Looking for a way to improve Naval Aviation prewar in the 1930's.

[Cryhavoc101]

Maybe, but if the torpedoes are duds then Churchill is still going to keep sending out the carriers on anti submarine sweeps until one is lost.

I think the warnings were writ large - Ark Royal had also nearly been sunk around about the same time - managing to comb the torpedoes

If Courageous had been damaged but not sunk or even hit by a pair of duds then even his nibs is going have to rethink that particular tactic and withdraw them.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

To return to the topic...

There were no legal restrictions on the USN preparing designs for small aircraft carriers based on the hulls and machinery of the "Treaty Cruisers" built between the wars.

The USA might have been able to prevent the reductions in aircraft carrier and cruiser displacements imposed by the Second London Naval Treaty.

The WNT and First LNT allowed aircraft carriers to displace up to 27,000 tons. The British delegation at the Second London Naval Conference wanted it reduced to 22,000 tons (which was why Ark Royal displaced 22,000 tons) and succeeded in having it reduced to 23,000 tons.

The WNT and First LNT allowed cruisers to displace up to 10,000 tons. The British delegation at the Second London Naval Conference wanted it reduced to 7,600 tons and succeeded in having it reduced to 8,000 tons.

AIUI what became the Cleveland class began as an 8,000 ton design, but the start of the Second World War allowed the design to grow to 10,000 tons by the time the first ship was laid down.

I think that had the Second LNT allowed the design to begin as a 10,000 ton design the CL-55 that was eventually laid down would have been a light cruiser version of the Baltimore class, that is the same hull, machinery and secondary armament as the Baltimore, but carrying an armament of twelve 6" guns in four triple turrets instead of nine 8" guns in three triple turrets.

Thus the 9 Independence class CVL of TTL would have been better ships because they were effectively based on the Balitmore class rather than the smaller Cleveland class. (Would that have created butterflies for French naval aviation in the 1950s and Spanish naval aviation in the 1970s?)

After the war does the USN convert 6 "Big Clevelands" to CLGs or does it convert another 6 Baltimores to CAGs? Regardless of whether six CA or six CL hulls are selected are the conversions repeats of Boston and Canberra or more conversions of the Albany type? My preference is for 6 additional conversions of the Albany type.

I'm not a fan of the Atlanta/Juneau class of light cruiser. If the TTL Second LNT had kept the maximum cruiser displacement at 10,000 tons it would have been possible to build CL51-54 to the TTL OTL Cleveland class design and the 7 succeeding ships to the TTL "Big Cleveland" design.

 

[McPherson]

Greece is a difficult one - I used to have a very clear opinion in that it should be left well alone - there was nothing in it for Britain.

I've gone back and forth on it, too.

After all we know by reading the history books that it was a disaster.

I don't know if I would characterize it as a disaster. The Singapore Bastion Defense Plan is a disaster. Greece is "unfortunate".

But at the time Greece and Yugoslavia represented another 450 thousand and 700 thousand Soldiers (had they mobilised in time) respectively with which to oppose the fascists.

I would have asked the British IGS these questions before we ever started;

--"Can we sustain these new allies?"
--"Can we gain air superiority and keep it?"
--"Can we guarantee our sea lines of communication?"
--"Will this force diversion hurt us in the Mandate, Syria, Iraq, Iran and our forces in Egypt?"
--"Can we reinforce faster in Greece than the Axis?"

If I get a no, to 1 of those 5 questions, I do not do Greece. The Germans have to commit and conquer because their Balkan flank is exposed. Why burn up my own resources when the Germans are doing what I want anyway? The mere threat is enough.

Had Yugoslavia not flip flopped when it did then things would have gotten more difficult for the Axis.

This is what I mean about Churchill being an incompetent strategist. Yugoslavia was a morass of treachery, internecine warfare and a political hazard of the highest order. You could rely on Tito (later to an extent) but anyone else in that game was either a tribalist, an opportunist, or short term objective oriented exploiter. You don't ally with bandits. You ally with national liberation movements. The Americans will [not] learn this lesson in China, Vietnam, Central America and in the Middle East.

