Protect and Survive: A Timeline
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Macragge1
Banned
It's strange; I personally believe that deterrence is the key reason why World War III hasn't happened; all the evidence suggests that it works. The problem is that should deterrence ever fail, once, for a moment, then it will look like the biggest and most deadly house of cards that man has ever known.
I have a huge amount of respect for everyone who was a part of the Strategic Air Command. They were doubtless brave men who would put their lives on the line in order to do what they knew was right. Saying that, a lot of them scare the shit out of me.
There's some videos up there of contemporary interviews with active SAC members (and Vulcan crewmembers, for that matter) being asked whether they would carry out their missions for real, and without fail they look into the camera, don't bat an eyelid and say that yes, they would. Now, obviously part of this is because if they said anything else they'd lose their job the second filming was over. Still, it's clear that they mean it - there's a common theme of practicing it so much that come the crunch, it becomes mechanical. In effect (especially in the Minuteman silos), they become a human component in the machine, mere switches. Basically, they just don't think about what they're really doing. To paraphrase one operator - 'there'll be plenty of time for reflection afterwards'.
That quote rather interests me; from what I understand, all the psychological proficiency tests to get to sit by the button only tested up to the point that the key was turned (as it happens, I'd love to see the content of those tests - how can you decide if someone is sane enough to kill millions of people?). I tried to explore the after-effects of such a burden with the Pilot in Prospero, but it's something that I feel would be more interesting in more depth.
I agree that the gallows humour is less unnerving than playing it straight. Whilst I'm sure that the majority of SAC were perfectly good people, one must remember that their founder, Curtis LeMay (who came up with the motto) was one of these people who by all accounts wanted nuclear war (and the father of the apocryphal quote 'if there's five Americans and three Russians left at the end, we win).
The SAC's primary purpose was to deliver thousands of megatons of nuclear weaponry and destroy the enemy as a functioning opponent. Deterrence was an essential by-product of this, but we must never forget that all of their training was training for the real thing. Please don't take this as being contrary - you're absolutely right in everything except semantics.
I love Duck and Cover. It's a little like the Protect and Survive films in that it gets so much stick for being useless whereas there are at least grains of usefulness in it - I didn't know the Nagasaki anecdote though, it's very interesting.
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Winston Smith
Banned
I don't think that LeMay was pro-war. He believed that if war was going to be war, it should be won very quickly.
Macragge1
Banned
I won't suggest that Lemay was in favour of an unprovoked, out of the blue attack on the USSR; still, he was certainly more inclined to use nuclear attack as an option than almost any of his western contemporaries.
Whilst not quite the General Ripper character history has made him out to be, LeMay did once suggest that the peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis was 'the greatest defeat in [America's] history' - given what the alternatives were, it's difficult to see this as anything other than a particularly warlike statement.
Similarly, Stratojet scout pilots report coming back from overflights of the Soviet Union to hear LeMay suggesting that 'maybe if we do this overflight right, we can get World War III started'. Obviously there's issues of provenance and the tone in which things were said, but my view is that LeMay believed that a nuclear war could be won by the US. I won't give my views on whether this is right or wrong because honestly, there's so much I don't know that he did, and so much context that I couldn't hope to understand. Still, thanks for commenting, and I hope this has explained to you what colours my own view on the man.
Of course there is the issue of how much Lemay believed in the probability of avoiding nuclear war.If you base your assumption on a high risk of conflict the desire to start a war on your own terms is higher than if you assume a minimal risk.And yes SAC was preparing for the real thing but that doesn't mean that their intention was to start a war.Soldiers by the nature of their profession have to prepare for war doesn't mean they plan to start one but if it happens they have to be ready.The same as a cop who has to know how to shoot doesn't mean he plans to start shooting people.
There's an element of the chicken and the egg in all this; deterrence cannot be effective unless you convince your adversary that you are perfectly prepared to retaliate in the event of attack. In this respect, the ability and willingness to deliver those megatons is the sine qua non of deterrence.
