A series of assumptions: a Britwank on a budget?

[Riain]

Perhaps the most important event of 1963 was a study undertaken by a panel of scientists, which could decide the future of British strategy for decades to come. A panel of seven British defence scientists, with full access to senior Service Officers met a dozen times to evaluate the best way for Britain to discharge it’s stated responsibilities east of Suez. In particular they were to evaluate the competing claims of the Navy and Air Force departments, the Carrier Replacement Programme against the so called ‘Island Bases Strategy’.

In order to asses these competing concepts a series of assumptions were made;

1. UK resources to intervene overseas were limited. As a yardstick it was considered that a brigade group and a parachute battalion within the Indian Ocean area or a ‘go it alone’ basis was the style of support envisaged.
2. Opposition would be such that military strength would have to be landed ready for action.
3. Russian ‘assistance’ in the form of equipment could be provided to the opposition. It was considered unlikely that manpower would be provided.
4. Australia would remain available as a base for operations in the Pacific and Indian ocean areas and that other bases would be of doubtful tenure.
5. The main body of the troops will be based in the UK and transported to the area by long range transport.
6. Air support and cover are a requirement.

The types of intervention considered most likely were;

• Intervention with an airhead available and with little or no immediate opposition. Generally in the form of an invitation from a threatened regime.
• Intervention against low or moderate opposition with no airhead available.
• Intervention against strong opposition.

Interventions where nuclear weapons were contemplated were not considered.

The crux of the Naval solution rested in it’s four aircraft carrier task forces, of which 2 wold be deployed East of Suez at all times, backed by an afloat Marine Commando and an array of support shipping. The base on Gan in the Indian Ocean would be sufficient to cover the entire area of operations and a staging base at Ascension and possibly Aldabra in support. In the naval led solution the RAF long range transport aircraft could land at the airhead at their full 3,000 mile range.

The Air solution required bases at Aldabra, Masirah, Cocos, Butterworth, Manila and Darwin, each of these being 800-1,000 miles apart with little to no overlap. Air cover and tactical strike would be provided from these bases at a range of 800,-1,000 miles and long range transports would deliver cargo to these bases to be flown in by tactical transports. In addition to these forward bases the Island Base Strategy was also dependant on Ascension and Gan as staging posts to support these tactical operations.

* A copy of this report was sent to the Australian Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee in early 1964. it can be found at pages 150-171.

 

[McPherson]

Were they smoking strange stuff when that report was compiled? The logistics required was just unsustainable for what was requested.

 

[marathag]

but t

Hypergolic propellants aren't going to help when 300 IRBMs hit Britain within the space of a single minute. Sorry.

They do allow hot launches from a hardened silos rapidly on getting an alert from BMEWS, so the incoming missiles hit empty holes

 

[Riain]

but t

They do allow hot launches from a hardened silos rapidly on getting an alert from BMEWS, so the incoming missiles hit empty holes

The Blue Streak had a system where the LOX was 'blasted' onto the rocket in 3 1/2 minutes using pressurized nitrogen I think, about the time it took for the gyros to spin up. Quick launching wasn't really the problem, as much as short warning times and the known locations meaning it might be worthwhile for the Soviets to try their luck with a preemptive strike which isn't an option with V bombers or SSBNs.

When Blue Streak was cancelled so too was the Violet Friend ABM system which at the very least would have tracked incoming missiles with some radars forward based in the Netherlands. IIRC Britain didn't have an early warning system until a space radio telescope (or whatever it was) was aimed east in about 1963 and even than it was pretty rudimentary.

 

[Riain]

Upon looking at the Navy and Air Force proposals it became clear almost immediately that the Navy solution offered vastly greater capabilities to deal with the scenarios offered, indeed the Navy had undertaken the sort of operation envisaged in Kuwait in 1961 with great success. Navy option met more military requirements including the ability to land tanks and heavy vehicles and a considerable logistical capability it was also able to provide air cover and air support and the close tactical control these require to reach maximum efficiency. In addition it met many political imperatives such not relying on uncertain third country bases, being able to deter by its presence and the ability to quickly put an operation into reverse is required. However the Navy option had 2 interlinked problems that were a dire threat to this option being selected; vulnerability and cost. To maintain 2 carriers East of Suez required the RN to have 4 in their force and these ships required a hefty escort which ensured the Naval option retained large cost overheads. This was particularly important for the lower threat scenarios where a carrier was not required.

The Air Force option appeared to have significant cost advantages over the Naval option and in the lower threat scenario did not appear to have any significant capability deficiency, indeed it proved an option for intervention far inland. The island bases the strategy relied upon already had facilities that could be expanded upon and when not required could be maintained by a skeleton staff at significantly less cost than 4 aircraft carriers, their air groups and their escorts. There remained some significant political drawbacks; the threat of an air operation couldn’t really deter nor could it be easily withdrawn once launched was not as significant as the fact that these bases relied on the cooperation of numerous third party countries which may not agree to operations. The geographical nature of these island bases was such that if one base was unavailable then the others could not compensate in order for the operation to go ahead.

