Is a Late CP Victory Possible?

[Riain]

It's funny how WW1 threads tend to fixate on single details, usually it's war guilt or Britain's DoW but in this case it's shelling of Dover. Forget the giant, and manifold ramifications of the Germans overrunning the BEF to get to the Channel coast in 1918, the range and accuracy of a handful of guns arising from a throwaway comment among many others is what's important!

 

[Fehérvári]

What is the earliest usable POD?

 

[Riain]

For a CP victory in WW1? Take your pick of any number of things from the first weeks of the war. I bang on about winning the Race to the Sea, others are proponents of German going on the offensive in the East, others like winning the Battle of the Marne (although how isn't usually specified). There a people, including me, who would like the see the German Navy do more, perhaps get a victory or two in 1915, or perhaps get Italy onside in 1915. The list goes on.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

It's funny how WW1 threads tend to fixate on single details, usually it's war guilt or Britain's DoW but in this case it's shelling of Dover. Forget the giant, and manifold ramifications of the Germans overrunning the BEF to get to the Channel coast in 1918,

Ramifications: the BEF has either been overrun or it has retreated south and probably embarked at Marseilles or Bordeaux for home.

Again, you've described the post-victory end credits, not the process of actual victory.

the range and accuracy of a handful of guns arising from a throwaway comment among many others is what's important!

You gave the challenge, I responded with the facts at my disposal.

And it was not a throwaway comment: you were using it to say that the British would obviously abandon Dover once the Germans moved up, which would have more than just an insignificant effect on the war.

 

[Athelstane]

Yes the Moltke plan was logistically unsound, but you know that there were missed opportunities; perhaps encircle the 5th French Army, to keep 4 divisions on the right rather than send them to the east, to transfer 2 whole armies from the left to the right wing and win the so called 'Race to the Sea' as a byproduct of trying to carry out the Moltke plan more fully. Despite all of this the Germans did get very close to Paris, and any of these changes might have swung the balance.

As for the long war, all of those generals underestimated Germany's ability to wage a long war, as did almost every combatant about their own country. I'm not suggesting they plan for a long war in the campaign, rather that if it was conducted better it would give Germany a better outcome to fight the long war with.

I agree. All this *was* possible, and not all that hard to achieve with a reasonable point of departure (say, Moltke getting kicked to death by his horse on 1912 army maneuvers).

One can say that the Schlieffen Plan as modified by Moltke was logistically unsound (and it was!) and also concede that, with a modest and available accession of strength on the right, it had stood a fair chance of gaining most of the Channel ports before the offensive ran out of steam.

Achieving that much in the 1914 campaigning season makes it much more likely they can win a war of attrition in the West by 1916. Having Amiens, Bethune, and the ability to make serious interdictions into the Channel really puts the Entente at a very serious disadvantage.

All of which prescinds from more radical (pre-war) points of departure like the Ostaufmarsch scenarios, which attempt to find a CP victory by taking Britain completely off the table.

 

[Riain]

I agree. All this *was* possible, and not all that hard to achieve with a reasonable point of departure (say, Moltke getting kicked to death by his horse on 1912 army maneuvers).

One can say that the Schlieffen Plan as modified by Moltke was logistically unsound (and it was!) and also concede that, with a modest and available accession of strength on the right, it had stood a fair chance of gaining most of the Channel ports before the offensive ran out of steam.

Achieving that much in the 1914 campaigning season makes it much more likely they can win a war of attrition in the West by 1916. Having Amiens, Bethune, and the ability to make serious interdictions into the Channel really puts the Entente at a very serious disadvantage.

All of which prescinds from more radical (pre-war) points of departure like the Ostaufmarsch scenarios, which attempt to find a CP victory by taking Britain completely off the table.

Wow, that's harsh. I'd have him finish his plan by April 1914 and then have someone else discharge it.

I'd point out that winning the Race to the Sea isn't a primary objective, rather a side effect of pushing the plan to its logical limit rather than weakening it as OTL.

East first plans were dead once it was decided in late 1912 that Britain was bound to join the war against Germany, from then on plans had to deal with Britain from the start rather than hope they wouldn't join.

