A series of assumptions: a Britwank on a budget?

[Riain]

The entry on the Tyne in Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1965-66 says that development up to 7,630ehp were projected. Do you think that the Belfast could have used them?

Technically I don't know. I know the Hercules wing/nacelle can only handle about 4,500hp which is why the Herc didn't use the 4,900 T56 of the P3 or the 5,200hp T56 of the E2 and the J engines are down-rated from 6,000hp to 4,500hp. Perhaps the Belfast has a similar wing/nacelle limit on installed horsepower.

As for the British getting it, I doubt it would be cheap so the chances are slim at best. Changing to a single Tyne standard reduces overhead costs of maintaining 2 engines/props so any conversion that improves the performance of the Belfast will be a byproduct of a cost saving exercise. The Belfast fleet has 60 installed whereas the C160 fleet has 112 installed engines of greater power so it makes sense to standardise on the C160 version. The British undertook a project to stretch 31 C130K from 1978, so that's where the standardisation project money would come from.

 

[Sam R.]

I’m not competent on metal things nobody hopes go boom.

But as far as bits of paper and competing groups of paper sorters this is great. I just let the metal bits wash over and try to hold on. But I presume the metal has the same quality as the paper. And the paper bits are dead set.

 

[Riain]

I’m not competent on metal things nobody hopes go boom.

But as far as bits of paper and competing groups of paper sorters this is great. I just let the metal bits wash over and try to hold on. But I presume the metal has the same quality as the paper. And the paper bits are dead set.

Over the years I've become a lot more interested in the stories behind the toys rather than the toys themselves, which is why I tend to be dismissive of the rule of cool as it tends not to fit the story.

 

[Electric Monk]

I just rewatched The Pentagon Wars, so this timeline is shockingly optimistic on military procurement .

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Technically I don't know. I know the Hercules wing/nacelle can only handle about 4,500hp which is why the Herc didn't use the 4,900 T56 of the P3 or the 5,200hp T56 of the E2 and the J engines are down-rated from 6,000hp to 4,500hp. Perhaps the Belfast has a similar wing/nacelle limit on installed horsepower.

As for the British getting it, I doubt it would be cheap so the chances are slim at best. Changing to a single Tyne standard reduces overhead costs of maintaining 2 engines/props so any conversion that improves the performance of the Belfast will be a byproduct of a cost saving exercise. The Belfast fleet has 60 installed whereas the C160 fleet has 112 installed engines of greater power so it makes sense to standardise on the C160 version. The British undertook a project to stretch 31 C130K from 1978, so that's where the standardisation project money would come from.

Have I interpreted the above properly?

The 30 Belfasts built ITTL were completed with the same R.Ty.12 Mk 101 engines producing 5,730 e.h.p. that the 10 OTL aircraft were built with? These are replaced with R.Ty.20 engines producing 6,100 e.h.p. using the money that IOTL was spent on rebuilding 26 Hercules C. Mk 1 to C. Mk 3 standard? According to my copy of Thetford's Aircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918 the rebuilt aircraft flew between 10th January 1980 and 25th November 1985.

However, IOTL the two Britannia squadrons were disbanded in January 1976 and the sole Belfast squadron was disbanded in September 1976. The three squadrons were victims of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75, which also saw the disbandment of the Comet C.4 squadron, the remaining Andover transport squadron and two out of six Hercules squadrons.

Does this mean that I can look forward to seeing the Belfast remain in service until at least the second half of the 1980s?

There will be other standardisations ITTL. You haven't bought the Argossy ITTL and I'm guessing that you aren't a fan of the Andover, so that will cut the Dart out completely. The earlier retirement of the Britannia in favour of the 20 extra Belfasts will also mean the earlier retirement of the Proteus.

 

[Riain]

As 1967 dawned the pressure for devaluation did not abate, despite cuts to Defence spending intended to reduce this pressure. In addition costs to the TSR2 programme were increasing and the schedule was slipping, as a result in April the Government placed an order for 50(1) in order to retain momentum in the project without committing too much money up front. The development of the Spey Phantom, originally expected to cost 25 million pounds had escalated to 100 million pounds while the order had dropped from an expected 140 to 110 and then again to 70 after the White Paper was tabled. That the Australian F111 order had been delivered directly into storage pending the development of a solution to the wing carry through box weakness was cold comfort. In May the French withdrew from the joint advanced trainer project, they saw many of the British requirements such as supersonic speed as superfluous to requirements and needlessly driving up the cost.(2)