And Churchill knew Barbarossa was coming - the British had known since Aug 1940 that it was coming.

You can't help the SU people by being in Greece and being beaten. Your best chance for victory is the long war, keep them in the game and make sure your forces and your allies are supplied and sustained where YOU can win. That means currently 1940-1941 the Middle East and North Africa where your logistics and lines of communication, give you a numerical and tactical edge to what the Axis can do. Axis forces, and resources committed into those regions can be chopped up, isolated and removed from the opposing OOB piecemeal. This actually helps Russia, but Stalin and Churchill were too amateur to see the knock on cascade effects.

Just because Uncle Joe stuck his fingers in his ears and went "what I can't hear you, LAALALALALALALALA" every time the British, the Americans and even his own top agents told him doesn't change the fact that he knew as well.

Given the Russian talent executed, and gulagged, the capability in situ that was destroyed by Stalin with his constant meddling and concerns about his own worthless hide, and the overall generic Russian historic insistence on having five bad options and only one "reasonable" bad option among them: and always, I mean always, historically choosing the worst one available, I have no sympathy for him or the Russians who allowed him. Stalin should have been executed and someone competent, (My gut says Khrushchev, but he is very junior and inexperienced.), should have become autocrat. But the Russians did not do it.

There is some debate as to the disruption the Balkans campaign made to Barbarossa but had that Yugoslavian army mobilised in time then it might definitely have made a bigger impact to the Russia campaign.

That is possible. Maybe a month. It could have helped the SU; if by no other metric by wearing out motorized transport and burning up maybe a half dozen divisions. The British do not have to be present for it to happen, though. That's the point.

So when we balance the potential long term benefits - what would have been more useful to the cause....Holding Benghazi/advancing into Libya or hamstringing the Invasion of Russia?

Holding Benghazi. The AIRPOWER presence alone makes holding Malta a lot easier. And of course from Benghazi, it is a shorter drive to Tunis, than from El Alamein.

Just food for thought, secure your Op-Areas behind you, keep the SLOCs to Russia and Egypt open. Wipe the Axis out in N. Africa and free up naval and army resources earlier.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

Ok, so I'm still in the idea formulation stages, and along these lines I'm starting to look into potential military uses for either pre-existing civil off shore platforms, or modifications to same. In context, what this means is, I am going to be having HH building yearly Yacht's, and these ships are going to be for-profit capable merchant ships first and foremost, and any and all other capabilities will be in the form of engineering add on's and cobbled together one-off installations, that give such ships capabilities well beyond other merchantmen, will special emphasis on aviation and ship to shore, and ship to platform capabilities.

Since HH is already involved with the Oil industry historically, and I'm going to be taking him out of historical activities and into maritime activities, in order to get the improvements in Naval Aviation I'm looking for, it seems that one aspect that might give me a way forward would be to create a need for a civilian offshore platforms market & production niche. Anything I want to bring into existence initially, and within the time constraints of say 1920-1940, will have to either;

1. Be an extremely low cost, limited production number type of thing, or else it has to be...
2. A profit making thing in it's own right.

HH is filthy rich in OTL, and did invest in projects that were not at the time profitable right off the bat, so there is some historical precedent for having him investing in things that historically don't have to make any initial, instant profits, but there is a limit even here. In OTL, the offshore platforms didn't really take off until after WWII was over and done with, and the idea I am currently playing around with is to have production of some offshore platforms starting up as part of HH aviation record setting activities, and I need ideas for how and when the first needs could be made believable. For me, the off-shore platforms means anything that floats and is unpowered, so small barges would be in this category, all the way up to giant, modern (for the 1920's-1940ish) time period Oil drilling rigs or Oil wells/storage facilities as well as anything and everything in between.