 

[Riain]

Ramifications: the BEF has either been overrun or it has retreated south and probably embarked at Marseilles or Bordeaux for home.

Again, you've described the post-victory end credits, not the process of actual victory.

You gave the challenge, I responded with the facts at my disposal.

And it was not a throwaway comment: you were using it to say that the British would obviously abandon Dover once the Germans moved up, which would have more than just an insignificant effect on the war.

I'd suggest those not overrun would evacuate via Le Harve and Cherbourg rather than the Atlantic and Med.

As for a scenario; Germany doubles down on it's naval Klienkreig strategy in early 1917, sending a light cruiser to Flanders and upping the uboat to 'sharpened' rules used in early 1916. As a result the US does not declare war in April 1917 and demobilises the National Guard fully, but speeds up the increases in strength allowed by the 1916 Naval and Defense Acts.

After defeating the Soviet Union and crippling Italy Germany launches Operation George in April 1918 (OTL George was limited and became Georgette, Michael was the main offensive) and makes gains so significant that Britain vacates it's position in Flanders allowing the Germans to reach the coast. Abandoned by it's ally that was bearing the main military burden in the field France asks for an armistice.

Britain does not sue for peace, German navy formerly based in Flanders moves to new bases in Bolougne, Calais and Dunkirk and begins a fresh naval offensive in seas unhindered by 3 years of minefields.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

As for a scenario; Germany doubles down on it's naval Klienkreig strategy in early 1917, sending a light cruiser to Flanders and upping the uboat to 'sharpened' rules used in early 1916. As a result the US does not declare war in April 1917 and demobilises the National Guard fully, but speeds up the increases in strength allowed by the 1916 Naval and Defense Acts.

The reopening of unrestricted sub warfare by itself was not the bigger reason why America decided to go to war. The bigger reason was the Zimmerman fiasco, which was a German attempt to prepare against the possibility of America entering into the war(*) - which, in light of previous German acts such as the Ypiranga incident and the Black Tom sabotage, was simply yet another confirmation that American attempts at neutrality would never be respected. Wilson had campaigned in 1916 on staying out of the war, but even by the time he'd gotten elected he'd had serious doubts of the feasibility of this idea, and the Zimmerman Telegram only confirmed them for him and everyone who'd been doubting the Preparedness movement's narrative. This is probably what you should nix.

(*): okay, it's a bit more complicated than that. The primary motive of the telegram was to get American soldiers tied down in case America entered the war; the secondary motive was to get American supplies diverted to fending off the Mexicans, regardless of whether they entered the war or not, and thereby weaken the WEntente.

After defeating the Soviet Union and crippling Italy Germany launches Operation George in April 1918 (OTL George was limited and became Georgette, Michael was the main offensive) and makes gains so significant that Britain vacates it's position in Flanders allowing the Germans to reach the coast. Abandoned by it's ally that was bearing the main military burden in the field France asks for an armistice.

So the British retreat under the weight of the German offensive, and the French interpret this as complete abandonment?
I'm looking at a map of the Belgian front and it doesn't seem sensible to me. For example, if the Germans advance west toward Somme department, the units around Calais could easily be encircled, so the British have to retreat to Somme to condense their men and smooth out their lines. I don't see how this could be seen as abandonment when the tactical explanation is obvious to the French.

Britain does not sue for peace, German navy formerly based in Flanders moves to new bases in Bolougne, Calais and Dunkirk and begins a fresh naval offensive in seas unhindered by 3 years of minefields.

If France and Italy surrender, then give it a month or two and Britain will probably surrender because literally everyone else on its side is now gone.

 

[Athelstane]

Wow, that's harsh. I'd have him finish his plan by April 1914 and then have someone else discharge it.

 

[WeissRaben]

I'm no expert on Italy, without the US on the way can Britain redeploy more troops to Italy? How long after Caporetto did it take for the Italians to rebuild?

It's worth noting that the Entente contribution to the Italian front after Caporetto was short-lived, minimal, and - due to a complete lack of trust in the Italian military - it ended up having nothing to do with the defense on the Piave River, as the eleven Franco-British divisions sent to "help" placed their own defensive lines almost a full hundred kilometers behind the Piave, waiting for a crushing of the Italian lines and a CP flooding into the Po River valley that never came. While the Italian High Command will of course be more nervous and feel more alone if no Entente troops come to "help", the actual impact in the forces involved was - and would be - close to zero.

