WI Saarland offensive continued

Hello y'all,

I haven't seen this pretty simple PoD discussed, but I find it quite interesting.
In 1939, during the invasion of Poland, the French invaded Saarland. They didn't seem to face serious resistance and had minimal losses with a big advance.

Then, as far as I gather, they kinda just got bored and went home? I don't quite understand.

So, WI this but not?
 

Deleted member 1487

It has been several times.
The French actually did face pretty strong resistance and found their invasion paths blocked by a heap of mines and supporting artillery, so they were slowed to a crawl to keep casualties down until they hit major defenses. They wanted to preserve their strength until they hit the West Wall, which they believed was quite a bit stronger than it was and thought they had more time with Poland than it turned out they did. Once the Soviets joined in the war it was clear that Poland was doomed even quicker than the already accelerated TL it was on (several months less than anticipated), so continuing the offensive wasn't going to achieve much. By late September German units even were transferring in from Poland, so things were going to get a lot more costly and bog down very quickly if they continued.
Not only that, but the French air force was not ready to support them while the Luftwaffe, much larger than the AdlA, was much more combat experienced and increasing in strength in the west.

Since France knew they were unprepared for a significant offensive they wisely broke off their attacks, as it was already too late to save Poland by September 15 with Soviet entry, two weeks into the war, and they only planned to be really ready to take the offensive in 1941.
 
Since France knew they were unprepared for a significant offensive they wisely broke off their attacks, as it was already too late to save Poland by September 15 with Soviet entry, two weeks into the war, and they only planned to be really ready to take the offensive in 1941
Surely they couldn't think the Germans would leave them alone to calmly prepare for a full 2 years? Without advancing further, couldn't they have entrenched themselves on the other side of the Rhine? Or was the plan to try again after the Germans also had 2 more years to prepare?
 

Deleted member 1487

Surely they couldn't think the Germans would leave them alone to calmly prepare for a full 2 years? Without advancing further, couldn't they have entrenched themselves on the other side of the Rhine? Or was the plan to try again after the Germans also had 2 more years to prepare?
Nope, which is even more reason to cut off the offensive and preserve their shallow manpower pool, because they knew they'd be fighting in summer 1940 defensively, hopefully breaking the German manpower pool enough to then go on the offensive with the British in 1941 once they both mobilized fully and had their supply lines from the US fully set up. That and their blockade strategy to strangle Germany to weaken them before trying to attack. Of course they hadn't anticipated the Soviet-German commercial agreement and the victory in Norway that secured their supply lines, but there the British got involved to try and strangle German supplies of iron ore from Sweden over winter to make sure they were weakened before the summer battles.

The problem with holding where they stopped in 1939 was that they were ahead of the Maginot Line and didn't want to waste lives trying to hold an unfortified line.
 
This sounds like an own goal by the French until you find out that:

1) The Germans had two competently led armies in fortifications prepared to meet the French.
2) The French hadn't completed mobilizing
3) Everyone thought the Poles would hold out longer and the French mobilization plans depended on their holding out longer

The Germans had air superiority and could have started to move units from the Polish campaign to the West Wall if they needed to, so the French offensive would likely have gotten nowhere fast and probably lowered French morale, which was bad enough as it was.
 

marathag

Banned
Still better to restart WWI Tactics that they expected for this War, and to do it on German soil, rather than French

They were Timid.
Ofensiva_del_Saar2.jpg

Advancing to the River Saar and entrenching should have been the minimum goal.
That give buffer area to allow the moving up of the French Very Heavy Artillery, and start shelling German cities.
 
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Hello y'all,

I haven't seen this pretty simple PoD discussed, but I find it quite interesting.
In 1939, during the invasion of Poland, the French invaded Saarland. They didn't seem to face serious resistance and had minimal losses with a big advance.

Then, as far as I gather, they kinda just got bored and went home? I don't quite understand.

So, WI this but not?

The problem is that you have a couple of facts wrong. The French faced a reasonably strong resistance, which was however only meant to be a delaying action to slow them down even before they reached the German MLR (the Siegfried Line); and their advance was anything but big.
You also don't know that the French had planned for further offensive operations for the third week; then news came of the Soviet invasion in Eastern Poland. That made it pretty unlikely that a quickly obtained result in the West could be of any actual help for the Poles.
 
