I think you'd have to get the IJN to realize that a great decisive battle is going to perhaps need time to arrange, and that during that time, the Empire's sealanes will need protecting.From straits of Tsushima to La perouse straits can the Japanese navy adopt a more effective ASW strategy in ww2 to counter USN subs In home waters
Also can they place more and better minefields in those straits ?
Getting rid of me? Oh no!I think you'd have to get the IJN to realize that a great decisive battle is going to perhaps need time to arrange, and that during that time, the Empire's sealanes will need protecting.
I thought about getting rid of Kantai Kessen, but the more I thought about it, any Japanese war based on attrition against the US wouldn't make it out of the planning stages.
Interesting thanks I thought the waters there were just too deep for effective mine warfare? But probably mines had evolved a lot more since the days of World War IFrom The Japanese Navy in World War II, Naval Institute Press. According to Atsushi Oi, who was involved in the IJN's attempts to set up escort forces and then develop a convoy strategy, there were plans to create a cordon because of the impact convoy would have on shipping circulation.
There was no question that the best way to prevent the mounting shipping losses was to adopt a convoy system in full measure. As we have seen, however, in the fall of 1943 the cry was still loud for a faster circulation of shipping. On the other hand, there was no hope of an early remedy for the extreme shortage of escort vessels. The GEHQ, caught in this dilemma, hit upon the idea that faster shipping circulation would not necessarily be unfeasible if the best use of geographic advantage could be made. The idea occurred first to Admiral Oikawa. He himself penciled the plan, the heart of which was as follows:1) The sea area linking the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea was to be made safe from submarine intrusion, so that within this sea area merchant ships would be able to sail independently, without forming a convoy, and thus secure the highest possible efficiency of shipping circulation. For this purpose, the island chain comprising the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo was to be connected with mine barriers. As for places where minelaying was not feasible, land-based radars and sonars as well as patrol planes and patrol vessels would guard the sea gaps.2) The sea belt along the Nampo Shoto (including the Bonin and Volcano islands) and the Mariana Islands was to be guarded by radar stations that would be installed on these islands, as well as by patrol planes and ships, so that enemy submarines would find it difficult to invade the sea belt. Convoys would sail within the belt.3) The sea lanes along the southern coast of Honshu (between Yokohama and Kobe) and along the eastern coast (between Yokohama and the ports of Hokkaido) would be guarded with shore-based radars, patrol planes, and patrol ships, so that ships would be free to sail safe from the submarine menace. In those days the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea were not infested with submarines.The idea was very enthusiastically received in government circles, although the Naval General Staff gave half-hearted support. The people of the Naval General Staff first insisted that all mines then on hand had to be reserved against the probable emergency of Russian entry into the war. Though this obstacle was at last surmounted, and though the government consented to appropriate necessary materials (especially steel) for the production of a sufficient number of mines, only four minelayers were made available. The minelaying took so much time that only the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait had been partly mined before the air supremacy over the projected sea area had been wrested from Japan’s hand. As for shore-based radars, the blueprint was completed in no time, but only one or two stations were actually installed before Okinawa was taken.
Can, yes. Will? No. Not without a major shift in training, doctrine, & officer education, which essentially makes it not IJN any more.can the Japanese navy adopt a more effective ASW strategy in ww2 to counter USN subs In home waters
can the Japanese navy adopt a more effective ASW strategy in ww2 to counter USN subs In home waters
I think you'd have to get the IJN to realize that a great decisive battle is going to perhaps need time to arrange, and that during that time, the Empire's sealanes will need protecting.
There were some officers who served as observers in the RN during the First World War who took notice of the effects of the submarine against the UK's merchant shipping. They did compile reports, but were not listened to much, and even later on when concerns were raised, for a variety of reasons, they were dismissed or little action taken.
The problem is if you are worried about USN Subs in home waters you have to accept that you can't win the war and so should not start it.......Can, yes. Will? No. Not without a major shift in training, doctrine, & officer education, which essentially makes it not IJN any more.
The Japanese military controlled government will see what they want to see, regardless of the study's conclusion.The problem is if you are worried about USN Subs in home waters you have to accept that you can't win the war and so should not start it.......
The IJN simply can't fight a fully mobilized USN in a long war (even without a mostly distracted RN) so any study will simply say you should not start a war in the first place.....
Yes but if they don't want to see the results they will not want to prepare for it as spending effort and money on the results (ie build more ASW stuff) is accepting the studies are valid.......The Japanese military controlled government will see what they want to see, regardless of the study's conclusion.
They'll accept the study is valid, but still believe they can win with a decisive battle.Yes but if they don't want to see the results they will not want to prepare for it as spending effort and money on the results (ie build more ASW stuff) is accepting the studies are valid.......
If you win with a short decisive battle war then ASW doesn't matter, so why spend anything on it (like OTL) if you can't then you look at US steel production and a long attritional war and know its lost..... you cant do both.They'll accept the study is valid, but still believe they can win with a decisive battle.
I know that, Japan doesn't. If Japan truly cared about US production capability, then there wouldn't have been a war in otl. Japan can still understand the importance of asw and still want to fight the us. Japanese leaders didn't see the facts. They saw what they wanted to see.If you win with a short decisive battle war then ASW doesn't matter, so why spend anything on it (like OTL) if you can't then you look at US steel production and a long attritional war and know its lost..... you cant do both.
The problem is that ASW only matters for a long war and the short decisive battle doctrine was all about avoiding that since the RJW as IJN knew they could not afford to do that. ASW is only important for a long war, and they knew that they would lose that, so it can't be important.If Japan truly cared about US production capability, then there wouldn't have been a war in otl. Japan can still understand the importance of asw and still want to fight the us. Japanese leaders didn't see the facts. They saw what they wanted to see.
Did the IJN not have the USN as the main panning opponent for all the 20s?Planning ship production happened in the 30s. Planning for war with the US was a last minute thing.
How effective is mining in Japanese straits both for USN and IJN
The problem is that ASW only matters for a long war and the short decisive battle doctrine was all about avoiding that since the RJW as IJN knew they could not afford to do that. ASW is only important for a long war, and they knew that they would lose that, so it can't be important.
Did the IJN not have the USN as the main panning opponent for all the 20s?
Agreed. The trouble is, IJNHQ hadn't the education or grasp of the strategic situation to realize that. They were treating the U.S. (& Britain) like the Russians & Chinese, expecting government collapses, while at the same time not recognizing they weren't fighting a brown water war.any study will simply say you should not start a war in the first place