The Great depression comes along to close out the roaring 20's, but interestingly, along about this time was something called the Texas Oil Boom. Being an unapologetic opportunistic grabber of things that may help my story ideas along, it seems that along with the vast increase in the Texas economy and heavy/Oil industries, I might just be able to have HH grab up some bankrupt golf coast shipyard, and have them begin building things for HH's personal toy-chest, and then start to look at finding any possible uses that such things could have, both to (maybe) make money on their own, or at least keep the shipyard building something (anything) until the Great Depression comes to an end.

So how do I tie all the loose ends together? Right now, I'm looking into merchant shipping, and cargo handling of the times (because anything and everything this guy does is going to be based upon making use of merchant shipping and shipbuilding, from his shipyards) but this also means I need to learn up about how a port is going to be handling cargo, so that I can create a way forward for the Hughes Merchantman to be larger and more expensive, but even more profitable than the historical merchantmen in production in OTL. Then I need a rich fellow that is into aviation and world record setting attempts (and this is turn requires that I do a decent job of tying this personality into activities mixing ships and planes and offshore oil exploration, drilling, and production) to be able to get to my desired stories.

Along these lines, this week I have been reading posts over in another thread, and the question of NGS came up in the form of reactivated Iowa class battleships, and then moved onto talk about other possible ships types, from DD's to Monitors, and then I got to thinking how I could use platforms in amphibious operations. Could some form of rapidly deploy-able offshore platform provide a stable base for NGS? As I understand it, naval gunfire support has advantages and disadvantages:

1. One the plus side, NGS is mobile artillery that can be brought into action at any time, irregardless of the extent of advancement of the ground forces inland from the beaches, and indeed is first and foremost all important for the pre-invasion bombardment of offshore obstacles, landmines, and other defensive works of the enemy, before one can deploy sufficient land based artillery and their ammunition to do this without tying up fleet units.
2. On the down side, naval gunfire is subject to the movements of it's various platforms, and the smaller the platform, the more easily they will be moved by wind and waves. Add in bigger guns, on smaller ships/platforms, and you will then have to account for recoil of the guns themselves causing movements, and all these various movements will decrease accuracy as ranges go up, which is of particular concern to the fellows on the beach after all.
3. So, what if there existed, in civilian use and production, a large variety of unpowered barges and various different designs of off shore platforms, say by the very late 1920's to the very early 1930's, such that various military uses might be found, and one of which, by the time war comes around and amphibious invasions might be a thing, there had already been work done on a wide variety of specialized military platforms, for everything from NGS, to forward observers, radio towers and offshore wind generators etc...

My thoughts lately have been about all the civilian uses I can think of, to explain away the a-historical existence of a small but robust shipbuilding (between 1920 and 1933) activity focused on offshore platforms, whereby HH can be setting world records by being the first to land/takeoff from such and such a type of platform, or to develop a collection of platforms that could allow seaplanes to land in a man-made sheltered water field, where enough of a reduction in the action of the winds and the waves could be achieved to allow for establishing a permanently manned/crewed/inhabited offshore platform/community.

Above I posited a military application for a type of offshore platform that would have a high tower, which would incorporate an observation platform high above sea level (say 100-150 feet), which would give a greater field of view than enjoyed by the guys on the beach. Aircraft would have an even better view, but if you place a telephone[1] at the tower top as well as a radio, and run a line to the beach, you have a potential second system of communication, that cannot be overheard by the enemy, nor scrambled by atmospheric conditions, and this is something an aircraft cannot do.

If you are operating in a remote location, and wish to have some local electrical power generation not tied to your generators fuel supply, why not slap a windmill or three on the tower? This isn't going to generate any great amount of electricity, but any radio/telephone is going to have to have juice from some source, and if you already have to have the tower, the electronics, and the batteries anyway, it would seem a big waste of potential NOT to harness at east some small part of this resource.

Could a series of offshore platforms, designed and built for the purpose, have a 'floating fence' strung between them, that could serve to provide assistance for small craft to not get scattered and messed up in various ship-to-shore sorties by wind and waves, if they were to have two lines of such towers strung up on either side of their transit path?

