More effective Japanese ASW in ww2
- Thread starter Monk78
- Start date
I think you'd have to get the IJN to realize that a great decisive battle is going to perhaps need time to arrange, and that during that time, the Empire's sealanes will need protecting.
I thought about getting rid of Kantai Kessen, but the more I thought about it, any Japanese war based on attrition against the US wouldn't make it out of the planning stages.
There were some officers who served as observers in the RN during the First World War who took notice of the effects of the submarine against the UK's merchant shipping. They did compile reports, but were not listened to much, and even later on when concerns were raised, for a variety of reasons, they were dismissed or little action taken.
See my post here for further information, notably of interwar thinking and even exercises in this regard. The issue was a known one and something could have been done, but you need a way to get it more widespread acceptance, and for that you need to get past the "Black Shoes" and the Carrier lobby. Not an easy call.
Sargon
See my post here for further information, notably of interwar thinking and even exercises in this regard. The issue was a known one and something could have been done, but you need a way to get it more widespread acceptance, and for that you need to get past the "Black Shoes" and the Carrier lobby. Not an easy call.
Sargon
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Best Options/PODs I Can Think Of:
- Germany gives China early U-Boat models in the 30s, which temporarily cause havoc in Japanese Sea Lanes, thus forcing Japan to adapt the way it thinks.
- Have Germany deploy U-Boats to Asia before the beginning of WW1. Said U-Boats cause havoc of Entente operations in the Sea of Japan/South China Sea.
- Have the army gain even more political influence in Japan at the expense of the navy. Army dictates that the main role of the Navy is to transport and supply the army instead of seeking the decisive battle.
- As mentioned above by another poster, naval officers from Japan did observe and research British saw warfare. Making their role more prominent in post ww1 naval development is possible.
- Have the Washington Naval Treaty further limit battleship, cruiser, and carrier production for all nations including Japan, influencing Japan to build more destroyers in otl, putting it in a better position to protect it's sea lanes.
Slightly off topic but remember Japan has limited resources. Being better at asw most likely means a weaker carrier fleet and less battleships, thus limiting Japan's offensive abilities in WW2.
- Germany gives China early U-Boat models in the 30s, which temporarily cause havoc in Japanese Sea Lanes, thus forcing Japan to adapt the way it thinks.
- Have Germany deploy U-Boats to Asia before the beginning of WW1. Said U-Boats cause havoc of Entente operations in the Sea of Japan/South China Sea.
- Have the army gain even more political influence in Japan at the expense of the navy. Army dictates that the main role of the Navy is to transport and supply the army instead of seeking the decisive battle.
- As mentioned above by another poster, naval officers from Japan did observe and research British saw warfare. Making their role more prominent in post ww1 naval development is possible.
- Have the Washington Naval Treaty further limit battleship, cruiser, and carrier production for all nations including Japan, influencing Japan to build more destroyers in otl, putting it in a better position to protect it's sea lanes.
Slightly off topic but remember Japan has limited resources. Being better at asw most likely means a weaker carrier fleet and less battleships, thus limiting Japan's offensive abilities in WW2.
From The Japanese Navy in World War II, Naval Institute Press. According to Atsushi Oi, who was involved in the IJN's attempts to set up escort forces and then develop a convoy strategy, there were plans to create a cordon because of the impact convoy would have on shipping circulation.
There was no question that the best way to prevent the mounting shipping losses was to adopt a convoy system in full measure. As we have seen, however, in the fall of 1943 the cry was still loud for a faster circulation of shipping. On the other hand, there was no hope of an early remedy for the extreme shortage of escort vessels. The GEHQ, caught in this dilemma, hit upon the idea that faster shipping circulation would not necessarily be unfeasible if the best use of geographic advantage could be made. The idea occurred first to Admiral Oikawa. He himself penciled the plan, the heart of which was as follows:
1) The sea area linking the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea was to be made safe from submarine intrusion, so that within this sea area merchant ships would be able to sail independently, without forming a convoy, and thus secure the highest possible efficiency of shipping circulation. For this purpose, the island chain comprising the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo was to be connected with mine barriers. As for places where minelaying was not feasible, land-based radars and sonars as well as patrol planes and patrol vessels would guard the sea gaps.
2) The sea belt along the Nampo Shoto (including the Bonin and Volcano islands) and the Mariana Islands was to be guarded by radar stations that would be installed on these islands, as well as by patrol planes and ships, so that enemy submarines would find it difficult to invade the sea belt. Convoys would sail within the belt.
3) The sea lanes along the southern coast of Honshu (between Yokohama and Kobe) and along the eastern coast (between Yokohama and the ports of Hokkaido) would be guarded with shore-based radars, patrol planes, and patrol ships, so that ships would be free to sail safe from the submarine menace. In those days the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea were not infested with submarines.
