Improve the Singapore Strategy
- Thread starter MatthewB
- Start date
There is a couple of things you need to understand regarding your comment
In WW1 (and WW2 for that matter) - Infantry Divisions, principally the fighting Battalions suffered disproportionately heavier losses than other types of units in a given army
In WW1 - Australia and New Zealand (and Canada for that matter) with few exceptions only sent Infantry Divisions (and the odd Cavalry unit - which in WW1 are mounted Infantry and fight like Infantry Battalion just with fewer men) and so their armies as a whole suffered disproportionally more casualties than the British Army did as its manpower was spread out across all arms. British Infantry Divisions suffered no less than Australian or New Zealand ones on the same battlefields.
Barry Bull
Donor
1. Politics. Any failure to send a significant force to SEA would be political disaster;
2. The Bismarck and Tirpitz did indeed distract a lot of RN assets. The Fleet sent to Singapore may be larger and/or sent earlier if the Bismarck and Tirpitz did not exist.
The British response to the Tietsen crisis in August 1939 would have been to send 7 Battleships to Singapore. It was never fleshed out as the pressure of Europe and Danzig being of more importance.
The 1939 'Main Fleet to Singapore' proposal.
The Admiralty initially said it could only spare 2 battleships while the Japanese force would probably compose 9. 1939 dispositions were Channel (2 R Class), Scapa (2 Nelson, 3 R class 2 BC) and Med (3 QE). Presuming the 2 come from the Med fleet, probably Malaya and Barham, leaving Warspite behind. When just 2 ships was objected to, then this was lifted to 7 ships by transferring the whole Med fleet (3 QE's) and 4 Home fleet ships. This was advised against as so many ships were in refit (Renown, QE and Valiant) and the intentions of Italy were in doubt. Perhaps the other 4 would be Hood, Repulse, Rodney and Nelson. GB would be unable to lift the blockade of Tientsen (port closest to Peking) and probably lose Hong Kong (hold for 30 days) but Japan would be unable to take on this GB Force in the South China Sea without the benefit of French Indochinese bases. A carrier strike would be possible, IIRC HMS Eagle approached within 100 miles of Singapore undetected during exercises in 1938?
Other ships to add probably cover 1 CV, 4 CA, 2 CL, 24 DD 15 SS from Med Fleet while 3 CL were India based and 1 CV, 3 CA, 1 CL, 8 DD and 18 SS were the China station. 2 CV, 7 CA, 6 CL, 32 DD and 32 SS total. There was also the RAN of 2CA, 3CL, 5DD.
Apparently ranking the Japanese as 'Italian' comes from a 1939! memo that described 6 refitted RN ships (QE, Valiant etc.) equal to Japan's 9 older ships. This was used in justifying the smaller fleet to Singapore. By late 1939, Japan was reeling from the losses in Mongolia, repudiation of the 1911 US trade treaty and the surprise German-Soviet non-aggression pact but GB had lost face in backing down over the Tientsen affair.
The land/air forces were judged to be sufficient at the time in 1941 as:
- they were being built up.
- the oil embargo will have an impact.
- the American's MAY assist.
- the Japanese capabilities were unknown but probably on par with Italy who in 18 months had shown:
- would take advantage of the French surrender
- could be beaten on the ground in North Africa
- could be beaten by the Greeks
- could be beaten at sea
- could only win with help from the Germans.
The Japanese:
- were already involved in a war in China
- could be beaten by Russians
- running out of oil
- could not be helped by the Germans.
Only the navy was an unknown. With the other evidence, and entrenched prejudice coupled with starting to believe our own propaganda, why would the IJN+air forces be any more effective than the Italian Navy had been upto late 1941?
It still took the Japanese 70 days to take Singapore. They would have failed had it come to street-to-street fighting.
Later events showed they should have been saying 'nice doggie' in the second half of 1941 because GB's rock wasn't big enough.
The 1939 'Main Fleet to Singapore' proposal.
The Admiralty initially said it could only spare 2 battleships while the Japanese force would probably compose 9. 1939 dispositions were Channel (2 R Class), Scapa (2 Nelson, 3 R class 2 BC) and Med (3 QE). Presuming the 2 come from the Med fleet, probably Malaya and Barham, leaving Warspite behind. When just 2 ships was objected to, then this was lifted to 7 ships by transferring the whole Med fleet (3 QE's) and 4 Home fleet ships. This was advised against as so many ships were in refit (Renown, QE and Valiant) and the intentions of Italy were in doubt. Perhaps the other 4 would be Hood, Repulse, Rodney and Nelson. GB would be unable to lift the blockade of Tientsen (port closest to Peking) and probably lose Hong Kong (hold for 30 days) but Japan would be unable to take on this GB Force in the South China Sea without the benefit of French Indochinese bases. A carrier strike would be possible, IIRC HMS Eagle approached within 100 miles of Singapore undetected during exercises in 1938?
