Stalin listens to warning of Barbarrossa in 1941

The pilots will be attacked in the air and they are highly inefficent. It took until 1942-43 for the Soviet Air Force to do well and that was with a good amount of their pilots still active and not shot down

Yes but in this version the axis have less oil which = less axis performance and less axis production = greater axis losses and fewer soviet losses = higher soviet performance and higher soviet production = less soviet pilots lost and more personal experience for each pilot and the whole system itself.
 
No

The question is what can Stalin do if he believes the intelligence.

He can start by shooting down enemy recon planes, but that does not mean, he must also launch a pre-emptive invasion.

Stalin did all he could with intelligence, up to and including having the actual dates of the invasion; he also did, in fact, have shoot downs of Luftwaffe plans. As has been repeatedly pointed with Glantz among others, Stalin did everything he could with the only other alternative being to conduct a pre-emptive invasion. No other choice existed or was feasible.
 
Yes we are on the same page on this

Here is something I have though about over the years, which is not exactly what this thread is about, and perhaps you who sees my point will be able to give your opinion

Here is the hypothetical scenario.

Lets say in a hypothetical scenario where the USSR initially performs much better, so much better that the axis only reach a few 100kms in or even are held at the border, initially.

In the original timeline the axis were greeted as saviors, some of the people were happy to be freed from the communist system and Stalin. The peoples happiness changed rapidly once it became clear that they were to be enslaved and exterminated. And when faced with such a fate the people rallied around the system.

Now what if the axis are initially driven back or just penetrate 100km in.

Would such a scenario perform worse because perhaps the axis then cool down the extermination policy and waits with that until after the war.

What if the USSR performs very well the first few months and the battle swings back and forth 100s of km, bu then the Soviets are pushed back more and more, but because the axis do not have their enslavement extermination openly shown to the people, the people do not mind the axis that much.

Could an initial good performance from the Soviets actually back fire in the long run.

This is something I have thought about, what is your opinion?

In theory although I think the Nazis were too wedded to extermination to wait long.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes but in this version the axis have less oil which = less axis performance and less axis production = greater axis losses and fewer soviet losses = higher soviet performance and higher soviet production = less soviet pilots lost and more personal experience for each pilot and the whole system itself.
All aviation fuel was made from synthetic fuels not Romanian oil because of the base octane rating of the refined petroleum products:

Only the US had the right type of natural oil and refining process to get that necessary base octane rating before additives were introduced to raise the rating up to the necessary levels.

So taking out Romanian oil, even if presumably achievable, which is extremely doubtful given the inability of the Soviets even to deal with Finland in 1940, wouldn't have impacted the Luftwaffe fuel production at all.
 
Basically, last minute evacuation of most airfield = Luftwaffe punches in the void and has a more difficult life thenceon. A second Red Army echelon, reasonably armed and on alert, awaits for the Germans after the border battles = heavier losses in July and Vitebsk-Smolensk will be MUCH harder. Pskov also probably holds a couple weeks more, if not a line on the Dvina. In the Unkraine likely nothing changes, maybe a bit more preparation in the Stalin line forts and some reserves more.
 
All aviation fuel was made from synthetic fuels not Romanian oil because of the base octane rating of the refined petroleum products:

Only the US had the right type of natural oil and refining process to get that necessary base octane rating before additives were introduced to raise the rating up to the necessary levels.

So taking out Romanian oil, even if presumably achievable, which is extremely doubtful given the inability of the Soviets even to deal with Finland in 1940, wouldn't have impacted the Luftwaffe fuel production at all.

Yeah you still can not read what is written.

Without the Romanian oil, less armaments can be produced because the whole industry is suffering

Fewer weapons means less damage that can be done on the ground, in the air and at sea

Less damage that can be done means the Soviets suffer less
 
Stalin did all he could with intelligence, up to and including having the actual dates of the invasion; he also did, in fact, have shoot downs of Luftwaffe plans. As has been repeatedly pointed with Glantz among others, Stalin did everything he could with the only other alternative being to conduct a pre-emptive invasion. No other choice existed or was feasible.

This thread is what can Stalin do from may 30th if he believes the intelligence.

And no he did not shoot down all the planes.

Go back and look at the list I wrote and there are suggestions of what can be done that was not done.
 
This thread is what can Stalin do from may 30th if he believes the intelligence.

And no he did not shoot down all the planes.

Go back and look at the list I wrote and there are suggestions of what can be done that was not done.

As has been repeatedly out by Wiking and others, your suggestions have no basis in documented reality and can thus be dismissed. If Stalin had totally ignored his intelligence, the mobilization wouldn't have been ordered in April, nearly two months before your proposed PoD. There was literally nothing else the Soviets could do, short of committing to Zhukov's proposed pre-emptive action, and that would've been an absolute disaster.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yeah you still can not read what is written.
I'm not engaging with nonsense.

Without the Romanian oil, less armaments can be produced because the whole industry is suffering
Really? How so? German industry was based on domestic coal production, not Romanian oil.

Fewer weapons means less damage that can be done on the ground, in the air and at sea
Were that the case then sure, but you haven't established than Romanian oil would actually do that.