One factor above all mitigated against the potential cost savings of the Island base Strategy; the BAC Lightning.(1) In capability terms the RAF could expect to have the long range transport in the form of the Shorts Belfast in service shortly and the short range transport in the form of the Transall C160 in a similar timeframe. The existing Canberra fleet could undertake tactical strike, implemented by V bombers if the need arose, and the TSR2 in development could undertake these strikes in the future. However the RAF fighter force would be made up of the Lightning for at least another decade, the only other fighter type aircraft under consideration for the RAF was the p1127/Kestrel on order for the tripartite evaluation squadron. While the Mk3 versions of the Lightning were able to be refueled in flight and carried over-wing fuel tanks to extend their ferry range Combat Air Patrols at 800-1,000 miles were simply beyond it’s capability. In the Air Force solution no fighter cover could be expected until an airhead was available, captured in the higher threat scenarios, and fighters could be flown in. It was possible that the P1127/Kestrel could deploy sooner than Lightnings due to their VTOL capability, the Air Force solution offered this possibility. This created a dilemma in that local control of aircraft would be limited to non-existent in the early phases, in which case the AI radar equipped Lightning could cope better than the simple day fighter-bomber capability of the P1127/Kestrel.(2) The fact of the matter was that the Island Base Strategy was not practical until the RAF acquired a fighter capable of operating at 1,000 miles from base, which with the Lightning the core of the RAF fighter force until the mid 70s this was not likely to happen.

This report was particularly poignant as not only was there low level fighting in Malaysia on the other side of the Indian Ocean on 14 December 1963 a grenade attack against British High Commissioner of Aden Sir Kennedy Trevaskis took place as he arrived at Khormaksar Airport to catch a London-bound flight. The grenade killed the High Commissioner's adviser and a woman, and injured fifty other people. On that day, a state of emergency was declared in Aden. The NLF and FLOSY began a campaign against British forces in Aden, mainly guerrilla attacks largely focused on killing off-duty British officers and policemen.

1. IOTL the Island Base Strategy hinged on the P1154 being able to undertake reasonable CAPs at 1,000 miles range.
2. IOTL the radar equipped P1154-RN was referred to in this capacity, despite the RAF having no firm plans to acquire it.

 

[Rickshaw]

The Blue Streak had a system where the LOX was 'blasted' onto the rocket in 3 1/2 minutes using pressurized nitrogen I think, about the time it took for the gyros to spin up. Quick launching wasn't really the problem, as much as short warning times and the known locations meaning it might be worthwhile for the Soviets to try their luck with a preemptive strike which isn't an option with V bombers or SSBNs.

When Blue Streak was cancelled so too was the Violet Friend ABM system which at the very least would have tracked incoming missiles with some radars forward based in the Netherlands. IIRC Britain didn't have an early warning system until a space radio telescope (or whatever it was) was aimed east in about 1963 and even than it was pretty rudimentary.

Violet Friend was cancelled because it was shown to be any attempt at a anti-ICBM/IRBM interception had first to boost the intercepter to higher speeds than the incoming warhead and then use a counter-booster to halt the interceptor and then reboost it to intercept the warhead. As this was likely to have to happen over Denmark/Netherlands it was deemed politically difficult when nuclear warheads were involved (apparently it was thought the Danes or the Dutch might get upset with nukes exploding overhead). The problems were all decreed by physics and politics and believed to be difficult, if not insurmountable.

 

[Riain]

Several development projects were nearing completion as 1964 rolled around. The Shorts Belfast prototype undertook its first flight in January as did the first British Transall C160 prototype. This was welcome news as the inability to find suitable replacement for the Beverly and Hastings in the late 50s(1) had pushed the RAF into using it’s other types such as the Britannia and Comet more than expected. The Belfast and C160 would be welcome additions to the RAF transport fleet, the sooner the better.

In the civil aviation sphere the Trident went into revenue service with American Airlines and the BAC 111 with BEA and BUA but the simmering hostility of BOAC to the VC10 exploded into open warfare as the prototype Super 200 was rolled out. BOAC wished to cancel their entire 30 plane Super 200 order, but this caused a row in Parliament as it would be catastrophic for BAC to lose such an order, insisting that it go ahead. This dispute caused the BOAC Chairman and Managing Director to resign defending the opinion that the airline was a profit-making company, not a sponsor of indigenous aircraft. BOAC's incoming chairman Sir Giles Guthrie was also anti-VC10; he proposed that the Vickers programme be shelved in favour of more 707s. In the end a compromise was reached with what we now call a ‘whole of government’ solution. BOAC would keep it’s entire order for 30 Super 200s, the RAF would immediately take delivery of 3 VC10 and would buy the 12 standard VC10s from BOAC as an agreed price as the 18th Super 200 was delivered to BOAC.(2) Since neither BOAC or the RAF was happy with this outcome it was apparently a good compromise politically and now both users had to find a use for these aircraft. Soon after the dust was settled on this deal the MoA issued Air Staff Target 381 for a jet powered Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft to replace the RAFs aging piston powered Shackletons.