Other ships to add probably cover 1 CV, 4 CA, 2 CL, 24 DD 15 SS from Med Fleet while 3 CL were India based and 1 CV, 3 CA, 1 CL, 8 DD and 18 SS were the China station. 2 CV, 7 CA, 6 CL, 32 DD and 32 SS total. There was also the RAN of 2CA, 3CL, 5DD.
Apparently ranking the Japanese as 'Italian' comes from a 1939! memo that described 6 refitted RN ships (QE, Valiant etc.) equal to Japan's 9 older ships. This was used in justifying the smaller fleet to Singapore. By late 1939, Japan was reeling from the losses in Mongolia, repudiation of the 1911 US trade treaty and the surprise German-Soviet non-aggression pact but GB had lost face in backing down over the Tientsen affair.
The land/air forces were judged to be sufficient at the time in 1941 as:
- they were being built up.
- the oil embargo will have an impact.
- the American's MAY assist.
- the Japanese capabilities were unknown but probably on par with Italy who in 18 months had shown:
- would take advantage of the French surrender
- could be beaten on the ground in North Africa
- could be beaten by the Greeks
- could be beaten at sea
- could only win with help from the Germans.
The Japanese:
- were already involved in a war in China
- could be beaten by Russians
- running out of oil
- could not be helped by the Germans.
Only the navy was an unknown. With the other evidence, and entrenched prejudice coupled with starting to believe our own propaganda, why would the IJN+air forces be any more effective than the Italian Navy had been upto late 1941?
It still took the Japanese 70 days to take Singapore. They would have failed had it come to street-to-street fighting.
Later events showed they should have been saying 'nice doggie' in the second half of 1941 because GB's rock wasn't big enough.
IIRC, Morrison notes in his Rising Sun in the Pacific Volume that the area navies (I don't recall if the RAN was present; they may have been) had meetings in April 1941 on defending the territories around the South China Sea. The USN wanted to combine forces for offensive operations, the RN wanted to use the other powers cruisers for convoy protection and Dutch wanted a combined defense. Things fell apart because the Dutch couldn't see the sense of escorting convoys and not defending Dutch territory, the British not wanting to give up convoy protection, and the Americans being unable to commit to come to the aid of the others if the US was not attacked. US naval officers are not permitted to usurp Congress' responsibility to declare war. Seeing things at an impasse, the Dutch threw up their hands and called for everyone to engage in 'local defense'. The sad part is the failure in April 1941 meant that when ABDA was necessary, there were no common codes or even signals between the navies, let alone experience operating together.
If you look at what the British Spent on Singapore then the problem is one of poor priorities and a failure to anticipate the Japan could land in Malaya until it was too late . To change this you need to change how the British build shore defences for a start . The 15 inch guns mounted in single units was not ideal . A far better option would be to take the Russian approach and take complete turrets from Battleships being scrapped and mount them in interconnected forts with full generator and fire control capabilities . By the mid 20's you have 40 twin 13.5 inch turrets available due to scrapping or 4 to 6 twin 15 inch turrets . Mounting 3 twin turret forts with a full 360 degree firing plot is achievable in either calibre . This takes care of Battleship and enemy heavy artillery . Then you take the smaller guns from 6 inch down to 3 inch being removed and placed in stores and again build actual forts with fire control for these guns . Most likely the 6 inch will end up facing the straights and the 3 to 4 inch facing inland . Put in large magazines designed to service the entire British fleet and you will have sufficient ammunition .
Do tests on storing ammunition and hold poor stowage as a court martial offence . I assure you solutions to humidity will be found .
The Aviation needs to be well looked after as a night shelling by battleships (easier to imagine then bombing) would destroy nice neat lines of aircraft . Malaya is too big to hold with such small forces . However the concept of mobile units ie Armoured experimental force should be encouraged .
Do tests on storing ammunition and hold poor stowage as a court martial offence . I assure you solutions to humidity will be found .
The Aviation needs to be well looked after as a night shelling by battleships (easier to imagine then bombing) would destroy nice neat lines of aircraft . Malaya is too big to hold with such small forces . However the concept of mobile units ie Armoured experimental force should be encouraged .
If you can shoot at targets on land with 15" rifles it is already too late.
Being tough to crack is merely a bonus of a fortress. The real reason for their existence is as a secure base of operations for troops to impose their will on the surrounding countryside. If Singapore is under direct investment it has failed because it can no longer function as an air or naval base.
Being tough to crack is merely a bonus of a fortress. The real reason for their existence is as a secure base of operations for troops to impose their will on the surrounding countryside. If Singapore is under direct investment it has failed because it can no longer function as an air or naval base.
It's not like the US did for altruistic reasons. They needed Australia and New Zealand as secure supply depots to support their Pacific campaign. If they could have done what they needed to from Hawaii or the West Coast they would have.