The problem is that you have a couple of facts wrong. The French faced a reasonably strong resistance, which was however only meant to be a delaying action to slow them down even before they reached the German MLR (the Siegfried Line); and their advance was anything but big.
You also don't know that the French had planned for further offensive operations for the third week; then news came of the Soviet invasion in Eastern Poland. That made it pretty unlikely that a quickly obtained result in the West could be of any actual help for the Poles.
But wasn't it obvious the Wehrmacht would wheel toward them after? Why not entrench yourself, dig down on the other side if the Rhine and then wait for your preparations and for the Brits to come?
 
But wasn't it obvious the Wehrmacht would wheel toward them after?

It was obvious, but what wasn't obvious was how quickly that would happen. The Wojska was overestimated to start with, the Blitzkrieg was not known, and on top of that there was the unexpected Soviet pile-in.
 
But wasn't it obvious the Wehrmacht would wheel toward them after? Why not entrench yourself, dig down on the other side if the Rhine and then wait for your preparations and for the Brits to come?

So you spend the whole Interbellum to build a extremely well defended line of fortresses and then when the war starts you go out and leave that line to entrench yourself in field fortifications where the enemy is a lot more to defeat you?
 
So you spend the whole Interbellum to build a extremely well defended line of fortresses and then when the war starts you go out and leave that line to entrench yourself in field fortifications where the enemy is a lot more to defeat you?

The fact that the French had a powerful defensive line doesn't mean they did not have a doctrine for offensives or did not realize that sometimes it might be good to attack.
It does mean they were reluctant to attack, true; but that is only in part due to the Maginot Line existing, and more due to the reason why the Maginot Line existed too. That is, the manpower scarcity (mentioned in post #4) coupled with the experiences of WWI.
 
The fact that the French had a powerful defensive line doesn't mean they did not have a doctrine for offensives or did not realize that sometimes it might be good to attack.
It does mean they were reluctant to attack, true; but that is only in part due to the Maginot Line existing, and more due to the reason why the Maginot Line existed too. That is, the manpower scarcity (mentioned in post #4) coupled with the experiences of WWI.

Nothing I said contradicts that does it? :)
I have no doubt that if the Saar Offensive had been much more succesfull the French Army would have kept on pushing. I only question the wisdom of abandoning ones prepared positions in favour of a position of lesser defensive value which only 'advantage' is that it's closer to the enemy lines.
 
wi French and RAF aircraft had hit Nazi airbases in the West hard (ideally a 6pm on September 3rd having sent the ultimatum earlier
 

Deleted member 1487

wi French and RAF aircraft had hit Nazi airbases in the West hard (ideally a 6pm on September 3rd having sent the ultimatum earlier
The French didn't have the aircraft and the Brits didn't have the range. Plus both tried to avoid retaliation on their own bases and cities.
Not only that, but the Luftwaffe wasn't really in the area to hit anyway and the first Allied air raids didn't go well:
 
I only question the wisdom of abandoning ones prepared positions in favour of a position of lesser defensive value which only 'advantage' is that it's closer to the enemy lines.

That turned out to be the only advantage, yes; and you can clearly see it now, with your 20/20-hindsight.
When the French started advancing, the assessment and expectations were different - as explained.
 
That turned out to be the only advantage, yes; and you can clearly see it now, with your 20/20-hindsight.
When the French started advancing, the assessment and expectations were different - as explained.

Because they weren't really planning to only just advance a bit is it?
 
Because they weren't really planning to only just advance a bit is it?

Exactly, and also because they did not expect Poland to be beaten so quickly by Germany, and even more quickly once the Soviet Union jumped in. The general plan was to advance in bounds to the German MLR (the Siegfried Line); slowly and in bounds so as to not take pointless casualties. The French were planning a renewed, larger offensive for the third week of September, which would bring them to the river and to the Line. Then, a full month after mobilizing, they were expecting to be able to launch a major offensive, which would now invest the enemy's MLR.
They expected that, in the meantime, the Poles would still be alive and kicking, preventing the Germans from redeploying sizable reinforcements West. They did not expect the Soviet Union to barge in too. Poland still being in the fight not only would help the French, but would also mean that an offensive was needed to help the Poles in turn. Once Poland was out of the fight, there was no reason to rush into a costly offensive.