The Royal Navy’s new carrier design, designated CVA 01, was firming up into a 54,000t ship with three shaft propulsion. This displacement had been chosen to match the three shaft machinery as it was found that a 4 shaft layout would displace 58,000t and cost more but not provide any extra capability. In line with US practice the carrier was to mount an area defence SAM, in order to economise on the number of escorts required in the carrier task force and the British had entered into a joint project with the Dutch to develop a 3D radar suitable for both carriers and escorts. The ship featured several novel features, including the ‘Alaskan taxiway’ where aircraft could taxi on the outside of the island clear of the rest of the flight deck. This was was an expansion on the Alaskan Highway of earlier carriers where ground support vehicles could move forward and aft without impacting on flight operations. The flight deck had a reduced angle known as a parallel deck, the inboard lift was a new scissor style developed by McTaggart Scott and the catapults were to be BS6 with a 250’ shuttle run a further growth over the 199’ BS5A fitted to the HMS Eagle. These catapults would be capable of launching the McDonnell Douglas Phantom II which, the Spey version with having begun development from February.

The versatility of carriers was again demonstrated In January 1964, when the 1st Tanganyika Rifles, who were based near the capital Dar-es-Salaam, mutinied against their British officers, seizing the British High Commissioner and taking over the Airport. After urgent appeals for help from President Julius Nyerere, Britain decided to deploy the carrier HMS Centaur from Aden with it’s usual aircraft of Sea Vixens, Gannet AEW and Wessex helicopter as well as 815 Naval Air Squadron and 45 Commando of the Royal Marines. When Centaur arrived at Dar-es-Salaam, a company of Royal Marines was landed by helicopter. Later, four Sea Vixens from Centaur provided cover for more Royal Marines and a small number of armoured cars of the 16th/5th The Queen's Royal Lancers, who were landed on an air strip. The operation was a success and the rest of the mutineers surrendered, with the main culprits being arrested. Centaur left on 29 January, nine days after originally sailing for what was then a country in crisis.

BAC believed that the delays with the TSR2 first flight were putting the project in jeopardy, so decided to conduct the first flight using the faulty engines they had available. The TSR2 took to the air on September 27 1964, with the pilot instructed not to exceed 97% engine power and once completed this aircraft did not take to the air until the end of the year although ground testing and taxi runs continued. The static testing on the first static test airframe also began and the development batch and pre production aircraft were nearing completion. To reduce delay and ensure process in order to avoid cancellation BAC was considering ways to mitigate against the late delivery of certain equipment. One measure was to install the Blue Parrot radar from the Buccaneer into the 11 pre-production aircraft to provide a modicum of capability suitable for conducting testing and trials with the type.(3)

Over at HSA the first Kestrel, built to production standard took to the air in May and by October the Tripartite evaluation squadron had commended operations. As these progressed a new government took power, after 13 years in opposition the Labour Party under Harold Wilson was sworn in.

1. IOTL the RAF bought 56 militarised AW650 as the AW660 Argosy from 1961, these covered the gap between the Hasting/Beverly and planned HS681/actual C130
2. IOTL the RAF only received the 3 surplus VC10, BOAC kept 12 VC10 and was compelled to receive 17 of the 30 Super VC10s it had contracted to buy.
3. IOTL At April 1965 there was one flyer, one ready to fly, two more practically complete and the rest in various stages of construction. Of the two static test airframes, one was complete and in use, and the second was nearly complete. Eleven more airframes were to follow in the pre-production batch, but progress on these was mostly limited to rear fuselages - and even these were not actually complete when cancellation came.

 

[Riain]

The Wilson Government faced some interesting challenges with regards to Defence. His Government had an agenda to fund yet was under pressure almost immediately to devalue the pound. As Labour had devalued the Pound last time they were in government it was a party-political imperative to resist devaluation this time lest Labour be known as ‘the Party of Devaluation’. They had been elected on a promise to both cut Defence expenditure yet retain the East of Suez commitment and Britain’s world role. However East of Suez was a troubled area with the ongoing Confrontation against Indonesia in Malaysia and Emergency in Aden requiring large resources to deal with, while another crisis like Tanganyika was always a possibility. Indeed the Confrontation with Indonesia had recently expanded with a small, conventional seaborne landing and parachute assault on the Malayan peninsula, a significant escalation from the cross border raids in Borneo. Thus began their review of defence with few easy answers.

