What if Napoleon accepts the plan of Marshal Davout before the battle of Borodino ?
- Thread starter Jena
- Start date
Well, planning is one thing. Successfully implementing a plan is a quite different thing. Napoleon’s army had been trying to defeat the Russian for 2 and a half months. And the Russian army, which was more mobile because at home and enjoying superiority in cavalry, had successfully avoided it.
So, anyway, either the move fails, or it succeeds and gives no significant strategic result.
Napoleon no longer had sufficient reserves at Borodin. The best he could strike then was a Pyrrhic victory quite the same as he did OTL.
Going as far as Moscow chasing down the main Russian army was a losing and even absurd strategy.
After OTL’s Borodin victory, the best thing Napoleon had to do was immediately retreating westward instead of waiting 4 weeks in Moscow.
To a certain degree this did happen and even was anticipated by Kutuzov who left corps of Tutchkov behind the main line of the left flank. This was quite logical to expect because Ponyatovski corps was marching along the Old Smolensk Road (see map above) that was on the far end of the Russian left flank. Anyway, in OTL the battle started with the massive French attacks on the Russian left flank.
A deep circumventing maneuver could easily result in a Russian retreat without a battle by the New Smolensk Road and this is not what Napoleon was looking for because he needed a decisive victory.
A more limited maneuver into the immediate rear of the Russian 2nd army would mean marching across the forest (could cause problems with carrying artillery) while leaving the Russians with a possibility to retreat unopposed behind Semyonovskaya Creek, again, leaving them with a protected retreat line by the New Smolensk Road.
What is really interesting (IMO) about this battle is not Napoleon's plan was doing but rather what could pass for Kutuzov's plan because it provides a much greater area for the speculations. As a premise, Kutuzov had many flaws but he was not a nincompoop and he had a considerable military experience so the whole thing can not written off as a pure idiocy:
Position at Borodino clearly had an exposed left flank and it would not take a genius to figure this out. OTOH, its right flank was reliably secured by the Kolocha river at front and even more so by the high hills and numerous field fortifications. It would be logical to hold it with a relatively weak force while placing most of the troops and artillery on the left flank and center. It would also be logical to build as many field fortifications as possible to protect the left flank and the center. However, what was there?
Fortifications: a redoubt well before the front of the left flank (which was left by the Russians after a heavy fighting prior to the main battle) and so-called Bagration flèches (3 triangular earthworks with an open rear) on the left and so-called "The Great Redoubt", open-backed earthwork mounting nineteen 12-pounder cannons (which disqualifies it as a "redoubt" because redoubt has to be enclosed by definition; the name was invented by the French, Russians called it "Raevsky battery" and as a fortification it qualifies as a lunette) in the center. While it was well-placed and defended fiercely (being a focal point of the second phase of the battle), what are 19 heavy artillery pieces in a battle where more than 1200 artillery pieces had been involved (Russians had 624)? If there was no place for putting extra pieces inside the battery why weren't they protecting its flanks? And why more fortifications were not built at least between Semenovskaya Creek and the battery to protect its left flank? Why no fortifications and massive artillery in front of Semenovskaya village to shoot along the front of the French troops attacking Bagration flèches? At least Ney's left flank should be within the reach of artillery shooting from Semenovskaya.
Troops: on the left - the 2nd Army, which was much weaker than the 1st Army. General reserve - practically absent. During the battle troops from the 1st Army had been moving piecemeal to the left and center by Barclay's and/or Kutuzov's orders to patch the holes in front. In some cases deployment of these reinforcements was done by the generals who just happened to be nearby.
Artillery: Russians had more artillery pieces and a definite advantage of a caliber. Their main field caliber was 6 pounder while the French had numerous 3 pounders of the regimental artillery. Yet, the French artillery was seemingly more effective. One of the factors was definitely a crowded positioning of the Russian troops: according to Clausewitz (who was there) the 2nd line of infantry was too close to the 1st line and the same goes for the cavalry (in his opinion, placing the 2nd line just few hundreds meters back would cut the losses dramatically). However, there is a recent theory (can't say how correct) according to which mass of the Russian reserve artillery had been placed in a rear close to the New Smolensk Road so that it could retreat securely in a case of expected defeat (loss of the artillery pieces was a shame). A spiel about commander of the Russian reserve artillery being killed early in the battle is not convincing: surely he had 2nd in command.