McPherson

Banned
People who continue to claim China can only "copy" superior western tech begin sweating and try to find some half baked explanation.

What's the best potential counter to such a weapon? Lasers?
Get the launch platforms and burn out the Chinese LEO satellite targetting constellations and warn them, the Chinese, that a FORBS launch will be deemed a strategic attack on the United States proper, since the thing orbited the Earth once before it descended to plummet toward its intended target impact site. It falls within the ICBM class. Google MIDGETMAN.
 
People who continue to claim China can only "copy" superior western tech begin sweating and try to find some half baked explanation.

What's the best potential counter to such a weapon? Lasers?
Fractional Orbital Bombardment was developed by the Soviets in the 1960s. The new element is the hypersonic glide vehicle, but that is only helpful if there are any terminal defenses in play. It wouldn't be a significant improvement to the ability of an ICBM launching a conventional FOBS payload with a ballistic RV. The lower trajectory (150 km vs 1,000 - 2,000 km for an ICBM on a ballistic trajectory) would require denser radar installations like the DEW line and the offshore radar pickets, unless space-based radars (probably in Molniya orbits) can detect the vehicles. The use of space-based surveillance was why the US did not consider Soviet FOBS to be a particularly significant threat. The US doesn't have strategic ABM defenses so the hypersonic glide RV isn't anything different to the existing threat, especially because it will still be in a stable orbit at constant velocity over Alaska. In fact, it would be lower and therefore easier to hit for ASAT missiles. My suggestion for BMD has been and always will be missiles with unitary nuclear shaped charge or nuclear-pumped X-ray laser warheads, but in the long run the cheapest form of BMD is adding another ICBM and silo.
Get the launch platforms and burn out the Chinese LEO satellite targetting constellations and warn them, the Chinese, that a FORBS launch will be deemed a strategic attack on the United States proper, since the thing orbited the Earth once before it descended to plummet toward its intended target impact site. It falls within the ICBM class. Google MIDGETMAN.
The Soviets launched a lot of missile capable of carrying a FOBS package and it didn't start a nuclear war. The US still has comprehensive missile launch warning coverage, so any salvo of missile launches will be detected regardless of whether they are on ballistic or orbital trajectories. Even if such a weapon would enable a first-strike against US strategic targets, the peacetime US nuclear deterrent is based on a countervalue second strike from SSBNs that can only be targeted by Chinese SSNs. The MGM-134 Midgetman was probably not big enough to get to orbit, especially with the heavy in-space stage a FOBS warhead would need to deorbit and reenter the atmosphere.
 
A talking head last night said the main problem was you don't know which space flights are putting these things in orbit. Starting from space it cuts out half your detection time. It is why for the most part the US and USSR didn't play around with things like Rods from God. It makes the hair trigger slightly less hairy.

China is taking the position that they can deploy this system at any time on any flight. Being opaque about this kind of weapon is very risky. No one should be happy if any nation wants to play these kinds of games.
 
People who continue to claim China can only "copy" superior western tech begin sweating and try to find some half baked explanation.

What's the best potential counter to such a weapon? Lasers?
What is the great advantage of launching an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle for a payload? What's the point of making an full orbit, before dropping it? So you have to guess at the target? You can shoot the ICBM down with an SM-3. In the test the glide vehicle was several km's off target. Hypersonic weapons are a danger, but an overrated threat. One obvious disadvantage is their the biggest IR target on earth. Also a missile covered in a plasma sheath has problems using data links, and targeting radar. They have a long way to go before they can become highly accurate.
 

McPherson

Banned
Fractional Orbital Bombardment was developed by the Soviets in the 1960s.
This was never admitted.
The new element is the hypersonic glide vehicle, but that is only helpful if there are any terminal defenses in play. It wouldn't be a significant improvement to the ability of an ICBM launching a conventional FOBS payload with a ballistic RV. The lower trajectory (150 km vs 1,000 - 2,000 km for an ICBM on a ballistic trajectory) would require denser radar installations like the DEW line and the offshore radar pickets, unless space-based radars (probably in Molniya orbits) can detect the vehicles. The use of space-based surveillance was why the US did not consider Soviet FOBS to be a particularly significant threat. The US doesn't have strategic ABM defenses so the hypersonic glide RV isn't anything different to the existing threat, especially because it will still be in a stable orbit at constant velocity over Alaska. In fact, it would be lower and therefore easier to hit for ASAT missiles. My suggestion for BMD has been and always will be missiles with unitary nuclear shaped charge or nuclear-pumped X-ray laser warheads, but in the long run the cheapest form of BMD is adding another ICBM and silo.
This is a question of altitude bands between 80-150 km above the surface of the Earth. The hypersonic glide vehicle actually conforms somewhat to a FORBS profile with the ability to use the upper atmosphere as a medium to apply steer forces at high mach numbers during reentry. The proliferation of such "steerable" hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) makes terminal defense using hit to kill interceptors... difficult and that is why HGVs are a lot deadlier than 1960s FOBs or FORBs.
The Soviets launched a lot of missile capable of carrying a FOBS package and it didn't start a nuclear war. The US still has comprehensive missile launch warning coverage, so any salvo of missile launches will be detected regardless of whether they are on ballistic or orbital trajectories. Even if such a weapon would enable a first-strike against US strategic targets, the peacetime US nuclear deterrent is based on a countervalue second strike from SSBNs that can only be targeted by Chinese SSNs. The MGM-134 Midgetman was probably not big enough to get to orbit, especially with the heavy in-space stage a FOBS warhead would need to deorbit and reenter the atmosphere.
Assured destruction then and now is the only guarantee of no-first-use by a hostile power.

