A True and Better Alamo: The Battle For Wake Atoll
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Part III: Adjustments
(From “An Unexpected Obstacle: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Wake Island” By Bill Ray)
…Commander of the 4th fleet, Admiral Inouye was a busy man on December 8th 1941. His command was responsible for operations throughout the Central Pacific ranging from the capture of Guam, to Makin, Tarawa and finally, Wake Island…
…The surprisingly large number of casualties taken by the 24th Air Flotilla called into question the trivial nature with which the Japanese had assigned the Wake garrison’s defensive forces. Heavy, accurate AA fire, coupled with at least 12 fighters would make further aerial attacks difficult. At the time the A5M Claude fighters, in addition to being obsolete and probably no match for the Wildcats at Wake, did not have the range to accompany the remaining G3M bombers. Even the Navy’s vaunted A6M fighter would not be able to engage in combat operations over the island due to range constraints…
…The failure of a second air raid on December 9th to do significant damage, coupled with the loss of another 5 bombers, forced a change in Japanese tactics. Inoue decided that without air superiority, an attack on the island would be foolish. The attack was postponed and instead naval units earmarked for supporting the amphibious assault on Wake were tasked with the nighttime bombardment of the island. Inoue and Kajioka hoped that by bombarding the airfield they could even the playing field for their bombers and ultimately the invasion…
…On December 11th Kajioka arrived off the southern shore of Wake Atoll and ordered his force consisting of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers to open fire on the American positions. For two hours the Imperial Japanese peppered the island with no response. Unbeknownst to them, Devereux and Cunningham had agreed to issue an order to the batteries not to return fire. Believing their mission to be a success, Kajioka proceeded to reverse course and make for Kwajalein in order to be out of range by daybreak to avert a potential American strike…
…The only loss suffered by the Japanese during the first bombardment of Wake was the obsolete cruiser Tatsuta which was hit by a salvo of torpedoes from the USS Triton. The Triton had been south of Wake, recharging her batteries when the bombardment began and had moved to intercept. Fortunately for the Tatsuta out of the 6 torpedoes, only 4 hit, and of the 4, only one detonated due to the faulty Mark 6 Exploders present within the American torpedoes. Nevertheless, this hit effectively removed the Tatsuta from combat operations (1)…
…The next day however, the Japanese found that their optimism regarding the previous night’s bombardment was unfounded. Inadequate intelligence and rough seas severely impeded the accuracy of the Japanese attack. This coupled with the sheer ingenuity and determination shown by the American defenders meant that no fewer than 6 F4F Wildcats were scrambled to meet the incoming Japanese attack the next day. Once again the 24th Air Flotilla was forced to limp back to Roi with fewer aircraft than it departed with…
…The failure of aerial raids and naval bombardment to reduce Wake led Inoue to request further reinforcements in order to provide air cover. Almost immediately, Japanese High Command recognized the problem posed by a strong American presence on Wake Island. If the garrison there would not succumb to the initial Japanese attack, more resources must be allocated in order to establish a defensive bulwark in the Central Pacific. Seeing that more air assets were required, on December 12th, orders were issued to the Kido Butai now returning from the successful raid on Pearl Harbour. Carrier Division 2, consisting of the carriers Soryu and the Hiryu, the cruisers Tone and Chikuma, and a pair of screening destroyers, was detached from the main body and sent to rendezvous with elements of the 4th fleet (2)…
…The importance of Wake also necessitated the allocation of more conventional forces as well. 4 older cruisers from Cruiser Division 6, along with over a thousand additional troops, both fresh from taking the island of Guam were sent to rendezvous with the original invasion force, now deemed insufficient for the task at hand (3)…
…Unbeknownst to anyone in the Japanese high command, the Americans were also making adjustments to the unexpected resistance shown by the First Marines and the aviators of VMF 211…
(From “Kimmel’s Last Gasp: The Daring Expedition to Relieve Wake Island” by James Vandervelden)
…As most of the preparatory works that had taken place in 1941 had escaped popular notice, many Americans, even those in High Command positions, were taken by surprise. That a handful of fighters and AA guns could inflict such losses on Japanese aircraft if properly warned stood in stark contrast to the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Had the initial radar reports been heeded, perhaps the losses could have been fewer, perhaps the Japanese carrier forces would have been mauled as badly as the strikes above Wake. Ironically, though Kimmel had played a large role in preparing Wake to withstand a Japanese attack, it was precisely this resistance that exacerbated his failure at Pearl Harbor…
…Kimmel quickly became determined to do something, anything, to ameliorate or aid the American situation on Wake. This was only reinforced as news of Wake’s resistance reached the populace. The aerial victories of VMF-211, the cocky swagger of “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and Devereux’s infamous ending to his request for reinforcements and supplies “Send us more Japs!” all became prominent in American discourse. To leave Wake to “wither on the vine” would have been tantamount to political and popular suicide for Kimmel, and by the same measure, to relieve Wake would allow Kimmel to begin to repair the damage of Pearl Harbor…
...Initially, Kimmel had planned to send a carrier taskforce centered around the USS Saratoga to provide not only additional planes to the island, but also reinforcements and spare parts onboard the Tangier. Yet the Saratoga’s delays in arriving at Pearl Harbour prevented Kimmel from moving as quickly as he wanted to. Problems with refueling the Lexington and a lack of modern aircraft to reinforce VMF-211 also inhibited quick action…
...During these early hours, Kimmel must be credited with a great deal of prescience. On the 11th, after receiving the latest combat reports from Wake, he surmised, as did Admiral Inoue and Kajioka, that Japanese aircraft carriers were the only way the Japanese could subdue the island and its stubborn defenders. Though he desperately wanted to strike back, Kimmel had no idea how many carriers the Japanese would commit to the invasion. He simply couldn’t risk sending in a single carrier alone at this point, or even a pair of carriers (4)…
…At some point on the 11th Kimmel and his staff came up with the idea of using destroyers to ferry supplies and reinforcements to Wake. Apparently, a junior officer cited similar British actions in the Mediterranean with Malta and Kimmel seized upon the idea. A group of destroyers might be able to reach Wake before the Japanese if they maintained high enough speeds. In Kimmel’s mind, an infusion of men and equipment might buy enough time for a later relief expedition. Though part of him must have known that in all likelihood he was sending everyone to their death he pressed on nonetheless…
…Though several possibilities were raised, in the end Kimmel opted to use the 4 obsolete Wickes class destroyers of Destroyer Division 80 as his “fast transports” for the initial Wake Island Relief convoy. They in turn would be escorted by several other destroyers, as, in order to carry as much cargo as possible, they would be stripped of most combat equipment, and be operated by skeleton navy crews. Kimmel’s decisions would be echoed months later as the USN pulled back a number of obsolete destroyers for the same purpose, only giving them far more thorough modifications (5)…
…Work proceeded at a breakneck pace on the 4 destroyers as the Wake relief convoy became one of the highest priority tasks at Pearl. Though each destroyer was stripped of features deemed “excessive” such as torpedoes, excess ammunition, and “excess” crewmembers, additional features such as additional AA machine guns were installed. Work began almost immediately and within 48 hours the 4 destroyers were deemed “ready” and loading began. As the Saratoga sailed into Pearl Harbor on the 15th, the “Tin Can Convoy” sailed out making full speed for Wake Island…
…Though contemporaries criticized Kimmel for not sending the Saratoga on a similar mission to deliver the aviators and planes of VMF-221 to the island. Later events would prove him right in this regard. Knowing the poor logistical situation on Wake and the supplies sent to the island, he must have known that the impact of sending VMF-221 and its F2A Buffalo fighters to the island would have been minimal. The real strength of the island was not in its aerial strength, though that had indeed been prominent in the initial days. Once the Japanese carriers arrived the Marines would need as much help as possible to dissuade or delay a Japanese naval assault…
…Though far from everything Devereux asked for, the first Wake relief convoy would bring valuable reinforcements and supplies to the island. Each converted destroyer left Pearl Harbor with 70 Marines and 5 Navy Corpsmen onboard. In barrels stacked on the decks of the ship and in every nook and cranny were ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts. The latter mostly for the gunnery batteries as Kimmel held no illusions about keeping the fighters of VMF-211 flying much longer...
