A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta
- Thread starter TheKnightIrish
- Start date
How can you not tell the difference between a comment and one of the updates? Very easy to find.
Japhy
Banned
That always seems rather pointless. Just keep track of the Chapter Numbers.
Incidently, question about the Timeline, Irish: How far are you intending to go?
I have the presidents and primaries worked out until 1900 and I know the cabinet officers, wars and economic issues through to 1880.
Don't panic - I am only moving to a new flat (thats an "apartment" to our American cousins) and am waiting for my internet to be connected (I am sending this from my work PC). I should post again in the next couple of days...even now Wade Hampton and John Buford are clashing on the roads into Gettysburg...
Chapter Seventy-Two The Battle of Gettysburg The Prelude and Day One
Chapter Seventy-Two
The Battle of Gettysburg
The Prelude and Day One
The Prelude and Day One
From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918
Empire 1918
"General Philip Kearny jr was very much awake and demanding to know what was going on. For a recuperating patient, Doctor Pancoast described General Kearny as more like "a caged tiger". Doctor Joseph K. Barnes, personal physician to Secretary Stanton and later medical director of the forces under General David Hunter, had been assigned to "ensure General Kearny's swift recovery". Dr (and Colonel) Barnes believed that the General "needed to avoid the inevitable distraction and distress of following the campaign" and therefore embargoed any news being passed to his patient...
General Kearny's doctors sought to keep news of the campaign from him to aid his recovery
General Rodman was very uncomfortable about his retention in Washington. He believed it unnecessary, and boardering on negligent with a campaign underway. He sought out General Kearny's AG, Chauncey McKeever, to sound out the Commanding General...
McKeever did not carry the rank to bypass Barnes' authority so he sought out someone who did - William Alexander Hammond...
The atmosphere in the upper levels of medical services was then one of internal strife and personal conflicts. Hammond, a tall and imposing young man, was no man of intrigue, nor even, according to all accounts, a very flexible person. However Surgeon General and Brigadier General Hammond had been appointed by Lincoln, against Stanton's advice and normal rules of promotion. Thus Hammond had a stormy relationship with Stanton who ironically wished to replace Hammond with his own trusted physician, Colonel Barnes. However for the moment Hammond had the rank and authority and sought an interview with General Kearny, which McKeever and Rodman happened to attend...
Rodman described the interview with the prostrate Kearny as "stormy", McKeever as "like tying a burning branch to an old dog's tail. He went wild with action...In a snap the old man was pulling on his tunic one handed over his gown...". General Kearny certainly agreed with Rodman that Washington was not the place for the VI Corps..."
From "The Battle of Gettysburg" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 2005
"Wade Hampton had identified the little town of Gettysburg as a hub for all the roads in the part of Pennsylvania. Further on his scout around the town he realised the very favorable nature of the ground commenting to Colonel Baker "Laurence this is the best damn ground I've seen since we crossed the Potomac". He informed General Lee that if he wished to fight a defensive battle this might be the place do it. Furthermore Hampton's assessment was that the town was guarded only by militia. At the time Hampton made his report he was correct. However it was not long before Union cavalry was spotted on the Emmitsburg Pike. General Alfred Pleasanton's Division had arrived...
The ball opened with Hampton leading Baker's North Carolinans against Pleasanton near the crossroads of the Emmitsburg Pike with the road to Taneytown. Baker's brigade had Hampton's own brigade in support, and General Hampton had already sent word back down the Hagerstown road for Jones and Robertson to come up with all possible speed...
Pleasanton was ably supported by his brigade commaders, William Averell and the boy general, George Custer. It was a see-saw battle with Averell's men fighting on foot one moment, and Custer's charging on horseback, pistols blazing the next...
Wade Hampton is momentarily separated from his troops during one of Custer's countercharges
Pleasanton could not hold his ground as rebel reinforcements arrived, and began a fighting retreat south towards some woods on Cemetary Hill. It therefore came as a surprise to both him and Hampton when more blue troops burst forth from the woods - David McMurtrie Gregg's division had ridden north from Taneytown towards the sound of the guns with Major General John Buford at its head. Wade Hampton was about to have the fight of his life with the "best Dragoon soldier in the Union Army" (Hampton's own words in praise of John Buford)...