It wasn’t all bad news, the Belfast and C160 production were proceeding apace and the P1127 entered squadron service with the RAF as the Harrier GR1. The HMS Warspite nuclear submarine entered service as did the next two Resolution Polaris missile submarines. With three Resolution class in service the Royal Navy could now maintain a continuous at sea presence with Polaris missiles, and took on the burden of strategic nuclear deterrence alongside the Blue Steel V bombers. Whilst the French had withdrawn from the trainer project and ordered the Mirage F1 into production they still remained committed to the AFVG project. Indeed the Marine Nationale had emerging requirements for perhaps 100 aircraft to replace firstly the Etendard fleet and the Crusader fleet.(3)

By midyear a confluence of events enabled Britain to engage in some ‘Lightning Diplomacy’ along the lines of Magic Carpet to Saudi Arabia the previous year. The British position in Aden was to be closed in September and the Lightning FG2 squadron based there(4) withdrawn and aircraft distributed to UK based Lightning squadrons. However in June 1967 a short but incredibly intense conflict broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbour Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Jordan’s Air Force consisted of 22 Hawker Hunters and 33 F104A/B newly supplied by the US under MWDP, however as these aircraft were US controlled they were moved from Jordan to Turkey as hostilities threatened and as a result took no part in the war. Their absence was keenly felt during the first day of the war with the Israelis, who’s Air Force conducted intense and sustained bombing of Jordanian Air Force bases and destroyed all 22 Hunters in the RJAF inventory. Weighing the cost of moving the Lightning squadron in Aden to the UK for little operational benefit against gifting them to Jordan to make up for their Hunter losses the British made King Hussein an offer that he could not refuse. This gift was implemented by the purchase of a handful for Lightning trainer aircraft and other stores and spares from RAF stocks.

With the final delivery of Lightnings to Kuwait the Lightning production line went cold. For an aircraft that begrudgingly survived the 1957 White Paper as an interim aircraft because it was too far to cancel it had turned into a remarkable success. Production for the RAF amounted to 20 Mk1, 56 Mk1A, 66 Mk2, 253 Mk3 (5)(6) and 20 Mk4 and 22 Mk5 two seat trainers. New production for export amounted to 15+3 for South Africa(8), 34+6 for Saudi Arabia and 12+2 for Kuwait, all to Mk3 standard for a grand total of 456 single seater and 55 two seaters.(9) In addition ‘Lightning Diplomacy’ had delivered 10+2 Mk2 to Saudi Arabia and 12+2 Mk2 to Jordan(10). Yet the Lightning story was not finished, as the gradual rundown of the RAF meant that the almost 40 Mk2s leaving RAF service could be offered for export on the used weapons market like the Hunter was so successfully doing.

Despite Wilson’s best efforts over two years in Government, on Saturday 18th of November the exchange rate of the Pound Sterling was dropped from US$ 2.80 to US$ 2.40.

1. IOTL this was the total F111K order, 10 in 1966 and 40 in April 67
2. IOTL the French withdrew from AFVG which had morphed into a strike aircraft, but remained with the Jaguar
3. IOTL MN switched their interest to the Jaguar upon French withdrawal from the AFVG
4. ITOL a Hunter FGA9 squadron was based at Aden
5. IOTL no fighter-bomber Lightnings were acquired by the RAF, fighter only new build production was 28 F1A, 44 F2, 70 F3, 16 F3A, 39 F6.
6. IOTL The RAF converted 138 Hunter F.6 into FGA9 and FR10s between 1960-63
7. ITOL South Africa did not buy the Lightning
8. IOTL the total was 263 single and 52 two seaters, plus many upgrade rebuilds
9. IOTL the fighters at Aden were Hunter FGA9s and not transferred to Jordan

 

[Riain]

Have I interpreted the above properly?

The 30 Belfasts built ITTL were completed with the same R.Ty.12 Mk 101 engines producing 5,730 e.h.p. that the 10 OTL aircraft were built with? These are replaced with R.Ty.20 engines producing 6,100 e.h.p. using the money that IOTL was spent on rebuilding 26 Hercules C. Mk 1 to C. Mk 3 standard? According to my copy of Thetford's Aircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918 the rebuilt aircraft flew between 10th January 1980 and 25th November 1985.