 

[Athelstane]

I'd point out that winning the Race to the Sea isn't a primary objective, rather a side effect of pushing the plan to its logical limit rather than weakening it as OTL.

Totally agreed.

East first plans were dead once it was decided in late 1912 that Britain was bound to join the war against Germany, from then on plans had to deal with Britain from the start rather than hope they wouldn't join.

But not so much on this. The evidence does not present us with a universal consensus in German leadership that Britain was certain to join any continental war regardless of circumstances. To the point, indeed, that Wilhelm II himself was persuaded they would not enter the war right up to the last day (August 1).

That said . . . you do need a point of departure that accounts for, and deals with, the great suspicions there were of Britain among key figures.

 

[Riain]

The evidence does not present us with a universal consensus in German leadership that Britain was certain to join any continental war regardless of circumstances. To the point, indeed, that Wilhelm II himself was persuaded they would not enter the war right up to the last day (August 1).

Not universal, but for planning to use the blunt instrument of 8 field armies in a 'war = yes/no?' scenario it was good enough. After all they did go from having 4 war plans for 4 different diplomatic scenarios in 1913 to a single plan in 1914. That the Kaiser grasped at peace in August 1914 says more about his lack of fitness for the job and lack of understanding of what mobilisation meant than the soundness of prewar assumptions and the planning around these assumptions.

 

[NoMommsen]

But not so much on this. The evidence does not present us with a universal consensus in German leadership that Britain was certain to join any continental war regardless of circumstances. To the point, indeed, that Wilhelm II himself was persuaded they would not enter the war right up to the last day (August 1).
...

... That the Kaiser grasped at peace in August 1914 says more about his lack of fitness for the job and lack of understanding of what mobilisation meant than the soundness of prewar assumptions and the planning around these assumptions.

It shouldn't be forgotten that Wilhelm II wasn't alone in his 'grasping' on the meeting/crown counsil of said 1st August late afternoon between ~17:10 and ~ 19:00.
With him were:

Bethmann-Hollweg (chancellor of the Realm and prussian Ministerpresident)​

Jagow (State Secretary for foreign affairs of the Realm)​

Tirpitz (State Secretary for the Navy of the Realm)​

Müller (Chief of the naval Cabinet of the Kaiser)​

Valentini (Chief of the civilian Cabinet of the Kaiser)​

Lyncker (Chief of the military Cabinet of the Kaiser)​

Somewhat 'indifferent' was

Plessen (General Adjutant of the Kaiser)​

​

and against him were (only)

Moltke (Chief of the Great General Staff)​

Falkenhayn (prussian War Minister)​

 

[Riain]

It shouldn't be forgotten that Wilhelm II wasn't alone in his 'grasping' on the meeting/crown counsil of said 1st August late afternoon between ~17:10 and ~ 19:00.
With him were:

Bethmann-Hollweg (chancellor of the Realm and prussian Ministerpresident)​

Jagow (State Secretary for foreiign affairs of the Realm)​

Tirpitz (State Secretary of for the of the Realm)​

Müller (Chief of the naval Cabinet of the Kaiser)​

Valentini (Chief od the civilian Cabinet of the Kaiser)​

Lyncker (Chief of the military Cabinet of the Kaiser)​

Somewhat 'indifferent' was

Plessen (General Adjutant of the Kaiser)​

​

and against him were (only)

Moltke (Chief of thwe Great General Staff)​

Falkenhayn (prussian War Minister)​

I assume Moltke and Falkenhayen were against him because they knew the practicalities of trying to stop mobilisation and the military dangers of getting it wrong.

Similarly I assume if the 'fors' were aware of the practical details of mobilisation they might not have been so careless in the preceding days.

 

[Helmuth48]

I assume Moltke and Falkenhayen were against him because they knew the practicalities of trying to stop mobilisation and the military dangers of getting it wrong.