Hampton's troopers had begun their withdrawal towards McPherson's Ridge when his scouts returned to the scene of the battle, now raging to the south and west of the town. More Union cavalry had been spotted on the road from York. This was Wyndham's Division summoned from Hannover by the farsighted Buford. Unbeknownst to Hampton a fourth Union cavalry division was on that road in the form of Devin's command marching down from York itself...
Buford races to Pleasanton's relief
The day ended with Hampton's four brigades perched precariously on McPherson's Ridge while Buford's troops were held back behind Stevens Run, straining for an opportunity to renew the battle come the morning. Frequent exchanges of gunfire between aggressive pickets broke the silence of the night...
During the night Devin's tired troopers rode into Gettysburg bringing Buford's command to a total of 4 divisions. He was eager to renew the fight with Hampton come the morning. The value of the ground had not been lost on Buford either and he had sent word to the nearest Union infantry, Meade's right wing of the Army of the Potomac, to come up with a possible speed...
Surprisingly given his rough handling that evening, Hampton too was keen to renew the fight come the morning. An aide had arrived from General Stuart confirming he was but a short distance down the Mummasburg Pike and would be on the field come the morning. More importantly orders had arrived from Lee - "Take and hold the ridges if you can... General Longstreet's Corps will be with you tomorrow"...
The following morning would open to the largest cavalry battle in American history as the bulk of Stuart's Confederate Cavalry Corps would engage 4 of the 5 divisions of Buford's Union Cavalry Corps..."
General Buford used his cavalry as dragoons, often fighting on foot. Even the a "grand hussar" like Custer fought his men on foot at times at Gettysburg
Last edited:
is this a reverse battle? As in the confederates and Union armies each hold their OTL counterparts positions of said OTL battle??
We need a map. But I think with the Union troops coming from the south and east, and the rebels from the west and north that we are looking at a replay of Gettysburg maybe? Rather than a reverse.
Chapter Seventy-Three The Battle of Gettysburg Day Two
Chapter Seventy-Three
The Battle of Gettysburg
Day Two
Day Two
From "The Battle of Gettysburg" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 2005
Penn State 2005
"Anticipating that the Confederates might try to retreat to the west come the morning, Buford laid out his plan of attack to assault Hampton's position on Seminary Ridge and Oak Ridge. This was appropriate terrain for a delaying action by Hampton's smaller cavalry force against the superior Union cavalry forces. Hampton meant to buy time awaiting the arrival of Stuart as well as Longstreet's Confederate infantrymen who could push back the Yankees with a view to occupying the strong defensive positions west and perhaps south of town. Buford, himself also understood that if the Confederates came up in force and could gain control of these heights, Reynolds' army would have difficulty dislodging them. However his priority that morning was driving Hampton off from the area altogether...
Eventually, Buford's men reached dismounted troopers of Colonel Laurence Baker's cavalry brigade, who raised determined resistance and delaying tactics from behind fence posts with fire from their carbines and shotguns...
A depiction of one of the Rebel cavalry counter-charges on the second day
By 10.20 am the Union cavalry had pushed the Confederate force west to McPherson Ridge, when the vanguard of Longstreet's corps finally appeared on the horizon (General Samuel French's division). It was about this time that Stuart finally arrived and Buford was forced to divert Devin's division to deal with this threat to his right (northern) flank...
