September, 1866
Curupayty, Paraguay
George McClellan's eyes bulged at his bickering Generals, each demanding to lead THEIR forces against the enemy line. This was perhaps the stupidest thing McClelland had ever heard. If there was one thing he'd learned in 4 years of war in North America, it was one DID NOT ATTACK AN ENTRENCHED POSITION DIRECTLY.
And that was what Lopez and Diaz were inviting him to do.
Over the past months, McClellan's intelligence on the Paraguayan materials shortages were compounded with each prisoner taken. Between the obsolete weapons, critical shortage of powder and devastated navy, the Paraguayans were on the backfoot.
Indeed, with the loss of their Navy, the entire pretext of the Paraguayan War had vanished. They simply lacked the capacity to project their forces back to the Rio Plata without a Navy and thus were no threat to the allies. That they were still fighting was more a matter of mule-headedness or desperation.
Or, McClellan thought sourly, General Lopez merely hoped that the allies would fall part. Not exactly a forlorn hope given the obvious divisions between the allies.
The Paraguayans had found as strong a position as they could. The Curupayty River was to the west while wide lagoons blocked the east of the battlefield. Lopez had chosen his place to make his stand well. Having dug up a wide ditch with a large earthen battlement, the Paraguayans had significant cover the length of the mile-wide battlefield.
The American had seen FAR TOO MANY men die in the War Between the States by charges into such defenses. Given the allied artillery advantage - both and sea - this may be the Paraguayans' best chance to seize victory in this war. But only if the McClellan danced to Lopez' tune.
There was no way McClellan was going to order a direct attack on the defenses. Instead, he ordered his artillery to switch to shell and bombard the defenses while he ordered his cavalry division and two brigades of Argentine and Uruguayans to march around the wide lagoons to the east.
The predominantly Brazilian fleet along the Curupayty River would then then carry the bulk of the Brazilian forces two miles down the river to a safe landing spot. Caught between three forces, the Paraguayans would be caught.
The implementation of the complex plan did not go well. The Argentine and Paraguayans would get bogged down and take twice as along as expected to march to the Paraguayan rear while the Brazilians took nearly a full day to unload their supplies down the river.
Still, Lopez attempted to engage each of the three split forces in isolation. He would inflict 100 casualties on the Argentines while a group of Paraguayan cavalry took a few dozen prisoners among the Brazilian in his rear.
But Lopez could not be strong everywhere and McClellan saved his best for last. After nearly a day long artillery barrage, the American left the impression that he was not going to attack and, as Lopez was forced to pull more and more of his forces from the main line, McClellan would launch a daring night attack right at the end of the line less than 100 feet from the shores of the Curupayty.
Led by the French forces, hundreds of allied soldiers would managed to ford the ditch and the earthen walls. These men would be armed with the repeating weapons and the heavy rate of fire issued forth in the free-for-all would allow hundreds of more allies across the breach.
Unfortunately, both General Lopez and his best commander, Diaz, were leading the assaults against the other allied formations and a mass counter-attack by the Paraguayans was ordered too late.
The line broken and allies torching their precious supply train, the Paraguayans were forced to withdraw, quickly retreating northwards through the broken terrain. McClellan intended for the Brazilians under the Count of Puerto Alegre and the Argentines/Uruguayans under Flores to cut off the enemy retreat. However, only about 750 captives were taken, much to the American's disbelief.
Though McClellan was convinced that the Paraguyans had equal numbers of his 20,000 men, in reality they only managed to raise 5000. Later historians would concede, however, the capture of so much of the Paraguayan supply train would be of vital importance.
Within days, the fortress of Humaita would be besieged from the landward side while the Brazilian Navy prepared to speed by the massive fortress and isolate it from Asuncion, the Paraguayan capital.
Rome
General Ulysses Grant would received a series of visitors during his recovery in Rome from a gunshot to his left collarbone. Fortunately, the mad Frenchman's weapon was aged and underpowered. A Colt at that range would cut straight through the American.