Could HH be used to develop the need for such things, perhaps by having competitions for setting up temporary seaplane bases ashore on an otherwise undeveloped island/coast? If the civilian sector is the driving force for such things, rather than military budgets and bureaucracies, and initially done just for the hell of it, can I pull off things like, mobile radar stations, both shore based and offshore platform based? How about air search and rescue platforms off shore, if they are built to provide a safe place for those that cannot quite make it back to the beach?

Anyone have some ideas or comments along these lines?

 

[vl100butch]

Has anyone talked about additional SEATRAIN ships? Early type of RORO with an 18 knot speed....how much impact would it have if there were 25-30 of them

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

Has anyone talked about additional SEATRAIN ships? Early type of RORO with an 18 knot speed....how much impact would it have if there were 25-30 of them

They have not, and you have just given me a valuable link to new information! Thank you!

 

[McPherson]

Has anyone talked about additional SEATRAIN ships? Early type of RORO with an 18 knot speed....how much impact would it have if there were 25-30 of them

From Wiki.(^^^)

Those goofballs were on to something. Let's discuss why it was not used more than it was in WWII (about 50 hulls worth.).

The mods needed. Trucks instead of railcars and either a drawbridge or ramp, for ship to shore drive through. The same for a pier-side drive off. Problem? As can be seen in the modern box-crane type pier-side receiver shown in the illustration, the TIDES. You cannot just pull up and drive off when your float level changes with the moon's gravitational influence. For combat loaders the ramp or drawbridge has to be articulated and/or the prow of the ship has to be flat bottomed so that it can ground and back off a gentle sand shelf. (LST).

Like so;

From Wiki.

Again note that TIDES, mean that a beach grounding means the ship has to unload quickly and float off or it will snap in two like a ends supported banana with a weight hung from its middle, or it will float off and have to re-beach which was a common evolution.

Now SEATRAINS would require a box crane at its receiving pier or a naval standard boom and derrick crane rated for up to 150 tonnes. These cranes can be shipped to a secured port and used for pier-side mounted railroad sidings a' la Cuba. This was done in France 1944.

 

[CV12Hornet]

IUI what became the Cleveland class began as an 8,000 ton design, but the start of the Second World War allowed the design to grow to 10,000 tons by the time the first ship was laid down.

That’s not what happened, exactly. Yes, C&R was studying 8000-ton designs before switching to the Cleveland design, but there was no evolution from the 8000-ton type to the Clevelands. The 8000-tonner was chucked in the bin and the designers did a minimum-modification design based on the last two Brooklyn’s in the interest of expediency. It’s why the first Cleveland’s hit the water a year before the Baltimores.

AIUI what became the Cleveland class began as an 8,000 ton design, but the start of the Second World War allowed the design to grow to 10,000 tons by the time the first ship was laid down.

I think that had the Second LNT allowed the design to begin as a 10,000 ton design the CL-55 that was eventually laid down would have been a light cruiser version of the Baltimore class, that is the same hull, machinery and secondary armament as the Baltimore, but carrying an armament of twelve 6" guns in four triple turrets instead of nine 8" guns in three triple turrets.

Thus the 9 Independence class CVL of TTL would have been better ships because they were effectively based on the Balitmore class rather than the smaller Cleveland class. (Would that have created butterflies for French naval aviation in the 1950s and Spanish naval aviation in the 1970s?)

Ain’t gonna happen. With the 10,000-ton limit repealed the building program is going to still focus on a smaller cruiser for fleet work, but also include ships at the 10,000-ton limit for distant action like scouting and convoy protection. This latter design, or a minimally modified version like the OTL Cleveland’s, is going to be what’s built during the war for all the same reasons the Cleveland’s were OTL.