Less damage that can be done means the Soviets suffer less
Sure, we see that from the transfer of equipment off of the Ostheer from 1942 on. But again you haven't established that it was Romanian oil that would actually do that. Or that the Soviets even could 100% shut down Romanian production when the best bombing efforts of the WAllies took until 1944 to achieve any results.
 
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Deleted member 1487

As has been repeatedly out by Wiking and others, your suggestions have no basis in documented reality and can thus be dismissed. If Stalin had totally ignored his intelligence, the mobilization wouldn't have been ordered in April, nearly two months before your proposed PoD. There was literally nothing else the Soviets could do, short of committing to Zhukov's proposed pre-emptive action, and that would've been an absolute disaster.
Zhukov's proposed offensive was impossible before the German invasion. May 15th was WAY too late to even begin to organize an offensive given how the Soviets couldn't even mobilize for a defensive war by June 22nd.

Basically, last minute evacuation of most airfield = Luftwaffe punches in the void and has a more difficult life thenceon. A second Red Army echelon, reasonably armed and on alert, awaits for the Germans after the border battles = heavier losses in July and Vitebsk-Smolensk will be MUCH harder. Pskov also probably holds a couple weeks more, if not a line on the Dvina. In the Unkraine likely nothing changes, maybe a bit more preparation in the Stalin line forts and some reserves more.
And those late minute evacuations would render all those aircraft inoperable, because there was no setup dispersion airfields that could maintain, supply, or direct them to combat. They'd have to use what few radios they would have to stay in contact and in doing so reveal themselves. So they'd still either be bombed or overrun on the ground.

Not that that really mattered given the low operational rates of Soviet aircraft and how old and obsolete they were. The Soviets were desperately trying to modernize their aircraft park, which was not going well. As it was over half of aircraft losses in 1941, even including the 2000 lost in the first day (or week I get conflicting claims on that) were not even lost in combat, they either fell out of the sky, crashed upon take off or landing, or were on the books but actually inoperable.

You don't even have to take me at my word on ANY of this. Just check out David Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus" and Von Hardesty's (head of the Smithsonian's aircraft collection) "Red Phoenix Rising". Basically dispersal of aircraft is a wash or a worse hindrance to the VVS. Plus remember of the 21,000 aircraft lost by the Soviets in 1941, less than 10% were lost on the first day/week, which were mostly obsolete models anyway and the pilots survived to fight another day. People make WAY too big of a deal about those early losses, which really didn't put much of a dent into Soviet aircraft numbers and in fact let pilots who otherwise would have died fighting in obsolete aircraft (assuming they could even get aloft from their dispersal fields) instead IOTL died fighting in more modern aircraft later in the campaign after Axis forces had been sucked into fighting deeper in the USSR.

So your TL laid out above really isn't based on any facts, it's wishful thinking. Again this isn't about Germany being uber-stronk or whatever, its about the completely messed up state of the Soviet military in 1941 due to decisions made prior to any warnings that the Axis were going to invade.

Certainly there were much better things the Soviets could have done in hindsight had they seriously prepared in 1940 for it, but that would be ASB, because it requires modern hindsight and is not compatible with the theories of the day or the personalities in charge of the USSR and it's military.
 
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marathag

Banned
BTW is the recoil on that as bad as they say?
Most high power rounds are like that. After 20 thru an M1903, if feel that's enough: same for K98s
The SMLE is an exception, i can fire more of those before the shoulder says 'that's enough for now'
 

marathag

Banned
Would such a scenario perform worse because perhaps the axis then cool down the extermination policy and waits with that until after the war.
When the Nazis had the choice of using rail to move ammunition and troops, or move Jews to the Ovens, they picked the latter.

It's baked in to being a Nazi. Untermensch must be eliminated.
 
Sounds like Krivosheev's 500k, as they were captured while still mobilizing, which would indicate they were likely largely without official uniforms or weapons since they were still en route to their units and the Soviets couldn't even provide pre-invasion mobilized units with all the rifles and uniforms they needed.

I think we can both agree that the initial period of war was very chaotic on the Soviet side, where accurate reporting was near to impossible.
And that a significant number of soldiers were enlisted, but the record of that event was lost in the chaos.

So I believe a lot of those 500k (or whatever the true number is) were armed and deployed, and not only idling around near a mobilization centre.

BTW where do you stand on the book "The Price of Victory"? That book has David Glantz's support in it's criticisms of Krivosheev's numbers, since he wrote the forward and has published at least one of the authors in his journal.

I read it when it was published a few years ago.
It raises a number of problems with Krivosheev et al, but I havent gotten around to re-read it yet, so I'm not in a position to say anything beyond that it was an interesting viewpoint.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think we can both agree that the initial period of war was very chaotic on the Soviet side, where accurate reporting was near to impossible.
Yes.
And that a significant number of soldiers were enlisted, but the record of that event was lost in the chaos.
No. I don't think the records really existed for most in the chaos of the situation; people were inducted and sent on their way or might have even been overrun on their way to their units so they were never even counted, but were reservists trying to make it to their mobilization points. There is likely a lot going on, including people just showing up and wanting to fight, who got swept up in pockets or overrun before even getting issued arms.

