The threat matrix does present interesting problems. Note that the DPRK missile carries a gas expulsion module up with it as it rises and breaks the water, and then drops the gas generator when it ignites its rocket motor. This is a most distinctive fingerprint tech marker from a certain outside power providing the DPRK with their ballistic missile technology. The only thing new to note is a skip glide profile to the warhead. The commentator may be wrong about some things about path prediction and engagement capability. Active-terminal-guidance, hit-to-kill is maybe possible, if the mean track between skips can be established in the mid-course fly-out. At least the Russians claim it is possible. Personally, I do not think anyone has solved it, or would admit it, if they had?

Several nations do have MARV capability. The DPRK has joined the club a few decades late and rather short, since they BOTCHED the launch.
Rocket man.jpg
 
Australia doesn't operate 2 reactors anymore, we did between 1961 and 1994 when we had HiFAR and Moata, and for a short time as we wound down HiFAR and worked up OPAL. However I think for us to claim Australia has a nuclear industry we'd need a power reactor as well as training and research reactors and some ancillary processes.
My understanding is that there are two medical/research reactors at Lucas Heights. There were originally plans for a power reactor at Jervis Bay as well but they were canned in the 1970s. I could be wrong.

The DPRK is a sideshow from an Australian perspective. We are not America. America is and always has been concerned with being the world's policeman. We are not. America and Americans need to pull their heads in. Australia has been too long forgetting what it's concerns and subsiding them in America's. Canberra needs to let go the apron strings and grow up.
 
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My understanding is that there are two medical/research reactors at Lucas Heights. There were originally plans for a power reactor at Jervis Bay as well but they were canned in the 1970s. I could be wrong.

Not anymore, but there was for about 35 years: HIFAR and Moata. OPAL is all we have now.

Jervus Bay power reactor got as far as site preparation and levelling before being cancelled.
 

McPherson

Banned
The DPRK is a sideshow from an Australian perspective. We are not America. America is and always has been concerned with being the world's policeman. We are not. America and Americans need to pull their heads in. Australia has been too long forgetting what it's concerns and subsiding them in America's. Canberra needs to let go the apron strings and grow up.
Any challenge to sea, air, space usage anywhere is a challenge to sea, air, space usage EVERYWHERE. The mediums are "global". This is why Mahan beats Mackinder.
 
However I believe we are being sold a pig in a poke. My understanding is that the US boat builders are working pretty much to capacity. The British boat builders have been pretty well run down over the last 30 years and also lack capacity. If we going to build these boats we will need a substantial technology transfer from the US/UK. Substantial. We lack experience at building submarines we have no experience building nuclear reactors. These boats are unlikely to hit the water for at least 20 years.
Has the British program not been run down and up repeatedly at extra cost, as well as deliberately slowed at extra cost to maintain a very slow build rate due to low numbers needed? Did the 7 Astutes not actually as much as 8 Astutes would have done at a faster build rate with hindsight? So as long as AUS is willing to simply buy some boats or at least large parts from UK then they could easily be done in far less than 20 years at reasonable costs (ie probably GB selling at the RN price and pocketing the saving from higher build rate as its profit)?
you might be better attacking the USN which has had a long list of disasters - collisions and so on, Chinese subs surfacing in the middle of task forces and so on. The USN is not a service to look up to IMHO.
Is that really also just a matter of larger numbers and active & aggressive training of USN subs? Also, the not detected might very well be simply not wanting to admit your capabilities in peacetime so detecting the sub and then not changing what the CV/TF was doing so that the sub can't tell when and at what range or sound level it was detected? Only a very small number of the CV/TFs crew would actually be in the loop about such decision-making, and they would not be talking......?
 

