As has been repeatedly out by Wiking and others, your suggestions have no basis in documented reality and can thus be dismissed. If Stalin had totally ignored his intelligence, the mobilization wouldn't have been ordered in April, nearly two months before your proposed PoD. There was literally nothing else the Soviets could do, short of committing to Zhukov's proposed pre-emptive action, and that would've been an absolute disaster.
Zhukov's proposed offensive was impossible before the German invasion. May 15th was WAY too late to even begin to organize an offensive given how the Soviets couldn't even mobilize for a defensive war by June 22nd.
Basically, last minute evacuation of most airfield = Luftwaffe punches in the void and has a more difficult life thenceon. A second Red Army echelon, reasonably armed and on alert, awaits for the Germans after the border battles = heavier losses in July and Vitebsk-Smolensk will be MUCH harder. Pskov also probably holds a couple weeks more, if not a line on the Dvina. In the Unkraine likely nothing changes, maybe a bit more preparation in the Stalin line forts and some reserves more.
And those late minute evacuations would render all those aircraft inoperable, because there was no setup dispersion airfields that could maintain, supply, or direct them to combat. They'd have to use what few radios they would have to stay in contact and in doing so reveal themselves. So they'd still either be bombed or overrun on the ground.
Not that that really mattered given the low operational rates of Soviet aircraft and how old and obsolete they were. The Soviets were desperately trying to modernize their aircraft park, which was not going well. As it was over half of aircraft losses in 1941, even including the 2000 lost in the first day (or week I get conflicting claims on that) were not even lost in combat, they either fell out of the sky, crashed upon take off or landing, or were on the books but actually inoperable.
You don't even have to take me at my word on ANY of this. Just check out David Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus" and Von Hardesty's (head of the Smithsonian's aircraft collection) "Red Phoenix Rising". Basically dispersal of aircraft is a wash or a worse hindrance to the VVS. Plus remember of the 21,000 aircraft lost by the Soviets in 1941, less than 10% were lost on the first day/week, which were mostly obsolete models anyway and the pilots survived to fight another day. People make WAY too big of a deal about those early losses, which really didn't put much of a dent into Soviet aircraft numbers and in fact let pilots who otherwise would have died fighting in obsolete aircraft (assuming they could even get aloft from their dispersal fields) instead IOTL died fighting in more modern aircraft later in the campaign after Axis forces had been sucked into fighting deeper in the USSR.
So your TL laid out above really isn't based on any facts, it's wishful thinking. Again this isn't about Germany being uber-stronk or whatever, its about the completely messed up state of the Soviet military in 1941 due to decisions made prior to any warnings that the Axis were going to invade.
Certainly there were much better things the Soviets could have done in hindsight had they seriously prepared in 1940 for it, but that would be ASB, because it requires modern hindsight and is not compatible with the theories of the day or the personalities in charge of the USSR and it's military.