…The real question plaguing the Americans was whether the convoy of destroyers would reach Wake before the arrival of the Japanese carriers. Though not crippling, the loss of 8 destroyers, albeit only half of them being modern combat effective craft, would impede further efforts to pursue offensive operations in the Pacific. In fact, many expected the mission to be recalled after Kimmel’s relief on December 17th. However Kimmel’s replacement, Admiral Pye, also saw the importance of at least trying to relieve Wake. Furthermore, the decision to push the elderly destroyers to their limit and maintain a speed of nearly 25 knots meant that once Pye took command, the convoy had nearly reached its destination…
…Nevertheless, Pye’s caution would ultimately be his undoing. His orders to the convoy to dump their supplies and return to Pearl if they came under attack would later be coupled with future actions and make him incredibly unpopular. Most officers present with the convoy state that they were determined to do whatever it took to get supplies to Wake, even if it meant grounding the ships on the atoll…
…The Americans’ ingenuity, and sheer determination were aided by indecision on the part of the Japanese. Though it was apparent that Wake would only be able to be subdued by the use of carrier borne aircraft, the Japanese High Command wasted precious time ordering Carrier division 2 to launch a raid on Midway. Japan’s initial offensive was literally running on a shoestring and even the minor reallocation of resources to deal with Wake needed to be couched in efficiency. It was hoped that en-route to its rendezvous with the 4th fleet, Carrier division 2 could launch an aerial raid on Midway Island. Poor weather, coupled with the decision to press on with the attack gave the relief convoy and the defenders of Wake much needed breathing room (6)...
…Much to the chagrin of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the raid did little to
damage the American garrison on the island resulting in only a few casualties and putting some planes out of action for the coming raids against Wake…
…On the island of Wake itself, the days preceding the arrival of the relief convoy were oddly quiet. The 24th Air Flotilla was simply in no position to launch major air attacks after the events of December 8-11. The first 3 raids on Wake had resulted in the loss of nearly two thirds of the unit’s prewar strength. Though reinforcements were incoming, any major raids on Wake were delayed until adequate escort could be requisitioned. Instead, only a handful of reconnaissance missions were launched. These too were often the target of American fighters, with several being shot down prior to the arrival of the Japanese fleet…
…Henry “Hammering Hank” Elrod’s destruction of a G3M Nell on December 18th gave him his 5th aerial victory and made him the first American “ace” of the war. Something that was met with considerable celebration in America, and consternation as he later refused to leave his comrades...
…While the aviators of VMF-211 were busy chasing Japanese reconnaissance planes, Devereux and the men of Wake Island were busily preparing for the inevitable Japanese assault. Like Kimmel, Devereux believed that Wake was simply too important to be left alone. The same Japanese carriers that raided Pearl would eventually arrive and be accompanied by an amphibious landing force. Plans were made and a number of plans were made for the eventual Japanese landing…
…In a move that would foreshadow later Marine Defense Battalions, at the insistence of Peters, Devereux ordered the conversion of several pieces of heavy equipment into a makeshift armored unit. Though only armed with machine guns, the bolted on pieces of scrap metal provided adequate protection from small arms fire without decreasing their speed too much (7)…
…“Where are the transports?” was the whisper going through the garrison as the relief convoy arrived off Wake on the night of December 18th. Though it wasn’t everything they wanted, even the surliest of Marines had to marvel of the ingenuity as barrel after barrel of supplies was tossed overboard and promptly recovered…
…The unloading of the convoy continued through the night into the day of December 19th under the watchful eye of VMF-211. Though a Japanese reconnaissance plane spotted the convoy, no offensive action was taken. When the final tallies were reached, over 300 Marines, millions of rounds of .30 and .50 caliber ammunition, a 2 thousand modern 3-inch AA shells, valuable spares and supplies had been offloaded…
…What followed remains one of the most memorable moments of the Pacific War. From the inception of the convoy, the intent was to evacuate at least some of the civilians from the island. Devereux had made this known to the civilians, though he did not take any immediate action in this regard. An unspoken agreement existed that the wounded received priority on the ships. However, by the 19th this only comprised less than 50 people…
…A decision had to be made quickly and in the end it was made by none other than Peters. The de facto commander of the civilian contractors, Peters approached Devereux and Cunningham on the airfield, rifle in hand and spoke lines that would go down in history. “We’ve fought with you so far Colonel. I don’t know about you, but my men and I like to finish what we start. If you’ll have us, we’d like to stay and finish the job.”…
…Though remaining on Wake was not a compulsory decision, 17 healthy civilian contractors opted to leave with the convoy, their decision to remain behind and fight made waves throughout the United States. The civilians would stay, integrating themselves into the Marine battalion and steeling themselves for the coming Japanese assault…
…Of the 17 uninjured contractors that chose to leave with the convoy, half would be dead before the end of the war, the remainder before 1950…
…The relief convoy departed as quickly as it had arrived in the hopes of avoiding a Japanese aerial attack. By the 21st they had reached a safe distance and reduced speed to a more manageable 17 knots. The relief expedition to Wake Island had succeeded…
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)
…The Marine reinforcements having arrived on the 18th/19th wouldn’t have to wait long for their first taste of combat. They had barely begun to unpack the supplies brought by the convoy when on the 20th, the report from the radar sets came in. The real battle for Wake was about to begin…
Footnotes
1) The Triton was one of the subs patrolling the area in OTL around Wake. In TTL the Japanese night naval bombardment coupled with better positioning allows her to make an attack.
2) 3 days earlier than OTL due to the absolute trouncing of the 24th Air Flotilla by VMF-211. In TTL the Japanese see that there’s simply no chance in hell that they’re taking Wake without significant air support.
3) Also requisitioned earlier than OTL. Inoue and Kajioka both knew that the 450 men originally allocated to take Wake was far too few. Given that the troops are available, needed, and that the invasion date has been pushed back in TTL due to a lack of air support I don’t think this is too farfetched.
4) Perhaps I’m giving Kimmel too much credit. In OTL he launched the relief expedition without knowing that the Japanese were going to send in carriers. Given the fact that in TTL Wake has suffered almost no losses to enemy action, besides a handful of damaged planes. Coupled with the massive losses inflicted on the 24th Aerial flotilla I think his reasoning in TTL is sound.
5) Kimmel’s just jumping the gun here on what the USN would do a couple months later. Mind you, these APD’s aren’t nearly as efficient, but they’ll do in a pinch. I’m thinking along the lines of the infamous “Tokyo Express” brought about by desperation on the American side. Reinforcing Wake would be a huge propaganda coup given the fact that it was an instant bright spot on the rather dim news of Pearl Harbour.
6) The Japanese attempted such a raid in OTL on the 15th but were dissuaded by poor weather. In TTL they arrive earlier and thus the weather is better, they think they have a bit more time, and thus go through with the raid, inadvertently buying the Americans much needed time.
7)No such actions were undertaken in OTL due to the fact that there was a strict separation between the civilians and Marines as previously mentioned, and that Wake was under constant aerial attack. Without radar, or effective AA guns in OTL the Japanese bombers faced far fewer casualties. In TTL the defenders of Wake have over a week of relative peace in which they get to be…inventive.
”That’s all?”
-The reported remark of Admiral Kajioka upon hearing of how many bombers returned from the first raid on Wake.
-The reported remark of Admiral Kajioka upon hearing of how many bombers returned from the first raid on Wake.