Initially Buford's force stood up to Confederate counterattacks. This was a combination of the good ground on which Buford's dragoons skirmished and the fact that General French initially sought to drive Buford with only two brigades in line (Daniel's North Carolinans and O'Neal's Alabamans). Eventually, north of the Chambersburg Pike, French's infantry gained success against Brigadier General di Cesnola's brigade. Wyndham’s division, of which Luigi di Cesnola’s brigade formed part, had focused on training with the arme blanche. Unlike most of Buford’s troops they were poor dragoons and skirmishers. Pushed into an unfinished railroad bed cut in the ridge, separated from their horseholders, they were flanked and suffering serious casualties effectively collapsed as a fighting force and fled for the town…
General Buford realised that he was in trouble and quickly mounted a fighting retreated by brigades, skilfully using his mounted advantage to out distance French’s infantry. Hampton’s cavalry, bloodied by two days of fighting, had little appetite to pursue and engage Buford on their own. Stuart’s division however, even though ragged from its own bloodying at Carlisle and hard ride south, kept up a sharp fight with Devin on the Mummasberg Pike…
...when the vanguard of the IV Corps, now under the senior divisional commander Major General Lew Wallace, finally arrived. With Wallace and the troops of IV Corps, as they marched north west into Gettysburg, was the commander of the Right Wing George Gordon Meade. Wallace was the first to spot John Buford in the cupola of the Lutheran Seminary. Wallace’s interest in classical warfare is apparent from their initial greeting…
“What goes John?” “There’s the Devil to pay!” “I see you’re giving them the parthian shot.” “I reckon I am at that.”…
General Lew Wallace would wash away the stain of Shiloh at west of the town of Gettysburg
As Buford’s line withdrew east of Steven’s Run, another rebel force was spotted advancing up the Hagerstown Pike (Cadmus Wilcox’s division of Longstreet’s Corps). Meade had summoned his remaining corps commanders to come up in advance of their troops to join him, Wallace and Buford in Gettysburg itself…
Meade resolved that Wallace would take IV Corps forward to support and ultimately replace Buford’s hard pressed troopers in holding off the advancing rebels. The three divisions of IV Corps (Newton’s, J.J.Barlett’s and Wallace’s now commanded by Abram Duryee) should be more than capable of holding off French’s Division and the rebel cavalry for the moment. However Meade was loathe to advance his other troops through the town towards the ridge (Seminary Ridge) now swarming with rebels (R.H. Anderson’s Division was coming up behind French now on the Chambersburg Pike). Sickles and Hancock were both keen to get into the fray as soon as their forces were up, but Sickles’ III Corps was next on the road behind Wallace, and it has been alleged that Meade had such a low opinion of Sickles’ skill as a corps commander he did not wish to deploy him far from his sight. With no idea of where or when Reynolds would be up with the left wing, and a suspicion that the entire rebel army was within hearing distance of the firing, Meade resolved to remain on the defensive. While Wallace screened the town, Meade would deploy Sickles on the high ground south of town, around a prominent feature known locally as Cemetery Hill. Eventually as Hancock’s corps came up he would deploy on Sickles left, on the ridge running south from the hill. Once in a decent position on good ground, Meade could draw Wallace back in, as see if he couldn’t hold the rebels until word arrived from Reynolds…
Wallace's IV Corps faces an attack by 3 divisions of Longstreet's Corps
The first major casualty on either side was General John J. Abercrombie, commander of Newton’s led brigade, as he led his troops to Buford’s relief. General Abercrombie was shot and killed by one of “a cloud of rebel sharpshooters that seemed to infest every copse of trees on the battlefield” (Wallace)…
There was brief lull in the fighting as the rebels realised Union infantry had arrived, and General French sought counsel with Generals Anderson and Wilcox. It resumed around 3.30 pm, when Longstreet arrived and launched a three division attack on Wallace’s line. Even with the loss of Abercrombie (and the promotion of the mildly inebriated William Harrow to command his brigade as senior colonel) Newton’s division stood the attack well, as did Bartlett’s. Duryee on the extreme left, with most of his men in the railroad cut, was doing well. Brigadiers William Morris and Edwin Stoughton were solid brigade commanders, as was Colonel Edward E. Cross commanding Duryee’s old brigade. However as Wilcox’s attack developed his troops began to overlap Duryee’s left flank…