Of course in this timeline detterence failed badly.Interestingly Lemay was still alive in 1984,most likely from his point of view 'I told you so' meaning they could have started the war in 1962 when the US still had a superiority in nukes and delivery systems.Actually 1962 was the last year when the US could at least in theory strike without suffering catastrophic damage from the soviets.After that the soviets increased their available nukes to levels that regardless of attack patterns would still devastate much of american society.So the Lemay of 1984 in this timeline would probably be proven right assuming anyone would still care.
During WW2, when LeMay was a leader in very thoroughly bombing cities in Japan, he said that if the allies lost, then he (and others involved in the heavy bombing of Japanese cities) would be prosecuted as war criminals.
Mister "Make The Rubble Bounce" would have made for a very interesting Viking.
From what I've read I think that Le May believed war was so terrible that there had to be a way found to prevent one from ever happening again. Creating SAC as a very effective weapon and making everybody believe that you were more than prepared to fight a nuclear war is probably as good a strategy as any.
I can imagine senior officials in the Kremlin deciding that they better behave themselves because 'that crazy Le May is just looking for an excuse to attack us'.
1962 might still be late enough for the US and Canada, but not for the rest of NATO, alas.
I can imagine senior officials in the Kremlin deciding that they better behave themselves because 'that crazy Le May is just looking for an excuse to attack us'.
1962 might still be late enough for the US and Canada, but not for the rest of NATO, alas.
One question that should be asked exactly how many of SACs personell survived the war?ICBM launch personell would probably die in the long run assuming they weren't hit directly by a soviet missile.Since areas like Montana,North and South Dakota,Nebraska and Missouri would be largely radioactive wastelands any surviving air force officers would in the long term die despite being in a bunker, from low supplies.Personell at the main air force bases like Minot or Barksdale would have been killed in the soviet strike so most surviving SAC personell in the long term would be any B-52 crewmen who survived.How many would have survived we shouldnt forget that once a mission was completed aB-52 had to go back all the way to the US or any other friendly airport assuming battle damage.Of course landing would be difficult since most airports are gone.Still they would be among the few still living former SAC members.
I'm not so sure I can believe the 'anti-war LeMay' theory. Remember, this guy was PISSED when JFK pulled out of the Bay of Pigs in April of 1961.
I don't blame him, Cuba was a little bit of Communism right off Florida. It's possible that if JFK had backed the Bay of Pigs invasion that Castro might have been overthrown.
Now we can debate elsewhere as to whether that would have been a good thing but a lot of US officials and military men would be very happy to get rid of a Communist Cuba.
Now we can debate elsewhere as to whether that would have been a good thing but a lot of US officials and military men would be very happy to get rid of a Communist Cuba.
1. Concerning the nuking of Southern neutrals:
although they would surely not be plastered by nukes, I am sure that at least the capitals, maybe also some main centres of those countries which were probable to rise to prominence after the war if left untouched would have been targeted in case of such a general exchange. I blame the ideological component here: why risk being at war with the other camp and annihilate the main opponent and oneself so that others can "pick up the torch" quickly?
I am not talking about hundreds of nukes, but a number of carefully picked targets to make sure everybody has quite a recovery to do.
2. I go a bit off-topic here. The discussion on Curtis Le May reminds me a bit on the 1914 situation (I do not remember who already had made the connection closely after the Cuban Missile Crisis - was it one of the Kennedies themselves?). Le May's point of view very much ressembles the assumptions of parts of the German High Command which would rather risk war sooner than later instead of expecting a future where France and Russia were certainly unbeatable by the Central Powers.
Also, speculating on his general view on nuclear war to be avoided or provoced, it probably depended on the point of time. Another German example: Moltke, the mastermind behind the Prussian campaigns of 1864, 66 and 70/71 used his last speech in the Reichstag in 1890, shortly before his death to warn of the dangers of modern warfare and the certainty of a major European war to ruin all states and destroy civilization. His advice to any future German leadership was to avoid war (though, also through deterrence).