Further, the US Navy would consider a Baltimore hull entirely too much ship for 12 6” SP guns. Even the fast, uparmored super-Cleveland’s they considered as a follow-on were 1000 tons lighter and five feet narrower than the Baltimores.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That’s not what happened, exactly. Yes, C&R was studying 8000-ton designs before switching to the Cleveland design, but there was no evolution from the 8000-ton type to the Clevelands. The 8000-tonner was chucked in the bin and the designers did a minimum-modification degn based on the last two Brooklyn’s in the interest of expediency. It’s why the first Cleveland’s hit the water a year before the Baltimores.

If the 2nd LNT allows C&R to start on a modified Brooklyn in 1937 (instead of having to wait until September 1939 as IOTL) would the first Cleveland "hit the water" a year or two earlier than it did IOTL?

 

[CV12Hornet]

If the 2nd LNT allows C&R to start on a modified Brooklyn in 1937 (instead of having to wait until September 1939 as IOTL) would the first Cleveland "hit the water" a year or two earlier than it did IOTL?

Yes. You could probably get the first four in the water in 1940, with another three in 1941. This also allows for more leisurely design of the fast fleet cruisers the Navy also wanted. From Brooklyn design studies, a ship just a hair under 9000 tons could mount 12 6” with a top speed of 34 knots, but reduced protection compared to a Brooklyn: 4.4” belt, 1.25” deck, and 5.5” turret faces and 4.4” barbettes. Alternatively (and perhaps optimistically) reducing to 9 6” guns allowed for 35 knots and Brooklyn protection on 8000 tons. With a requirement for 21 such ships, these would be the major wartime construction.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Ain’t gonna happen. With the 10,000-ton limit repealed the building program is going to still focus on a smaller cruiser for fleet work, but also include ships at the 10,000-ton limit for distant action like scouting and convoy protection. This latter design, or a minimally modified version like the OTL Cleveland’s, is going to be what’s built during the war for all the same reasons the Cleveland’s were OTL.

Further, the US Navy would consider a Baltimore hull entirely too much ship for 12 6” SP guns. Even the fast, uparmored super-Cleveland’s they considered as a follow-on were 1000 tons lighter and five feet narrower than the Baltimores.

AIUI the Cleveland design was considered cramped and overloaded. Is that true?

I'm probably wrong, but here goes...

AIUI the Baltimore was effectively an enlarged and improved Wichita.

Therefore, if the designers of the light cruiser were starting from a limit of 10,000 tons rather than 8,000 tons, would the TTL Cleveland have been an enlarged and improved Brooklyn? That is still fifteen 6" in five triple turrets like the Brooklyn, but with twelve 5" in six twins, rather than the eight 5" in eight singles that Brooklyn carried?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Yes. You could probably get the first four in the water in 1940, with another three in 1941. This also allows for more leisurely design of the fast fleet cruisers the Navy also wanted. From Brooklyn design studies, a ship just a hair under 9000 tons could mount 12 6” with a top speed of 34 knots, but reduced protection compared to a Brooklyn: 4.4” belt, 1.25” deck, and 5.5” turret faces and 4.4” barbettes. Alternatively (and perhaps optimistically) reducing to 9 6” guns allowed for 35 knots and Brooklyn protection on 8000 tons. With a requirement for 21 such ships, these would be the major wartime construction.

Earlier in the threat I posted this.

Is this of any use?

View attachment 483625​

The above are the tonnages of ships that the US Navy was allowed to have under US Law.

Had a new design for a 10,000 ton light cruiser been available in 1938 would Conress have been prepared to authorise the construction of a few using the extra tonnage made available by the 1938 Act?

According to my US Cruisers spreadsheet the first Clevelands were ordered in FY1940. Perhaps they could be brought forward to FY1938 ITTL, which as AFAIK ran from 1st July 1938 to 30th June 1939?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Here's the Naval Acts spreadsheet again.

Does anyone know which piece of legislation that authorised the increases in the "Date Unknown" column?

 

[McPherson]

Supplemental 1934. Big fight in Congress. Your tonnage is actually found under the National Industrial Recovery Act, which is why it does not show up in the 1934 NAVY ACT.