(From “An Unexpected Obstacle: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Wake Island” By Bill Ray)
…Commander of the 4th fleet, Admiral Inouye was a busy man on December 8th 1941. His command was responsible for operations throughout the Central Pacific ranging from the capture of Guam, to Makin, Tarawa and finally, Wake Island…
…The surprisingly large number of casualties taken by the 24th Air Flotilla called into question the trivial nature with which the Japanese had assigned the Wake garrison’s defensive forces. Heavy, accurate AA fire, coupled with at least 12 fighters would make further aerial attacks difficult. At the time the A5M Claude fighters, in addition to being obsolete and probably no match for the Wildcats at Wake, did not have the range to accompany the remaining G3M bombers. Even the Navy’s vaunted A6M fighter would not be able to engage in combat operations over the island due to range constraints…
…The failure of a second air raid on December 9th to do significant damage, coupled with the loss of another 5 bombers, forced a change in Japanese tactics. Inoue decided that without air superiority, an attack on the island would be foolish. The attack was postponed and instead naval units earmarked for supporting the amphibious assault on Wake were tasked with the nighttime bombardment of the island. Inoue and Kajioka hoped that by bombarding the airfield they could even the playing field for their bombers and ultimately the invasion…
…On December 11th Kajioka arrived off the southern shore of Wake Atoll and ordered his force consisting of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers to open fire on the American positions. For two hours the Imperial Japanese peppered the island with no response. Unbeknownst to them, Devereux and Cunningham had agreed to issue an order to the batteries not to return fire. Believing their mission to be a success, Kajioka proceeded to reverse course and make for Kwajalein in order to be out of range by daybreak to avert a potential American strike…
…The only loss suffered by the Japanese during the first bombardment of Wake was the obsolete cruiser Tatsuta which was hit by a salvo of torpedoes from the USS Triton. The Triton had been south of Wake, recharging her batteries when the bombardment began and had moved to intercept. Fortunately for the Tatsuta out of the 6 torpedoes, only 4 hit, and of the 4, only one detonated due to the faulty Mark 6 Exploders present within the American torpedoes. Nevertheless, this hit effectively removed the Tatsuta from combat operations (1)…
…The next day however, the Japanese found that their optimism regarding the previous night’s bombardment was unfounded. Inadequate intelligence and rough seas severely impeded the accuracy of the Japanese attack. This coupled with the sheer ingenuity and determination shown by the American defenders meant that no fewer than 6 F4F Wildcats were scrambled to meet the incoming Japanese attack the next day. Once again the 24th Air Flotilla was forced to limp back to Roi with fewer aircraft than it departed with…
…The failure of aerial raids and naval bombardment to reduce Wake led Inoue to request further reinforcements in order to provide air cover. Almost immediately, Japanese High Command recognized the problem posed by a strong American presence on Wake Island. If the garrison there would not succumb to the initial Japanese attack, more resources must be allocated in order to establish a defensive bulwark in the Central Pacific. Seeing that more air assets were required, on December 12th, orders were issued to the Kido Butai now returning from the successful raid on Pearl Harbour. Carrier Division 2, consisting of the carriers Soryu and the Hiryu, the cruisers Tone and Chikuma, and a pair of screening destroyers, was detached from the main body and sent to rendezvous with elements of the 4th fleet (2)…
…The importance of Wake also necessitated the allocation of more conventional forces as well. 4 older cruisers from Cruiser Division 6, along with over a thousand additional troops, both fresh from taking the island of Guam were sent to rendezvous with the original invasion force, now deemed insufficient for the task at hand (3)…
…Unbeknownst to anyone in the Japanese high command, the Americans were also making adjustments to the unexpected resistance shown by the First Marines and the aviators of VMF 211…
(From “Kimmel’s Last Gasp: The Daring Expedition to Relieve Wake Island” by James Vandervelden)
…As most of the preparatory works that had taken place in 1941 had escaped popular notice, many Americans, even those in High Command positions, were taken by surprise. That a handful of fighters and AA guns could inflict such losses on Japanese aircraft if properly warned stood in stark contrast to the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Had the initial radar reports been heeded, perhaps the losses could have been fewer, perhaps the Japanese carrier forces would have been mauled as badly as the strikes above Wake. Ironically, though Kimmel had played a large role in preparing Wake to withstand a Japanese attack, it was precisely this resistance that exacerbated his failure at Pearl Harbor…
…Kimmel quickly became determined to do something, anything, to ameliorate or aid the American situation on Wake. This was only reinforced as news of Wake’s resistance reached the populace. The aerial victories of VMF-211, the cocky swagger of “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and Devereux’s infamous ending to his request for reinforcements and supplies “Send us more Japs!” all became prominent in American discourse. To leave Wake to “wither on the vine” would have been tantamount to political and popular suicide for Kimmel, and by the same measure, to relieve Wake would allow Kimmel to begin to repair the damage of Pearl Harbor…
...Initially, Kimmel had planned to send a carrier taskforce centered around the USS Saratoga to provide not only additional planes to the island, but also reinforcements and spare parts onboard the Tangier. Yet the Saratoga’s delays in arriving at Pearl Harbour prevented Kimmel from moving as quickly as he wanted to. Problems with refueling the Lexington and a lack of modern aircraft to reinforce VMF-211 also inhibited quick action…
...During these early hours, Kimmel must be credited with a great deal of prescience. On the 11th, after receiving the latest combat reports from Wake, he surmised, as did Admiral Inoue and Kajioka, that Japanese aircraft carriers were the only way the Japanese could subdue the island and its stubborn defenders. Though he desperately wanted to strike back, Kimmel had no idea how many carriers the Japanese would commit to the invasion. He simply couldn’t risk sending in a single carrier alone at this point, or even a pair of carriers (4)…
…At some point on the 11th Kimmel and his staff came up with the idea of using destroyers to ferry supplies and reinforcements to Wake. Apparently, a junior officer cited similar British actions in the Mediterranean with Malta and Kimmel seized upon the idea. A group of destroyers might be able to reach Wake before the Japanese if they maintained high enough speeds. In Kimmel’s mind, an infusion of men and equipment might buy enough time for a later relief expedition. Though part of him must have known that in all likelihood he was sending everyone to their death he pressed on nonetheless…
…Though several possibilities were raised, in the end Kimmel opted to use the 4 obsolete Wickes class destroyers of Destroyer Division 80 as his “fast transports” for the initial Wake Island Relief convoy. They in turn would be escorted by several other destroyers, as, in order to carry as much cargo as possible, they would be stripped of most combat equipment, and be operated by skeleton navy crews. Kimmel’s decisions would be echoed months later as the USN pulled back a number of obsolete destroyers for the same purpose, only giving them far more thorough modifications (5)…
…Work proceeded at a breakneck pace on the 4 destroyers as the Wake relief convoy became one of the highest priority tasks at Pearl. Though each destroyer was stripped of features deemed “excessive” such as torpedoes, excess ammunition, and “excess” crewmembers, additional features such as additional AA machine guns were installed. Work began almost immediately and within 48 hours the 4 destroyers were deemed “ready” and loading began. As the Saratoga sailed into Pearl Harbor on the 15th, the “Tin Can Convoy” sailed out making full speed for Wake Island…
…Though contemporaries criticized Kimmel for not sending the Saratoga on a similar mission to deliver the aviators and planes of VMF-221 to the island. Later events would prove him right in this regard. Knowing the poor logistical situation on Wake and the supplies sent to the island, he must have known that the impact of sending VMF-221 and its F2A Buffalo fighters to the island would have been minimal. The real strength of the island was not in its aerial strength, though that had indeed been prominent in the initial days. Once the Japanese carriers arrived the Marines would need as much help as possible to dissuade or delay a Japanese naval assault…
…Though far from everything Devereux asked for, the first Wake relief convoy would bring valuable reinforcements and supplies to the island. Each converted destroyer left Pearl Harbor with 70 Marines and 5 Navy Corpsmen onboard. In barrels stacked on the decks of the ship and in every nook and cranny were ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts. The latter mostly for the gunnery batteries as Kimmel held no illusions about keeping the fighters of VMF-211 flying much longer...