Thus, while Le May may have advocated nuclear war as long as it seemed winnable, might well have been aware of the point when even the theoritical strategical benefits of waging one have sunken to nil.
although they would surely not be plastered by nukes, I am sure that at least the capitals, maybe also some main centres of those countries which were probable to rise to prominence after the war if left untouched would have been targeted in case of such a general exchange. I blame the ideological component here: why risk being at war with the other camp and annihilate the main opponent and oneself so that others can "pick up the torch" quickly?
I am not talking about hundreds of nukes, but a number of carefully picked targets to make sure everybody has quite a recovery to do.
2. I go a bit off-topic here. The discussion on Curtis Le May reminds me a bit on the 1914 situation (I do not remember who already had made the connection closely after the Cuban Missile Crisis - was it one of the Kennedies themselves?). Le May's point of view very much ressembles the assumptions of parts of the German High Command which would rather risk war sooner than later instead of expecting a future where France and Russia were certainly unbeatable by the Central Powers.
Also, speculating on his general view on nuclear war to be avoided or provoced, it probably depended on the point of time. Another German example: Moltke, the mastermind behind the Prussian campaigns of 1864, 66 and 70/71 used his last speech in the Reichstag in 1890, shortly before his death to warn of the dangers of modern warfare and the certainty of a major European war to ruin all states and destroy civilization. His advice to any future German leadership was to avoid war (though, also through deterrence).
Thus, while Le May may have advocated nuclear war as long as it seemed winnable, might well have been aware of the point when even the theoritical strategical benefits of waging one have sunken to nil.
Whatever the situation southern neutrals are still in overall better shape except for Argentina,surely Cuba no way was Fidel ignored by the US,Panama and probably Nicaragua.Strikes on Brazil,Chile or Mexico are possible but more likely the overall economic chaos brought about by the war is worse.For Mexico added problems are refugees from the US in one unexpected irony, although unlike the Roland Emmerich movie The day after tomorrow which completely ignored realism I doubt mexican officials would have the resources to handle large numbers of refugees.
Have you read Resurrection Day, where a LeMay expy (1) disobeys orders and starts the Cuban Missile War in that book? Doesn't strike me as something LeMay would do in RL, IMO.
(1) Probably because if they showed LeMay doing it, his surviving relatives might object. Assuming he had any.
Waiting for the next update!!!
(1) Probably because if they showed LeMay doing it, his surviving relatives might object. Assuming he had any.
Waiting for the next update!!!
In all honesty few nuclear war stories actually present a credible start to World War III.While some generals in real life do get close to the general Ripper cliche of Doctor Strangelove its actually a lot harder for a rogue general to start doing things by his own.There are things like the chain of command in place.It would actually have been more believable before the advent of instant communication for a general Ripper type than today.But the existence of these types in fiction is mainly because its easier to write the protagonists in a nuke fest as mad and power hungry than trying to find a credible reason for war even if that is very hard.
Indiana Beach Crow
Monthly Donor
Well, the real life General Ripper was Gen. Thomas Powers, a man even LeMay thought was....unstable. If you were ever going to see an American start a preemptive nuclear war, he'd be a far more plausible candidate. But since everyone knows the name LeMay he's always going to be one who gets name-dropped in these kind of stories, unfortunately.
Not sure I'd characterise it as a game of chicken, perhaps more a sword of damoclese hanging over the heads of both sides if they missbehaved. Thankfully neither side did anything silly and democracy was able to defeat the second major challenge to it in the 20th Century.
MAD did work very well, thankfully, but only because leaders on both sides were rational human beings. If one side is not rational, or thinks that they'll get into Paradise if they're killed, then it won't work, which is why I'm a believer in having an ABM system, but that's a discussion for another day.
MAD did work very well, thankfully, but only because leaders on both sides were rational human beings. If one side is not rational, or thinks that they'll get into Paradise if they're killed, then it won't work, which is why I'm a believer in having an ABM system, but that's a discussion for another day.