Among Grant's visitors would be the American Ambassador to Italy, the great Italian General Garibaldi, Crown Prince Umberto and, astonishingly, Pope Pius IX. Apparently, a famous man being shot on the Vatican's doorstep merited a private visit.
Though the doctors feared some sort of blood poisoning, the General would recover well enough to return to his tour of Europe by October.
Washington DC
President Lincoln would be shocked at the assassination of Generals Sheridan and Longstreet and their wives. Even most Southerners were appalled at the murder of women. Within days, a massive manhunt would comb the state of Louisiana but the assassin would not be discovered.
In retribution, the assorted Union Reconstructionist Military governors would hunt down the "raiders" which had been so vexing the Freedmen population.
In Louisiana itself, Lincoln ordered General Rosecrans to replace Sheridan. Though not a "fighting General" of Sheridan's reputation, Rosecrans was an able organizer and administrator. He would ruthlessly hunt down any semblance of irregular resistance.
London
First Lord of the Treasury Benjamin Disraeli would learn of the French "intervention" in Siam and the Joseon Kingdom , the latter in conjunction with the Russians, in October of 1866 via a fast ship back from Asia.
For all Britain's occasional bluster, the government never had the slightest intention of forcibly opposing Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean without numerous allies. Yes, the Royal Navy could probably wipe the Russian Black Sea Fleet (it may have been renamed the "Mediterranean Squadron" by now) but that would not alter the fact that Russian forces occupied much of the Balkans and did not lack for allies even if one did not count France.
Britain had recently learned to her dismay that controlling the high seas did little to intimidate a nation the size of a continent. Unless that Navy power could be matched with landward military forces, any conflict would prove futile and only put Egypt, Greece and the other eastern nations further into the Russian-French camp.
There may be little Britain could do about the fait accompli in the Eastern Mediterranean but there was damned well something they could do in Southeast Asia. If the French thought that the resources they could bring to bear from Indochina could compete with those of the British Raj, they would be very, very disappointed.
Madrid
Worse for Britain, even Spain was looking increasing problematic.
Queen Isabella had rejected any entreaty from Britain for an alliance, seeing no reason to antagonize France. This would initially not vex anyone in London as an "alliance" with Spain would likely provide few actual benefits and probably draw Britain into other conflicts.
However, the Spanish Queen had her own colonial aspirations. News from the Chincha Islands west of Peru did not paint a positive picture as Chile, Peru and Ecuador were apparently allying against the Queen's forces. In truth, the Spanish Government had no real plans on the South American mainland but were willing to test throwing their weight around.
Much more importantly, the "reconquest" of Hispaniola would continue to suction the already limited Spanish resources. Had it not been for the wave of volunteers from Europe seeking land-grants for their service and the tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans and Cubans served as irregulars, the Haitians would probably have pushed the Spanish back into the Dominican by now.
With most of the Haitian cities having fallen, the inland campaigns were proving disastrous for all involved. By most estimates over 20,000 "Spanish" troops had died (this was actually a gross underrepresentation with the actual number), at least half to disease.
The Haitians, of course, suffered much, much worse as the conquest had led to mass slaughter. Lacking much in the way of modern weapons and powder, the Haitian irregulars would resort to using spears and clubs. Even the most conservative estimates held that 100,000 Haitians had been directly killed by the invaders and perhaps twice that of disease, starvation and exposure.
The population retreated inland where there were few supplies to be had. Malnutrition led to disease and greater and greater death. Even when the Haitians were taken prisoner, they were relegated to fenced compounds in which disease ran rampant.
By fall of 1866, no semblance of central government was left though Faustin II controlled the massive Citidelle Laferriere which the Spanish never bothered to assault. It was too far inland and there were more important things to do than besiege the Masada of Hispaniola. Thus Faustin II would use the fortress to raid outward among the other Haitians for supplies. Indeed, the "Emperor's" forces spent vastly more time feeding off their countrymen than opposing the Spanish.
The suffering would only grow worse and worse over the season as virtually no crops were being sown, no harvest collected and certainly no food imports reaching the population.
More importantly to Britain, the Spanish were also starting to covetously eye Morocco as well.