…The real question plaguing the Americans was whether the convoy of destroyers would reach Wake before the arrival of the Japanese carriers. Though not crippling, the loss of 8 destroyers, albeit only half of them being modern combat effective craft, would impede further efforts to pursue offensive operations in the Pacific. In fact, many expected the mission to be recalled after Kimmel’s relief on December 17th. However Kimmel’s replacement, Admiral Pye, also saw the importance of at least trying to relieve Wake. Furthermore, the decision to push the elderly destroyers to their limit and maintain a speed of nearly 25 knots meant that once Pye took command, the convoy had nearly reached its destination…
…Nevertheless, Pye’s caution would ultimately be his undoing. His orders to the convoy to dump their supplies and return to Pearl if they came under attack would later be coupled with future actions and make him incredibly unpopular. Most officers present with the convoy state that they were determined to do whatever it took to get supplies to Wake, even if it meant grounding the ships on the atoll…
…The Americans’ ingenuity, and sheer determination were aided by indecision on the part of the Japanese. Though it was apparent that Wake would only be able to be subdued by the use of carrier borne aircraft, the Japanese High Command wasted precious time ordering Carrier division 2 to launch a raid on Midway. Japan’s initial offensive was literally running on a shoestring and even the minor reallocation of resources to deal with Wake needed to be couched in efficiency. It was hoped that en-route to its rendezvous with the 4th fleet, Carrier division 2 could launch an aerial raid on Midway Island. Poor weather, coupled with the decision to press on with the attack gave the relief convoy and the defenders of Wake much needed breathing room (6)...
…Much to the chagrin of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the raid did little to
damage the American garrison on the island resulting in only a few casualties and putting some planes out of action for the coming raids against Wake…
…On the island of Wake itself, the days preceding the arrival of the relief convoy were oddly quiet. The 24th Air Flotilla was simply in no position to launch major air attacks after the events of December 8-11. The first 3 raids on Wake had resulted in the loss of nearly two thirds of the unit’s prewar strength. Though reinforcements were incoming, any major raids on Wake were delayed until adequate escort could be requisitioned. Instead, only a handful of reconnaissance missions were launched. These too were often the target of American fighters, with several being shot down prior to the arrival of the Japanese fleet…
…Henry “Hammering Hank” Elrod’s destruction of a G3M Nell on December 18th gave him his 5th aerial victory and made him the first American “ace” of the war. Something that was met with considerable celebration in America, and consternation as he later refused to leave his comrades...
…While the aviators of VMF-211 were busy chasing Japanese reconnaissance planes, Devereux and the men of Wake Island were busily preparing for the inevitable Japanese assault. Like Kimmel, Devereux believed that Wake was simply too important to be left alone. The same Japanese carriers that raided Pearl would eventually arrive and be accompanied by an amphibious landing force. Plans were made and a number of plans were made for the eventual Japanese landing…
…In a move that would foreshadow later Marine Defense Battalions, at the insistence of Peters, Devereux ordered the conversion of several pieces of heavy equipment into a makeshift armored unit. Though only armed with machine guns, the bolted on pieces of scrap metal provided adequate protection from small arms fire without decreasing their speed too much (7)…
…“Where are the transports?” was the whisper going through the garrison as the relief convoy arrived off Wake on the night of December 18th. Though it wasn’t everything they wanted, even the surliest of Marines had to marvel of the ingenuity as barrel after barrel of supplies was tossed overboard and promptly recovered…
…The unloading of the convoy continued through the night into the day of December 19th under the watchful eye of VMF-211. Though a Japanese reconnaissance plane spotted the convoy, no offensive action was taken. When the final tallies were reached, over 300 Marines, millions of rounds of .30 and .50 caliber ammunition, a 2 thousand modern 3-inch AA shells, valuable spares and supplies had been offloaded…
…What followed remains one of the most memorable moments of the Pacific War. From the inception of the convoy, the intent was to evacuate at least some of the civilians from the island. Devereux had made this known to the civilians, though he did not take any immediate action in this regard. An unspoken agreement existed that the wounded received priority on the ships. However, by the 19th this only comprised less than 50 people…
…A decision had to be made quickly and in the end it was made by none other than Peters. The de facto commander of the civilian contractors, Peters approached Devereux and Cunningham on the airfield, rifle in hand and spoke lines that would go down in history. “We’ve fought with you so far Colonel. I don’t know about you, but my men and I like to finish what we start. If you’ll have us, we’d like to stay and finish the job.”…
…Though remaining on Wake was not a compulsory decision, 17 healthy civilian contractors opted to leave with the convoy, their decision to remain behind and fight made waves throughout the United States. The civilians would stay, integrating themselves into the Marine battalion and steeling themselves for the coming Japanese assault…
…Of the 17 uninjured contractors that chose to leave with the convoy, half would be dead before the end of the war, the remainder before 1950…
…The relief convoy departed as quickly as it had arrived in the hopes of avoiding a Japanese aerial attack. By the 21st they had reached a safe distance and reduced speed to a more manageable 17 knots. The relief expedition to Wake Island had succeeded…
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)
…The Marine reinforcements having arrived on the 18th/19th wouldn’t have to wait long for their first taste of combat. They had barely begun to unpack the supplies brought by the convoy when on the 20th, the report from the radar sets came in. The real battle for Wake was about to begin…
Footnotes
1) The Triton was one of the subs patrolling the area in OTL around Wake. In TTL the Japanese night naval bombardment coupled with better positioning allows her to make an attack.
2) 3 days earlier than OTL due to the absolute trouncing of the 24th Air Flotilla by VMF-211. In TTL the Japanese see that there’s simply no chance in hell that they’re taking Wake without significant air support.
3) Also requisitioned earlier than OTL. Inoue and Kajioka both knew that the 450 men originally allocated to take Wake was far too few. Given that the troops are available, needed, and that the invasion date has been pushed back in TTL due to a lack of air support I don’t think this is too farfetched.
4) Perhaps I’m giving Kimmel too much credit. In OTL he launched the relief expedition without knowing that the Japanese were going to send in carriers. Given the fact that in TTL Wake has suffered almost no losses to enemy action, besides a handful of damaged planes. Coupled with the massive losses inflicted on the 24th Aerial flotilla I think his reasoning in TTL is sound.
5) Kimmel’s just jumping the gun here on what the USN would do a couple months later. Mind you, these APD’s aren’t nearly as efficient, but they’ll do in a pinch. I’m thinking along the lines of the infamous “Tokyo Express” brought about by desperation on the American side. Reinforcing Wake would be a huge propaganda coup given the fact that it was an instant bright spot on the rather dim news of Pearl Harbour.
6) The Japanese attempted such a raid in OTL on the 15th but were dissuaded by poor weather. In TTL they arrive earlier and thus the weather is better, they think they have a bit more time, and thus go through with the raid, inadvertently buying the Americans much needed time.
7)No such actions were undertaken in OTL due to the fact that there was a strict separation between the civilians and Marines as previously mentioned, and that Wake was under constant aerial attack. Without radar, or effective AA guns in OTL the Japanese bombers faced far fewer casualties. In TTL the defenders of Wake have over a week of relative peace in which they get to be…inventive.
Fearless Leader
Donor
Okay so admittedly this is where my TL gets a bit "immodest", not too immodest in my opinion, but perhaps "immodest" in someone else's view. I see 3 potential areas of contention, 2 of which I'm more willing to be flexible on if someone is willing to provide some expertise.
1) Kimmel's decision not to send in the carriers: I argued my case in the footnotes. I realize it's a stretch but I don't think it's beyond the realm of possibility. There is a precedent with Malta, and the stakes are high enough to provide the necessary push for invention.
2)I realize the numbers for the convoy's total supplies are out of whack. To be honest I just guestimated here. I think in terms of personnel, 300 over 4 Destroyers is pushing it. The remaining supplies are probably too generous. Thoughts on more realistic numbers?
3) 17 civilians choosing to return is probably too low. If someone wants to suggest an alternate number they're more than welcome to. I just have a hard time seeing the civilians pick up and leave the Marines en masse after having worked steadily to prepare the island and having only experienced success in fighting the Japanese. Especially once news of their reputation back home trickles back to the island.
