It does, but then again the point is to determine why Howe acted as he did, not to make him look good.
It does, but then again the point is to determine why Howe acted as he did, not to make him look good.Well that explanation replaces simple incompetence with something closer to insubordination, assuming Howe’s superiors expected more action out of him than they got.
I think that's unfair.McLellan lacked the moral courage to ever accept the responsibility of his command.
I understand what you're saying my friend, but those qualities you describe in McClellan are moral cowardice. Looking at someone at the other end of the spectrum we see a general like Ambrose Burnside. Burnside lacked McClellan's tactical, and organizational skills, but he had moral courage. When in command he accepted responsibility for his actions. He's remembered as a bad general because of what happened at Fredericksburg, which is a little unfair. His was perhaps a case of the Peter Principle. His plan to take the direct route through Fredericksburg might have worked if the pontoons had been ready on time, and some diversions had been made upriver to keep Lee guessing about his true intentions.I think that's unfair.
There are many mental gifts some people have and others don't. I notice grammar and spelling errors in text without even trying. But I have minimal grasp of musical style. (I read performance reviews, and have no idea what the reviewer is talking about.) Some football running backs know instantly where to go next.
Field command is one such. Charles XII had the "sight of the battlefield". Rommel was known for his Fingerspitzengefühl ("fingertips feeling"). But it's almost impossible to explain it in words to someone who doesn't have it. One can "fill in" with "book" tactics, but that only gets one so far.
McClellan lacked it almost completely, I think. When confronted with the task of maneuver on the field, he was like a deaf man trying to dance to music. Neither he nor his colleagues understood what was wrong. He did the best he could "by the book", but whenever possible, he stopped, waited, and tried to execute "sure thing" operations. Thus his preference for siege-type operations - at Yorktown, and later before Richmond.
IMO, it was this unnerving uncertainty which made him so prone to believe exaggerated estimates of enemy strength and paranoia about his civilian superiors.
I understand what you're saying my friend, but those qualities you describe in McClellan are moral cowardice. Looking at someone at the other end of the spectrum we see a general like Ambrose Burnside. Burnside lacked McClellan's tactical, and organizational skills, but he had moral courage. When in command he accepted responsibility for his actions. He's remembered as a bad general because of what happened at Fredericksburg, which is a little unfair. His was perhaps a case of the Peter Principle. His plan to take the direct route through Fredericksburg might have worked if the pontoons had been ready on time, and some diversions had been made upriver to keep Lee guessing about his true intentions.
When put in command Burnside chose to act. He formed a plan and carried it through. He understood the limitations of time, so he needed to attack before the mud season set in, unlike McClellan who never had any sense of urgency. After the disaster at Fredericksburg Burnside didn't go marching back to his winter camps around Washington, but instead set off to attack again. That ended in the humiliation of the Mud March, but other than Grant he was the only commander of the Army of the Potomac who after being checked decided to attack again. Burnside never put the blame for those serious setbacks on his subordinates because he knew it was all on him. That's what a commander does.
When Joe Hooker was in command it was a different story. Hooker had better tactical skills than Burnside, and had a good plan of operations, but when the moment came to act, he faltered. He pulled back and decided to fight a defensive battle, surrendering the initiative to Lee. Then when incapacitated he refused to relinquish command. After suffering a tactical defeat involving 1 Corps, he ordered a retreat back over the Fords of the Rappahannock. As he said himself, "I lost faith in Joe Hooker."
In addition to his other moral problems Hooker was a back bitter, who had worked to undermine Burnside, and advance his own cause. In his letter placing him in command Lincoln told Hooker he knew he wasn't a moral man, but he thought an immoral man might still be a skillful general. During the march to Gettysburg Lincoln was convinced Hooker couldn't be in command in the next battle, and fortunately the pugnacious Meade replaced him.
It's painful to imagine McClellan in command at Gettysburg. All he'd be doing was make plans to retreat to stronger defensive positions, while shooting off wires to the War Department about how he was saving the Army of the Potomac from destruction against overwhelming odds. In the end like Hooker McClellan lacked the self-confidence to try to win a battle, all he was interested in was not losing one. To not win might be alibied away, but the disgrace of losing a battle would be too damaging to his ego, and harder to make excuses for.
Leaders in all walks of life face the possibility of failure but need the self-confidence to overcome their doubts and move ahead. A general has to have faith in themselves, and their army in order to win. Courage isn't the absence of fear, it's the ability to overcome your fear and do brave things. That's why courage, covered in the broader virtue called fortitude is always one of the major virtues of mankind.