McPherson

Banned
I also have to take exception to McPherson's comments WRT the COLLINS class. When originally concieved the COLLINS Class was to be twice as quiet as the OBERONS. They failed. They found they were only 1.5 times as quiet. They found they had problems with the trailing SONAR housing which couldn't be fixed. As the OBERONS where the quietest boats, I don't think they did all that badly. The COLLINS have regularly fooled the USN's best. Rather than attacking the COLLINS class you might be better attacking the USN which has had a long list of disasters - collisions and so on, Chinese subs surfacing in the middle of task forces and so on. The USN is not a service to look up to IMHO.
1. Covered this. The problem is non-correctable sound shorts in shaft drives, sail, and screws. These not only give away the submarine's presence, but interfere with its own ability to listen.
Is that really also just a matter of larger numbers and active & aggressive training of USN subs? Also, the not detected might very well be simply not wanting to admit your capabilities in peacetime so detecting the sub and then not changing what the CV/TF was doing so that the sub can't tell when and at what range or sound level it was detected? Only a very small number of the CV/TFs crew would actually be in the loop about such decision-making, and they would not be talking......?
2. Ocean areas surveilled =s minimum number of platforms.
3. Targets that need to die before they can launch =s minimum number of platforms added to 1. .
4. See 1.? Can't hear? Can't determine the signal threshold detection danger levels going out or coming in.
5. A fighting navy trains hard and has accidents, a LOT of accidents. This is why despite the list of Russian submarine disasters, that navy's submarine service was held to be a severe threat. If you are getting banged up in a bump and scrape war, you are doing it "right". You "know" where the enemy is and can engage him. See 3.?
 
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1. Covered this. The problem is non-correctable sound shorts in shaft drives, sail, and screws. These not only give away the submarine's presence, but interfere with its own ability to listen.
and how did you discover this? It is far more detail than what has been published downunder. Was it in some Boys Own Annual?
 
In Senate estimates the RAN admitted we won't get our first SSN until ~2040, however that's on the basis of virtually no information or guidance from the Government.
 

mial42

Gone Fishin'
Kicked
I also have to take exception to McPherson's comments WRT the COLLINS class. When originally concieved the COLLINS Class was to be twice as quiet as the OBERONS. They failed. They found they were only 1.5 times as quiet. They found they had problems with the trailing SONAR housing which couldn't be fixed. As the OBERONS where the quietest boats, I don't think they did all that badly. The COLLINS have regularly fooled the USN's best. Rather than attacking the COLLINS class you might be better attacking the USN which has had a long list of disasters - collisions and so on, Chinese subs surfacing in the middle of task forces and so on. The USN is not a service to look up to IMHO.
You can say that again. The USN losing the Bonhomme Richard to a fire at port and needing to be bailed out by the local firemen is both embarrassing and (as an American) concerning. The USN's greatest moments include a laundry list of heavily damaged (by the enemy, not by spurned arsonists) ships saved from disaster and fire in the middle of the Pacific; being unable to even put out the fire on the Bonhomme Richard, let alone save the ship, at port, is a massive loss in capabilities compared to its peak. And that's not to mention all the collisions and procurement disasters of the past couple decades. Not sure what the "model navy" today is for a country trying to build up; the USN has been so utterly dominant for so long that there's not a lot of other options. Maybe China, but the PLAN is totally untested (and hopefully remains that way).
 
You can say that again. The USN losing the Bonhomme Richard to a fire at port and needing to be bailed out by the local firemen is both embarrassing and (as an American) concerning. The USN's greatest moments include a laundry list of heavily damaged (by the enemy, not by spurned arsonists) ships saved from disaster and fire in the middle of the Pacific; being unable to even put out the fire on the Bonhomme Richard, let alone save the ship, at port, is a massive loss in capabilities compared to its peak. And that's not to mention all the collisions and procurement disasters of the past couple decades. Not sure what the "model navy" today is for a country trying to build up; the USN has been so utterly dominant for so long that there's not a lot of other options. Maybe China, but the PLAN is totally untested (and hopefully remains that way).
The problem was the ship in port had limited crew and limited time to control the fire before it reached a critical size and intensity. Fire while having major life extension and repair is sadly common. I can recall a French SSN having to be repaired following a major fire.
My own personal opinion baked by some friends who served is that the lack of crew made it possible for the fire to reach the intensity it did. Instead of having 900 sailors and officers the complement on hand was minimal. So the reaction time is dismal. The same fire while the ship was underway would be extinguished in minutes.
 