1) Kimmel's decision not to send in the carriers: I argued my case in the footnotes. I realize it's a stretch but I don't think it's beyond the realm of possibility. There is a precedent with Malta, and the stakes are high enough to provide the necessary push for invention.
2)I realize the numbers for the convoy's total supplies are out of whack. To be honest I just guestimated here. I think in terms of personnel, 300 over 4 Destroyers is pushing it. The remaining supplies are probably too generous. Thoughts on more realistic numbers?
3) 17 civilians choosing to return is probably too low. If someone wants to suggest an alternate number they're more than welcome to. I just have a hard time seeing the civilians pick up and leave the Marines en masse after having worked steadily to prepare the island and having only experienced success in fighting the Japanese. Especially once news of their reputation back home trickles back to the island.
Fearless Leader
Donor
AH! I think I found what you were talking about!
Apparently, there was a plan early on to evacuate Wake. Captain Charles H. "Soc" McMorris, Kimmel's war plans officer came up with a plan that would see all 1600 people board the Tangier (Marines and civilians) under the cover of a task force with the USS Lexington. All personal belongings would have to be abandoned/destroyed in this scenario and the ship would be crowded as all get out but it was considered.
What killed the plan was some inaction and the Lexington's inability to refuel at sea. Had Kimmel decided to evacuate Wake in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor (December 8th?), I think it might have been doable. The Tangier would've been able to leave almost immediately, the Lexington might have found stable seas in which to refuel while trying to rendezvous with the Tangier and if they maintained a decent speed they could reach Wake around the 11th or 12th.
Scout planes from the Lexington could then have conceivably stumbled upon the remnants of the force retreating from Wake and "finished the job" while covering the evacuation of Wake. Given that many of the Japanese vessels were damaged from the attack I think it's reasonable that the USN could have sunk a good number of them while the island was evacuated. I guess such a battle would still go down as a major propaganda coup, though Kimmel would have been criticized for not trying to hold Wake instead. Longer term, I'm not sure how big of an impact such an action would have had.
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Good work, where did you find this version? I had wanted to check my copy of Costellos history of 'The Pacific War' but not made the time.
A pity something could not have been carried out. Those men deserved better.
Longer term effects would be subtle. Pressure to relieve the Phillipines: 'You saved Wake, cant you save Luzon?' USN admirals might be a bit more aggresive in the raids of the next five months. On the Japanese side the IJN has another embarrasment to hide, and a hotter desire to seek and destroy the residual US fleet.
A pity something could not have been carried out. Those men deserved better.
Longer term effects would be subtle. Pressure to relieve the Phillipines: 'You saved Wake, cant you save Luzon?' USN admirals might be a bit more aggresive in the raids of the next five months. On the Japanese side the IJN has another embarrasment to hide, and a hotter desire to seek and destroy the residual US fleet.
Fearless Leader
Donor
Here though the source is somewhat dubious. I'd want to check it out further just to be sure.
You're probably right about the effects being subtle. Then again, just a thought, such an action would mean that US carrier deployments would be different in the first months of January 1942. Thus you could argue that the Saratoga probably wouldn't run into a Japanese sub and be sent back to the US in TTL. This would give the US an extra carrier to play around with in the early days of the Pacific. Perhaps the Saratoga is sent along with the Yorktown and Lexington to the battle of the Coral Sea in TTL?
Or one could see such actions around Wake as a catalyst for a January 1942 raid by the Kido Butai to Hawaii as is currently being played out in another thread...
Good work!
This is nice! A few more men could be carried on the escorting destroyers--tight quarters, but this is a war...
Regarding the civilians, the ones that stay should all be enlisted in the Marines RIGHT AWAY! This gives them a chance if they are captured--they are soldiers and entitled to soldier's treatment in that case. If fighting as civilians, they can be shot out of hand. (We didn't know about the Japanese treatment of POWs yet, but even a nation folling the Geneva Conventions scrupulously would be able to shoot civilians who were fighting, I believe.)
This is nice! A few more men could be carried on the escorting destroyers--tight quarters, but this is a war...
Regarding the civilians, the ones that stay should all be enlisted in the Marines RIGHT AWAY! This gives them a chance if they are captured--they are soldiers and entitled to soldier's treatment in that case. If fighting as civilians, they can be shot out of hand. (We didn't know about the Japanese treatment of POWs yet, but even a nation folling the Geneva Conventions scrupulously would be able to shoot civilians who were fighting, I believe.)
Actually it might be more palatable to create a 'militia', and have them wear plain unmarked uniforms with eg armbands. That would probably help their case a lot. Any that WANTED to sign up for the duration would be welcome, in some unit or other.,
Werent the Marines all volunteer? If so, conscripting civilians into the force would be a problem.
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Yes, the destroyers are also packed with supplies. Yes, it is a long way from Hawai'i to Wake. But, those destroyers have also been stripped.
OTL, during the evacuation of Crete they had more than that many on EACH destroyer.
There was an earlier movement of 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers that took off 4000 men, again 500 / ship.
So 300 on 4 destroyers should be 'easy'. Heck, they MIGHT even have somewhere to sleep.
Fearless Leader
Donor
Yeah...I was thinking more along militia lines. I'll be sure to explain it a bit more in subsequent parts of the TL.
Yes, the destroyers are also packed with supplies. Yes, it is a long way from Hawai'i to Wake. But, those destroyers have also been stripped.
OTL, during the evacuation of Crete they had more than that many on EACH destroyer.
There was an earlier movement of 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers that took off 4000 men, again 500 / ship.
So 300 on 4 destroyers should be 'easy'. Heck, they MIGHT even have somewhere to sleep.
I never thought to use Crete as an OTL example. Mind you, it's 300 Marines plus loads of supplies. Also the distances involved are considerably greater. Good to know the initial responders don't think my numbers are totally out of whack. (Mind you...Calbear has yet to comment...)
Agreed, Kimmel's still going to get sacked, but his reputation is going to take a boost proportional to how well Wake does...
I like this so far.....
Thanks!
Militia, etc...
As long as the civilian workers have uniforms and some sort of official status-with appropriate documents with them--they should be OK under international law--and no more subject to abuse than any other POW's under the Japanese regime, for that matter.
Comparing this to The Alamo says that it will end poorly--and also be a symbol of resistance for the Americans...
As long as the civilian workers have uniforms and some sort of official status-with appropriate documents with them--they should be OK under international law--and no more subject to abuse than any other POW's under the Japanese regime, for that matter.
Comparing this to The Alamo says that it will end poorly--and also be a symbol of resistance for the Americans...
As I recall, the civilians captured when Wake fell OTL did not do any better overall than the Marines in terms of treatment by the Japanese. If memory serves the only bit of international law the Japanese adhered to was with regard to diplomats - US/British/etc diplomats were exchanged via neutrals, as were Japanese (and German) diplomats in the US and other allied countries.
Giving the civilians uniform shirts and armbands with a US flag and "auxiliary militia" or something stamped on it will satisfy international law. Of course the Japanese will do whatever they care to do if they take anyone prisoner. BTW in this scenario if they do take Wake and all these folks prisoner they are likely to be harsher than they were OTL because they are pissed at the greater losses and the delay in their timetable.
Giving the civilians uniform shirts and armbands with a US flag and "auxiliary militia" or something stamped on it will satisfy international law. Of course the Japanese will do whatever they care to do if they take anyone prisoner. BTW in this scenario if they do take Wake and all these folks prisoner they are likely to be harsher than they were OTL because they are pissed at the greater losses and the delay in their timetable.
That's kind of a scary thought, as IOTL, the civilians actually fared worse than the Marines in captivity- most of the Marines & civilians were shipped off to a POW camp in China (where 15 of the military personnel & 82 civilians would die due to the conditions,) except for 5 Marines whom the Japanese believed were associated with VMF-211 or the coast defense guns and were summarily executed by the Japanese for revenge shortly after the surrender, and 98 civilians who were kept on the island as slave labor to construct & maintain installations, and were later massacred in October, 1943 when the Japanese CO, fearing an imminent invasion after US carrier planes bombed the island, ordered them to be killed, an act which got him executed as a war criminal after the war.