The idea was very enthusiastically received in government circles, although the Naval General Staff gave half-hearted support. The people of the Naval General Staff first insisted that all mines then on hand had to be reserved against the probable emergency of Russian entry into the war. Though this obstacle was at last surmounted, and though the government consented to appropriate necessary materials (especially steel) for the production of a sufficient number of mines, only four minelayers were made available. The minelaying took so much time that only the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait had been partly mined before the air supremacy over the projected sea area had been wrested from Japan’s hand. As for shore-based radars, the blueprint was completed in no time, but only one or two stations were actually installed before Okinawa was taken.
I once started a thread on this earlier this year. Here it is FYI:
AHC/WI: Better IJN anti-submarine warfare in WW2
Your challenge, should you choose to accept it, is to get the IJN's anti-submarine doctrine, ships, planes and other equipment into fighting shape for the Pacific War by December 1, 1941. You may use any POD after 1900; you must stay within historical resources used on the IJN. However, not...
www.alternatehistory.com
Interesting thanks I thought the waters there were just too deep for effective mine warfare? But probably mines had evolved a lot more since the days of World War I
Can, yes. Will? No. Not without a major shift in training, doctrine, & officer education, which essentially makes it not IJN any more.
IJN took the doctrine of attack more seriously, AFAICT, than any other navy. (Even RCN resisted landing torpedo tubes, fearing it would keep DDs from being available for escorting the battle line.)
IJN A/S training was laughably bad, & officers assigned to A/S were (near) the bottom of the barrel. (It's not clear to me if submarine officers were actually considered lesser status.)
IJN officers were dismally unqualified in their understanding of the importance of logistics.
As you can see, fixing these things is an enormous task. I'm not at all sure when you'd have to begin, or how you'd achieve it. Not having IJN fall in love with Mahan would be a start--but that raises the question why they did (along with so many other navies) in the first place, & how you fix that. IMO, you need to start sometime after the First Sino-Japanese War, & no later than the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Much after that, the trouble is so baked in, you're hooped, IMO; indeed, if you don't get at it in (before!) the RJW, it may already be too late.
Oikawa's idea of using extensive mine barriers might have worked, if Japan had actually executed it. Clearly, the lack of understanding by senior officers played a role. (Only 4 MLs?
) Whether it would have proven too porous to prevent USN subs from getting through anyhow is another matter.The problem is if you are worried about USN Subs in home waters you have to accept that you can't win the war and so should not start it.......
The IJN simply can't fight a fully mobilized USN in a long war (even without a mostly distracted RN) so any study will simply say you should not start a war in the first place.....
The Japanese military controlled government will see what they want to see, regardless of the study's conclusion.
Yes but if they don't want to see the results they will not want to prepare for it as spending effort and money on the results (ie build more ASW stuff) is accepting the studies are valid.......
They'll accept the study is valid, but still believe they can win with a decisive battle.
If you win with a short decisive battle war then ASW doesn't matter, so why spend anything on it (like OTL) if you can't then you look at US steel production and a long attritional war and know its lost..... you cant do both.
I know that, Japan doesn't. If Japan truly cared about US production capability, then there wouldn't have been a war in otl. Japan can still understand the importance of asw and still want to fight the us. Japanese leaders didn't see the facts. They saw what they wanted to see.
Planning ship production happened in the 30s. Planning for war with the US was a last minute thing.
The problem is that ASW only matters for a long war and the short decisive battle doctrine was all about avoiding that since the RJW as IJN knew they could not afford to do that. ASW is only important for a long war, and they knew that they would lose that, so it can't be important.
Did the IJN not have the USN as the main panning opponent for all the 20s?
Very. Also, in 1942 & 1943 single & twin engined bombers became very effective in sinking Japanese cargo ships. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' has the annual ships lost by Japan sorted by method. Mines, submarines, aircraft. The results for 1942-1943 are surprising. Even in 1944 aircraft were still accounting for 20% of total losses. Losses to mines surged back up in 1945 when access to the home islands became practical.
Yes, but... The assessment of US capabilities was very different in that era. Plus US submarine doctrine had two parts: 1. Large fleet submarines would scout ahead of the Battle Line and make opportunity attacks on capitol ships. @. Smaller coastal submarines would provide point defense of naval bases, like Cavity on Luzon, or Oahu. A Guerre de Course against enemy cargo ships was discussed by US naval officers, but the book doctrine and training was for the two items above.
Agreed. The trouble is, IJNHQ hadn't the education or grasp of the strategic situation to realize that. They were treating the U.S. (& Britain) like the Russians & Chinese, expecting government collapses, while at the same time not recognizing they weren't fighting a brown water war.
In short, they were ignoring the study, or just not doing it, because they didn't like the conclusions.