However, IOTL the two Britannia squadrons were disbanded in January 1976 and the sole Belfast squadron was disbanded in September 1976. The three squadrons were victims of the Mason Defence Review of 1974-75, which also saw the disbandment of the Comet C.4 squadron, the remaining Andover transport squadron and two out of six Hercules squadrons.

Does this mean that I can look forward to seeing the Belfast remain in service until at least the second half of the 1980s?

There will be other standardisations ITTL. You haven't bought the Argossy ITTL and I'm guessing that you aren't a fan of the Andover, so that will cut the Dart out completely. The earlier retirement of the Britannia in favour of the 20 extra Belfasts will also mean the earlier retirement of the Proteus.

The rule of thumb is if I don't mention it there is no change, so the Andover stays in, but with some 350 in prodcution the fact that it's the only aircraft in the RAF with Darts isn't the problem that the Tynes in the Belfast were because there's a decent civilian pool to draw support from that wasn't there for the Belfast.

Lets not get ahead of ourselves just yet, I don't know what I'm going to do in the late 70s yet. However the IOTL Belfast was an orphan which by nature are very vulnerable to defence cuts and basically immediately after it was scrapped the RAF undertook expensive work to regain some lost cargo capacity by stretching Hercs. Now whether the Herc stretch translates into a Belfast upgrade or not I don't know but I do know that even with the Mason review the RAF was short on lift so at least some Belfast capacity was needed and the Government was prepared to cough up money to upgrade an existing aircraft fleet.

 

[Riain]

Wilson’s reaction to the devaluation of the Pound was swift and savage, although careful not to renege on any election commitments. Victorious, which had suffered a minor fire while under refit was immediately struck of the RN register and offered for disposal. The cruiser Tiger’s planned conversion into a command/helicopter cruiser was canceled(1) and she and her sister Lion put up for disposal.(2) The Hermes would be placed in reserve in 1970, once the Eagle(3) and Ark Royal Phantom refits were completed, and an offer of sale was made to Australia. Once Hermes left RN service the Sea Vixen aircraft would be withdrawn from service(4), in addition the Phantom order was reduced from 70 to 55(5). The Commando carriers HMS Albion and Bulwark was designated as ASW carriers (6) if operating in home waters. The Royal Navy would now discharge Britain’s responsibilities in the Far East with a single aircraft carrier supported by a Commando carrier. The commitment to Strike Fleet Atlantic would be undertaken with whatever of the 2 carriers, 2 Commando/ASW carriers or HMS Blake was in commission in Home waters, and Strike Group 2 was downgraded to ASW Group 2(7) to the consternation of many NATO members.

With the 4 Resolution class SSBNs (8)now able to conduct a continuous patrol presence the B1 V bombers and the Blue Steel missiles(9) would be withdrawn from service immediately. The Victor and Vulcan B2 would be retained to discharge Britain’s commitment to NATO and in the Near and far East using some of the 102 new WE.177B nuclear bombs on order as a result of a SACEUR request(10) and conventional weapons until the TSR2 entered service in sufficient numbers to wholly replace them. This meant that several Canberra squadrons based in Germany and Cyprus could be disbanded and their duties undertaken with less cost, in particular foreign exchange, by UK based V Bombers.(11) All remaining Mk2 Lightning squadrons were disbanded and these aircraft offered for sale. In addition a Brigade in BAOR was bought home as a way to save foreign exchange expenditure, adding further concern within NATO.

1968 was not all doom and gloom in defence circles. The final Resolution class SSBN was commissioned into the Royal Navy a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the French concerning the AFVG with the RAF to commit to 200 against a requirement exceeding 300 and the French Air Force 150 (12) while the MN remained an interested party. “Lighting Diplomacy’ gained another adherent that years as Singapore included 12 Lightnings in it’s 42 aircraft deal, the remainder being 30 Hunters,(13) as well as conversion trainers of both types. In addition another 42 TSR2 were ordered for the RAF (14) bringing the total to 9 development batch, 11 pre-production and 82 production against a total requirement of 193. While the aircraft and engines of this aircraft were well and truly on the right path the advanced electronics were proving troublesome. The 1965 decision to fit pre-production TSR2 with Blue Parrot radars was paying off as it was giving the TSR2 and opportunity to reach IOC earlier than looked possible with the definitive avionics package.(15)