If, not only do large numbers of civilians take part in the fighting, but the island still falls after much more intense fighting where the Japanese take much heavier losses, well, that'll likely result in one of the bigger & more notorious of Japanese war crimes inflicted upon Allied POWs (as opposed to those resulting from their gross mistreatment of conquered native civilian populations)
Just caught up with what has been shared so far and I LIKE!
I am just a casual history buff so can not share exact details onte departure but it sounds feasible and possible. Using the old 4 pipers as transports is an early start on what the US did in OTL allows the Navy to assist Wake.
We shall have to see how long Wake holds out and if there are any survivers. That is if this turns out like OTL Alamo. If not and Wake is key blocking on the Japanese, so much the better.
Write when you can Fearless Leader. I am subscibing so I can follow and enjoy
I am just a casual history buff so can not share exact details onte departure but it sounds feasible and possible. Using the old 4 pipers as transports is an early start on what the US did in OTL allows the Navy to assist Wake.
We shall have to see how long Wake holds out and if there are any survivers. That is if this turns out like OTL Alamo. If not and Wake is key blocking on the Japanese, so much the better.
Write when you can Fearless Leader. I am subscibing so I can follow and enjoy
Fearless Leader
Donor
Part IV: War Comes to Wake…Again
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)
…The span between the end of the 3rd air raid on December 11th and the arrival of Carrier Division 2 on December 20th could be described as a resumption of the “Watchful Peace” that pervaded the island’s atmosphere since August. Japanese bombers were no longer seen, save for the few reconnaissance planes brave enough to try and test the island defenses, and the only action came from the daily patrols of VMF-211 in which they endeavoured to shoot down said reconnaissance planes…
…Yet something about this watchful peace was different. A certainty that the full might of the Japanese Empire was about to fall on the island was common throughout both Marine and civilian camps. Yet everyone seemed to believe that they had a good chance of weathering the storm. The initial Japanese attacks, besides causing a rather large conflagration when a 25,000 gallon fuel storage tank was hit, did relatively little damage. Though many feared for the maintenance of VMF-211 with the seeming destruction of the squadron’s tools and spares in the initial attack, the mechanics and civilian volunteers were able to work wonders. A great deal was salvageable, and parts soon became available once it had been decided to cannibalize 2 of the squadron’s Wildcats. Using parts from these fighters the mechanics were able to maintain a constant strength of 6 fighters and were able to repair 4 more fighters damaged in the initial air and naval attacks by the 20th (1)…
…The arrival of the relief convoy on the 18/19th and the decision of the majority of civilians to remain behind further strengthened the resolve of the Island’s defenders. As evening fell on the night of the 19th, the men of Wake were determined to make the Japanese pay dearly for every inch of Wake’s soil…
…A particular fatalism sprung up among the fighters of VMF-211 who knew that their paltry 10 Wildcats stood no chance of defeating the same aerial armada that devastated Pearl Harbor. They were determined to sell their machines and their lives dearly, before the rest of the squadron formed an infantry company and joined the defensive lines…
…The squadron’s last mission was a subject of fierce and lively debate for the duration of the lull. Knowing that defensive actions were essentially futile, several pilots, including Henry Elrod advocated for a strike mission to be carried out instead. Each Wildcat was capable of carrying a pair of 100 lb bombs, one on each wing, and though the bombs provided to Wake were of the wrong type to fit the hardpoints on the Marine Wildcats, some ingenuity had solved that problem (2). Elrod advocated sending the squadron out on a reverse heading in the hopes of catching the Japanese carriers unaware, or sending it out along the route of a likely Japanese invasion fleet…
…Though Elrod and others continued to push for a strike mission for the duration of the lull, when the first radar reports came in of a large formation inbound from the north, the conservative faction won out, and the bombs were left in the airfield’s magazine. Instead Major Putnam and the 10 remaining fighters of VMF-211 scrambled in the predawn gloom to meet the Japanese strike in the same way that they had met the first 3 air raids on Wake….
…Yet this air raid would be fundamentally different than the previous ones. A far cry from unescorted obsolete bombers, the pilots from the Soryu and Hiryu flew the best planes Japan had to offer and were escorted by the feared A6M Zero fighters. Fortunately, the events over Wake coupled with the fortuitous find of the “Niihau Zero” on the 14th quickly demonstrated the Zero’s weaknesses and gave the Americans a vital advantage in the early days of the war 14…
…14 The Niihau Zero refers to the fighter that landed on the Hawaiian island of Niihau after the attack on Pearl Harbour. The pilot, suffered a severe head trauma upon landing and died a few days later. Yet due to the island’s isolation, American officials did not find the fighter until the 14th of December. Upon finding the fighter it was immediately shipped to the United States where it was tested strenuously and influenced the design of several fighters as well as aerial tactics (3)...
…Knowing that they would be facing the fearsome marine flyers of Wake, the initial strike against the island was escorted by the majority of the Zeroes carried by both carriers. Had Elrod’s suggestion been taken and a strike mission been sent instead, it is likely that the fighters of VMF-211 would have caught Carrier Division 2 completely by surprise if they would have been able to locate them…
…Using the advantage given by radar, Wake’s remaining fighters climbed into the predawn sky and began to reach altitude. Knowing it was their last mission, each pilot carried an extra sidearm with extra ammunition and orders to link up with the rest of the Marines should they survive being shot down. In a somber moment, upon the last Wildcat’s takeoff, the remaining groundcrew of VMF-211 set down their tools and took up their helmets and rifles in preparation for what was to be one of the most ferocious battles of the war…
…Though every pilot knew his odds of surviving were low, the Marines were eagerly anticipating the opportunity to fight the same aviators which had attacked their comrades earlier in December. With that thought probably in their minds, the Wildcats of VMF-211 began their diving attack on the 4th Air raid on Wake…
…While the Wildcats of VMF-211 approached from above, the 3-inch AA batteries and machineguns opened fire from below with devastating effect. The Japanese planes, distracted by VMF-211 often failed to effectively evade the island’s AA fire which was far more effective due to the arrival of modern ammunition for the 3-inch guns…
…One of the highest priority requests for the relief convoy had been the arrival of modern AA shells for the 3-inch guns. These shells, which used a 30 second mechanical fuse instead of a 21 second power train fuse, were far more reliable than the original ammunition sent to Wake which dated from the First World War. Most Marines believed that the performance of their AA during the first battles would be substantially improved. Statistics would later show this to be the case, however, the limited number of modern shells meant that it wasn’t long before the Marines were forced to revert to their older ammunition (4)…
…A third infamous nickname was added to the ranks of VMF-211 when Tharin found himself engaged by a trio of Zeros. Engaged in a whirling dogfight, Tharin took advantage of the Wildcat’s heavier construction to shoot down two of the Zeros before trying to close with the third. Unfortunately for the Japanese pilot, a miscalculation on both of pilots parts’ led to a rare mid-air collision in which Tharin’s wing sliced clean through the Zero’s wing earning him the nickname “Battle-axe”. Unfortunately, the dogfight left Tharin vulnerable to a fourth Zero which damaged his plane to such an extent that he was forced to bail out…
…The rest of the Marine pilots, like Tharin, Elrod, and Putnam all found themselves in the same situation. Despite fighting valiantly, they were horribly outnumbered, and though they sold their lives and their planes dearly, averaging 1.5 aerial victories per plane that day, within 30 minutes, all of them had been shot down thus satisfying the main objective of the Japanese raid (5)…
…The remainder of the raid was a bit of a letdown for the defenders of Wake. The Japanese bombers continued their runs on the now isolated airfield and destroyed what was left standing before turning and attacking the remnants of the Pan Am facility on Peale. No attempt was made on either the coastal or the AA batteries, even as the latter hammered away at the Japanese planes, often with surprisingly effective results…