McP.

 

[CV12Hornet]

AIUI the Cleveland design was considered cramped and overloaded. Is that true?

I'm probably wrong, but here goes...

AIUI the Baltimore was effectively an enlarged and improved Wichita.

Therefore, if the designers of the light cruiser were starting from a limit of 10,000 tons rather than 8,000 tons, would the TTL Cleveland have been an enlarged and improved Brooklyn? That is still fifteen 6" in five triple turrets like the Brooklyn, but with twelve 5" in six twins, rather than the eight 5" in eight singles that Brooklyn carried?

The Clevelands weren't cramped, precisely - they were roomier in the machinery spaces compared to the Brooklyns, for example - but they were considered unstable and badly top-heavy thanks to all the sensors and AA guns they mounted high up compared to the Brooklyns. Not helping matters was that the aluminum superstructure they were originally supposed to be built with had to be replaced by steel. It should be noted, though, that the Clevelands were a post-treaty design, which meant sacrifices accepted under the treaty regime were now something they'd prefer not to suffer.

And the OTL Clevelands were an enlarged and improved Brooklyn; they had almost five feet more beam and 1700 tons on their predecessors, with better underwater protection, structural strength, and AA armament. Something bigger, though, isn't happening in 1937; the Washington 10,000-ton limit is still in effect. You're not getting treaty-breakers until 1939 or thereabouts, at which point you've got the Baltimores being designed and at least one or two existing CL designs that can be built a hell of a lot faster than a cleansheet.

Earlier in the threat I posted this.

Had a new design for a 10,000 ton light cruiser been available in 1938 would Conress have been prepared to authorise the construction of a few using the extra tonnage made available by the 1938 Act?

According to my US Cruisers spreadsheet the first Clevelands were ordered in FY1940. Perhaps they could be brought forward to FY1938 ITTL, which as AFAIK ran from 1st July 1938 to 30th June 1939?

Yes. The 1934 Act and supplements cover the entire prewar cruiser fleet; the 1938 act could support an additional 7 10,000-ton CLs with a little tweaking, and I don't think Congress would get that up in arms about an extra 1250 tons of ship.

 

[phx1138]

Let me second @sonofpegasus. Hughes, if he builds a big ship, is more likely to build Queen Mary than Whiteside.

If you can get him interested in tankers, you have a chance at a couple of interesting knock-ons. One, you could free up a lot of older ships for sale to Britain (as USN takes over the new ones Hughes has built); other possibility is, he builds them essentially for the British (in Canada? Mexico?). Two, you can convert to CVEs, per Empire McAlpine, able to operate a handful of TSRs; that's a good thing for Atlantic convoy escort.

You're going to need more horsepower if you want so wide a beam; that really buggers the fineness ratio, which means you're going to need more power even at the same speed & displacement.

That beam also risks running afoul of the Panama Canal, at a time "Panamax" wasn't a thing--but was a reality, if you build so big.

You also run into draft issues: can these bigger ships enter all harbors? (This is an issue for modern supertankers, but might not be for a ship of only 20000grt or so.)

And bear in mind, in 1935 or 1940, a 20000 grt tanker is a big damn ship, so you may need more excuse than just Hughes' ego. You can bet it would get a ton of news coverage, even without being built by him. It won't be cheap, either--tho, in the Depression, maybe cheaper than any other time.

That might be a selling point: it creates jobs...

USN preferred smaller carriers. While the naval treaty had no overall tonnage limit, carriers size was restricted. A point which needs to be taken into account.

How much of that was based on aircraft technology? There really wasn't a great need for larger carriers until about the F6F or F4U.