Looking at Defence aviation projects, the Buccaneer S.2 was on the verge of production and on time and budget while the Spey Phantom was under development in the US which drew the support of the Labour Party who believed American aircraft would be cheaper and better than British aircraft. American as well as West German partnership in the Kestrel project made it safe also, particularly as it was also cheap to develop.(1) The Shorts Belfast was almost ready for production and in addition Labour was keen to avoid redundancies at the Shorts factory that would result from its cancellation. So too the Transall C160 was close to production and part of a partnership with France and Britain, something the Labour Government valued highly so it was safe from cancellation. In any case the replacement for both of these aircraft was the American C130, which would generate no particular benefits if it replaced either or both of these aircraft.(2) The Lightning was well into its production run, indeed the end was in sight for RAF Lightning production.

AST 381 had not yet gone beyond proposal evaluation phase, indeed both airline manufacturers had submitted proposals based on both of their extant production airliners. HSA had submitted proposals based on their Comet and Trident(3) while BAC had submitted proposals based on their VC10 and BAC111. The BAC proposals were too big and too small to effectively and efficiently meet the requirement while the Comet was a major modification of an aircraft already almost 20 years old in conception and decidedly old fashioned compare to the other 3 contenders. This left the HSA’s steady selling, Medway powered Trident, between the BAC contenders for size and range but thoroughly modern in design and conception and not requiring major changes to structure and engines like the Comet. Accordingly in January Prime Minister Wilson announced the intention to order Hawker Siddeley's maritime patrol version of the Trident as a replacement for Shackleton Mk 2. (4)

This left the TSR2. As a wholly British aircraft its cancellation and replacement with the TFX purchased from the USA would not damage Britain’s reputation with partner nations. However by April 1965 Britain had spent 150 million pounds on the TSR2 and for this effort had 3 flying development batch prototypes, 2 complete static test airframes undergoing testing, 6 more development batch aircraft awaiting engines which were under construction. In addition there were some 11 pre production aircraft at an average of 75% complete and their engines were also on the production line. In addition the cancellation costs wold amount to another 50 million pounds, money to be added to the cost of the programme. Much like Sandys with the Lightning in 1957, the Labour Government found that the TSR2 was ‘too far along to cancel’ so took out an option for 110 aircraft.(5)

In terms of Armoured the FV432 APC had entered production in 1963 and it’s Self Propelled Artillery variant the FV433 Abbott had just entered production almost trouble free. Similarly the first production batch of 40 Chieftain Mk1 was being delivered to training units. This vehicle had the strengthened production TN12 semi-automatic transmission and a 720hp and weighed 51 tons, which made it the slower than its contemporaries the German Leopard and French AMX30 but it was by far the most lethal and best protected. Israel became interested in the Chieftain and took delivery of a pair of tanks to undertake trials with a view to purchase and possibly licence build the design. The Wilson government was able to exercise their penchant for buying American with purchase of M109 and M110 self propelled artillery pieces. One victim of the cost cutting was Falcon Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun, a variant of the Abbot SPG with a a pair of Hispano-Suizia 30mm cannon in a two-man turret, which ostensibly lacked ammunition storage capacity but that was a convenient excuse for it’s cancellation.

Wilson would have to look elsewhere for savings.

1. IOTL the Labour Government canceled the P1154-RAF after some 25 million pounds had been spent and ordered 120 F4M for the RAF
2. IOTL the British developed the HS.681 STOL transport which was canceled after some 21 million pounds had been spent.
3. IOTL Avro division of HSA proposed an enlarged Trident with as yet undeveloped RB.178 engines of 16,300lbs thrust.
4. IOTL the Govt preferred Avro’s Trident variant but it required considerable structural modification like the Nimrod but a new engine to be developed, unlike the Nimrod’s Spey.
5. IOTL the TSR2 was canceled in April 1965 and an option taken out on 110 F111s form the USA

 

[Riain]

An opportunity for savings arose at the start of 1965 with the grounding of the Valiant fleet due to structural fatigue, both the bombers assigned to SACEUR and the tankers. Despite fatigue mitigation being done on Hastings of similar vintage and the planing to keep Valiant in the SACEUR role until 1967 it was decided to retire the Valiant fleet rather than undertake work to keep it in service. Here was perhaps an opportunity to utilise the BOAC VC10s that were to be dumped on the RAF in the next couple of years, to replace in the long term converted V bomber in-flight refueling tankers with efficient airliners, and the VC10 in particular with its hot and high performance so derided by BOAC would make a very good tanker.(1) Meanwhile, just as winning the MP contract and healthy civil sales vindicated De Havilands decision to resist BEA pressure to shrink the DN.121 so too was BACs decision not to bow to BOAC pressure and keep the Super 200s full 28’ stretch looking like the right decision. In 1965 the VC10 Super 200 entered service with the largest seating capacity of any Transatlantic airliner in the world, a fact that soon lead to a stead stream of orders coming in.(2)