So I believe a lot of those 500k (or whatever the true number is) were armed and deployed, and not only idling around near a mobilization centre.
Based on what though? Genuinely curious.

I read it when it was published a few years ago.
It raises a number of problems with Krivosheev et al, but I havent gotten around to re-read it yet, so I'm not in a position to say anything beyond that it was an interesting viewpoint.
I'd be curious to know what you think when you get a chance to look through it.
 
I'm not engaging with nonsense.


Really? How so? German industry was based on domestic coal production, not Romanian oil.


Were that the case then sure, but you haven't established than Romanian oil would actually do that.


Sure, we see that from the transfer of equipment off of the Ostheer from 1942 on. But again you haven't established that it was Romanian oil that would actually do that. Or that the Soviets even could 100% shut down Romanian production when the best bombing efforts of the WAllies took until 1944 to achieve any results.

The only nonsense comes from you, when you talk about things that were never written.

Oil is needed for industry overall, oil is used in many different products and for transportation, if transportation slows down so does industry

Each and every drop of less oil means less production and less military performans, this is 100% obvious. Your whole statement is ironic since you not only fabricate words that were never written then respond to your own fabrications you also can not understand basic logic.
 
When the Nazis had the choice of using rail to move ammunition and troops, or move Jews to the Ovens, they picked the latter.

It's baked in to being a Nazi. Untermensch must be eliminated.

This is not exactly the case.

The concentration camps produced profit for the nazis, the holocaust was not free but it did run a profit for the nazis.

The nazis did co-operate with local Ukrainians and others during the war, and later when the war was not going well the nazis even wrote that volunteers have to be real volunteers so there was a capacity to adapt to the actual situation.

So in a scenario where the axis are initially stuck or even forced back a bit and are unable to penetrate as deep as the OTL, in such a scenario if the axis treat the local population better then perhaps that would change the whole outcome of the war even though the axis were initially held or even pushed back
 

Deleted member 1487

The only nonsense comes from you, when you talk about things that were never written.
When you write about ASB scenarios in a non-ASB forum it's kind of hard to engage with from a historical record based position

Oil is needed for industry overall, oil is used in many different products and for transportation, if transportation slows down so does industry
Again, can you show where Romanian oil was used in the German economy?

Each and every drop of less oil means less production and less military performans, this is 100% obvious.
Not all oil is used for the same things and historically Germany never had an oil deficit before the bombings of 1944, so while the loss of Romanian oil, assuming that was even possible to the degree you think, wouldn't be nearly as crippling as you think, especially given that production was mostly based on coal output rather than natural oil and transportation internally was nearly exclusively based on trains and coal. If push came to shove in terms of powering motor vehicles there is always this option:
Wood can be used to power cars with ordinary internal combustion engines if a wood gasifier is attached. This was quite popular during World War II in several European, African and Asian countries, because the war prevented easy and cost-effective access to oil.

Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-V00670%2C_Berlin%2C_Pkw_mit_Holzgasantrieb.jpg

A wood-gas powered car, Berlin, 1946. Note the secondary radiator, required to cool the gas before it is introduced into the engine
 
This is not exactly the case.

The concentration camps produced profit for the nazis, the holocaust was not free but it did run a profit for the nazis.

The nazis did co-operate with local Ukrainians and others during the war, and later when the war was not going well the nazis even wrote that volunteers have to be real volunteers so there was a capacity to adapt to the actual situation.

So in a scenario where the axis are initially stuck or even forced back a bit and are unable to penetrate as deep as the OTL, in such a scenario if the axis treat the local population better then perhaps that would change the whole outcome of the war even though the axis were initially held or even pushed back
There were several SS and Wehrmacht units composed of "volunteers" from occupied territories like the USSR, Balkans, Baltics, etc.
Most of them fought poorly, especially if they were in the Western Front. Many simply surrendered to the Allies in hopes of better treatment, which they did get for a time before they were deported back to the USSR at the end of the war as part of OP Keelhaul.
Desertions were common, especially after Stalingrad.
There were several mutinies in different units as well, that had to be put down with difficulty.
Overall, foreign units in the Wehrmacht and SS were a failure, with a few exceptions like the Cossacks, Kalmyks, and the Baltic legions.

ITTL ain't going to be much different.
 
When you write about ASB scenarios in a non-ASB forum it's kind of hard to engage with from a historical record based position


Again, can you show where Romanian oil was used in the German economy?


Not all oil is used for the same things and historically Germany never had an oil deficit before the bombings of 1944, so while the loss of Romanian oil, assuming that was even possible to the degree you think, wouldn't be nearly as crippling as you think, especially given that production was mostly based on coal output rather than natural oil and transportation internally was nearly exclusively based on trains and coal. If push came to shove in terms of powering motor vehicles there is always this option:


Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-V00670%2C_Berlin%2C_Pkw_mit_Holzgasantrieb.jpg
I recall seeing images of woodgas powered Tiger I tanks used for training.
Tank Encyclopedia, I believe.
 
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