1. IOTL Tiger underwent a 13 million pound, 5 year conversion into a helicopter/command cruiser
2. IOTL Lion was in reserve from 1965 to 1972 and disposed in 1975, Tiger served until 1978.
3. IOTL the Eagle’s Phantom refit was canceled, ostensibly due to damage sustained in a 1969 grounding.
4. IOTL the Sea Vixen served until 1972
5. IOTL the RN Phantom order was 48 with an option for 7 that was not exercised
6. IOTL Albion remained a Commando carrier until paying off in 1972, Bulwark remained a command carrier until paying off into Reserve in 1976, she was commissioned as an ASW carrier 1978-81
7. IOTL from 1970 Ark Royal was allocated to NATO Strike Fleet Atlantic and Strike Group 2 was not downgraded until 1979 when she paid off.
8. IOTL all 4 Resolutions were not delivered until 1969
9. ITOL Strike Command did not relinquish the deterrent responsibility and Blue Steel until late 1969
10. IOTL 64 x 10kt WE.177 were ordered in 1968-70, SACEUR requested the UK get more 450kt WE.177B in 1970. I chose 102 to match the 1963 order and bring the number of warheads ITTL up to the amount of WE.177A & B and ET.317 ordered ITOL.
11. IOTL Canberra plans changed so often it is difficult to keep up, what is certain that in 1964 less than 90 were planned to be in service by 1969 but by 1968 some 150 were planned to be in service
12. IOTL the Sept 68 MoU was for the Jaguar with those numbers
13. IOTL Singapore’s order was for 46 Hunters
14. IOTL the RAF ordered 42 new-build Buccaneers in 1968 and expected to inherit ex RN aircraft.
15. IOTL at this point the TSR2 had been canceled for 3 years so everything is different, although linked to OTL actions

 

[Riain]

Events outside Britain were having a subtle impact without her being aware initially. President Johnson, heavily committed to the war in Vietnam, withdrew 2 divisions from Germany but formulated a plan to be know as REFORGER: REturn of FORces to GERmany whereby US units could rapidly deploy to Europe in a crisis. This plan was due to be tested in an exercise early in the new year.

West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Canada formed a working group to examine replacements for the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, called the Multi Role Aircraft (MRA). As the partner nations' requirements were so diverse, it was decided to develop a single aircraft that could perform a variety of missions that were previously undertaken by a fleet of different aircraft. On the face of it this MRA looked to meet similar requirements that the AFVG did for Britain and France. Meanwhile in France the Breguet company was experiencing financial trouble and began talks with Avions Marcel Dassault concerning a merger, which would increase the size and therefore political power of the resulting company. This was particularly important as Marcel Dassault was notoriously ruthless in the operation of his company, readily sabotaging projects in order for AMD to win contracts.

Additionally the Netherlands took delivery of a Chieftain tank allocated British registration number 03 EB 81 and Dutch number KZ-99-65 which was tested alongside a Leopard between 15 January and 22 March 1968 by the Detachement ter Beproeving van Voertuigen of the Royal Netherlands Army. Leyland and Rolls Royce paid careful attention to the build quality of this vehicle as it represented a a significant export opportunity.(1) By 1968 the concept that led to the development of the lightweight but high mobility Leopard and AMX30 able to defeat the Red Army by manoeuvre was looking to be the wrong choice. In the face of massed Soviet tanks there was no empty flank to manoeuvre to, and only the Chieftain has the firepower and protection to go head to head with massed tanks, leading to an order for 468(2) Mk3/N with a 780hp engine.(2) The Netherlands was also in the market for a SPAAG on the same chassis and the Abbot-Falcon turret was mated to their Mk3/N and linked to a pair of Dutch made radars to create the Flakpanzer Falcon, leading to an order of 95 in addition to the MBTs and specialist vehicles.(4) The Netherlands order for the Flakpanzer Falcon caused British officers to cast covetous eyes in their direction.