Midgetman could throw a maneuvering reentry vehicle of approximately 350-400 kilograms the flight profile was 10,000 + kilometers.
 
This was never admitted.
Khrushchev announced the development of FOBS in 1962. They were a main target of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967. The Soviets completed deployment in 1972. They were explicitly mentioned in SALT I in 1979. The Soviets maintained a squadron of 18 FOBS capable missiles in Kazakhstan until 1982.
This is a question of altitude bands between 80-150 km above the surface of the Earth. The hypersonic glide vehicle actually conforms somewhat to a FORBS profile with the ability to use the upper atmosphere as a medium to apply steer forces at high mach numbers during reentry. The proliferation of such "steerable" hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) makes terminal defense using hit to kill interceptors... difficult and that is why HGVs are a lot deadlier than 1960s FOBs or FORBs.
An orbital vehicle conducting reentry only encounters meaningful atmospheric effects below about 80 km, well into the terminal portion of the reentry. The United States does not maintain any terminal defense capability, so whether the enemy reentry vehicle is capable of maneuvering is irrelevant.
Midgetman could throw a maneuvering reentry vehicle of approximately 350-400 kilograms the flight profile was 10,000 + kilometers.
The Midgetman could carry a 200 to 300 kg non-maneuvering reentry vehicle on a suborbital trajectory of up to 10,000 km. The missile didn't need a warhead bus because it was a unitary payload, so maneuvering capability ended at burnout, probably 2 minutes into flight. I don't know if the third stage of the missile was even capable of reaching orbit without a payload, but a purpose-built, solid-fueled, 14-ton launch vehicle would probably be able to carry about 100 kg into orbit. Also, when you're talking about FOBS, range is irrelevant because you go straight to orbit and your bomb can sit in orbit for however long you want. The relevant factor for determining the capability of a particular missile is payload to orbit.
 

McPherson

Banned
USA was doing MACH 25 re-entry glides 40 years ago ;)
Hence the current family of Russian and American ICBMs and the current TRIDENT. Soon to be joined by HGVs from Virginia Block Vs and those port destroying nuclear weapon tipped torpedoes carried by the Belgorods. In theory there is nothing new at all with the last decade of naval geopolitics and tech developments, but still I see it as very very dangerous in a possible naval geopolitics frame. The past four decade old two corner game of naval Pacific chess up the Kahn Ladder was always extremely deadly. This projected three cornered game, especially with an inexperienced player whose leadership is "questionable" is a guaranteed; "The only way to win, is not to play for real."

The way an AUKUS platform fits into the (^^^) projected mix is interesting in that if you can push an HGV out of an ASTUTE, then obviously it will carry one. Not noticed in the AUKUS agreement is that little bit about the three countries sharing joint HGV technology?
 
Hence the current family of Russian and American ICBMs and the current TRIDENT. Soon to be joined by HGVs from Virginia Block Vs and those port destroying nuclear weapon tipped torpedoes carried by the Belgorods. In theory there is nothing new at all with the last decade of naval geopolitics and tech developments, but still I see it as very very dangerous in a possible naval geopolitics frame. The past four decade old two corner game of naval Pacific chess up the Kahn Ladder was always extremely deadly. This projected three cornered game, especially with an inexperienced player whose leadership is "questionable" is a guaranteed; "The only way to win, is not to play for real."

The way an AUKUS platform fits into the (^^^) projected mix is interesting in that if you can push an HGV out of an ASTUTE, then obviously it will carry one. Not noticed in the AUKUS agreement is that little bit about the three countries sharing joint HGV technology?
That depends on how large you want the HGV and its payload to be (and fielding a ICBM range, conventionally armed HGV, whether by China, Russia, the US or Mordor, is a colossal waste of money).
 

McPherson

Banned
That depends on how large you want the HGV and its payload to be (and fielding a ICBM range, conventionally armed HGV, whether by China, Russia, the US or Mordor, is a colossal waste of money).
One misses the point. Shorter range HGV = no warning to impact launches.
 