If the Confederacy had won, I bet Johnston would have had a McClellanish reputation.
One presumes you mean Joe, not Albert. And that would be unfair. Johnston was nearly always in very difficult situations: actually facing superior numbers, unlike McClellan. His only realistic approach was defensive, and he did it pretty well.If the Confederacy had won, I bet Johnston would have had a McClellanish reputation.
Similar to McClellan? Hardly. He made mistakes, but he was never afraid to attack. His problem was managing his subordinates.Bragg has a similar reputation. I've joked that we should keep Fort Bragg named after him because,he was the Union's MVP.
Similar to McClellan? Hardly. He made mistakes, but he was never afraid to attack. His problem was managing his subordinates.
One presumes you mean Joe, not Albert. And that would be unfair. Johnston was nearly always in very difficult situations: actually facing superior numbers, unlike McClellan. His only realistic approach was defensive, and he did it pretty well.
And if we're going to pick a Confederate actively undermining their own cause, I'd pick Leonidas Polk.
It's the only explanation that makes sense. I'm not sure other than being popular with his men Polk had much of anything going for him as a general before counting being an insubordinate backbiter to both Albert Sidney Johnston and Bragg (not sure he was under Joe Johnston long enough to add a third general he undermined).I remember reading about a Union report after the event that read, "We killed Bishop Polk yesterday, and we made good progress today."
Pretty sure it was a typo. They must have meant, "We killed Bishop Polk yesterday, but we made good progress today."
True, but it is rare in history for a victorious army to try so hard to have their commanding general relieved. After Chickamauga Creek all the senior generals in the Army of Tennessee wanted Bragg to be sacked. The only one who seemed to get along with his was Jefferson Davis. Bragg may have spent more energy fighting the men in his own army than he did against the Union Army.Similar to McClellan? Hardly. He made mistakes, but he was never afraid to attack. His problem was managing his subordinates.
Bragg's issues with his army were more about the previous few months that preceded Chickamauga than anything that happened in the battle. The introduction of Longstreet's corps into the army merely meant there was another dissenting wing to make the existing issues more salient.True, but it is rare in history for a victorious army to try so hard to have their commanding general relieved. After Chickamauga Creek all the senior generals in the Army of Tennessee wanted Bragg to be sacked. The only one who seemed to get along with his was Jefferson Davis. Bragg may have spent more energy fighting the men in his own army than he did against the Union Army.
Those are good point. Personal issues are rarely one sided. However, Bragg's problems working with others seemed to have been a major problem his whole life. Instead of building confidence, and respect within his command he bread anger. It seemed to be the consensus of the senior generals that the follow up from Chickamauga was botched, and the Union army was allowed to retreat to Chattanooga to fight another day. It may not have been possible to prevent that, but it did lead to the disaster at Missionary Ridge, making Chickamauga only a tactical victory that was only a temporary setback for the Union. Chattanooga only gave Grant another opportunity to further build his legend.Bragg's issues with his army were more about the previous few months that preceded Chickamauga than anything that happened in the battle. The introduction of Longstreet's corps into the army merely meant there was another dissenting wing to make the existing issues more salient.
While Bragg did himself no favors, I think when one looks at the conduct of subordinates like Polk, Hardee, or even Forrest, it's clear he was far from the only one to blame
Do all the soldiers at Ft Bragg end up fighting each other?Bragg has a similar reputation. I've joked that we should keep Fort Bragg named after him because,he was the Union's MVP.
Bragg's army after Chickamauga was not in any condition to attack again immediately. Now, more of the Army of the Cumberland could have been cut off on the battlefield had the rearguard been bypassed or flanked. If there was a moment to attack, it probably would have been right after the big wagon train was captured by his cavalry and Rosecrans was having a breakdown - his whole army was there and had a bit of time to rest, and the Union entrenchments were not yet impregnableThose are good point. Personal issues are rarely one sided. However, Bragg's problems working with others seemed to have been a major problem his whole life. Instead of building confidence, and respect within his command he bread anger. It seemed to be the consensus of the senior generals that the follow up from Chickamauga was botched, and the Union army was allowed to retreat to Chattanooga to fight another day. It may not have been possible to prevent that, but it did lead to the disaster at Missionary Ridge, making Chickamauga only a tactical victory that was only a temporary setback for the Union. Chattanooga only gave Grant another opportunity to further build his legend.
The only one who seemed to get along with his was Jefferson Davis. Bragg may have spent more energy fighting the men in his own army than he did against the Union Army.
Ulysses Grant said:I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster—himself—for something he wanted. As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: "My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"
Bragg apparently couldn't even get along with himself.