Improve the Singapore Strategy

[marathag]

No, send the Valentines. You’ve got a Pacific coast nation building them in 1941.

But unlike Covenanters and Tetrarch tanks, Valentines were useful. They were promised to Uncle Joe, around 1380 of the 1420 made in Canada.

So Singapore would have to make do with those terrible tanks, that still would be superior to the IJA models in most areas.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

There is also the option of sending captured Italian equipment, though I'm not sure they'd be any better off than otl if they did.

 

[HJ Tulp]

There is also the option of sending captured Italian equipment, though I'm not sure they'd be any better off than otl if they did.

IIRC Italian equipment captured in Ethiopia was made available to the KNIL. It wasn't a success.

 

[b0ned0me]

Then you probably shouldn’t join in oil embargoes without the muscle to back it up. Unfortunately many countries put too much faith in the League of Nations to solve the need to adequately fund defence.

UH, what? AFAIK the Netherlands joined no oil embargo until 1941 by which time:

1. The Netherlands was occupied by Germany
2. The Netherlands government in exile relied on the British for food, clothing, housing and any hope for the future
3. The no 1 British policy was “fellate the Americans more vigorously”
4. The Americans had decided Embargo Idea is Best Idea

For all the flaws in their prewar policy the Netherlands didn’t get their colonies invaded until after the French, British and American colonies had been attacked, and probably wouldn’t have ended up in a war at all if not for the far greater errors of the great powers.

So one again we come back to the elephant in the room, which is that no matter how good the suggestions that are made they :

1. Need to be implemented by the same people that made a hash of things OTL
2. Rely on resources being diverted from a threat which is existential, immediate and proximate to address a threat which is serious but not immediate

Once the war breaks out there is IMO no realistic prospect of the British leadership taking an extended break from LOSING THE GODDAMN WAR in order to completely rethink and re-resource their Far East strategy.
Before the war the Far East is still going to be third fiddle behind Germany & Italy - and fix either of those two and The Singapore Problem is relatively easily fixable or a non- issue.

 

[perfectgeneral]

A hand grenade sized shell is better then nothing. The American 37 mm also had a cannister/ shotgun found. Think the effect of a 37 mm shotgun. A 40mm/2 lbr with a canister round would have gotten around the Royal Artillery's unwillingness to share high explosive rounds

Is a chamber sleeve to load the 37mm round into 2pdr AT guns viable?

 

[MatthewB]

I'm not talking about changing ship building timelines, I'm talking about starting to ask some hard questions, like, "What if the Malay Barrier can't be held?" This then naturally leads to natural conclusion that the facilities in Colombo or Trincomalee need to be improved because that is where the fleet will have to fall back to. It also means developing the facilities in the next line of bases on an arc stretching from Akyab, Port Blair, Christmas Island, and the Cocos Islands (yes I am drawing from my TL here) if Singapore falls and the DEI are compromised, that line of bases becomes the front line.

While it’s too late to redirect the Singapore base expenditure, IMO once FIC was in Japanese hands in Sept 1940 any ideas of using Singapore, now likely on the front lines, as the RN’s primary base was foolhardy. From Oct. 1940 onwards plans should have been in place to move the RN Far East HQ and large surface units to Ceylon, and to have secondary bases ready for destroyers, coastal warships and submarines (when any are available) in Sumatra or elsewhere.

So, perhaps the question I should have asked in the opening post was, starting with the Japanese seizure of FIC in Sept 1940 and given the situation in Europe, revise the Singapore Strategy. Perhaps it’s as simply as having Operation Matador equipped, ready and under orders to act as deemed fit by local commander.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The only way I can see to avoid Malaya falling once FIC has gone is to not Kow Tow to Washington and impose the oil embargo, but by then London has little choice but to follow Washington's lead. When you're on economic life support you don't tell your banker to get stuffed if he wants a favour.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

No, send the Valentines. You’ve got a Pacific coast nation building them in 1941.

They are not ready in time - production was only just ramping up at CPR Angus Shops in Montreal - Between May and Sept 1941 they had only made 30 tanks - mainly due to unskilled workers 'hand making' the tanks rather than using power tools etc

Production did rapidly ramp up with the 100th tank rolling off the lines in November - but from what I have read about tank quality at this stage of the war that did not necessarily mean that it was ready for war

Indeed many tanks arrived in North Africa with parts missing and were finished in theatre!

And then the tanks have to get to where they are needed ideally with blokes who know how to use and maintain them - 30 tanks by Sept is not enough.