Having to purchase the Belfast, C160 and TSR2 Wilson now had the majority of pieces in place for the cheaper Island Base Strategy, the only pieces lacking were the long range fighters and the means to control them. Looking to foster more cooperation with Europe Wilson signed the RAF up for two projects; an advanced trainer against a requirement for 200 aircraft and a variable geometry fighter to replace the Lightning against a requirement for 300 aircraft(3) in June. Harking back to the RAF Vanguard flight where Neptunes were used to trial AEW techniques the RAF was ordered to convert surplus Shackleton MR aircraft into AEW by fitting them with APS20 sourced from RN Gannet AEW3s.(4) With this Anglo-French Variable Geometry Aircraft and AEW Shackleton in RAF service in 1975 the carriers would no longer be required East of Suez and would be surplus to requirements.

The incoming Labour Government’s policy on South Africa’s racist regime was to abide by the 1963 UN resolution for a voluntary arms embargo. South Africa was seeking to purchase another batch of Buccaneers and Lightnings along with Bloodhound Mk2 SAGW, however this was rebuffed and the Lightnings (5) and Buccaneers being delivered during the year would be the only ones South Africa would receive.

The fighting in Aden has escalated to a point where multiple Lightning fighter-bomber squadrons were deployed to RAF Khormaksar to undertake gun, rocket and bombing attacks on the rebels in support of Army operations.(6) While in order to deter the Indonesians from making more conventional attacks on the Malayan peninsula Victor and Vulcan bombers were deployed to Butterworth, Darwin and Gan on a rotating basis. These aircraft, at times making low level sorties over the Indonesian side of the north Borneo border at night, exercised a powerful deterrent effect on the Indonesians, representing as they did the nuclear capability held by Britain.

1. IOTL BOAC didn’t start retiring VC10s until 1974, studies to convert them into tankers began in 1977 and the RAF started buying ex-commercial VC10s then
2. IOTL the Super VC10 was profitable, possibly due to its popularity with customers but apart from BOAC’s 17 only 5 Super combis were sold to East African Airways.
3. IOTL the RAF directly received 140 Phantoms and 165 Jaguars between 1968-77.
4. IOTL Shackletons were not fitted with ex RN APS20s until 1972
5. IOTL South Africa did not purchase Lightning, and was not allowed to buy a 2nd batch of Buccaneer or Bloodhounds or even replace a single Buccaneer that crashed on its delivery flight.
6. IOTL these were Hunter FGA and FR sqns

 

[MickCz]

Despite being canceled the previous year the Saunders Roe hybrid fighter SR.177 was not dead. At the time of cancellation the design of the main component jigs was 70 per cent complete while the component assembly jigs were almost 50 per cent complete; the manufacture of a quantity production batch was nearing. Japan, which was interested in developing a rocket-jet fighter itself, approached Britain with a request for quotations for the purchase of the two prototype SR.53s along with the completion of two SR.177s. Britain had learned their lesson from West Germany’s withdrawal from the SR.177 project, partly due to a desire for a Government to Government agreement took a strong interest in enabling this deal to occur.(1) Saunders Roe was not in a position to actually build the SR.177 themselves and planned to subcontract out the work to other firms. When approached by the Government Saunders Roe leapt at the chance to recoup some of their investment and retain an interest in a fighter programme without disrupting their current production programme. In the event the Government to Government agreement was as extensive as it was possible for Saunders Roe to make. They sold both SR.53 prototypes, completed 2 SR.177 pre production aircraft and sold those, all the design work done on the SR.187 proposal for the F.155, spare Gyron junior and jets, spare Spectre rocket engines, as well as all the production equipment that had been designed and built.(2) Control of future developments was passed to the Japanese government with Saunders Roe receiving a royalty payment on any production that resulted from Saunders Roe’s work.
View attachment 610212
With the loss of West German government support of the SR.177 due to changing requirements from an interceptor to a high-altitude reconnaissance machine, a tactical fighter-bomber, and an all-weather fighter moved it firmly into the wheelhouse of where the EE P1B development was heading. Work was proceeding apace to develop air to ground options for the replaceable pack, increasing range with a large fixed belly tank and the scorpion rocket engine was deleted to save space for fuel, especially given the spectacular climb of the Lightning. The British Government vigorously promoted the P1B to the German Government,(3) boosted by the fact that unlike the SR.177 mere months before the P1B was actually flying in prototype and pre-production forms.The Germans remained interested in the P1B throughout 1958 and into 1959.