Longstreet added Major General John Bell Hood’s division to the assault, and first Duryee’s division and then all of IV Corps was slowly driven back through the streets of Gettysburg…
As the fighting to the west intensified, the first divisions of Johnston's Corps, marching south on the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads toward Gettysburg, could be seen from the town. Sickles was unenthusiastic about “digging in” and wanted to go to Wallace’s aid, but Meade stayed close and kept him to his work. If Meade had concerns about Sickles’ reliability, he must also have had difficulties with Hancock’s aggressiveness. All agree Hancock was even less enamoured of the order to dig in, while Wallace fought on alone, than Sickles. As Hancock was further from Meade’s eye though, he did sent forward Doubleday’s division to shore up Wallace’s left flank. It was too late. Both Wallace and Meade saw the writing on the wall, and Wallace’s troops raced back through and around the town. Hancock’s troops made withdrawal south of the town a more organised retreat. In the town itself as French’s troops pursued it was chaos…
Hancock directs Doubleday to Wallace's relief
(artistic licence has littered this famous painting with factual errors - the wrong corps flags and it is set too far north of its actual position)
By early evening the Federal line ran in a semicircle from the northern end of Cemetery Hill (Hancock’s I Corps), through Cemetery Hill (Sickles’ III Corps) around to Culp’s Hill where Meade placed Wallace’s IV Corps to counter the threat from the troops that could be seen advancing on the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads in the fading light…
Hancock’s view of their position is instructive. Hancock told Doubleday "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." Though many have argued over whether Meade should have been more aggressive with his dispositions (by the end of the day he had almost three corps on the field to Longstreet’s five divisions) one cannot fault his choice of ground or his placement of his forces on that ground. The morning would tell whether he could hold it until Reynolds could come up…
General Lee arrived to join Longstreet before sunset. Surveying the ground he understood the defensive potential to the Union if they held this high ground. However it was too late for Longstreet to move on Cemetery Hill, which Lee viewed a the lynchpin of Meade’s defence, and Johnston’s advance troops were only now arriving on the field. Furthermore with the lions share of his cavalry involved in fighting all day Lee had little idea of the Union force south of Gettysburg. So far he estimated but two or three corps had arrived. Where were the rest? The uncertainty would have been unsettling for any commander.
On the other hand Longstreet’s four divisions (Pickett’s had not been engaged) had driven the Union cavalry and a full corps out of the town; in the morning Johnston would be up with perhaps the bulk of his corps from the vicinity of Harrisburg; and Jackson was driving his corps as only Jackson could to be on the field as soon as was possible. So Lee resolved to attack come the morning. Gettysburg would see a third day of fighting…"
Last edited:
Magnificent. Good to see Wallace shining sometime earlier than OTL Monocacy. I do wonder, with Gouverneur Warren in the west, whether the significance of a certain hill will be appreciated.
An update will follow tomorrow (I forgot to bring my notebook to work - I still have no internet at home).
What happens when you share your AH Timeline with your girlfriend...?
She organises it so I don't forgot what was happened to people in the past or forget to include interesting people in the future...everything picture has details of the OTL facts about the person and TTL facts so far established! She's organised!
What happens when you share your AH Timeline with your girlfriend...?
She organises it so I don't forgot what was happened to people in the past or forget to include interesting people in the future...everything picture has details of the OTL facts about the person and TTL facts so far established! She's organised!
I only recognise McClellan, Hooker and Hancock.
Edit: my mistake, it's actually an older photo of Hancock, not McClellan.
Edit: my mistake, it's actually an older photo of Hancock, not McClellan.
Last edited:
I don't see McClellan at all. I see Hanock, Hooker, Wallace, Kearny and Logan.
my mistake, it's actually an older photo of Hancock, not McClellan. Second Row, far right.
Only now do i realize how that seriously does not make any sense....