The greatest chance of 'getting it wrong' is working on only one war plan, which creates inflexibility. IMO 'The Schlieffen Plan' is a textbook example of tunnel vision and a reckless gamble, caused by the 'cult of the offensive'. "We've already spent so much time on that plan, we're going to use it anyway because otherwise it would have been a waste of time". Although it no longer suited the diplomatic situation of 1914...

 

[David Flin]

The greatest chance of 'getting it wrong' is working on only one war plan, which creates inflexibility. IMO 'The Schlieffen Plan' is a textbook example of tunnel vision and a reckless gamble, caused by the 'cult of the offensive'. "We've already spent so much time on that plan, we're going to use it anyway because otherwise it would have been a waste of time". Although it no longer suited the diplomatic situation of 1914...

A textbook case of military considerations over-riding and over-ruling the political authorities, rather than the political authorities being the decision-making body.

Clausewitz would have spun in his grave.

 

[Riain]

The greatest chance of 'getting it wrong' is working on only one war plan, which creates inflexibility. IMO 'The Schlieffen Plan' is a textbook example of tunnel vision and a reckless gamble, caused by the 'cult of the offensive'. "We've already spent so much time on that plan, we're going to use it anyway because otherwise it would have been a waste of time". Although it no longer suited the diplomatic situation of 1914...

A textbook case of military considerations over-riding and over-ruling the political authorities, rather than the political authorities being the decision-making body.

Clausewitz would have spun in his grave.

I disagree, the single plan for 1914 came from the diplomatic crisis of late 1912 surrounding the 1st Balkan War. Bethmann confirmed Germany had an alliance with AH, and Lord Chancellor Haldane advised ambassador Lichnowsky the British would not remain passive in the case of an Austro–Hungarian attack on Serbia, nor would they tolerate any aggression of Germany against France. This lead to a meeting on 8 December with the Kaiser, Tirpitz, Moltke and others.

IUC it was at this meeting that the German leadership changed their stance of the previous 4 or so yeas that Britain was possibly going to be a combatant to Britain was certainly going to be a combatant. What is certain is that after this meeting:

• The mooted 6th Naval Law was dropped.
• The Army was expanded for the first time in decades by 135,000.
• The annual planning cycle that began in April 1913 dropped the 4 mobilisation options in favour of a single plan.

Moltke's plan was devised under political direction, it wasn't something he dreamed up out of nowhere. That the plan had a few political hiccups isn't surprising, these mobilisation plans are blunt instruments for use in the most dire circumstances, even the 4 plans of 1912-13 couldn't possibly cover all the possible scenarios Germany might have found itself. The British famously didn't adhere to their mobilisation plans and almost blundered into war without a firm political decision.

 

[NoMommsen]

I disagree, the single plan for 1914 came from the diplomatic crisis of late 1912 surrounding the 1st Balkan War. Bethmann confirmed Germany had an alliance with AH, and Lord Chancellor Haldane advised ambassador Lichnowsky the British would not remain passive in the case of an Austro–Hungarian attack on Serbia, nor would they tolerate any aggression of Germany against France. This lead to a meeting on 8 December with the Kaiser, Tirpitz, Moltke and others.

IUC it was at this meeting that the German leadership changed their stance of the previous 4 or so yeas that Britain was possibly going to be a combatant to Britain was certainly going to be a combatant. What is certain is that after this meeting:

• The mooted 6th Naval Law was dropped.
• The Army was expanded for the first time in decades by 135,000.
• The annual planning cycle that began in April 1913 dropped the 4 mobilisation options in favour of a single plan.

Moltke's plan was devised under political direction, it wasn't something he dreamed up out of nowhere. That the plan had a few political hiccups isn't surprising, these mobilisation plans are blunt instruments for use in the most dire circumstances, even the 4 plans of 1912-13 couldn't possibly cover all the possible scenarios Germany might have found itself. The British famously didn't adhere to their mobilisation plans and almost blundered into war without a firm political decision.