I wonder was there any point where Australia could have built even a small nucular industry so that it had something to base there nuke boats on?
Australia has a small nuclear industry. It has two nuclear reactors at Lucas Heights near Sydney. It once had a small scale enrichment industry at Port Pirie in South Australia which was abandoned after the end of the British nuclear tests. It has a large Uranium mining industry. 1967 was the last time we looked at building nuclear weapons under John Gorton. His successor Billy Mcmahon put the kybosh on that plan to build nukes for the RAN. What we had now is a return to that plan with modifications. However I believe we are being sold a pig in a poke. My understanding is that the US boat builders are working pretty much to capacity. The British boat builders have been pretty well run down over the last 30 years and also lack capacity. If we going to build these boats we will need a substantial technology transfer from the US/UK. Substantial. We lack experience at building submarines we have no experience building nuclear reactors. These boats are unlikely to hit the water for at least 20 years.

I also have to take exception to McPherson's comments WRT the COLLINS class. When originally concieved the COLLINS Class was to be twice as quiet as the OBERONS. They failed. They found they were only 1.5 times as quiet. They found they had problems with the trailing SONAR housing which couldn't be fixed. As the OBERONS where the quietest boats, I don't think they did all that badly. The COLLINS have regularly fooled the USN's best. Rather than attacking the COLLINS class you might be better attacking the USN which has had a long list of disasters - collisions and so on, Chinese subs surfacing in the middle of task forces and so on. The USN is not a service to look up to IMHO.
 
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What is the great advantage of launching an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle for a payload? What's the point of making an full orbit, before dropping it? So you have to guess at the target? You can shoot the ICBM down with an SM-3. In the test the glide vehicle was several km's off target. Hypersonic weapons are a danger, but an overrated threat. One obvious disadvantage is their the biggest IR target on earth. Also a missile covered in a plasma sheath has problems using data links, and targeting radar. They have a long way to go before they can become highly accurate.
Baseball versus cricket analogy. In the former, you can basically ignore everything outside the foul lines and place your interceptors....err fielders, inside the lines. In cricket, its fair 360 degrees so you have a much more difficult task to cover all possible avenues of approach.

Australia has a small nuclear industry. It has two nuclear reactors at Lucas Heights near Sydney. It once had a small scale enrichment industry at Port Pirie in South Australia which was abandoned after the end of the British nuclear tests. It has a large Uranium mining industry
None of that is relevant. The small pool-type reactors that the Aussies operate aren't going to have much if any use in training personnel. The Chinese and the Indians used people with experience running nuclear power stations and breeder reactors to train their crews. Such people, while hardly having the same expertise as a US/UK Navy Nuc, at least have an idea of what they are doing.
 
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Baseball versus cricket analogy. In the former, you can basically ignore everything outside the foul lines and place your interceptors....err fielders, inside the lines. In cricket, its fair 360 degrees so you have a much more difficult task to cover all possible avenues of approach.
The terrain in cricket is more variable too. Eg there is size of the field is variable. Pitch conditions change over a week.
Perhaps most importantly you have to give your opposition a Confucian chance to win, otherwise they can screw you with a draw. Baseball is win lose. Cricket is win lose and fuck you. WarGames territory.
 

Riain

Banned
Australia doesn't operate 2 reactors anymore, we did between 1961 and 1994 when we had HiFAR and Moata, and for a short time as we wound down HiFAR and worked up OPAL. However I think for us to claim Australia has a nuclear industry we'd need a power reactor as well as training and research reactors and some ancillary processes.
 

McPherson

Banned

The threat matrix does present interesting problems. Note that the DPRK missile carries a gas expulsion module up with it as it rises and breaks the water, and then drops the gas generator when it ignites its rocket motor. This is a most distinctive fingerprint tech marker from a certain outside power providing the DPRK with their ballistic missile technology. The only thing new to note is a skip glide profile to the warhead. The commentator may be wrong about some things about path prediction and engagement capability. Active-terminal-guidance, hit-to-kill is maybe possible, if the mean track between skips can be established in the mid-course fly-out. At least the Russians claim it is possible. Personally, I do not think anyone has solved it, or would admit it, if they had?

Several nations do have MAneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARV) capability. The DPRK has joined the club a few decades late and rather a few political common sense logics short, since they BOTCHED this launch. From the AUKUS' point of view, this provides a mere propaganda sidebar distractor, which has been the role the DPRK has adopted and has been cheerfully willing to play for decades, first as a running dog to one nation's ideological-driven imperialism and now subscribes to another imperialist sponsor to maintain the local bandit regime's existence.

From the Australian point of view, this is another shortstop position that her allies may have asked her to backstop and backfill further south IN THE PAST, so the other allies can have a look see in certain northern Pacific operation areas.
 
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