Unless CPR Angus shops gets their act together earlier (POD1?) then unfortunately to all intents and purposes they are not getting to Malaya in anything like meaningful numbers

Another idea is for New South Wales Government Railways (NSWGR) to begin building Valentines at the same time as CPR Angus Shops (POD2) rather than buggering about trying to build a heavy tank (Sentinel)

A better POD (POD3?) is all of the above but that HMG accepts the Valentine design earlier (rumour has it that it was offered as early as FEB 10 1938!) as a war Emergency design to supplement the Matilda II (of which only 2 had been built by the start of WW2 and only 23 were ready by May 1940) and to initially allow replacement of the Matilda I (which while heavily armoured for its time was only armed with a Vickers MMG and was as 'slow as molasses' with an eye watering 8 mph top speed)

That way given the numbers built the Commonwealth might very well find itself with lots of Valentines (and far fewer Covenanters) far earlier than OTL

But without an improvement in production numbers - there are lots of Covenanters sitting around in the Uk being used to train armoured divisions.

As I said - send 300 to help the Aussies build their Armoured Division (300 is good enough to initially equip the 6 'Regiments' (battalions) of the Divisions 2 Armoured Brigades)

By mid/late 1942 they were getting M3 Stuarts and M3 Lees - so by the time the Covenanters would be worn out (6+ months) and in need of serious workshop TLC they start to replace them with US Tanks - but of course with increasing tensions the 1st armor brigade and support group forms up in Malaya and slots in with 8th Division - the rest is used to reinforce Rabaul, Ambon, and Timor with at least a Reinforced company of tanks each.

 

[MatthewB]

They are not ready in time - production was only just ramping up at CPR Angus Shops in Montreal - Between May and Sept 1941 they had only made 30 tanks - mainly due to unskilled workers 'hand making' the tanks rather than using power tools etc

How about sending the 225 odd M1917 tanks that arrived at Camp Borden in Oct 1940?

http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/Canada/canadian-m1917-light-tank.php

It’s slow at 9 mph (15 km/h), but its .30 (7.62 mm) Browning M1919 tank machine gun and 37 mm (1.46 in) M1916 cannon will be up to the task vs. Light Japanese tanks.

The 1791mm wide M1916 should be small enough to transport on Malaya’s 1m wide narrow gauge railway, where US-built engines were rather wide https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federated_Malay_States_Railways

 

[Cryhavoc101]

How about sending the 225 odd M1917 tanks that arrived at Camp Borden in Oct 1940?

http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/Canada/canadian-m1917-light-tank.php

It’s slow at 9 mph (15 km/h), but its .30 (7.62 mm) Browning M1919 tank machine gun and 37 mm (1.46 in) M1916 cannon will be up to the task vs. Light Japanese tanks. The M1916 should be small enough to transport on Malaya’s narrow gauge railway.

Are you sure you wouldn't rather have the Covenanters instead?

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

I think they'd be better off with Italian tankettes rearmed with 15mm Besa's rather than ancient Renault FT knock offs. God knows there's enough cluttering up warehouses in Egypt.

 

[MatthewB]

Are you sure you wouldn't rather have the Covenanters instead?

Worthington is itching to have a go with his newly formed CAC, I’d bet he’d take his light tanks now, and Covenanters later, if they’ll be released in time.

 

[StevoJH]

I think they’d be better off bolting 2pdr anti tank guns on the back of universal carriers then using 25 year old First World War cast offs.

At least they know that they will go from A to B.

 

[marathag]

so by the time the Covenanters would be worn out (6+ months)

And could have hulls buried to make pillboxes after that

 

[King Augeas]

So, perhaps the question I should have asked in the opening post was, starting with the Japanese seizure of FIC in Sept 1940 and given the situation in Europe, revise the Singapore Strategy. Perhaps it’s as simply as having Operation Matador equipped, ready and under orders to act as deemed fit by local commander.

Yep, exactly right.

For the RN, it's probably something like:

"Send whatever fleet we can as a deterrent and hope for the best, then if they invade make a decision on whether to gamble the ship on crushing the landing on the basis that Malaya is lost otherwise, or to hope that Malaya can hold long enough for us to put together a major resupply effort and then use the ships to force it through"

But as you note, the problem isn't really a naval one any more - it's an army and RAF one. The Malaya campaign was decided on land, not at sea...

 

[jsb]

While it’s too late to redirect the Singapore base expenditure, IMO once FIC was in Japanese hands in Sept 1940 any ideas of using Singapore, now likely on the front lines, as the RN’s primary base was foolhardy. From Oct. 1940 onwards plans should have been in place to move the RN Far East HQ and large surface units to Ceylon, and to have secondary bases ready for destroyers, coastal warships and submarines (when any are available) in Sumatra or elsewhere.