Chapter Seventy-Four The Battle of Gettysburg Day Three
Chapter Seventy-Four
The Battle of Gettysburg
Day Three
Day Three
From "The Battle of Gettysburg" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 2005
Penn State 2005
"Throughout the evening and following morning, most of the remaining infantry of both armies approached the field. Of Jackson’s Corps Lee would have the divisions of A.P.Hill and Ewell available come the dawn with Field and Early not far off. On the Union side Reynolds’ wing was on the road from Taneytown, and both Williams’ XII Corps and von Steinwehr’s XI Corps would arrive at Meade’s headquarters shortly after dawn. Reynolds had ridden through the night to find Meade’s HQ and assume command. Andrew A. Humphrey was left in command of his own V Corps and Stevens’ IX with orders to come up as quick as possible as the day progressed…"
From “The Gray Fox – Robert E. Lee” by R. Southey-Freeman
Orange & West 1958
"At around 7am Allegheny Johnson would open the attack on the Federal right. With his four divisions he was to attack the Federal troops on Cemetery and Culp's Hill, and seek out the flank and if possible turn it.
This was not however the main thrust of Lee’s attack. Instead it would be the first move of an attack in en echelon along the whole line. As Johnson seized the attention of the Federals, Longstreet’s First Corps would commence his attack, first on the west face of Cemetery Hill and then along the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge – French, Wilcox, Anderson and Hood with Pickett in reserve. Finally Jackson’s divisions on the field would move on a tight front towards the Trostle Farm and the two hills beyond, which would dominate the Taneytown Road and perhaps even sever it, thus cutting off Meade…
However Lee understood the potential flaws in his plan. He still believed he outnumbered the Federals but he knew his intelligence was “patchy” at best. Stuart’s orders were to extend both flanks to seek out intelligence on Union numbers and location. Lee had no idea that morning that Reynolds’ Wing was already partially on the field…
However Lee understood the potential flaws in his plan. He still believed he outnumbered the Federals but he knew his intelligence was “patchy” at best. Stuart’s orders were to extend both flanks to seek out intelligence on Union numbers and location. Lee had no idea that morning that Reynolds’ Wing was already partially on the field…
We know from the testimony of Walter Taylor that Lee had sought counsel from his corps commanders that night. The pugnacious Edward Johnson was in favor of an attack but either upon the flank beyond his current position (i.e. on Wolf Hill) or on another front. Johnson was not so aggressive as to have missed “the formidable nature of the ground” before him. General Longstreet was also somewhat reluctant. “General Longstreet was willing to make the attack because of our supposition that there were but three Federal Corps before us. But if the Federals had concentrated Longstreet was adamant that the army should not then attack”…
One must remember in judging Lee’s later decisions that his army had known bold successes in the Peninsula and at the Blackwater, but otherwise had met reverses at the hands of the Army of the Potomac when it could concentrate its superior numbers against Lee’s troops…"
From "Always The General - The Life of John Fulton Reynolds" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 1999
“Reynolds himself did not sleep but an hour that night, between riding to find Meade, and then riding the ground as best he could in the dark. Reynolds had ordered Williams to take his corps and place it on Hancock’s left, on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge, as the morning progressed. As Reynolds did not yet feel confident in either the ground or the likely rebel line of attack, if any come the morning, he held von Steinwehr in reserve behind the Ridge. Von Steinwehr described his location as the “bridge between the two legs of the letter A” – the legs being the Union positions on Cemetery Ridge and Wallace’s refused position on the two hills. However if Meade’s and Buford’s description of the position was accurate, “Lee would be fool to attack with serious intent” come the morning…”
From "The Battle of Gettysburg" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 2005
"Attacks on the Union right flank
Union breastworks on Culp's Hill
About 7.00 am the Third Corps' attack began with an assault by D.H.Hill on the northern face of Cemetery Hill. Led off by Doles’ and Garland’s brigade, Hill did little more than demonstrate which reflected both his orders and his view of the strength of Union position before him. Mott’s division of II Corps holding the position was not troubled by the attack. Indeed even this demonstration was an easy target for Union artillery…