The latest snippets of information is that Australia will build the front half of the SSN and the rear half will be built overseas giving us some 40% local content and presumably the means to conduct the full cycle docking as cheaply and efficiently as possible. Additionally it has been said that we will use an existing, mature design. However from there sources say both the US and UK designs are front runners, so who knows.
 
The problem was the ship in port had limited crew and limited time to control the fire before it reached a critical size and intensity. Fire while having major life extension and repair is sadly common. I can recall a French SSN having to be repaired following a major fire.
My own personal opinion baked by some friends who served is that the lack of crew made it possible for the fire to reach the intensity it did. Instead of having 900 sailors and officers the complement on hand was minimal. So the reaction time is dismal. The same fire while the ship was underway would be extinguished in minutes.
USN ships that are capable of going to sea have to have enough crew onboard to get underway 24/7/365. As you noted this was not the BHR. They would have had a very small duty section onboard. USN ships also do damage control different then us sub guys. They have teams that fight fires and aren’t all as trained as we are. The small teams might not have been used to working together. Add in the shipyard environment, perp doing some damage to DC equipment, and just confusion, I’m sure it was hell. Remember the USS Miami was taken out of service when a shipyard worker started a fire on it that took a long time to put out. Fire during overhaul completely different than fire with crew onboard. I could get woken up, run to crews mess, don a complete fire fighting outfit with Scott Air Pack, and be in engine room in 2 minutes. Not going to happen in a shipyard.
 
USN ships that are capable of going to sea have to have enough crew onboard to get underway 24/7/365. As you noted this was not the BHR. They would have had a very small duty section onboard. USN ships also do damage control different then us sub guys. They have teams that fight fires and aren’t all as trained as we are. The small teams might not have been used to working together. Add in the shipyard environment, perp doing some damage to DC equipment, and just confusion, I’m sure it was hell. Remember the USS Miami was taken out of service when a shipyard worker started a fire on it that took a long time to put out. Fire during overhaul completely different than fire with crew onboard. I could get woken up, run to crews mess, don a complete fire fighting outfit with Scott Air Pack, and be in engine room in 2 minutes. Not going to happen in a shipyard.

Thankyou for your service and thankyou for the info.
 
You can say that again. The USN losing the Bonhomme Richard to a fire at port and needing to be bailed out by the local firemen is both embarrassing and (as an American) concerning. The USN's greatest moments include a laundry list of heavily damaged (by the enemy, not by spurned arsonists) ships saved from disaster and fire in the middle of the Pacific; being unable to even put out the fire on the Bonhomme Richard, let alone save the ship, at port, is a massive loss in capabilities compared to its peak. And that's not to mention all the collisions and procurement disasters of the past couple decades. Not sure what the "model navy" today is for a country trying to build up; the USN has been so utterly dominant for so long that there's not a lot of other options. Maybe China, but the PLAN is totally untested (and hopefully remains that way).
As for Embarrassing the USN I don't think anyone around the world thought it embarrassing because every single maritime group knows the single biggest danger to a ship is fire and in the last two decades 7 submarines have had fires according to WIKI. In addition multiple other ships have caught fire and the Argentinians even had a Destroyer capsize in port.
 
As for Embarrassing the USN I don't think anyone around the world thought it embarrassing because every single maritime group knows the single biggest danger to a ship is fire and in the last two decades 7 submarines have had fires according to WIKI. In addition multiple other ships have caught fire and the Argentinians even had a Destroyer capsize in port.
Another thing I think few people focus on is that when a ship catches fire in a dockyard you dont only have to worry about the saving the ship, but also keeping the dockyard from spreading to other areas of the dockside. If you loose the dock where you build and repair ships, but save the ship from burning have you really won?
 
Scomo has laid out a bit of detail on the RAN SSN story the other day.

I'm not concerned about the details of telling the French, but it appears the timeline is Australians started looking into nuclear subs early last year and from other things I've heard it was in response to China being arseholes with our trade as covid started. Once we'd sorted out the details at our end we approached the UK and US at the level below that of political leaders, but we didn't go political until Biden was well and truly inaugurated.
 
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