The problem is you cant be reasonable and keep publicly pushing deterrence, even without Japan getting a copy of the real situation from the raider.....

If you pull back as is sensible you look weak and if you stay you are weak both invite war that GB cant afford to fight....

 

[Zheng He]

I think they'd be better off with Italian tankettes rearmed with 15mm Besa's rather than ancient Renault FT knock offs. God knows there's enough cluttering up warehouses in Egypt.

The problem with any of the captured equipment or old French stuff is the lack of logistics tail to support them. Unless of course the plan is to use them more or less as stationary pillboxes, say at some of the landing beaches or along the Johore Strait.

One thing I've come to realize in doing research for this discussion is that as far back as 1938, various British officials in Malaya scoped the place out pretty well and determined the Japanese would land at Patani, Singora, and Khota Baru - exactly where they did land.

If you can improve the situation on the ground to include some better beach defenses and get some attack squadrons equipped with planes designed to put bombs on ships (hence my previous suggestion for even things like Skuas and Vindicators) you just might be able to change this. Additionally, to use a modern term, I view the transports as a critical vulnerability for the Japanese. Both for this operation and follow on operations. Sink a lot of the transports at the landing beaches and you not only hose up the Malaya operation, but operations in the DEI as well.

 

[Zheng He]

While it’s too late to redirect the Singapore base expenditure, IMO once FIC was in Japanese hands in Sept 1940 any ideas of using Singapore, now likely on the front lines, as the RN’s primary base was foolhardy. From Oct. 1940 onwards plans should have been in place to move the RN Far East HQ and large surface units to Ceylon, and to have secondary bases ready for destroyers, coastal warships and submarines (when any are available) in Sumatra or elsewhere.

So, perhaps the question I should have asked in the opening post was, starting with the Japanese seizure of FIC in Sept 1940 and given the situation in Europe, revise the Singapore Strategy. Perhaps it’s as simply as having Operation Matador equipped, ready and under orders to act as deemed fit by local commander.

IMO I see an easy POD for executing MATADOR. Well, two easy PODs. One is leaders with the steel to do it. The other is have that PBY that was shot down over the invasion convoys the day before survive. Bedell gets off a sighting report and a frantic message that says something like, "The bastards are shooting at us" and then he gets his plane back to Seletar, shot up with a several wounded crew members on board. Note, the OTL shootdown occurred at 0900 local time on 7 December, a good 16 hours before Japanese troops started splashing ashore at Khota Baru. ITTL when Bedell's message comes in, the wheels are started in motion to execute MATADOR. When his plane lands a few hours later and the commanders realize the shit is about to hit the fan, the execute order is given.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Worthington is itching to have a go with his newly formed CAC, I’d bet he’d take his light tanks now, and Covenanters later, if they’ll be released in time.

The problem with the M1917s is that they were so unreliable that it was common for a training platoon of 5 to go out in the morning and for 2 to return in the afternoon

Now the Covenanter suffered a reputation for poor reliability and had certain design limitations - but its a stella bit of kit when parked next to the old Renaults.

Also I know the Canadian Government sent C-Force to Hong Kong but they were 'reluctant' to allow the Divisions building up in the UK to be used for overseas deployment due to political issues - so would they allow an armoured formation to be sent to Malaya?

And could have hulls buried to make pillboxes after that

Hopefully it would be more a case of a proper workshop is setup to recondition them while newer tanks arrive (M3 Stuart/M3 Lee as well as Valentines) in mid/late 1942 to replace them.

Eventually the surviving Covenanter chassis get retasked as Engineering recovery vehicles, mine flail tanks, flamethrower tanks, radio command tanks, Observation tanks, Bridgelayers etc - but that's a year or 2 down the road

I would think they would die quickly to IJN if out east, far better to have them operate on the west cost where they they no surface opposition and can provide fire support with 6" guns if IJA drives down the cost.

The East coast would make sense but I had the idea of them operating from Kota Bharu as mobile batteries either from the river or from behind the shoals along with the MTB Squadron

I can't find production dates, but would some of the 200-odd 2 Pounder Anti-tank Gun Carriers being used for training in Australia be available for deployment to Singapore/Malaya during this time?

These were great for training and all but quite frankly they would be more useful as universal carriers towing a gun - they were poor AFVs.

You should always think of the universal carrier as a slightly armoured tracked Jeep - but then I always have to remind myself that there was this - so umm yes....maybe....

 

[marathag]

The problem with the M1917s is that they were so unreliable that it was common for a training platoon of 5 to go out in the morning and for 2 to return in the afternoon

Ah, so typical UK tank performance before 1942