Posey's Mississippi Brigade made some gains at the foot of Culp's Hill
The attack by Rodes on Culp's Hill got off to a late start. Most of the hill's defenders, Wallace’s IV Corps (Meade had not returned to his corps but instead remained at HQs with Reynolds), had dug in. Wallace’s insistence on constructing strong defensive works, perhaps a lesson learned from the desperate experience of his comrades at Shiloh, meant that, even depleted by the previous day’s fighting, the five brigades that made up Newton’s I and Barlett’s II division had no difficultly holding off the Confederate attackers. However Posey’s Mississippians did capture a portion of some forward Union works on the lower part of Culp's Hill abandoned by the inebriate Colonel William Harrow, who was relieved later that day by General Wallace and placed under arrest…
Wallace’s III division, formerly his own, now under Duryee’s command had been positioned on the southern portion of Culp’s Hill opposite a stream and Spangler’s Spring. It was here that Johnson set the division of Isaac Trimble to the attack. Trimble was an aggressive, if simple, commander. He attacked a position, every position, head on. Johnson described him as “a terrier with a vice-like jaw. He would hold onto the enemy and shake it til one or both were exhausted or defeated”. Fighting was fierce on this portion of the battlefield. As Trimble’s 3 North Carolina brigades attacked head on, it was Dick Garnet and his Virginians that sought out the extreme right of the Union army…
Colonel Edward E. Cross of the Union army would win plaudits that day for his refusal of his brigade’s right flank and his repulse of Garnet’s attacks…
General Meade and staff preparing for the third assault on Wolf Hill
The critical move of the day, unknown to Lee, was Evans advance on Wolf Hill. Though obvious to Wallace from his elevated position, he had no spare troops to secure his flank. Yet if Evans proceeded beyond Wolf Hill, no doubt leaving artillery up there, he could descend into the rear of the Union position. Wallace sent urgent messengers to Reynolds and Meade alerting them of the danger…
The timely warning brought forth George Meade himself at the head of Von Steinwehr’s XI Corps. Meade knowing the ground better than most at headquarters and keen to aid his own Corps rushed to their relief. Evans' division had already crested Wolf Hill as the XI Corps reached it foot at McAllisters Mill. In order to remedy this potential disaster Meade himself direct the leading division, Barlow’s, to the attack as von Steinwehr readied Webber’s and Schimmelfennig’s…
Casualties in Barlow’s Division were high as they contested the crest with Evans. Underwood’s brigade collapsed and raced down the hill through Devens’ brigade as it came up in support. As Barlow’s division withdrew, the attack was taken up by von Steinwehr’s “Dutchmen” – the brigades of Krzyzonowski, von Gilsa and von Amsberg. These Germans pushed back Evans’ South Carolinans but were flanked themselves as Evans committed his reserve – his sole brigade of North Carolinans under James Johnson Pettigrew. Against this threat, and as von Steinwehr steadied his Germans, Meade against led the rallied brigades of Devens (of Webber’s Division) and McLean (of Barlow’s) against Pettigrew. This counterattack succeeded. Evans could not maintain his attack nor indeed his position atop Wolf Hill under the pressure of XI Corps. However the success of XI Corps was marred by the wounding of General Meade. Having taken a wound to his arm in the first assault, he then sustained gunshot wounds to his stomach and left leg. Carried from the hill only after hearing from Barlow that the hill had been taken, Meade died before he reached the surgeons…
Pettigrew's attack on the XI Corps' flank
Attacks on the Union left flank
As Longstreet’s attack developed, or as Henry Hunt described it “slammed” into Birney on Cemetery Hill and Hancock on the ridge, Reynolds enquired if Hancock required assistance. “Not today General” was Hancock’s nonchalant reply…
Longstreet anticipated that at the very least Hood’s attack would “hit air” as it overlapped the left flank of the Union army. As Hood’s attack went in, the last of Longstreet’s front line divisions, at some time between 10 and 11am, Hood was surprised to find Yankees rushing into positions before him. “General I find the banners of the XII Corps on the ridge before me, a corps I know was not in yesterday’s fight” is supposed to have been Hood’s message to Longstreet. The cautious Longstreet had his forces slowly disengage and withdraw to their starting positions to prepare…for what? Longstreet was not specific. However the Corps artillery opened a telling fire on Williams’ position from some higher ground but 200 yards from the Union position on Cemetery Ridge…