1. ITOL the British Government provided little to no support to this request.
2. IOTL no sale to the Japanese occurred
3. IOTL it was later discovered that the British Government representative advised the Germans to NOT buy the Lightning.

Great timeline!
I am interested in your source for Note 3. I remember reading that the UK government dissuaded West Germany from buying the Lightning, but have never found an original source for this. Can you tell us your source?

 

[Riain]

Great timeline!
I am interested in your source for Note 3. I remember reading that the UK government dissuaded West Germany from buying the Lightning, but have never found an original source for this. Can you tell us your source?

No original source, just Thunder and Lightnings.

 

[Riain]

After conducting a Defence review throughout 1965 Minister for Defence Healey tabled a Defence White Paper in Parliament in February. It did not seek to change policy, indeed the Labour Government had pledged to retain Britain’s world role and this was popular within the British electorate, instead it sought to undertake these commitments more efficiently. In order to reduce overseas expenditure and overstretch, decisions were also taken to reduce the UK’s global footprint and concentrate the deployment of the military more in Europe. That included reductions in British forces deployed in Germany, Cyprus and Malta, withdrawal from Aden, and a timeline of withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia and the Persian Gulf ending in 1975. The review also included a commitment to “not undertake major operations of war except in co-operation with allies” although this was left vague as Britain had a lot of allies. The reduction in forces overseas and the reorganisation and reduction of the Territorial Army by almost half subsequently led to reductions in manpower requirements.

With 1975 set as the date for withdrawal East of Suez there was no requirement for the Royal Navy to receive new aircraft carriers so the CVA01 project was canceled. Several mitigations against this cancellation were made, most notably the HMS Ark Royal would be refitted to accept the Phantom aircraft and serve until 1975 alongside the recently rebuilt Eagle. The Victorious and Hermes would serve as carriers until the end of the Sea Vixen life in about 1972 and once the Eagle and Ark Royal retired the RN Phantom force would be available as long range fighters for the Island Base Strategy, thus the RN’s success would also spell it’s doom. Given the length of this draw-down the Government ordered 63 WE.177A for the RN, some 20 for surface strike and the remainder as depth charges.(1)

In order to command the RN’s NATO task forces and what distant stations remained in the future the ‘Escort Cruiser’ concept of the early 60s was resurrected. This would be trialed in the short term by the cruisers Blake and Tiger the former already in refit for conversion to carry 4 large ASW helicopters with the latter to be laid up in reserve at the end of the year pending similar conversion. The resurrection of the Escort Cruiser, which as early as 1961 was to have a full-length flight deck with provision for 9 large ASW helicopters coincided with the completion of the Tripartite Kestrel trial in November 1965 and subsequent order for 60 production aircraft.(2) This gave rise to speculation, with no firm plans, that the Royal Navy could continue fixed wing aviation after 1975 by using the P1127 from the Escort Cruiser’s full-length fight deck. This thinking quickly spread to other RN ships including the Commando carriers Albion and Bulwark and possibly the Hermes once the Sea Vixen left service. It seemed as if the P1127 mania was the future of the RN despite no plans being made, however this suited the Government as such speculation diverted attention away from the serious reduction in capability the Royal Navy was about to embark upon.

1. IOTL the Government reduced this order to 43
2. IOTL 6 pre-production P1127 were ordered in Nov 65 followed with an order for 60 production aircraft in 1967.

 

[Riain]

As Sandys discovered from 1957 tabling a major policy in Parliament does not lead to immediate effects. Production of 30 Belfasts(1) began as did 56 C160s(2), by the end of the year all RN FAA squadrons had transitioned to the S.2 Buccaneer, Lightning production for the RAF was winding up with the last Javelins leaving service(3). The Mk2 Bloodhound SAGW had entered service with six squadrons, all 8 County class DLG were in comission, as was the HMS Dreadnought nuclear attack submarine, her follow-on HMS Valiant and the first of four Resolution class Polaris missile submarines from mid year(4). Valiant’s sister boat Warspite and 2 more Resolution class boats were launched and expected in to commission in 1967.

The TSR2 project was experiencing more delays but it was becoming apparent that the American F111 project was running into technical trouble and also increasing in cost. The Anglo-French projects for the fighter and trainer were working out the details, with the RAF wanting a supersonic trainer able to undertake the emerging ‘lead in fighter’ role while France wanted a simpler aircraft. The AFVG specification was finalised with the RAF wanting a multi-role fighter capable of beating fighters in air to air combat and undertaking CAPs at 1,000 mile range.(5) This coincided to an extent with the current French thinking which had lead to the development of the TF30 powered Mirage F2/F3. A study was undertaken to arm the AFVG to maximise the work done with the new into service Red Top AAMs, the dual paths were for Red Top itself be be expanded into a longer range missile with semi-active radar homing(6) while it’s advanced seeker technology incorporated into a smaller ‘dogfight’ missile.(7)