1. IOTL Chieftain 03 EB 81 had poor construction quality, especially the engine, which leaked so much oil that the engine compartment turned black.
2. IOTL the Dutch chose the Leopard, primarly due to the poor build quality
3. IOTL the Cheitain Mk3 with 720hp came out in 1971
4. IOTL the Dutch ordered 95 Flakpanzer Gepard

 

[Riain]

Exercise REFORGER I was held in January 1969 and as the first effort it was a small affair with units from 3 ACR and 24 ID moved from the US to Germany, but considered a harbinger of what was to come. The thinking around REFORGER was not as limited as the exercise itself and quickly expanded to where REFORGER’s success in a Soviet invasion could be the difference between victory and defeat. Given REFORGER’s importance it was expected to provoke a climactic naval battle as the Soviets threw all of their naval resources into stopping the REFORGER convoys, in a manner akin to the Malta Convoy battles of WW2. However in January 1969 the Royal Navy’s key contribution to the potential naval battle surrounding REFORGER as a helicopter command cruiser HMS Blake assigned to Strike Fleet ASW Group 2, which was a very meagre contribution for a sea power of Britian’s and strategic importance. Granted it was unusual to have both fleet carriers and a Commando carrier in refit leaving the 2 available flattops east of Suez, however this situation was not going to improve in the future as the carrier fleet was to shrink from 4 ships in 1968 to 2 in 1970, the helicopter command conversion for the Tiger canceled, the Hermes slated for conversion to Commando-ASW carrier and Albion to retire. Firther, under current plans after 1975 the Eagle and Ark Royal were to be retired and the proposed Escort Cruier development the definitive helicopter command cruiser would be in command of ASW Group 2.(1)

1969 was the year that the 12 year gestation of the TSR2 finally ended and an Initial Operational Capability was declared. The aircraft had been undergoing testing and trials since 1967 but the advanced avionics had experienced delay after delay and inevitable increases in cost. It had now been cleared for all weapons and in all flight envelopes, which in the dark days of 1965 had been progressively decreased to make them easier to meet but now had been increased back to the original targets as the flight test programme continued. All 20 development batch, pre-production and early production aircraft were fitted with an upgraded Blue Parrot radar and a hodgepodge of other avionics equipment, so while the numbers of aircraft available for IOC was high their individual capability was considerably lower than expected. However the definitive electronic specification aircraft were now on the production line so there was no point in delaying IOC any longer.(2)

BOAC began transferring their 12 VC10s(3) to the RAF at the rate of one a month, the first was sent to BAC to test the feasibility of converting these aircraft into tankers(4) while the others were sent into storage pending a decision as to their use.(5) The makeshift Victor K1 tankers were approaching the end of their service lives and the incoming TSR2 were to take over the Victor and Vulcan theatre-strategic role as one of their duties leaving these aircraft surplus to requirements. The option facing the government was to utilise either the 12 ex BOAC VC10s and tankers or convert 24 Victor B2s into tankers like their B1 brethren. Meanwhile another of Britain’s ‘class of 64’ airliners entered RAF service in May in the shape of the Trident, now renamed the Nimrod MR1.(6)

1. IOTL what would become the Invincible class was under development to command NATO ASW groups
2. IOTL in the early 60s the TSR2 was planned to enter service in full spec in about 1968
3. IOTL BOAC/BA didn’t retire VC10s until 1974-75
4. IOTL A Victor B2 was sent to Handley Page for tanker conversion study
5. IOTL The RAF did not start acquiring ex commercial VC10 for tanker conversions until 1978
6. IOTL this was the Comet derivative

 

[Riain]

Work on the AFVG had progressed to a point where it was obvious that the aircraft would exceed the 35,000lb launching limit of the BS5 catapults on the French carriers Clemenceau and Foch. Britain, as the biggest partner and design lead, was driving the requirements and it was clear that a 35,000lb aircraft would not be able to provide a CAP at 1,000 as dictated by the Island Base Strategy and increasingly for the NATO fighter/interceptor mission. Once the MN lost interest the major reason for French participation in the AFVG evaporated as the Air Forces was more than happy with the Mirage F1. AMD was pushing a development of the Etendard as a cheaper and wholly French replacement for the current MN Etendards and was unhappy with being the junior partner to BAC. In early 1969 these factors led to the French withdrawing from the AFVG project.(1)

While the French withdrawal was a blow, it was not unexpected nor without positive side effects. Without the MN carrier requirements the task of designing the aircraft became easier and their aircraft itself could be lighter and without the French input the aircraft could meet RAF needs with less compromise. In addition with the French contribution some 8 million pounds worth of development had been done at the cost of only 5 million pounds to the British taxpayer.(2) BAC was given a contract to build a mockup and continue detailed design, now known as the UKVG, going while the Government shopped for new development partners and export customers. The first port of call were the MRA signatories, the British government presented the group with an already partially developed aircraft that appeared to meet many of their needs and had a design headstart of three years. In addition British Government and BAC officials met with the MRA members individually to ascertain their respective preferences and in doing so learned that Canada was already on the verge of withdrawing from the MRA project for political reasons and the Dutch were unhappy because the proposals tended to be bigger and more complex than they would prefer.