Alpheus Williams rushes his corps into place on Cemetery Ridge
That Union reinforcements had arrived was obvious. That Longstreet had disengaged was an established fact that Lee could not challenge before it was effected. Lee’s plan was unraveling. Furthermore initial reports from the Confederate left suggested that Johnson’s attack was not gaining much traction…
Forestalling Jackson’s attack, Lee rode with Longstreet and sought out his Second Corps commander. Should the attack continue. Longstreet said no. They had but supplies for one more big fight and it should not be spent on an attack on a likely numerically superior force entrenched on good ground of its own choosing. Lee knew very well that Johnson would likely favor pursuing their attack in some revised form in the current position. But what of Jackson who had just seen the ground and to whom the right flanking attack would fall, what would he favor? Again we have only Taylor’s testimony to rely upon. Jackson did not favor an attack on the heights or on the flanks of the army's current position. It had the look of a natural fortress. Instead he suggested a move of the whole army around the enemy’s right flank. A grand flanking manoeuver. With the Army of Northern Virginia between Washington and its primary army, Reynolds would have to attack them. Was that not General Lee’s intention all along? Longstreet, placing a hand on Stonewall’s shoulder warmly the sentiments and the plan…
Lee and Longstreet listen to Jackson's assessment
Robert E. Lee was an aggressive commander. One but has to look at his record in the Peninsula, at the Rappahannock an at Blackwater to understand that. Yet he also knew his army was not invincible. Since the advent of Phil Kearny the Army of Northern Virginia had received as many whippings as it had dealt out. The Union position at Gettysburg was formidable and Lee knew he simply did not have the intelligence about the Union numbers or position to attack in the knowledge of superiority…
Lee halted Jackson’s attack and sent urgent word to Edward Johnson to draw off from his. By 2pm the fighting at Gettysburg had died down. Reynolds was mystified. The fighting on the Union right had been vicious and extremely perilous to the Union position. Now the Confederates had withdrawn to their starting positions. Sickles recommended a counterattack but Reynolds discounted that for the moment. He would wait and see what Lee was up to. The delay allowed Humphreys and Stevens to get into position…”
From "The Lessons of the Civil War" by Professor Martin Edgars
Hutchinson Press 1975
"In the first years after Gettysburg many rebels saw the attack on Wolf Hill as a lost opportunity. Braxton Bragg would later accuse the commanders of the Army of Northern Virginia of "timidy" and " a collective lose of nerve". Evans alone had almost broken into the rear of the Union line. Had Longstreet continued his attack, committing Pickett, in conjunction with Jackson's attack then perhaps the Union position might have been "pinched off" to borrow the words of Evans himself. That position does not however stand up to assessment in the opinion of modern scholars...
Jackson's attack would not have found a lightly guarded flank. Williams' corps held the southern end of Cemetery Ridge, and the crucial point ignored by many early assessments of the battle, Andrew Humphreys had spotted the value of both the hills at the southern edge of the ridge - Big and Little Round Top. Far from Jackson sweeping over this terrain with the only two divisions of his yet on the field, he would have instead run into John Barnes' Division on Little Round Top and George Sykes' regulars on Big Round Top, with the third division of Samuel Crawford coming up in reserve...
Furthermore Reynolds, in his interior position, had a further reserve following the deployment of von Steinwehr's Corps in the form of Stevens fast arriving IX Corps. Battered though it might be...
Confederate dreams about victory at Gettysburg are just that, dreams...
However the subsequent flanking manouver by Lee's army in the face of the entire Union army is deserving of the study it has received. Strategically wise; tactically well executed; it was a masterclass in battlefield deceit..."
Last edited:
So Meade becomes the Reynolds of TTL. Well, at least he will be better remembered this time around.
Is that the end of the Battle of Gettysburg then? of does the flanking movement still continue it. Also, are you drawing this from Newt Gringich's books?
And i am also curious, but what are some of the Civil War books you are using
Is that the end of the Battle of Gettysburg then? of does the flanking movement still continue it. Also, are you drawing this from Newt Gringich's books?
And i am also curious, but what are some of the Civil War books you are using