1966 saw further export customers emerge for the Lightning. In 1965 Egyptian aircraft began undertaking incursion into Saudi Arabian airspace leading the Saudi Government to urgently require a means to counter this. In March 1966 the British government quickly made an offer to the Saudis for 12 Lightnings from RAF stocks comprising 4 x F2, 2 x T4 and 6 x FG2(8) as well as a pair of radars and Thunderbird Mk2 SAGW from Army stocks for immediate delivery, known as Operation Magic Carpet. The deal also consisted of 40 new build Lightnings and 25 BAC Strikemaster lighter attack-trainer aircraft and a comprehensive maintenance contract with British company Air Services. The ex RAF Lightnings were delivered in June and upon going into action immediately stopped the Egyptian incursions near the Saudi-Yemeni border. On the strength of this quick delivery and impressive performance Kuwait made it’s own order for 14 new build Lightnings in December 1966. Beyond this the prospects for more new build Lightning exports looked slim, partly because of Britain herself by being the first export customer for the Phantom. By the mid 60s Mach 2 was the standard performance marker for fighter aircraft and there was a lot of competition on world markets, and the Lightning’s unique characteristics meant it was not competitive in most cases. Customers wanting a short-range fighter at lower cost could buy the French Mirage III or Soviet Mig21 which countries did in huge numbers but those which more money to spend on a big twin-engine fighter tended to opt for the more capable US Phantom now that it was available for export.

In March another one of the unexpected events that had a way of popping up to make a call on Britian’s resources reared it’s head. The United Nations Security Council reacted by passing Resolution 217, calling for sanctions on Rhodesia after Rhodesia's government unilaterally declared the former colony's independence on 11 November 1965. Britain imposed its own national sanctions, including an embargo on oil but by the first week of February 1966, it became clear that Rhodesia continued to import oil by land from Portuguese Mozambique. On 1 March, the Royal Navy established the Beira Patrol with HMS Ark Royal sailing from Mombasa with escort forces HMS Rhyl, HMS Lowestoft and later HMS Plymouth. began search operations in the Mozambique Channel. On 28 Feb 1966 HMS Eagle had sailed from Singapore on passage to Beira and remained on station until 10 May 1966 In 71 days Eagle flew 1,070 sorties, flying 600,000 miles, surveying 200,000 square miles daily, steaming a total of 30,000 miles. From then on two British frigates or destroyers, with the support of land and carrier-based surveillance aircraft and auxiliary vessels, were committed to the patrol. Various British warships cruised the Mozambique Channel 20–45 miles (32–72 km) from Beira and checking on oil tankers heading for the port.

Having commitment to 2 conflicts as well as the seaborne embargo did not last long, as a new leader had emerged in Indonesia, General Suharto. While cross border Claret operations were conducted in 1965 and 1966 the Malaysian and Indonesian Governments declared the conflict over in May and a peace treaty was signed between the parties in August, allowing a welcome reduction in British efforts in the region.

1. IOTL 10 Belfasts were ordered, 30 was the profitability mark for Shorts.
2. IOTL 56 Argosys were ordered from 1961, 56 HS.681 were planned before cancellation and 66 C130K were ordered in 1965.
3. IOTL the Javelin lasted until late 1967 with the Far East Air Force, retired without replacement
4. IOTL the 1965 AFVG concept was for a fighter to replace the Lightning however with the 66 WP it changed to a strike aircraft to supplement the 50 planned F111K, the 66 spec was for this type.
5. IOTL SARH Blue Jay MkV was cancelled in 1958
6. IOTL in 1968 Hawker Siddeley began a private venture for an IR homing dogfight missile called Taildog.
7. IOTL the Saudis ordered 6 Lightnings and 6 Hunter FGA for 1966 delivery

 

[Deleted member 94680]

IOTL the 1965 AFVG concept was for a fighter to replace the Lightning however with the 66 WP it changed to a strike aircraft to supplement the 50 planned F111K, the 66 spec was for this type.

So will we see a TSR2 strike aircraft and the variable geometry AFVG stay as a fighter?

Just want to see who’ll become the mud-moving heroes and who’ll be the Air Display Variant wastes of space...

 

[Riain]

So will we see a TSR2 strike aircraft and the variable geometry AFVG stay as a fighter?

Just want to see who’ll become the mud-moving heroes and who’ll be the Air Display Variant wastes of space...

Yes on both counts. With the adoption of the Lightning as a ground attack aircraft instead of the Hunter conversions means no requirement to replace the Hunter with the P1154 in 1961 when Sandy's dogma was dropped. No P1154 means no Phantom for the RAF, no Phantom for the RAF means nothing is available in the mid 60s to replace the Lightning. Also no P1154 means no HS.681 to support it.

