It wasn't. The US had better supply, more electronics, air dominance (meaning both denying the enemy air observation, having all the observation they could want, and of course being able to air attack enemy artillery and prevent it's concentration and unhindered operation), strategic bombing of enemy factories and supply line (which thanks to the resulting German air defense allocations meant no radar for artillery and reduced access to radios and other gunnery aids as FLAK got priority), and fewer major enemies drawing off the vast majority of it's army units. Plus a much smaller percentage of production dedicated to air defense since there was a lack of air threat. If the shorthand for all of that is 'American artillery superiority' then fine, but to me artillery superiority is related to the direct technicals of the artillery arm rather than related areas like the supply and air situation.
The one (well two) advantage(s) the US had was ToT and VT fuses, the latter of which only showed up at the end of the Bulge.
In terms of technical details of the artillery, the German 105 40M outranged the US M2 105 and the 170mm outranged all the Allied guns for a weapon in that class and the US even used captured units in France as long as ammo held out. That inspired the post-war 175mm US gun. Same with the 88mm PAK43, which was also used as an artillery piece. And the 120mm mortar handily outperformed the 4.2 inch mortar, which led to the post-war upgrade for the 4.2 inch.
Sure, they had the high ground and were able to spot attacked building up.
I mean in terms of combined arms, everything has it's role. Artillery though can lag badly if it's towed in the offensives and by very late 1944 into 1945 Germany was not in a position to move it's stuff forward that quickly given the road situation in the Ardennes. Same thing happened in 1940 and they relied on the Luftwaffe, not a big factor during the Bulge.
I cannot speak to what you read, but I think by that point in the war the Germans were probably thinking of the French, British, and Soviets who outnumbered and outgunned German forces from 1940 on in just about all theaters they fought. Add in the Americans and it's over. From what I've seen the criticism of the American way of fighting is that it dragged out the war, because by being cautious it lets the enemy reform and then it becomes a pretty awful attrition battle like WW1, but with even heavier firepower. Patton didn't have that mentality and his prisoner hauls really showed how being bold to the point of recklessness when the enemy was on the ropes paid big dividends. Arguably he could have done even more had he not been logistically sabotaged by Eisenhower's rather flawed 'Broad Front' strategy and then supporting Monty's push in the north.
There is actually a good book on the subject:
The sequel is about the Soviets in 1944 and what they did differently. I don't fully agree with the author's take, but it's an interesting argument that does challenge a lot of orthodox views of war in 1944 in Europe.
Not really, they weren't doing more than getting like a 15% casualty ratio advantage, which while impressive at that point in the war given the overall situation, is still fatally low since the Germans were outnumbered at least 5:1 strategically when you add up Soviet+UK+US+minor allied forces. Anything sort of that 5:1 loss rate is losing in terms of attrition.
Since the Bulge was a losing idea to start with, it should never have been launched and if anything surrender should have been the choice once the Normandy breakout happened, as the entire idea of getting getting a separate peace for ensuring a 1 front war for a while as utterly dashed. But this is the Nazis we're talking aout.
Not sure how commit figures lead you to assume anything about casualties, especially when all the allocated units never actually deployed and some were later used for Nordwind instead. Those figures are for allocated, not actually committed units.