The French withdrawal from the AFVG was not the only deal that was severed that year, as the British withdrew from the arrangement with Israel to sell and even licence produce the Chieftain tank. Knowledge about the pair of Chieftains on loan to Israel leaked out and caused a political crisis. Mobs attacked the British embassy in Cairo and other Arab cities, the British embassy in Tripoli was even set on fire. The British promised to provide the Libyans with Chieftain tanks of their own, but this did not satisfy the Arabs, who threatened to take their foreign currency accounts out of British banks. With the big order for the Netherlands already on the books and another large deal with Iran looming, ironically assisted by the Israeli connection, the export revenue was not worth the political trouble. Citing concerns about the regional balance of power Britain withdrew from the agreement and the pair of Chieftains that had been in Israel for some four years were returned, showing signs of combat damage.

1. IOTL in 1969 the French amended the Jaguar MoU to increase their order by 50 for a carrier version.
2. IOTL the British spent 2.5 million pounds on the AFVG between mid 65 and mid 67 and were the senior partner in the programme.
3. IOTL the Brtish Government issued continuation contracts in 1967 to support design changes, eliminating the carrier capability and growing it into a bigger strike aircraft.

 

[Riain]

The decision to convert VC10 or Victor B2s into tankers was really no decision at all. The Victors had spent the better part of a decade as low level nuclear strike aircraft and experiencing sudden fatigue issues like those the Valiant had undergone 5 years earlier were not off the table. In contrast the VC10s were airliners with a mere 3 or 4 years service under their belts with the potential more decades more at the lower usage rate they could expect with the RAF. As tankers there was no contest with the Victor B2 expected to carry 41 tonnes of fuel for offload compared to the VC10s 85 tonnes. Allocating the work to BAC was a simple decision also, coming as it did off the glory years where the VC10 Super 200 was the worlds most capacious transatlantic airliner and BAC was delivering dozens annually for several years. They were now moving into low rate production and conversion work, so were awarded with the contract to convert these 12 VC10s into VC10 K2 with 3 point refueling and a main deck fuel tank.(1) While the Victor B2 squadrons converted to TSR2 and these majestic aircraft went into retirement.

The 1970 General election bought the Conservative back to power after six years in on the Opposition benches, and with them different ideas about Defence. While more inclined to embrace a global role for Britain the Labour Government’s efforts to reduce the East of Suez role had a lasting impact and the Conservative certainly had no election commitment to change Labour’s policy in this regard. The incoming Government wished to retain the EoS role for as long as possible while putting even more focus onto Britain’s NATO roles in order to strengthen the case to join the EEC. The Heath Government were somewhat embarrassed by the withdrawal of a brigade from BAOR and the downgrading of Strike Group 2 to ASW Group 2 with the pitiful contribution to REFORGER covering forces of a helicopter cruiser.

The Brigade was quickly redeployed back to Germany to the relief of NATO members on the Continent, how striking the right balance between NATO and EoS with the Royal Navy was somewhat more difficult. The major ships at teh Government’s disposal for these tasks were the fleet carriers Eagle and Ark Royal which emerged from their Phantom refits within months of each other, in the Ark Royal’s case after a prolonged and expensive conversion, a pair commando carriers with the Hermes replacing Albion from 1972 and the HMS Blake, at least 3 of which could be expected to be available at any time. Discreetly reversing Labour’s policy of maximizing carrier resources EoS Lord Carrington directed that when not in refit HMS Blake must be deployed EoS while either of the Fleet Carrier must be available for NATO Strike Group 2 at all times. Upon issuing this direction the Commander of Strike Fleet Atlantic upgraded ASW Group 2 to Strike Group 2, however for political reasons East of Suez this was not widely publicised. The Commando carriers were to place first priority on EoS roles and were to cover the Blake when in refit but were tasked more and more with NATO roles.(2)