! VADE RETRO SATANAS !
DEMON NAMED "WAR COUNCIL of 8th DECEMBER 1912"
RETURN TO THE SEVENTH CIRCLE OF THE HELL YOU ESCAPED FROM​

Sry but ... this ir really dealt with. The most comprehensive comment on the results of said meeting - though as put at the correct time telling other events surrounding but NOT further related to your assumed 'consequences' - was written by Admiral von Mueller:

"The results were pretty much zero."​

• The next amendment to the naval law was already discussed and discarded by the political parties of the Reichstag since summer 1912. ... discarded in favor of
• The new Army law with said expansion which was overdue since the last 2 legislatural periods and was sanctioned by Bethmann-Hollwed on 2nd Dezember and sanctioned by the Kaiser on 5th Dezember befiore said "war council".

The change or abandoning of the former 4 mobilisation options for only 1 was the very lonely decision of Moltke the Minor alone. He obviously didn't told anybody of the 'political' leadership of otherwise their shock on revealing this lack of options on 1st August 1914 wouldn't have been as deep as it was. It came for them out of nowwhere being left with only one option.

Also all the other ... 'consequences' this John Röhl namend (as can be read of in this very unbalanced english wiki arcticle) were in the makings well before and came from sources and out of political reasons not at all related to this "war council".

@Helmuth48 and @David Flin are the ones who have it right IMHO. It was Moltke the Minors very wrong decision not only to put all of his eggs into just one basket and then not councelling this with the politicians and not even telling them about.

 

[NoMommsen]

However ...
As a 'confessing fan' of East First strategies I have to admitt that the plans Moltke had until the mobilisation period 1912/13 - for the period 1913/14 there seemed to have been only a 'study' - weren't much more than uninspiring, unimaginative cold infusions of much older ideas of his uncle.

His 'Moltke plan' as actually unfolded in August 1914 was also only a watered down version of Schlieffens ideas without the even by Schlieffen rendered necessary strenght of troops.
IMHO Moltke the Minor was simply unable of independant own operational thoughts.
... not even dare to ask for 'strategic' thinking ...

 

[Riain]

! VADE RETRO SATANAS !
DEMON NAMED "WAR COUNCIL of 8th DECEMBER 1912"
RETURN TO THE SEVENTH CIRCLE OF THE HELL YOU ESCAPED FROM​

Sry but ... this ir really dealt with. The most comprehensive comment on the results of said meeting - though as put at the correct time telling other events surrounding but NOT further related to your assumed 'consequences' - was written by Admiral von Mueller:

"The results were pretty much zero."​

• The next amendment to the naval law was already discussed and discarded by the political parties of the Reichstag since summer 1912. ... discarded in favor of
• The new Army law with said expansion which was overdue since the last 2 legislatural periods and was sanctioned by Bethmann-Hollwed on 2nd Dezember and sanctioned by the Kaiser on 5th Dezember befiore said "war council".

The change or abandoning of the former 4 mobilisation options for only 1 was the very lonely decision of Moltke the Minor alone. He obviously didn't told anybody of the 'political' leadership of otherwise their shock on revealing this lack of options on 1st August 1914 wouldn't have been as deep as it was. It came for them out of nowwhere being left with only one option.

Also all the other ... 'consequences' this John Röhl namend (as can be read of in this very unbalanced english wiki arcticle) were in the makings well before and came from sources and out of political reasons not at all related to this "war council".

@Helmuth48 and @David Flin are the ones who have it right IMHO. It was Moltke the Minors very wrong decision not only to put all of his eggs into just one basket and then not councelling this with the politicians and not even telling them about.

But why were these things discussed in 1912, what else was happening?

IIUC as you say Germany was looking to turn it's focus away from the long term Naval expansion toward the medium-short term Army expansion, which is where the lack of support for the new (big and expensive) Naval Law and expansion of the Army came from.

Haldane led a mission to Germany in early 1912 where the British wanted a naval agreement but Germany wanted British neutrality, this mission failed. Some time after Britain dropped the '2 power standard' and instead nominated Germany as the target of it's naval construction with the RN to be 60% larger than the KM.

The year started with Britain not agreeing to neutrality in exchange for a naval agreement and ended with their declaration that they would not stand idle if AH attacked Serbia and/or Germany attack France, with the RNs focusing on 60% superiority over the KM in the middle. In this environment I can't dismiss the 'War Council' as nothing, I'm inclined toward the middle of the road interpretation.