and the Schools of War may be the next thing to be reformed by Demetrios III.
EDIT 2: And I also think we're beginning to see the first signs of that desperate adaptation in figures like d'Este and the commander of the Army of Mesopotamia, as Rome plays around with flying columns capable of deep raids with professional troops instead of mercenary raiders.
I also think that it's consistent with pre-Byzantine Roman history as well: as Rome ceased offensive operations and the sort of probing campaigns that really strain commanders' abilities, as their armies became garrisons with offensive capabilities essentially, the quality of its subordinates gravitated towards a stable baseline of "competent but corseted by tradition, inertia and risk aversion".
Notably, every time Rome is shocked out of this complacent security in its borders, as its commanders are forced to adapt or die as their supplies are cut-off or they're forced to pursue their enemies, new subordinates rise to the top as they demonstrate their abilities. Rome's commanders seem to go through a pretty consistent pattern of desperate adaptation, brilliant innovation, then prolonged stagnation.
EDIT: I think Demetrios, the Megas Domestikos and the two main Strategoi will look back on the army's performance, and may come across some previous reports documenting the very problem I mention above (the predictable cycle of stagnation precipitating a dramatic correction), and the Schools of War may be the next thing to be reformed by Demetrios III.
EDIT 2: And I also think we're beginning to see the first signs of that desperate adaptation in figures like d'Este and the commander of the Army of Mesopotamia, as Rome plays around with flying columns capable of deep raids with professional troops instead of mercenary raiders.
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That seems very likely. Perhaps the Roman military would benefit from more limited military interventions abroad, perhaps by rotating units in their colonial possessions and in and out of troubled frontiers to keep the rust from building up. It certainly seems that the Roman attitude in the coming generations is likely to be a bit more aggressive with the new emphasis on "steel over gold" in terms of their interactions with the West so perhaps this will change in time.
Of course now your description of the subordinates rising to the top has me picturing the Macho Man ranting about how "The Cream will rise to the top, yeah!"
You are both right. There's something fundamentally wrong about how Rome trains officers and this war has shown that. Today's officers become tomorrow's generals after all. A major restructuring/revamp of training/leadership is sorely needed. It can wait til this war is over but it should be the first thing D3 and his high command do once peace is signed.
Consistently facing off against unsettlingly good enemy commanders can have a benefit: you can study how your enemies exploited your errors, and IIRC we're approaching the period where the idea of studying past campaigns to plan future ones became really common (along with more professional army staffs in general).