In order to introduce some permanency to this change Heath, Lord Carrington and Cabinet made the momentous decision to overturn Labour’s decision to end carrier aviation by 1975.(3) The Minister called for an update of CVA01s design as soon as possible so an order for it’s construction could be placed for two ships to replace the Ark Royal and Blake as air capable ships for NATO and EoS roles in conjunction with Eagle which was expected to serve until 1980-81. To further cement this decision the RAF was tasked with undertaking trails on a Commando carrier to ascertain if Harriers could provide the RN with another fixed wing option if needed. It was thought that a detachment of Harriers on a Commando carrier EoS could mitigate against the loss of a fleet carrier now these were allocated to NATO.(4)

1. IOTL the contract to convert Victor B2 into K2 was awarded to HSA as HP had folded in 1969
2. IOTL the withdrawal EoS was accelerated to 1971, with RN ships not being scheduled to deploy EoS from then on.
3. IOTL the 1966 decision was for 1975, but in 1968 this was bought forward to 1972, this meant the Ark Royal’s life was extended to the late 70s, but Eagle wasn’t refitted because her aircraft had already transferred to the RAF from 1969.
4. IOTL while Harriers had been landing on carriers ever since a P1127 landed on Ark Royal in 1963, regular Harrier operations were not contemplated until the mid 70s. The Hermes Commando conversion and the Invincible were not designed with Harriers in mind.

 

[groundhogday666]

Over the years I've become a lot more interested in the stories behind the toys rather than the toys themselves, which is why I tend to be dismissive of the rule of cool as it tends not to fit the story.

I'm going through a similar mutation since 2006, but the process takes much more time in my case, because the "rule of cool" is so powerful and addictive...

AFVG high and lows. Makes a lot of sense. The French Navy pockets, post WWII, were never deep... and post 1973, it was worse. Also the AFVG indeed would be too large for the Clems...

And Jaguar - good riddance. For all its virtues and usefulness OTL, it remained a camel - a horse designed by a committee. Hawk and Alphajet are fine machines.

Short Belfast, by contrast - nice to see some more of them build. While payload of 78 000 pounds was not that big, the 16 ft diameter fuselage was unmatched except for C-5 and An-22 of course. Even today, it is quite useful. Note that the C-130 and C-141 fuselages had the same width of merely 10 ft.

With the TSR2 too far to cancel means no F111K, no F111K means the AFVG doesn't morph into a strike aircraft, no morphing in a strike aircraft means no French withdrawal in mid 67. With the TSR2 going into production means no requirement to move RN Buccaneers into the RAF and buy new builds for the RAF, no need to keep Vulcans around for tactical strike until the 80s, no need to morph the Jaguar from an advanced trainer into a sophisticated CAS/interdiction aircraft and no need to develop the Tornado as a strike aircraft.

Geez... ! what an (OTL) mess. Nice to see AFVG going... somewhere. Same for the TSR-2, although it won't be all rosy for it, I guess.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Definitely looks like if they could’ve sorted the engine for the Belfast it could’ve had a decent British military career.

 

[groundhogday666]

The rule of thumb is if I don't mention it there is no change, so the Andover stays in, but with some 350 in prodcution the fact that it's the only aircraft in the RAF with Darts isn't the problem that the Tynes in the Belfast were because there's a decent civilian pool to draw support from that wasn't there for the Belfast.

Lets not get ahead of ourselves just yet, I don't know what I'm going to do in the late 70s yet. However the IOTL Belfast was an orphan which by nature are very vulnerable to defence cuts and basically immediately after it was scrapped the RAF undertook expensive work to regain some lost cargo capacity by stretching Hercs. Now whether the Herc stretch translates into a Belfast upgrade or not I don't know but I do know that even with the Mason review the RAF was short on lift so at least some Belfast capacity was needed and the Government was prepared to cough up money to upgrade an existing aircraft fleet.

A stretched Hercules won't replace a Belfast. The later was closer from a C-141 in capabilities, except at merely half the speed...

 

[CV12Hornet]

Well, now I'm really interested to see what you go with from that thread on the bespoke Lightning replacement...

 

[groundhogday666]

Once the MN lost interest the major reason for French participation in the AFVG evaporated as the Air Forces was more than happy with the Mirage F1.

Perdu !
The Armée de l'Air might want the AFVG to... replace the Mirage IV as a strategic bomber, carrying an ASMP. The last Mirage IVA rolled out of Dassault Mérignac production line in October 1968 after 62 were build. OTL a decade later (1978) 18 were converted into IVP but 70 Mirage 2000N were finally procured another decade later, in 1988.
The ASMP cruise missile was started for the ACF circa 1972, so after the variable geometry Mirages and AFVG kick the bucket.
Eventually, you may get 70 AFGV for the AdA.
This would strangle in infancy, the Mirage G4, G8, ACF, 4000, and also the Mirage IVP ASMP upgrade circa 1978 (18 aircraft), and... the Mirage 2000N (the final winner, 70 build).