The remaining option, following your reasoning, was of course subsequent to the end of the Polish campaign: to withdraw from the territory gained, so as to defend from more favorable positions.
As you can understand, propaganda and morale considerations were against such a course of action. Note how the newly raised Polish division in French service was deployed exactly there, in the occupied German territory. That tells you that by then, it was a matter of propaganda.
 

marathag

Banned
I only question the wisdom of abandoning ones prepared positions in favour of a position of lesser defensive value
I don't believe anyone advocated for abandoning the Maginot Line, like the Soviets did for pulling out and dismantling the Stalin Line on the Soviet Border for the new Molotov Line in ex-Poland.

Defense in Depth is a good thing, especially when you can move to a River.
 

marathag

Banned
Plus both tried to avoid retaliation on their own bases and cities.
Yes, by dropping leaflets, when they should have been dropping bombs. They learned nothing from Cities being bombed by the Germans in Spain and Poland.
Fools to believe that they soon wouldn't be bombing French and then British cities.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes, by dropping leaflets, when they should have been dropping bombs. They learned nothing from Cities being bombed by the Germans in Spain and Poland.
Fools to believe that they soon wouldn't be bombing French and then British cities.
Largely there weren't bombing of undefended Allied cities in the west until the accidental London attack and RAF retaliation on Berlin.
Poland was a different situation, but even there it seems the majority of city bombing was of defended cities or at least cities with troops in them or were thought to have them there. Same with Spain, Guernica was bombed because of it's military value and use as a troop transit point, plus there were troops in the city at the time.

But that didn't stop the press with sensationalizing things:
The Times journalist George Steer, a Basque and Republican sympathizer, propelled this event onto the international scene and brought it to Pablo Picasso's attention. Steer's eyewitness account was published on 28 April in both The Times and The New York Times, and on the 29th it appeared in L'Humanité, a French Communist daily.
Except he wasn't there until it was over:
Although he was not an eye-witness to the bombing itself, he arrived soon afterwards, and so was able to see the effects and talk to some of the survivors.
The number of victims is still disputed; the Basque government reported 1,654 people killed at the time, while local historians identified 126 victims[2] (later revised by the authors of the study to 153).[3]

From a USAAF study on the subject, starts on p.7 and deconstructs the myths of the bombing. Unfortunately it won't let me copy any of the text and I don't have time to type it out:
It also has info about how panicked the Allies were that if the Germans wanted they could wipe out cities at a whim, so didn't want to provoke attacks.

Similarly the bombing of Dresden wasn't a war crime because it was a major troop transit center, had military production, and was defended. That doesn't mean these attacks weren't atrocities whatever the laws of warfare of the time said, but the attacks were conducted for military reasons and not simply terror; it was often confused at the time, perhaps intentionally for propaganda reasons, when bombing attacks missed their mark that the attack was for terror purposes than an attempt to hit military targets. Like during the Blitz the Luftwaffe was constantly shifting targets and the British couldn't figure out what they were doing, so simply assumed it was meant to terrorize the population to break their morale.

Even the flawed BC dehousing strategy was pursued for military reasons rather than simply to terrorize, it was just hoped that the additional morale impact would break German will to resist, but that didn't stop Goebbels from calling it criminal terror attacks.

The French and British understood they couldn't defend against Luftwaffe retaliation (plus they assumed it was stronger than it was) so didn't want to provoke it. As we saw from 1940 the AdlA was not ready for combat, as IIRC something like 25% of it was even combat operational as of May. Plus the Allies didn't really have a serious radar network in France.

As to the British in 1939 few RAF aircraft could reach Germany and in daylight they were slaughtered; they switched to night and couldn't hit anything. The rest of the RAF was busy displacing to France, which was a long process and one that wasn't complete until 1940 and then they had to prep to fight off the expected invasion.
 
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