On the other points, I agree with you. Moving the needle to get USN to buy new ships, of any kind, is the issue. (I come back to "jobs program", & also to it being a response to the isolationists, but that needs explaining, too.)

educate the Congress. Three important words: "combat sortie radius". And a two word solution that does not impinge on ANY naval treaty, because it is lighters, ro/ros (LSTs in that era), fast tankers, ammunition ships, subsidized ocean liners (i.e. troop transports), break bulk subsidized cargo ships (STUFT ships that will mimic AKs, tenders, and other assorted auxiliaries), floating dry docks, ocean going tugs, etc., that can be summarized as the "fleet trains".

A fleet train is part of the navy budget, but if you have subsidized contract shipping *(STUFT) fleet, that can be hid from Congress as part of the Post Office Budget, Department of Commerce and Treasury, too, what the hey? What are all those Coast Guard revenue cutters doing with K-guns and sonars again?

Standard Oil needs 20,000 tonne 25-30 knot oil tankers to ship crude to England. Why? Unrefined Venezuelan crude precipitates during shipping? How should I know? Make an excuse and build at least 12 of them, 6 will become flattops.

I agree with most of this. I am a bit dubious about the need for such high speed, or the sense of converted AOs as fleet CVs (even small ones), rather than CVEs (or ASW CVs). If they're to go in harm's way, IMO, they should be purpose-built; otherwise, the ability to operate a handful or two of TSRs or equivalent is all you really need.

I could, perhaps, be persuaded, but it'd take a pretty good argument.

As for "hiding" the fleet train, OTL '30s, I don't see a need. Today, maybe; then, again, "jobs program" & "keep the foreign wars away"...

The "excuse" for a big, fast ship is pretty easy, actually, same as now: it means you can deliver more with fewer trips (lower cost) & faster (more trips in the same amount of time). The speed for diminishing returns, IMO, is under 26kt for a commercial tanker, & probably under 20kt in the '30s (but I could stand correction). The price of oil also bears on it, as the diminishing number of ULCCs demonstrates; they carry more than the demand, or cost too much to operate, or something, these days.

Edit:

'deck edge' elevators

Make it so, make it so. That doubles an aircraft carrier's strike below efficiency.

Isn't that a bit beyond the state of the art in 1935-40? (Good as idea as it is.)

Building drill rigs is, just, possible, but (without looking it up) I'd say you don't get rigs in really deep water, so they'd mostly be in sight of shore. It might encourage building more PTs or MGBs to defend them, but not anything much bigger. (Barely possible, IMO, you get more DDs or DEs.)

You lie and run it at 10 m/s (19.5 knots) until you cut in those 6 extra diesel electric motor generator sets

Oh, hell, no. You rig the governors so the main diesels don't produce their full rated output & blame the contractor for being an idiot. (And if necessary, pay him a "performance bonus" to keep him quiet. )

(Also, can I crow just a little that my thread on the flying deck cruiser had any influence on this idea? )

 

[jsb]

A 26-kt auxiliary would be illegal under the treaties. IIRC. limited to 20kt

You lie and run it at 10 m/s (19.5 knots) until you cut in those 6 extra diesel electric motor generator sets y0ou installed and did not tell anyone about. The USN would need them since 10 m/s battle speed for CTFs past 1935 is normal. 15 m/s would be ideal.

Yeah, and when everyone else points out the cheating?

Oh, hell, no. You rig the governors so the main diesels don't produce their full rated output & blame the contractor for being an idiot. (And if necessary, pay him a "performance bonus" to keep him quiet. )

Simply have the diesels designed for but not fitted with turbochargers, combined with a detune and over built for long service lives should allow them to be perfectly legal without to many questions?

 

[PMN1]

From Wiki.(^^^)

Those goofballs were on to something. Let's discuss why it was not used more than it was in WWII (about 50 hulls worth.).

The mods needed. Trucks instead of railcars and either a drawbridge or ramp, for ship to shore drive through. The same for a pier-side drive off. Problem? As can be seen in the modern box-crane type pier-side receiver shown in the illustration, the TIDES. You cannot just pull up and drive off when your float level changes with the moon's gravitational influence. For combat loaders the ramp or drawbridge has to be articulated and/or the prow of the ship has to be flat bottomed so that it can ground and back off a gentle sand shelf. (LST).