Then again, it's your TL, and GB has top priority.

 

[groundhogday666]

IOTL the French flirted with the big Mirages F2/3, G, G4 and G8 from about 1964 to 1968 and the AFVG from 1965 to mid 1967 but they also supported the development of the small F1from 1964 as a stopgap until the AFVG came into service. They cancelled the AFVG and ordered the Mirage F1 at about the same time and the Mirage G programme was canceled not long after although it remained as a research project.

IOTL the French navy wanted to replace the Crusader almost as soon as it entered service in 1965 and the original Etendard entered service in about 1961 soalso needed replacement in the 70s . IIUC they retained an interest in the AFVG until it's cancellation, then switched this interest to the Jaguar which by 1968 was morphing from an advanced trainer into a light strike aircraft. They developed this into a carrier aircraft but it disappointed on trials and was replaced by the Super Etendard project.

British behaviour will influence French behaviour, but the French will still be French and I haven't worked out what to do about this yet.

The Armée de l'air procurement, 1963-1988, was an horror and a complete mess. It hurt the brain even more than Great Britain chaos and failures over the same priod of time. Twenty-five years in hell between Mirage III IOC and the Rafale decision.

(1962) NATO NBRM-3, Balzac V demonstrator, then Mirage III-VSTOL... nope, it's an unworkable bloated monster with nine freakkin' jet engines - so Mirage F2, STOL for strike... hey, this is May 1965, so how a deal with the British for Jaguar and AFVG ? nah, this is spring 1966 and now we are (partially) out of NATO and its integrated air defense system, when our national radar cover is holed all over the place, so Mirage F3 for interception... but it has an american engine, bloody TF30, so hail the subscale F1 with the Atar... wait, we need to explore variable geometry and screw the AFVG from "below" so Mirage G derived from the F2... no, wait, Mirage G achieved its goal - except that, since AFVG is dead, we need to replace the Mirage IV... Mirage G4 ! Nah, too big, Mirage G8 ! Nah, VG too complex and expensive, it would be even better with fixed wing and M53s... G8A - ACF ! Wait, how expensive is this one - it needs a lower end, so how about a Mirage F1-M53s... except the Jaguar is eating our budget like crazy, oh damn, we lost Belgium, and then the Deal of the century, to the F-16, and now without its lower end ACF is too expensive for a 450 aircraft procurement, so let's re-invent it as the Mirage 4000, only with a delta-wing and FBW, oh drat, still too expensive, let's try the 2000, excellent... but we still want a heavy twin-jet, but it is too expensive, so let's shrink the 4000 and enlist the Navy and the Europeans, crap, we lost the Europeans, shit, screw them, RAFAAAAAALE here we go... (1988) oh wait the Crusaders are falling apart, but they can certainly last until 1999, because Hornets ? NO WAY !

(my brain is bleeding)
...
(it is as uncoherent as a Nixon-in-a-bad-day rant)
...
(and you thought the British air ministry were uncoherent, babbling idiots ?)

 

[CV12Hornet]

The Minister called for an update of CVA01s design as soon as possible so an order for it’s construction could be placed for two ships to replace the Ark Royal and Blake as air capable ships for NATO and EoS roles in conjunction with Eagle which was expected to serve until 1980-81.

Oh boy.

This is gonna get interesting, and by interesting I mean painful.

CVA-01 is a compromised design with some strange ideas about how a carrier should function and steam boiler propulsion that's going to be headache-inducing for the bean counters by the 1980s. There's going to be a strong temptation to tinker with the design, which could very well lead to a design spiral and lots of delays.

 

[Riain]

I'm not happy with the AF/UKVG, it's been in joint design with the French for 4 years with no prototype or even a mockup in sight. In contrast the P1154 was started in 1961 and by the end of 1964 metal had been cut for a prototype. I'm going to have to go back and do a rewrite, to at least get a mockup or something because at this point Britain has delivered 4 highly successful combat aircraft in the 60s: Lightning, Buccaneer Harrier and TSR2 so has the confidence in their industry that they lacked IOTL.