…As the Japanese bombers retreated, the defenders of Wake took stock. They had lost their first line of defense, yet the island’s network of defenses remained intact. All of the island’s AA guns remained active and the total manpower losses were negligible. That being said, the pilots of VMF-211 did not fare nearly so well. Half perished in that final furious dogfight over Wake, including Major “Pounding Paul” Putnam who was unable to bail out of his critically damaged Wildcat. Those pilots that did survive such as “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and the newly christened “Battle-axe Tharin” joined the rest of VMF-211 in taking up arms and waiting for the inevitable Japanese amphibious assault…
…The effectiveness of VMF-211 would foreshadow the immense importance airpower would come to have in the Pacific War. Though small in numbers, the 12 fighters and the small number of support staff effectively stymied an exponentially larger Japanese invasion force. The forces used for the subsequent invasion of Wake had all been earmarked for other operations which were delayed out of necessity. Their aerial victory record was also quite impressive. Over the course of 12 days, they shot down 38 Japanese aircraft and damaged another 15, effectively destroying the 24th Air Flotilla…
…Yet without the distraction of VMF-211, Wake subsequently began to feel the full weight of the Imperial Japanese forces that had been brought against them. A second wave from the Soryu and the Hiryu arrived later that day to build upon the damage done by the first. The AA batteries received particular attention in this attack, as did the remaining structures on the island. Camp 2, housing the Marines, was almost completely annihilated as was the much nicer Camp 1. The Hospital was also hit resulting in the deaths of a dozen wounded men. Fortunately, the presence of civilian volunteers allowed almost all the valuable medical supplies to be saved from the conflagration that followed…
…As casualties began to mount, some of the men, especially the civilians, began to question their choice to come to and eventually stay on Wake. As night fell, burial details went out and were forced to bury the largest number of dead yet. However in spite of the loss of VMF-211, the defenders remained optimistic. The AA batteries had managed to be quite effective, shooting down another 5 Japanese aircraft of the 2nd wave. They figured that if they could outlast the Japanese bombardment they might be able to hold out until the Pacific fleet could finally send more substantial reinforcements…
…The next day, December 21st saw more of the same for the defenders of Wake. This time the planes from Carrier Division 2 were joined by those of the Chitose Air Flotilla having absorbed what was left of the 24th Air Flotilla. Finally free to fly unescorted over the island due to the destruction of VMF-211’s Wildcats, the twin engine bombers still suffered from the determined AA fire of the Marines. The raids of the 21st were mainly concerned with reducing the batteries of the island and to their credit they did score several direct hits on the batteries and the island’s radar station, effectively reducing the island’s AA capacity by about half…
…Having gained air superiority, destroyed most of the buildings on the island, and damaged what they thought to be the island’s defensive network, it was decided to begin landing troops at dawn on the 22nd. They erroneously believed that the Americans had allocated all of their efforts into anti-aircraft defenses and airfield construction. Having bombarded the island with impunity, they assumed, wrongly, that the coastal defenses of Wake had yet to be completed and were unable of responding to a landing attempt. Out of prudence they had targeted them on the 2nd day, but they saw no reason to waste another day of sorties bombing effectively useless installations, yet they would soon find out just how wrong they were…
Footnotes
1) A few things to keep in mind. First, that the Wildcats at Wake were nowhere near as durable as the F4F-4 used later in the war, they had no armor, or self-sealing fuel tanks. Thus some combat damage when going up against swarms of unescorted bombers is unavoidable. Secondly, the naval bombardment of the 10th in TTL, though inaccurate, did damage several of the Wildcats. Finally, consider that the Americans did far more with far less in OTL. Given their performance in OTL with far less personnel and tools, I see no reason why they couldn’t maintain VMF-211 in TTL given a far better combat environment.
2)OTL
3)In TTL the Niihau incident went slightly differently. Nishikaichi suffered a far more severe head trauma upon landing on the isolated Hawaiian island. Thus he was unable to burn his fighter, allowing it to fall into the hands of the Americans on the 14th.
4)Ammunition situation for the 3 inch guns is OTL up until the relief convoy. Given that the majority of the combat had been aerial, 3-inch ammunition is at the top of Devereux’ supply list after reinforcements to help alleviate the trained manpower shortage.
5)Some of these victories must be partially attributed to AA fire as well.
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)
…The span between the end of the 3rd air raid on December 11th and the arrival of Carrier Division 2 on December 20th could be described as a resumption of the “Watchful Peace” that pervaded the island’s atmosphere since August. Japanese bombers were no longer seen, save for the few reconnaissance planes brave enough to try and test the island defenses, and the only action came from the daily patrols of VMF-211 in which they endeavoured to shoot down said reconnaissance planes…
…Yet something about this watchful peace was different. A certainty that the full might of the Japanese Empire was about to fall on the island was common throughout both Marine and civilian camps. Yet everyone seemed to believe that they had a good chance of weathering the storm. The initial Japanese attacks, besides causing a rather large conflagration when a 25,000 gallon fuel storage tank was hit, did relatively little damage. Though many feared for the maintenance of VMF-211 with the seeming destruction of the squadron’s tools and spares in the initial attack, the mechanics and civilian volunteers were able to work wonders. A great deal was salvageable, and parts soon became available once it had been decided to cannibalize 2 of the squadron’s Wildcats. Using parts from these fighters the mechanics were able to maintain a constant strength of 6 fighters and were able to repair 4 more fighters damaged in the initial air and naval attacks by the 20th (1)…
…The arrival of the relief convoy on the 18/19th and the decision of the majority of civilians to remain behind further strengthened the resolve of the Island’s defenders. As evening fell on the night of the 19th, the men of Wake were determined to make the Japanese pay dearly for every inch of Wake’s soil…
…A particular fatalism sprung up among the fighters of VMF-211 who knew that their paltry 10 Wildcats stood no chance of defeating the same aerial armada that devastated Pearl Harbor. They were determined to sell their machines and their lives dearly, before the rest of the squadron formed an infantry company and joined the defensive lines…
…The squadron’s last mission was a subject of fierce and lively debate for the duration of the lull. Knowing that defensive actions were essentially futile, several pilots, including Henry Elrod advocated for a strike mission to be carried out instead. Each Wildcat was capable of carrying a pair of 100 lb bombs, one on each wing, and though the bombs provided to Wake were of the wrong type to fit the hardpoints on the Marine Wildcats, some ingenuity had solved that problem (2). Elrod advocated sending the squadron out on a reverse heading in the hopes of catching the Japanese carriers unaware, or sending it out along the route of a likely Japanese invasion fleet…
…Though Elrod and others continued to push for a strike mission for the duration of the lull, when the first radar reports came in of a large formation inbound from the north, the conservative faction won out, and the bombs were left in the airfield’s magazine. Instead Major Putnam and the 10 remaining fighters of VMF-211 scrambled in the predawn gloom to meet the Japanese strike in the same way that they had met the first 3 air raids on Wake….
…Yet this air raid would be fundamentally different than the previous ones. A far cry from unescorted obsolete bombers, the pilots from the Soryu and Hiryu flew the best planes Japan had to offer and were escorted by the feared A6M Zero fighters. Fortunately, the events over Wake coupled with the fortuitous find of the “Niihau Zero” on the 14th quickly demonstrated the Zero’s weaknesses and gave the Americans a vital advantage in the early days of the war 14…
…14 The Niihau Zero refers to the fighter that landed on the Hawaiian island of Niihau after the attack on Pearl Harbour. The pilot, suffered a severe head trauma upon landing and died a few days later. Yet due to the island’s isolation, American officials did not find the fighter until the 14th of December. Upon finding the fighter it was immediately shipped to the United States where it was tested strenuously and influenced the design of several fighters as well as aerial tactics (3)...