Like so;

From Wiki.

Again note that TIDES, mean that a beach grounding means the ship has to unload quickly and float off or it will snap in two like a ends supported banana with a weight hung from its middle, or it will float off and have to re-beach which was a common evolution.

Now SEATRAINS would require a box crane at its receiving pier or a naval standard boom and derrick crane rated for up to 150 tonnes. These cranes can be shipped to a secured port and used for pier-side mounted railroad sidings a' la Cuba. This was done in France 1944.

On the Seatrains

US Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History by Norman Friedman

'Within a few weeks however, the Navy had pointed out that the Seatrain could not survive a single torpedo hit, and that even a minor calibre shell hitting at the waterline might sink one. The Army therefore shifted to the Maritime Commission C4 design, conceived for the American-Hawaiian Line, but intended to be adaptable to troop transport duty. Because, like the Seatrain, a C4’s engines were aft, it offered large uninterrupted cargo spaces amidships, and the contract was rewritten for 50 C4’s in August 1942. It called for C4-S-B1 tank carriers, with special tank ramps, in effect they would have been Ro-Ro’s. Only one ship was finished to this design, because in September 1943 the Joint Chiefs ordered the ships to be completed as point-to-point troop troopships (C4-S-B2) to support the planned invasion of Europe.'


This single ship became the Private Leonard C Bronstram and it was later converted to a heavy lift ship but does anyone know what the internal layout and the tank capacity was while it had while a tank carrier and if it had side ramps – the pictures I’ve seen don’t seem to show any, just derricks.

 

[McPherson]

Simply have the diesels designed for but not fitted with turbochargers, combined with a detune and over built for long service lives should allow them to be perfectly legal without to many questions?

Only gives you 25% overboost and will still destroy the engines.

This single ship became the Private Leonard C Bronstram and it was later converted to a heavy lift ship but does anyone know what the internal layout and the tank capacity was while it had while a tank carrier and if it had side ramps – the pictures I’ve seen don’t seem to show any, just derricks.

That is how she came off the weighs. The other thing about Seatrains, being not used because they were one torpedo sinkers is also a fallacy, (Why Friedman got it wrong, I do not know. Maybe he read the "official lie" in the record for non-selection, sort of like you see today in government documents attempting to justify a wrong decision (F-35 and F-22) post-facto, to cover up the real reason [politics] for the rotten choice.) else the standard Liberty ship would not have been used. Those types broke up as their welds came apart in the early production runs, sometimes on their first crossing, Later ones were still NTG coming off the weighs. And why not? They were like T-34s to the Russians, expected to only survive one use and adios amigo. Hard on the merchant marine crews, ya' know? They knew they sailed aboard garbage ships.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

A 26-kt auxiliary would be illegal under the treaties. IIRC. limited to 20kt.

Of course, if its just a merchant ship, that's fine. But I question who would believe you need a tanker that fast, especially under and American flag

I thought that the Second LNT placed no restrictions on the characteristics of auxiliary vessels.

However, according to the copy of the treaty on Naval Weapons.

6. Auxiliary vessels are naval surface vessels the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons), which are normally employed on fleet duties or as troop transports, or in some other way than as fighting ships, and which are not specifically built as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

a. Mount a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.);
b. Mount more than eight guns with a calibre exceeding 3 in. (76 mm.);
c. Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
d. Are designed for protection by armour plate;
e. Are designed for a speed greater than twenty-eight knots;
f. Are designed or adapted primarily for operating aircraft at sea;
g. Mount more than two aircraft-launching apparatus.

AFAIK the fastest tankers built IOTL were the Cimarron class "National Defence Tankers".

4 of the first 12 Cimarrons were converted to Sangamon class CVEs. The Commencement Bay class CVEs were Sangamons built as aircraft carriers from the keel up.

I reiterate that the easiest course of action is to build more Cimarrons instead of the slower National Defence Tankers and to start building them sooner.