MatthewB
Banned
Ok. No nation helps another for altruistic reasons. You're either making or keeping useful allies or destroying or scaring real or potential foes.
Christchurch is over 5800 miles from Tokyo. San Francisco is closer. It's over 4800 miles from Sydney to Tokyo. Pearl Harbor is just over 1000 miles closer than Sydney. Midway is 500 miles closer than that. In what way was Australia (with its infrastructure and population mainly on the east coast, then as now) or New Zealand a 'supply depot' for the central Pacific offensive that defeated Japan? I'll grant you, some forces for the central Pacific operations did stage out of the Solomons, Noumea and Espiritu Santo but without the Southwest Pacific, they would have staged out of somewhere else.
I will agree altruism doesn't play a part in war. But it is good strategy to support your allies and keep them in the war. The offensive in the Solomons was solely aimed at preventing Australia and New Zealand having their Pacific SLOC cut-off by the Japanese. Having pushed the Japanese up the Solomons did provide allied controlled territory for the offensive in the Philippines, but US was already in the Marianas at that point as well. And I will agree, landing in the Philippines did help cut Japan off from the southern resources they conquered, but that could have been done from Formosa as well.
The US could and did do what it needed to defeat Japan out of Pearl Harbor. The offensive in the Southwest Pacific was not going to bring Japan to its knees. The Central Pacific offensive did.
My thoughts,
No, the problem is that the forces needed to defend Malaya were committed elsewhere. Sensibly, too, as Malaya was a strategic backwater for almost all of 1941.
If the Japanese get to Singapore it's over. Shore batteries are a waste of money.
This why I say have Malaya as a training area. It gets the forces to defend it if attacked but those forces are doing something of real value to the war that's currently being fought.
MatthewB
Banned
I had an answer ready to type, but I sense a circular argument that will drag us off topic. As I hate a threadjacking as much as I do contrarians, I'm tapping out of this one. Back to Singapore strategy for me.
I agree. Going back to Post #1, The cost to build the Sembawang Naval Base and the shore batteries was £28 million (1938 GBP). At £3 million a piece, the RN would have been much better off with seven more Ark Royals (once Britain was free of the WNT) plus change.
A naval guerre de course was the last thing on the Japanese navies mind. Their doctrine and strategy for the big decisive battle meant their cruisers and submarines were part of the battle fleet operations, screening, scouting, and attrtioning the enemy battle fleet where the could. Based on the their perception of the German submarine raiders and cruiser warfare in the Great War, and the previous two year in WWII the Japanese navy decided to stick with no interdiction of merchant ships. Brit, and USN, ideas for convoy protection were overblown in that era.
This is somewhat understandable, the German guerre de course had badly damaged the Brits to that point. & the Japanese did not publicly publish their naval doctrine. So the Brit were running decisions out of experience.
And just how do you fund this?
The OTL 15" guns would also have been surplus so free.... moving larger mounts would cost far more than the lighter surface mounts used in OTL.....?
Tests didnt happen due to funds presumably as well.... you cant court marshal somebody HMT have said they cant do something due to funds....
Support (or at least less hostility) of the none aligned powers in the cold war?
Was it not also cruiser to defend from German raiders in the build up, after all the Malayan defensive plans got taken by one operating in IO?
But, a lot of that came after the cold war right? During the cold war, South Africa could be tolerated on the account of it being anti communist, but with the communists mostly gone and the cold war over, there was no longer a reason to allow South Africa to keep going on with Aparteid. South Africa keeping it wouldn't really have been a gain or a loss for other nations except in a moral sense. So, this would theoretically show that nations aren't all after power or gain, and that they're willing to do certain things because of a sense of morality. Of course there are certain factions within a nation that would be willing to, but they tend to be canceled out by others. I guess in general, where I'm going at is that nations aren't all necessarily shackeled to vague eternal interests and that these interests can change with time. Not everyone or everything is power hungry for the sake of it, and they're not going to kill or oppress the weak just because they can. But, I guess I'm derailing the thread, so I'll go, but I'll leave this as good for thought.
On this issue a well as they were there was a 6 vessel division of American destroyers with tender enroute, from the Asiatic fleet, due to arrive by December12th, I believe. While woefully underrated for anti aircraft operations, with 1x3" and 4 to 6 .50 cal mgs, the 4 " main guns could have, Iirc engaged torpedo bombers.. if Adm Phillip's had had them a week earlier, could they have had an effect, on defending the PoW and Repulse, or could the disaster be averted if Phillip's had waited to sorte.
A hand grenade sized shell is better then nothing. The American 37 mm also had a cannister/ shotgun found. Think the effect of a 37 mm shotgun. A 40mm/2 lbr with a canister round would have gotten around the Royal Artillery's unwillingness to share high explosive rounds