With the TSR2 too far to cancel means no F111K, no F111K means the AFVG doesn't morph into a strike aircraft, no morphing in a strike aircraft means no French withdrawal in mid 67. With the TSR2 going into production means no requirement to move RN Buccaneers into the RAF and buy new builds for the RAF, no need to keep Vulcans around for tactical strike until the 80s, no need to morph the Jaguar from an advanced trainer into a sophisticated CAS/interdiction aircraft and no need to develop the Tornado as a strike aircraft.

BUT there is a crucial need for a fighter-bomber to replace the Lightning by 1975, dragging it out until 1980 isn't acceptable.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

1. IOTL 10 Belfasts were ordered, 30 was the profitability mark for Shorts.

IOTL there was ASR.364 for a strategic transport aircraft to replace the Britannia. Shorts proposed a Belfast/Starlifter hybrid, that is the Starlifter wings and tail fitted to the Belfast fuselage and RB.178 engines. However, some of the documents that I sent to you show that the RAF wanted to buy Lockheed Galaxies.

Do the 20 extra Belfasts replace the Britannias in Nos. 99 and 511 Squadrons? That is as a stopgap until ASR.364 is ready. I don't see another way of fitting them into the RAF's order of battle.

 

[Lascaris]

1. IOTL the 1965 AFVG concept was for a fighter to replace the Lightning however with the 66 WP it changed to a strike aircraft to supplement the 50 planned F111K, the 66 spec was for this type.

So how does AFVG fit as a joint British-French program here? Dassault ACF in effect for the French? Either way if it's supposed to see the light of day I'd suggest the original workshare is used with Dassault leading the airframe development and Bristol or RR leading the engine development.

 

[Riain]

IOTL there was ASR.364 for a strategic transport aircraft to replace the Britannia. Shorts proposed a Belfast/Starlifter hybrid, that is the Starlifter wings and tail fitted to the Belfast fuselage and RB.178 engines. However, some of the documents that I sent to you show that the RAF wanted to buy Lockheed Galaxies.

Do the 20 extra Belfasts replace the Britannias in Nos. 99 and 511 Squadrons? That is as a stopgap until ASR.364 is ready. I don't see another way of fitting them into the RAF's order of battle.

From what I've read the Belfast wasn't loved by the RAF, it was slow and it's lack of engine power meant it couldn't fly over some mountains so had to fly longer routes. It was the only aircraft in the RAF with Tynes and by the time it entered service the EoS role was on a countdown, the Thor had left service and Blue Streak long cancelled so it was redundant.

ITTL the Britannias have been flogged more to compensate for the lack of Argosys and by 1966 there is a desperate need for tactical transports so the first Belfasts will spend their time doing more or less medium haul stuff around the NATO periphery until enough C160s are built. The Britannia fleet will be more worn out ITTL and will need replacing sooner and the 20 extra 'charity case' production Belfast will be there to step in.

The devaluation of the pound will put paid to any fancy-pants thoughts of C141 wings and jets or C5 Galaxy purchases when there are Belfasts in service. That said the Belfast used a 5,600hp Tyne whereas the C160 used a 6,100hp version and there was a proposal to fit the Belfasts with bigger 19' props, so an engine/prop standardisation programme could give the Belfast a boost.

 

[Riain]

So how does AFVG fit as a joint British-French program here? Dassault ACF in effect for the French? Either way if it's supposed to see the light of day I'd suggest the original workshare is used with Dassault leading the airframe development and Bristol or RR leading the engine development.

IOTL the French flirted with the big Mirages F2/3, G, G4 and G8 from about 1964 to 1968 and the AFVG from 1965 to mid 1967 but they also supported the development of the small F1from 1964 as a stopgap until the AFVG came into service. They cancelled the AFVG and ordered the Mirage F1 at about the same time and the Mirage G programme was canceled not long after although it remained as a research project.

IOTL the French navy wanted to replace the Crusader almost as soon as it entered service in 1965 and the original Etendard entered service in about 1961 soalso needed replacement in the 70s . IIUC they retained an interest in the AFVG until it's cancellation, then switched this interest to the Jaguar which by 1968 was morphing from an advanced trainer into a light strike aircraft. They developed this into a carrier aircraft but it disappointed on trials and was replaced by the Super Etendard project.

British behaviour will influence French behaviour, but the French will still be French and I haven't worked out what to do about this yet.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The devaluation of the pound will put paid to any fancy-pants thoughts of C141 wings and jets or C5 Galaxy purchases when there are Belfasts in service. That said the Belfast used a 5,600hp Tyne whereas the C160 used a 6,100hp version and there was a proposal to fit the Belfasts with bigger 19' props, so an engine/prop standardisation programme could give the Belfast a boost.

The entry on the Tyne in Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1965-66 says that development up to 7,630ehp were projected. Do you think that the Belfast could have used them?