…Knowing that they would be facing the fearsome marine flyers of Wake, the initial strike against the island was escorted by the majority of the Zeroes carried by both carriers. Had Elrod’s suggestion been taken and a strike mission been sent instead, it is likely that the fighters of VMF-211 would have caught Carrier Division 2 completely by surprise if they would have been able to locate them…
…Using the advantage given by radar, Wake’s remaining fighters climbed into the predawn sky and began to reach altitude. Knowing it was their last mission, each pilot carried an extra sidearm with extra ammunition and orders to link up with the rest of the Marines should they survive being shot down. In a somber moment, upon the last Wildcat’s takeoff, the remaining groundcrew of VMF-211 set down their tools and took up their helmets and rifles in preparation for what was to be one of the most ferocious battles of the war…
…Though every pilot knew his odds of surviving were low, the Marines were eagerly anticipating the opportunity to fight the same aviators which had attacked their comrades earlier in December. With that thought probably in their minds, the Wildcats of VMF-211 began their diving attack on the 4th Air raid on Wake…
…While the Wildcats of VMF-211 approached from above, the 3-inch AA batteries and machineguns opened fire from below with devastating effect. The Japanese planes, distracted by VMF-211 often failed to effectively evade the island’s AA fire which was far more effective due to the arrival of modern ammunition for the 3-inch guns…
…One of the highest priority requests for the relief convoy had been the arrival of modern AA shells for the 3-inch guns. These shells, which used a 30 second mechanical fuse instead of a 21 second power train fuse, were far more reliable than the original ammunition sent to Wake which dated from the First World War. Most Marines believed that the performance of their AA during the first battles would be substantially improved. Statistics would later show this to be the case, however, the limited number of modern shells meant that it wasn’t long before the Marines were forced to revert to their older ammunition (4)…
…A third infamous nickname was added to the ranks of VMF-211 when Tharin found himself engaged by a trio of Zeros. Engaged in a whirling dogfight, Tharin took advantage of the Wildcat’s heavier construction to shoot down two of the Zeros before trying to close with the third. Unfortunately for the Japanese pilot, a miscalculation on both of pilots parts’ led to a rare mid-air collision in which Tharin’s wing sliced clean through the Zero’s wing earning him the nickname “Battle-axe”. Unfortunately, the dogfight left Tharin vulnerable to a fourth Zero which damaged his plane to such an extent that he was forced to bail out…
…The rest of the Marine pilots, like Tharin, Elrod, and Putnam all found themselves in the same situation. Despite fighting valiantly, they were horribly outnumbered, and though they sold their lives and their planes dearly, averaging 1.5 aerial victories per plane that day, within 30 minutes, all of them had been shot down thus satisfying the main objective of the Japanese raid (5)…
…The remainder of the raid was a bit of a letdown for the defenders of Wake. The Japanese bombers continued their runs on the now isolated airfield and destroyed what was left standing before turning and attacking the remnants of the Pan Am facility on Peale. No attempt was made on either the coastal or the AA batteries, even as the latter hammered away at the Japanese planes, often with surprisingly effective results…
…As the Japanese bombers retreated, the defenders of Wake took stock. They had lost their first line of defense, yet the island’s network of defenses remained intact. All of the island’s AA guns remained active and the total manpower losses were negligible. That being said, the pilots of VMF-211 did not fare nearly so well. Half perished in that final furious dogfight over Wake, including Major “Pounding Paul” Putnam who was unable to bail out of his critically damaged Wildcat. Those pilots that did survive such as “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and the newly christened “Battle-axe Tharin” joined the rest of VMF-211 in taking up arms and waiting for the inevitable Japanese amphibious assault…
…The effectiveness of VMF-211 would foreshadow the immense importance airpower would come to have in the Pacific War. Though small in numbers, the 12 fighters and the small number of support staff effectively stymied an exponentially larger Japanese invasion force. The forces used for the subsequent invasion of Wake had all been earmarked for other operations which were delayed out of necessity. Their aerial victory record was also quite impressive. Over the course of 12 days, they shot down 38 Japanese aircraft and damaged another 15, effectively destroying the 24th Air Flotilla…
…Yet without the distraction of VMF-211, Wake subsequently began to feel the full weight of the Imperial Japanese forces that had been brought against them. A second wave from the Soryu and the Hiryu arrived later that day to build upon the damage done by the first. The AA batteries received particular attention in this attack, as did the remaining structures on the island. Camp 2, housing the Marines, was almost completely annihilated as was the much nicer Camp 1. The Hospital was also hit resulting in the deaths of a dozen wounded men. Fortunately, the presence of civilian volunteers allowed almost all the valuable medical supplies to be saved from the conflagration that followed…
…As casualties began to mount, some of the men, especially the civilians, began to question their choice to come to and eventually stay on Wake. As night fell, burial details went out and were forced to bury the largest number of dead yet. However in spite of the loss of VMF-211, the defenders remained optimistic. The AA batteries had managed to be quite effective, shooting down another 5 Japanese aircraft of the 2nd wave. They figured that if they could outlast the Japanese bombardment they might be able to hold out until the Pacific fleet could finally send more substantial reinforcements…
…The next day, December 21st saw more of the same for the defenders of Wake. This time the planes from Carrier Division 2 were joined by those of the Chitose Air Flotilla having absorbed what was left of the 24th Air Flotilla. Finally free to fly unescorted over the island due to the destruction of VMF-211’s Wildcats, the twin engine bombers still suffered from the determined AA fire of the Marines. The raids of the 21st were mainly concerned with reducing the batteries of the island and to their credit they did score several direct hits on the batteries and the island’s radar station, effectively reducing the island’s AA capacity by about half…
…Having gained air superiority, destroyed most of the buildings on the island, and damaged what they thought to be the island’s defensive network, it was decided to begin landing troops at dawn on the 22nd. They erroneously believed that the Americans had allocated all of their efforts into anti-aircraft defenses and airfield construction. Having bombarded the island with impunity, they assumed, wrongly, that the coastal defenses of Wake had yet to be completed and were unable of responding to a landing attempt. Out of prudence they had targeted them on the 2nd day, but they saw no reason to waste another day of sorties bombing effectively useless installations, yet they would soon find out just how wrong they were…
Footnotes
1) A few things to keep in mind. First, that the Wildcats at Wake were nowhere near as durable as the F4F-4 used later in the war, they had no armor, or self-sealing fuel tanks. Thus some combat damage when going up against swarms of unescorted bombers is unavoidable. Secondly, the naval bombardment of the 10th in TTL, though inaccurate, did damage several of the Wildcats. Finally, consider that the Americans did far more with far less in OTL. Given their performance in OTL with far less personnel and tools, I see no reason why they couldn’t maintain VMF-211 in TTL given a far better combat environment.
2)OTL
3)In TTL the Niihau incident went slightly differently. Nishikaichi suffered a far more severe head trauma upon landing on the isolated Hawaiian island. Thus he was unable to burn his fighter, allowing it to fall into the hands of the Americans on the 14th.
4)Ammunition situation for the 3 inch guns is OTL up until the relief convoy. Given that the majority of the combat had been aerial, 3-inch ammunition is at the top of Devereux’ supply list after reinforcements to help alleviate the trained manpower shortage.
5)Some of these victories must be partially attributed to AA fire as well.
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Killing those trained pilots will come back and hurt Japan in other campaigns later in this war. That was one of those bottlenecks Japan couldn't get over. So every pilot who dies at Wake will be one less pilot at Coral Sea or other battles yet to be written.
I wonder how this first crack at Wake will go. I wonder how those 5inch guns will do and how many ships they will sink this time around.
I wonder how this first crack at Wake will go. I wonder how those 5inch guns will do and how many ships they will sink this time around.
Cool Timeline!
Sir you have a great story in the making here and I just want to say Two Thumbs up! Five stars! Subscribed, Hell Ya!
Sir you have a great story in the making here and I just want to say Two Thumbs up! Five stars! Subscribed, Hell Ya!
Cool chapter and you add a combination of lecture, book mode,and personal viewpoints. The finding of a near intact Zero will assist in the designing of the Hellcat as well as future models of the Wildcar. Might also keep tbe Zero myth from fully forming in the Allied minds.
Thanks again for an enjoyable story.
Thanks again for an enjoyable story.